essay of nature of philosophy

1.1 What Is Philosophy?

Learning objectives.

By the end of this section, you will be able to:

Identify sages (early philosophers) across historical traditions.
Explain the connection between ancient philosophy and the origin of the sciences.
Describe philosophy as a discipline that makes coherent sense of a whole.
Summarize the broad and diverse origins of philosophy.

It is difficult to define philosophy. In fact, to do so is itself a philosophical activity, since philosophers are attempting to gain the broadest and most fundamental conception of the world as it exists. The world includes nature, consciousness, morality, beauty, and social organizations. So the content available for philosophy is both broad and deep. Because of its very nature, philosophy considers a range of subjects, and philosophers cannot automatically rule anything out. Whereas other disciplines allow for basic assumptions, philosophers cannot be bound by such assumptions. This open-endedness makes philosophy a somewhat awkward and confusing subject for students. There are no easy answers to the questions of what philosophy studies or how one does philosophy. Nevertheless, in this chapter, we can make some progress on these questions by (1) looking at past examples of philosophers, (2) considering one compelling definition of philosophy, and (3) looking at the way academic philosophers today actually practice philosophy.

Historical Origins of Philosophy

One way to begin to understand philosophy is to look at its history. The historical origins of philosophical thinking and exploration vary around the globe. The word philosophy derives from ancient Greek, in which the philosopher is a lover or pursuer ( philia ) of wisdom ( sophia ). But the earliest Greek philosophers were not known as philosophers; they were simply known as sages . The sage tradition provides an early glimpse of philosophical thought in action. Sages are sometimes associated with mathematical and scientific discoveries and at other times with their political impact. What unites these figures is that they demonstrate a willingness to be skeptical of traditions, a curiosity about the natural world and our place in it, and a commitment to applying reason to understand nature, human nature, and society better. The overview of the sage tradition that follows will give you a taste of philosophy’s broad ambitions as well as its focus on complex relations between different areas of human knowledge. There are some examples of women who made contributions to philosophy and the sage tradition in Greece, India, and China, but these were patriarchal societies that did not provide many opportunities for women to participate in philosophical and political discussions.

The Sages of India, China, Africa, and Greece

In classical Indian philosophy and religion, sages play a central role in both religious mythology and in the practice of passing down teaching and instruction through generations. The Seven Sages, or Saptarishi (seven rishis in the Sanskrit language), play an important role in sanatana dharma , the eternal duties that have come to be identified with Hinduism but that predate the establishment of the religion. The Seven Sages are partially considered wise men and are said to be the authors of the ancient Indian texts known as the Vedas . But they are partly mythic figures as well, who are said to have descended from the gods and whose reincarnation marks the passing of each age of Manu (age of man or epoch of humanity). The rishis tended to live monastic lives, and together they are thought of as the spiritual and practical forerunners of Indian gurus or teachers, even up to today. They derive their wisdom, in part, from spiritual forces, but also from tapas , or the meditative, ascetic, and spiritual practices they perform to gain control over their bodies and minds. The stories of the rishis are part of the teachings that constitute spiritual and philosophical practice in contemporary Hinduism.

Figure 1.2 depicts a scene from the Matsya Purana, where Manu, the first man whose succession marks the prehistorical ages of Earth, sits with the Seven Sages in a boat to protect them from a mythic flood that is said to have submerged the world. The king of serpents guides the boat, which is said to have also contained seeds, plants, and animals saved by Manu from the flood.

Despite the fact that classical Indian culture is patriarchal, women figures play an important role in the earliest writings of the Vedic tradition (the classical Indian religious and philosophical tradition). These women figures are partly connected to the Indian conception of the fundamental forces of nature—energy, ability, strength, effort, and power—as feminine. This aspect of God was thought to be present at the creation of the world. The Rig Veda, the oldest Vedic writings, contains hymns that tell the story of Ghosha, a daughter of Rishi Kakshivan, who had a debilitating skin condition (probably leprosy) but devoted herself to spiritual practices to learn how to heal herself and eventually marry. Another woman, Maitreyi, is said to have married the Rishi Yajnavalkya (himself a god who was cast into mortality by a rival) for the purpose of continuing her spiritual training. She was a devoted ascetic and is said to have composed 10 of the hymns in the Rig Veda. Additionally, there is a famous dialogue between Maitreyi and Yajnavalkya in the Upanishads (another early, foundational collection of texts in the Vedic tradition) about attachment to material possessions, which cannot give a person happiness, and the achievement of ultimate bliss through knowledge of the Absolute (God).

Another woman sage named Gargi also participates in a celebrated dialogue with Yajnavalkya on natural philosophy and the fundamental elements and forces of the universe. Gargi is characterized as one of the most knowledgeable sages on the topic, though she ultimately concedes that Yajnavalkya has greater knowledge. In these brief episodes, these ancient Indian texts record instances of key women who attained a level of enlightenment and learning similar to their male counterparts. Unfortunately, this early equality between the sexes did not last. Over time Indian culture became more patriarchal, confining women to a dependent and subservient role. Perhaps the most dramatic and cruel example of the effects of Indian patriarchy was the ritual practice of sati , in which a widow would sometimes immolate herself, partly in recognition of the “fact” that following the death of her husband, her current life on Earth served no further purpose (Rout 2016). Neither a widow’s in-laws nor society recognized her value.

In similar fashion to the Indian tradition, the sage ( sheng ) tradition is important for Chinese philosophy . Confucius , one of the greatest Chinese writers, often refers to ancient sages, emphasizing their importance for their discovery of technical skills essential to human civilization, for their role as rulers and wise leaders, and for their wisdom. This emphasis is in alignment with the Confucian appeal to a well-ordered state under the guidance of a “ philosopher-king .” This point of view can be seen in early sage figures identified by one of the greatest classical authors in the Chinese tradition, as the “Nest Builder” and “Fire Maker” or, in another case, the “Flood Controller.” These names identify wise individuals with early technological discoveries. The Book of Changes , a classical Chinese text, identifies the Five (mythic) Emperors as sages, including Yao and Shun, who are said to have built canoes and oars, attached carts to oxen, built double gates for defense, and fashioned bows and arrows (Cheng 1983). Emperor Shun is also said to have ruled during the time of a great flood, when all of China was submerged. Yü is credited with having saved civilization by building canals and dams.

These figures are praised not only for their political wisdom and long rule, but also for their filial piety and devotion to work. For instance, Mencius, a Confucian philosopher, relates a story of Shun’s care for his blind father and wicked stepmother, while Yü is praised for his selfless devotion to work. In these ways, the Chinese philosophical traditions, such as Confucianism and Mohism, associate key values of their philosophical enterprises with the great sages of their history. Whether the sages were, in fact, actual people or, as many scholars have concluded, mythical forebearers, they possessed the essential human virtue of listening and responding to divine voices. This attribute can be inferred from the Chinese script for sheng , which bears the symbol of an ear as a prominent feature. So the sage is one who listens to insight from the heavens and then is capable of sharing that wisdom or acting upon it to the benefit of his society (Cheng 1983). This idea is similar to one found in the Indian tradition, where the most important texts, the Vedas, are known as shruti , or works that were heard through divine revelation and only later written down.

Although Confucianism is a venerable world philosophy, it is also highly patriarchal and resulted in the widespread subordination of women. The position of women in China began to change only after the Communist Revolution (1945–1952). While some accounts of Confucianism characterize men and women as emblematic of two opposing forces in the natural world, the Yin and Yang, this view of the sexes developed over time and was not consistently applied. Chinese women did see a measure of independence and freedom with the influence of Buddhism and Daoism, each of which had a more liberal view of the role of women (Adler 2006).

A detailed and important study of the sage tradition in Africa is provided by Henry Odera Oruka (1990), who makes the case that prominent folk sages in African tribal history developed complex philosophical ideas. Oruka interviewed tribal Africans identified by their communities as sages, and he recorded their sayings and ideas, confining himself to those sayings that demonstrated “a rational method of inquiry into the real nature of things” (Oruka 1990, 150). He recognized a tension in what made these sages philosophically interesting: they articulated the received wisdom of their tradition and culture while at the same time maintaining a critical distance from that culture, seeking a rational justification for the beliefs held by the culture.

Connections

The chapter on the early history of philosophy covers this topic in greater detail.

Among the ancient Greeks, it is common to identify seven sages. The best-known account is provided by Diogenes Laërtius, whose text Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers is a canonical resource on early Greek philosophy. The first and most important sage is Thales of Miletus . Thales traveled to Egypt to study with the Egyptian priests, where he became one of the first Greeks to learn astronomy. He is known for bringing back to Greece knowledge of the calendar, dividing the year into 365 days, tracking the progress of the sun from solstice to solstice, and—somewhat dramatically—predicting a solar eclipse in 585 BCE. The eclipse occurred on the day of a battle between the Medes and Lydians. It is possible that Thales used knowledge of Babylonian astronomical records to guess the year and location of the eclipse. This mathematical and astronomical feat is one of Thales’s several claims to sagacity. In addition, he is said to have calculated the height of the pyramids using the basic geometry of similar triangles and measuring shadows at a certain time of day. He is also reported to have predicted a particularly good year for olives: he bought up all the olive presses and then made a fortune selling those presses to farmers wanting to turn their olives into oil. Together, these scientific and technical achievements suggest that at least part of Thales’s wisdom can be attributed to a very practical, scientific, and mathematical knowledge of the natural world. If that were all Thales was known for, he might be called the first scientist or engineer. But he also made more basic claims about the nature and composition of the universe; for instance, he claimed that all matter was fundamentally made of up water. He also argued that everything that moved on its own possessed a soul and that the soul itself was immortal. These claims demonstrate a concern about the fundamental nature of reality.

Another of the seven sages was Solon , a famed political leader. He introduced the “Law of Release” to Athens, which cancelled all personal debts and freed indentured servants, or “debt-slaves” who had been consigned to service based on a personal debt they were unable to repay. In addition, he established a constitutional government in Athens with a representative body, a procedure for taxation, and a series of economic reforms. He was widely admired as a political leader but voluntarily stepped down so that he would not become a tyrant. He was finally forced to flee Athens when he was unable to persuade the members of the Assembly (the ruling body) to resist the rising tyranny of one of his relatives, Pisistratus. When he arrived in exile, he was reportedly asked whom he considered to be happy, to which he replied, “One ought to count no man happy until he is dead.” Aristotle interpreted this statement to mean that happiness was not a momentary experience, but a quality reflective of someone’s entire life.

Beginnings of Natural Philosophy

The sage tradition is a largely prehistoric tradition that provides a narrative about how intellect, wisdom, piety, and virtue led to the innovations central to flourishing of ancient civilizations. Particularly in Greece, the sage tradition blends into a period of natural philosophy, where ancient scientists or philosophers try to explain nature using rational methods. Several of the early Greek schools of philosophy were centered on their respective views of nature. Followers of Thales, known as the Milesians , were particularly interested in the underlying causes of natural change. Why does water turn to ice? What happens when winter passes into spring? Why does it seem like the stars and planets orbit Earth in predictable patterns? From Aristotle we know that Thales thought there was a difference between material elements that participate in change and elements that contain their own source of motion. This early use of the term element did not have the same meaning as the scientific meaning of the word today in a field like chemistry. But Thales thought material elements bear some fundamental connection to water in that they have the capacity to move and alter their state. By contrast, other elements had their own internal source of motion, of which he cites the magnet and amber (which exhibits forces of static electricity when rubbed against other materials). He said that these elements have “soul.” This notion of soul, as a principle of internal motion, was influential across ancient and medieval natural philosophy. In fact, the English language words animal and animation are derived from the Latin word for soul ( anima ).

Similarly, early thinkers like Xenophanes began to formulate explanations for natural phenomena. For instance, he explained rainbows, the sun, the moon, and St. Elmo’s fire (luminous, electrical discharges) as apparitions of the clouds. This form of explanation, describing some apparent phenomenon as the result of an underlying mechanism, is paradigmatic of scientific explanation even today. Parmenides, the founder of the Eleatic school of philosophy, used logic to conclude that whatever fundamentally exists must be unchanging because if it ever did change, then at least some aspect of it would cease to exist. But that would imply that what exists could not exist—which seems to defy logic. Parmenides is not saying that there is no change, but that the changes we observe are a kind of illusion. Indeed, this point of view was highly influential, not only for Plato and Aristotle, but also for the early atomists, like Democritus , who held that all perceived qualities are merely human conventions. Underlying all these appearances, Democritus reasoned, are only atomic, unchanging bits of matter flowing through a void. While this ancient Greek view of atoms is quite different from the modern model of atoms, the very idea that every observable phenomenon has a basis in underlying pieces of matter in various configurations clearly connects modern science to the earliest Greek philosophers.

Along these lines, the Pythagoreans provide a very interesting example of a community of philosophers engaged in understanding the natural world and how best to live in it. You may be familiar with Pythagoras from his Pythagorean theorem, a key principle in geometry establishing a relationship between the sides of a right-angled triangle. Specifically, the square formed by the hypotenuse (the side opposite the right angle) is equal to the sum of the two squares formed by the remaining two sides. In the figure below, the area of the square formed by c is equal to the sum of the areas of the squares formed by a and b. The figure represents how Pythagoras would have conceptualized the theorem.

The Pythagoreans were excellent mathematicians, but they were more interested in how mathematics explained the natural world. In particular, Pythagoras recognized relationships between line segments and shapes, such as the Pythagorean theorem describes, but also between numbers and sounds, by virtue of harmonics and the intervals between notes. Similar regularities can be found in astronomy. As a result, Pythagoras reasoned that all of nature is generated according to mathematical regularities. This view led the Pythagoreans to believe that there was a unified, rational structure to the universe, that the planets and stars exhibit harmonic properties and may even produce music, that musical tones and harmonies could have healing powers, that the soul is immortal and continuously reincarnated, and that animals possess souls that ought to be respected and valued. As a result, the Pythagorean community was defined by serious scholarship as well as strict rules about diet, clothing, and behavior.

Additionally, in the early Pythagorean communities, it was possible for women to participate and contribute to philosophical thought and discovery. Pythagoras himself was said to have been inspired to study philosophy by the Delphic priestess Themistoclea. His wife Theano is credited with contributing to important discoveries in the realms of numbers and optics. She is said to have written a treatise, On Piety , which further applies Pythagorean philosophy to various aspects of practical life (Waithe 1987). Myia, the daughter of this illustrious couple, was also an active and productive part of the community. At least one of her letters has survived in which she discusses the application of Pythagorean philosophy to motherhood. The Pythagorean school is an example of how early philosophical and scientific thinking combines with religious, cultural, and ethical beliefs and practices to embrace many different aspects of life.

How It All Hangs Together

Closer to the present day, in 1962, Wilfrid Sellars , a highly influential 20th-century American philosopher, wrote a chapter called “Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man” in Frontiers of Science and Philosophy . He opens the essay with a dramatic and concise description of philosophy: “The aim of philosophy, abstractly formulated, is to understand how things in the broadest possible sense of the term hang together in the broadest possible sense of the term.” If we spend some time trying to understand what Sellars means by this definition, we will be in a better position to understand the academic discipline of philosophy. First, Sellars emphasizes that philosophy’s goal is to understand a very wide range of topics—in fact, the widest possible range. That is to say, philosophers are committed to understanding everything insofar as it can be understood. This is important because it means that, on principle, philosophers cannot rule out any topic of study. However, for a philosopher not every topic of study deserves equal attention. Some things, like conspiracy theories or paranoid delusions, are not worth studying because they are not real. It may be worth understanding why some people are prone to paranoid delusions or conspiratorial thinking, but the content of these ideas is not worth investigating. Other things may be factually true, such as the daily change in number of the grains of sand on a particular stretch of beach, but they are not worth studying because knowing that information will not teach us about how things hang together. So a philosopher chooses to study things that are informative and interesting—things that provide a better understanding of the world and our place in it.

To make judgments about which areas are interesting or worthy of study, philosophers need to cultivate a special skill. Sellars describes this philosophical skill as a kind of know-how (a practical, engaged type of knowledge, similar to riding a bike or learning to swim). Philosophical know-how, Sellars says, has to do with knowing your way around the world of concepts and being able to understand and think about how concepts connect, link up, support, and rely upon one another—in short, how things hang together. Knowing one’s way around the world of concepts also involves knowing where to look to find interesting discoveries and which places to avoid, much like a good fisherman knows where to cast his line. Sellars acknowledges that other academics and scientists know their way around the concepts in their field of study much like philosophers do. The difference is that these other inquirers confine themselves to a specific field of study or a particular subject matter, while philosophers want to understand the whole. Sellars thinks that this philosophical skill is most clearly demonstrated when we try to understand the connection between the natural world as we experience it directly (the “manifest image”) and the natural world as science explains it (the “scientific image”). He suggests that we gain an understanding of the nature of philosophy by trying to reconcile these two pictures of the world that most people understand independently.

Read Like a Philosopher

“philosophy and the scientific image of man”.

This essay, “ Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man ” by Wilfrid Sellars, has been republished several times and can be found online. Read through the essay with particular focus on the first section. Consider the following study questions:

What is the difference between knowing how and knowing that? Are these concepts always distinct? What does it mean for philosophical knowledge to be a kind of know-how?
What do you think Sellars means when he says that philosophers “have turned other special subject-matters to non-philosophers over the past 2500 years”?
Sellars describes philosophy as “bringing a picture into focus,” but he is also careful to recognize challenges with this metaphor as it relates to the body of human knowledge. What are those challenges? Why is it difficult to imagine all of human knowledge as a picture or image?
What is the scientific image of man in the world? What is the manifest image of man in the world? How are they different? And why are these two images the primary images that need to be brought into focus so that philosophy may have an eye on the whole?

Unlike other subjects that have clearly defined subject matter boundaries and relatively clear methods of exploration and analysis, philosophy intentionally lacks clear boundaries or methods. For instance, your biology textbook will tell you that biology is the “science of life.” The boundaries of biology are fairly clear: it is an experimental science that studies living things and the associated material necessary for life. Similarly, biology has relatively well-defined methods. Biologists, like other experimental scientists, broadly follow something called the “scientific method.” This is a bit of a misnomer, unfortunately, because there is no single method that all the experimental sciences follow. Nevertheless, biologists have a range of methods and practices, including observation, experimentation, and theory comparison and analysis, that are fairly well established and well known among practitioners. Philosophy doesn’t have such easy prescriptions—and for good reason. Philosophers are interested in gaining the broadest possible understanding of things, whether that be nature, what is possible, morals, aesthetics, political organizations, or any other field or concept.

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Chapter One: THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER ONE: THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY

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Bennett P Foster

“I hate everything that merely instructs me without augmenting or directly invigorating my activity.” – Goethe “To be a philosopher is not merely to have subtle thoughts, nor even to found a school…it is to solve some of the problems of life, not only theoretically, but practically.” – Thoreau Philosophy sometimes has a reputation of being an abstruse academic discipline, amounting to little more than the sum of so many unanswerable but nonetheless “interesting” questions—at least interesting to those who happen to be interested in them. Frankly, this characterization is not altogether unfair, particularly as applied to contemporary academic philosophy. But originally philosophy was, and to some still is, a way of living, a life discipline, a personal undertaking, a mode of being-in-the-world that deeply informs one’s spirit, thoughts, will, actions—the totality of one’s being—the goal of which is to achieve the highest state of human existence: wisdom. A philosopher, or “lover of wisdom,” takes on this life-project not merely by seeking knowledge or contemplation but by practicing a certain way of life, by cultivating habits conducive of human excellence, by committing to “spiritual exercises” that regulate one’s desires and transform one’s very character. To put it simply, philosophy is about living a good life. In this course, we will study philosophers who were committed to this ideal, as well as the exercises they used to achieve it. In addition, we will ourselves experiment with specific practices and ways of thinking that since ancient times have been used as methods of spiritual progress.

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Aristotle’s Natural Philosophy

Aristotle had a lifelong interest in the study of nature. He investigated a variety of different topics, ranging from general issues like motion, causation, place and time, to systematic explorations and explanations of natural phenomena across different kinds of natural entities. These different inquiries are integrated into the framework of a single overarching enterprise describing the domain of natural entities. Aristotle provides the general theoretical framework for this enterprise in his Physics , a treatise which divides into two main parts, the first an inquiry into nature (books 1–4) and the second a treatment of motion (books 5–8). [ 1 ] In this work, Aristotle sets out the conceptual apparatus for his analysis, provides definitions of his fundamental concepts, and argues for specific theses about motion, causation, place and time, and establishes in bk. 8 the existence of the unmoved mover of the universe, a supra-physical entity, without which the physical domain could not remain in existence. He takes up problems of special interest to physics (such as the problem of generation and perishing) in a series of further physical treatises, some of which are devoted to particular physical domains: the De generatione et corruptione (On Generation and Perishing) , the De caelo (On the Heavens) , [ 2 ] and the Meteorology , which lead up to the treatises on biology and psychology. [ 3 ]

The science of physics, Aristotle stresses, contains almost all there is to know about the world. Were there no separate forms—entities such as the unmoved mover at the pinnacle of the cosmos—which are without matter and are not part of the physical world, physics would be what Aristotle calls first philosophy ( Metaphysics 6.1, 1026a27–31). As there are such separate entities, physics is dependent on these, and is only a second philosophy ( Metaphysics 7.11, 1037a14f). Nevertheless, the interaction between these two “philosophies” is not completely exhausted by the causal influence exerted on the world by the supra-physical entities—the prime movers as it turns out. Aristotle’s metaphysics and physics use a common conceptual framework, and they often address similar issues. The prime and distinctive task of first philosophy is an inquiry into first entities; these, however, are not perceptible entities, and as a result they have to be investigated through a metaphysical investigation of physical entities. Hence the overlap between the two disciplines, which often verges on inseparability.

1. Natures and the four causes

3. the principle of causational synonymy, 4. priority among motions, 5. movers and unmoved movers, glossary of aristotelian terms, primary sources, secondary sources, other internet resources, related entries.

Nature, according to Aristotle, is an inner principle of change and being at rest ( Physics 2.1, 192b20–23). This means that when an entity moves or is at rest according to its nature reference to its nature may serve as an explanation of the event. We have to describe how—to what extent, through what other processes, and due to what agency—the preconditions for the process of change or of being at rest are present, but once we have provided an account of these preconditions, we have given a complete account of the process. The nature of the entity is in and of itself sufficient to induce and to explain the process once the relevant circumstances do not preempt it.

Natures as inner principles of change and rest are contrasted with active powers or potentialities ( dunameis ), which are external principles of change and being at rest ( Metaphysics 9.8, 1049b5–10), operative on the corresponding internal passive capacities or potentialities ( dunameis again, Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a11–13). When a change, or a state of rest, is not natural, both the active and the passive potentiality need to be specified. Natures, then, in a way do double duty: once a nature is operative, neither a further active, nor a further passive capacity needs to be invoked. Even so, as will be clear from Aristotle’s discussion, this general thesis will require a host of qualifications.

Because natures—beside the active and passive potentialities—are ultimate grounds in causal explanations, Aristotle sets out how they are integrated with the doctrine of causation.

An explanation for a state of affairs must specify some feature or some object (in general, some abstract or concrete entity) which is responsible for it. The entity responsible is, Aristotle submits, a cause ( aitia or aition , words used interchangeably by Aristotle). [ 4 ] Different explanations of a single state of affairs are possible, and indeed usually necessary, because there are different ways of being responsible for distinct facets of the same state of affairs. The varieties of responsibilities are grouped by Aristotle under four headings, the so-called four causes.

The first two of these are matter and form, what an entity is made up from according to Aristotle’s hylomorphic analysis. Understandably, both of them can be responsible for the features and the behaviour of the entity they make up. Hylomorphic analysis, together with the separation of the material and formal causes as distinct types, implies that if something is explicable in terms of matter or form, explanations in terms of form will be different in kind from those given in terms of matter. As a rule there is a collaboration between these causes: matter provides the potentialities which are actualised by the form. Accordingly, these causally relevant entities give rise to a hierarchic structure of explanation. [ 5 ] In order for a form to be realised, one needs to have suitable matter. This suitable matter brings with it the features required by a given hylomorphic composite. These features, then, are on the one hand the contribution of the matter, and as such the matter is the (material) cause of these features of the composite entity, whereas on the other hand they are indispensable presuppositions for the realisation of the form, and to that extent their presence is prompted by the form. [ 6 ] Such dependency relations between matter and form are labelled by Aristotle as cases of hypothetical necessity. Aristotle sometimes illustrates his point by appealing to the matter required for the construction of a house. If there is a house to be built, one needs building bricks, slabs, mortar, etc. Each part provides material with properties within a definite range of the sort required for a house to come into being. A house cannot, for example, be made out of liquid water. That sort of matter would provide potentialities not suited for the form of house.

Explanations often specify entities beyond the role played by the matter and the form of the entity itself. These cases are grouped by Aristotle as efficient or moving causes on the one hand and as final causes on the other. Efficient causes operate in a straightforward manner by initiating processes and bringing about their effects, whereas final causes account for processes and entities by being what these processes and entities are for, what they objectively intend to attain. [ 7 ] The fact that the role of efficient causes is not identical to that of the matter and the form of the entity whose features they are to explain does not require that every instance of efficient causation must issue from outside the entity moved. On the contrary, an efficient cause can also be internal. In cases in which the efficient cause is internal, it will be, in its specific function, one of the parts, or even the formal aspect, of the entity caused to move.

Natures, understandably, can feature in any of these four causal functions. However, when the matter of an entity functions as its nature—i.e., when its natural motion and rest are explained in terms of the matter it is made of—this matter must possess some causally relevant features, bestowed upon it by its own formal aspect.

This role of matter can be contrasted to the causal role of the three further types of causes—of form, of efficient cause, and of final cause, respectively. This is so, because, as Aristotle adds, form and final cause often coincide. Moreover, when a nature is specified as a first efficient cause, cause and effect are the same in form (or in species), though this is not to say that one and the same entity causes itself and is caused through its own causal efficacy ( Physics 2.7, 198a24–27, cf. Metaphysics 8.4, 1044a32–b1).

As internal principles of moving and rest, natures stand in an exclusive relationship to the efficient or moving causes of the motions and rests they bring about: in some cases when Aristotle is not specifying the first moving cause, he can assert the identity of nature and moving cause. Accordingly, the soul of living beings will be identified as the substance (i.e., form) and the moving cause of the organism whose soul it is. [ 8 ] But the identification, even in this restricted sense, will need some further important qualifications, to which we will return in Section 5 below, on movers and unmoved movers.

Because motion or change ( kinêsis ) is mentioned in the definition of nature, any discussion of nature will need to rely upon the explanation of motion. One might—erroneously—think that this is an easy task, because Aristotle’s categories (as listed in the Categories and also elsewhere) do contain two related types of entities, action and passion. Aristotle’s discussion of motion in the Physics , however, starts out in a somewhat different manner. When he submits that there is no motion besides the categories ( Physics 3.1, at 200b32–201a3), he does not assign motions to the categories of action and passion. After mentioning that the entities in the categories come in oppositions, Aristotle claims a few lines later (at 201a8–9) that there are as many kinds of motion and change as there are kinds of being. This means that motions are grouped here with the entities of the category where they effect change. [ 9 ]

Nevertheless, when making this claim, Aristotle speaks about four kinds of motion and change only—those in substance, in quality, in quantity and in place—whereas the number of the kinds of being should have remained ten.

Indeed, the Physics will later submit its own list of categories. That list is slightly reduced—it has seven or eight elements, depending on whether we include or exclude time. [ 10 ] The reduced list also concludes with the claim that there are three kinds of motion, plus the additional kind of substantial change. [ 11 ] That is to say, even where Aristotle enumerates a fairly complete list of categories, he will not have motions in every one of these categories, and he is not content to relegate motions to the categories of action and passion. [ 12 ] But this is a context where Aristotle stresses another issue: he is not interested in assigning a separate ontological niche for motions—regardless of whether that might or might not have been a feasible task within the categorization of entities. Here Aristotle is more intent on characterizing the ontological links which motions have to entities falling into different categories, and to find a general matrix of undergoing and effecting change. This happens in several steps. First Aristotle claims that changes of relations are not changes in their own right; rather they are accidental, as they occur also in entities in which no change occurs at all, if the entity which they stand in relation to undergoes some change. [ 13 ] After these considerations the crucial two categories of action and passion are eliminated. They cannot possibly house motions in the same way as the other four categories do. This is so because such a motion would require that there should be motion or change of an action or a passion. But there are no motions of motions, so even though actions and passions qualify as motions, or at least are intimately linked to motions, we can set aside action and passion as types in which motions can occur. [ 14 ] This leaves us with the shorter list of relevant categories, (1) substance, (2) quality, (3) quantity, and (4) place. [ 15 ]

Within the four domains where genuine change can occur, change always requires the existence of a potentiality which can be actualised. But change is neither identical to this potentiality, nor to the lack of a property, nor, without further qualifications, to the actuality which is acquired when the potentiality is actualised ( Physics 3.2, 201b33–35). It is a special kind of actuality, the actuality of the potential in so far as it is potential ( Physics 3.2, 201b4–5). Aristotle’s formulation strongly suggests that the potentiality actualised in the process of change is not a separate and independent potentiality for motion, alongside the entity’s potentiality for harbouring the end-state of the process: the process, say, house-building, and the end result, the house, are different actualisations of the same potentiality of a set of materials that is buildable into a house. Not only would Aristotle’s definition be uninformative otherwise, amounting to the tautologous claim that change is the actualisation of the capacity for change, the further qualification in the definition, that change is the actuality of the potential in so far as it is potential, would be completely idle. [ 16 ] This further restriction is easiest taken as selecting between the different types of the realisations of the same potentialities. [ 17 ] As Aristotle stresses these are the incomplete actualities belonging to these potentialities, adding also that what is actualised in a process of realisation is an incomplete potentiality only ( Physics 3.2, 201b32–33). Accordingly, potentialities of change may be admitted into the ontology. But even if they are admitted as additional potentialities, they]do not need to feature as potentialities in their own right, but as the incomplete variants of the fundamental potentiality for an end result. [ 18 ]

It is furthermore important to note that potentiality in this discussion throughout excludes actuality. In a formulation closely matching the formulation of the principle of non-contradiction, Aristotle asserts that “some things are the same [=have the same properties, are the same substances] both in potentiality and in actuality, but not at the same time or not in the same respect, as e.g. [a thing is] warm in actuality and cold in potentiality” ( Physics 3.1, 201a19–22). [ 19 ] Hence the ability of Aristotle’s definition to pick out the paradoxical entity, which is the actuality of a potentiality that can no longer be present once it has been replaced by the corresponding property in actuality.

The definition of motion suggests that such processes can be characterised in terms of a property or state of an entity, acquired as a result at the end of the process, which can be labelled the form within this process, and an initial lack of this form. Furthermore, Aristotle claims, there is a third component, which is not changed in the process, the substrate or subject of the motion ( Physics 1.7). [ 20 ]

In terms of this threefold division it is the duty of the entity effecting change to confer the requisite form on the object changed, as Physics 3.2, 202a9–12 puts it. But there are further important requirements for such a change to occur. First of all, these motions or changes occur at the interaction of two potentialities. One, the passive potentiality, is in the object undergoing change, while the other, the active potentiality, is in the entity initiating change. The two potentialities need to match each other: when there is a potentiality for being heated in the object undergoing change, the process needs to be initiated by another object possessing an active potentiality for effecting the heating. This is true to the extent that Aristotle can claim that the definition of passive potentiality is dependent on that of the active potentiality ( Metaphysics 9.1, 1046a9–13). These two potentialities need to work in tandem, and consequently Aristotle can claim that there is only a single process going on, which is located in the entity moved. Thus, for example, when a process of instruction is going on, it is identical to a process of knowledge acquisition, which happens in the mind of the learner. Hence although action and passion retain their categorical difference, because their accounts are different, what they subsist in, the motion, will be the same ( Physics 3.3, 202b19–22). [ 21 ]

Aristotle already by the introduction of a matching pair of active and passive potentialities for each causal interaction comes very close to admitting a separate potentiality for each and every change, something uncomfortably close to the vis dormitiva , ridiculed by Molière, according to which a sleeping pill allegedly induces sleep just in virtue of its power to induce sleep. Aristotle, however, subscribes to an even stronger principle, that causes in effecting change transmit the form they possess to the entity they effect change in. According to this claim the active capacity of the item effecting change is at its root an actuality, which is synonymous (in the Aristotelian sense) with the effect that is brought about by it. In Aristotle’s favourite example, only a human in actuality produces a human from what is a human in potentiality. If this is so, a sleeping pill need not only possess an active potentiality for inducing sleep: it needs also to be slumbering itself. [ 22 ] The principle—which we could term the principle of causational synonymy—comes from Plato (see e.g. Phaedo 100B–101D), but Aristotle has his own reasons for endorsing it. His science attests to the presence and operation of causally active forms at each level of analysis of the physical world. [ 23 ] Hence, as we shall see, Aristotle’s forms are the causally significant components of the substance effecting a change. Accordingly, when it comes to specifying the moving cause of an artefact, Aristotle will refer to the art of the craftsman as the fundamental component operative in the change. In cases where a living being is generated, it is the parental form which is transmitted to the newly emerging living being. [ 24 ]

But it is not only processes of generation that conform to this requirement. Instances of qualitative change are often mentioned alongside substantial generation, and as a crucially important instance of qualitative alteration—or of qualitative quasi-alteration, depending on how we interpret Aristotle’s theory of perception [ 25 ] —Aristotle presupposes that the principle of causational synonymy characterises also the causal link connecting the object of sensation and the sense organ.

It is, nevertheless, important to note that Aristotle restricts the principle of causational synonymy in different and subtle ways. Most significantly, an important domain of cases where a property of an object is actualised is exempted from the requirements of this principle. The actualisation of a property can be the continuation of a previous causal process to the extent that Aristotle claims it is a second actuality , following upon a previously acquired first actuality . In these cases the emergence of the second actuality does not necessarily require an additional external efficient cause. The operation of this first actuality, through which it reinforces and completes itself, can be the mere extension of the operation of the original efficient cause (this will be Aristotle’s claim about the natural locomotion of the elements, see Section 5 below), or the entity which has acquired this first actuality can be already causally responsible for its own activities, including the ones which bring it to a level of higher actuality [ 26 ] (Aristotle’s examples for this case are the soul of the embryo or of the newborn cub, which commands and effects the nourishing and the activities of the animal; or the actual application of a piece of knowledge one has acquired beforehand). It is important to note that these claims are far from trivial: they rest on further claims that the very definitions of these first actualities (what it is to be an element, an animal, or knowledge, respectively) inseparably include references to these activities.

Second, the principle of causational synonymy is couched in terms which do not include locomotions: it is substantial, qualitative or quantitative form which is claimed to be transmitted through the efficacy of the cause in Physics 3.2, 202a9–12. One of the reasons for this is that locomotion, as Aristotle claims, affects the least the substance, the ousia of the object undergoing motion ( Physics 8.7, 261a20f). Unlike the other types of change, locomotion does not change the being of the moved object at all. To some extent that should mean that the predication of place should remain extrinsic to the being of the entity that is at a particular location. [ 27 ] Hence the fundamental presupposition of causation, that it is intrinsic characterisations of entities which are conferred on the object moved cannot be in full force in cases of locomotion. [ 28 ] Accordingly, Aristotle will have a more intricate account for natural and forced locomotions.

Third, the principle of causational synonymy is restricted to substances at the end of Metaphysics 7.9, [ 29 ] and in the first half of the same chapter the non-standard presence of some causally relevant forms may also be envisaged. Aristotle’s example there is the heat in motion, which produces heat in the body when the doctor rubs the patient in the appropriate manner. This heat in the motion can be the presence of an active potentiality in the motion which is able to elicit heat in the body, without heat being predicable of motion itself. But even if such non-inherential subsistence of properties is only hinted at, and not expressly envisaged in this passage (on a more detailed description the heat in motion is the active capacity of motion to produce heat in the skin of the patient—and in the skin of the doctor—which as far as the treatment is concerned enters into the inner recesses of the patient’s body, becoming heat in the body), some similar sort of presence is required in two large classes of cases: natural generations and artificial productions.

Aristotle claims that in a chain of efficient causes, where the first element of the series acts through the intermediary of the other items, it is the first member in the causal chain, rather than the intermediaries, which is the moving cause ( Physics 8.5, 257a10–12). Then, both in cases of natural generation and artificial production, it is only this first efficient cause which has to satisfy the requirement of synonymous causation. Aristotle’s prime example, that human generates human, is also such a case. Here, the causal efficacy of the paternal human form is transmitted through the generative potentialities of the semen of the father. The semen, however, although it acts as an efficient cause in the process of the formation of the embryo, is not a human; it does not possess the form it transmits in the same way as the male parent does. Aristotle’s discussion makes it clear that this is not an isolated instance of an exception from the general principle. He compares the case to the activity of a craftsman, where the form of the product of the artistic production is in the soul of the craftsman, and then through the motions of the instruments this form can get imposed on the material manufactured into an artefact. The instruments and their motions are efficient causes of the process, but they do not contain the form in the same way as the soul of the craftsman ( On the generation of animals 730b14–23 and 740b25–29, for further discussion see the entry on Aristotle’s biology ). [ 30 ]

All these restrictions notwithstanding, Aristotle can claim that the principle of causational synonymy remains universally valid. This is so, because all the three restrictions above specify cases where Aristotle can claim that a preceding, more prominent cause has already satisfied the requirement: in the case of second actualities the first actuality was called into existence by a synonymous cause in the first place; locomotions, qualitative and quantitative changes, even if not caused by a synonymous entity, can be part of a larger pattern of causation, in which a substance is caused by a substance of the same kind; and causal chains producing substances can be claimed to start out invariably from synonymous substances.

Given his commitment to causal synonymy, Aristotle needs to invoke considerations through which a chain of efficient causes of some entity can be meaningfully compared in terms of causal efficacy. These considerations will on each occasion describe synonymous causes not only as temporally prior, but also as having priority in terms of causal efficacy over the intermediate causes, which are responsible only for the transmission of the forms of the original locus of causal efficacy.

This allows, then, that in the two major paradigms of such causation—in natural generation and in artificial production—the nature of the natural entity, and the art [ 31 ] of the craftsman exercising his art respectively, the relevant form is the causally operative entity initiating change. This has wide ranging consequences for the status of forms in several respects. First, the causal relevance of these forms shows that not any arrangement or configuration can qualify as a full-fledged form. While it is true that privations are also forms in some sense ( Physics 2.1, 193b19–20), this is not the sense in which the causally operative forms, describable in evaluative terms, can be called forms. Moreover, the causal relevance of forms allows Aristotle to switch (e.g. in De generatione et corruptione 1.7) without notice between the craftsman and the craft itself as the appropriate specification of the efficient cause in these cases. We should note that in the latter cases, Aristotle specifies causes which are unmoved. They do not effect motion by being in motion themselves, in so far as they are the causally effective forms within the causal framework; hence they are not under any reactive influence during this process either.

Even though the foregoing might have suggested that generation of substances is fundamental for all the other kinds of changes, in fact locomotion will have a privileged status. All other changes depend on locomotions, because any two entities involved in change, with their active and passive potentialities, respectively, need to come into contact in order for the interaction to occur. [ 32 ] Contact, however, as a rule needs to be established by locomotion: either the entity to be moved, or the mover, or both, need to proceed so that they meet ( Physics 8.7, 260a26–b7). Moreover locomotion is the form of change which can occur in isolation of generation, perishing and the other forms of change ( Physics 8.7, 260b26–29). Other changes are independent kinds of change insofar as they can occur in an entity which does not perform any other change. Nevertheless all these forms of change include or presuppose that some other entity engages in locomotion. [ 33 ]

Aristotle argues at the opening of Physics bk. 8 that motion and change in the universe can have no beginning, because the occurrence of change presupposes a previous process of change. With this argument Aristotle can establish an eternal chain of motions and refute those who hold that there could have been a previous stationary state of the universe. Such an eternal chain, Aristotle argues, needs to rely on a cause which guarantees its persistence: if each of the constitutive processes in the causally connected web were of finite duration, for every one of them it can be the case that it is not present in the world, indeed, at some later time it will not be present any longer. But then the whole causally connected series of events, Aristotle claims, would also be contingent. [ 34 ] Hence Aristotle postulates that the processes of the universe depend on an eternal motion (or on several eternal motions), the eternal revolution of the heavenly spheres, which in turn is dependent on one or several unmoved movers ( Physics 8.6, 258b26–259a9). [ 35 ]

The priority of the eternal celestial revolutions, furthermore, guarantees the causal finitude of the universe. This is so, even though there are infinite causal chains: behind every single individual of an animal species there is an infinite series of male ancestors, each causally responsible for the subsequent members in the series, because Aristotelian species are eternal and male parents are the efficient causes of their offspring. [ 36 ] Left to its own devices, the finite universe on its own would certainly reach a dissolution, a state of complete separation of the elemental masses into their concentrically arranged natural places. In view of the fact that such a complete segregation of the elemental masses is avoided through the constant excitation caused by the celestial motions, producing heat in the sublunary domain, especially around the regions of the Sun, [ 37 ] Aristotle will be entitled to assert that the cause of the human being is in the first instance his or her father, but is at the same time the Sun as it moves along its annual ecliptic path. [ 38 ] Between celestial revolutions and the individual natural processes there is always a finite causal chain, as these natural processes could not possibly have continued without the celestial motions. The infinite causal chains passing through male parents cannot subsist on their own without this constant external support, and this dependence can always be analysed in terms of finite causal chains.

The definition of motion as the actuality of a potentiality of the entity undergoing motion in so far as it is potential requires that in each case the passive potentiality for the change is present in the changing object. The presence of the potentiality can, nevertheless, be in accordance with the nature of the object—in which case the change is natural ( phusei ) or according to nature ( kata phusin ), or can happen in the face of a contrary disposition on the part of the nature of the entity—in which case the change is forced ( biâi ) or contrary to nature ( para phusin ). A major presupposition on Aristotle’s part is that this division is exhaustive: there are no changes to which the nature of the entity would be indifferent or neutral. [ 39 ] The major consideration behind such a presupposition is that natures regulate the behaviour of the entities to which they belong in a comprehensive manner, and not merely partially. Any influence the entity is exposed to interacts with its nature in a substantive manner. The entity does not possess potentialities for change which would not be directly related to the tendencies emerging from its nature.

Note, however, that even if we endorsed the exhaustiveness of the dichotomy of natural and forced motions, and accepted the thesis that simple bodies possess a unique natural motion ( De caelo 1.2, 269a8–9), we would not need thereby to accept Aristotle’s further major claim, that natural and forced motions come in pairs of opposites, with the result that if a motion is contrary to the nature of an entity, the opposite motion will be its natural motion ( De caelo 1.2, 269a9–18). Where there is room for some more complex relationships among the targets of changes than a simple opposition along an axis of a single dimension—and this is eminently so between locomotions along rectilinear and circular paths, respectively—there can be several forced translations in contrast to the single natural motion of the elements endowed with rectilinear natural motion, as Aristotle also admits in some passages of the De caelo (see 1.2, 269a30–b2 and 269b10–12).

Although this allows for several different motions that are contrary to the nature of the same entity, the natural motion will still have a single opposite motion, the one which is directed to the opposite location. Consequently, natural circular motion will have no motion that is opposite to it ( De caelo 1.4, 270b32–271a5). [ 40 ]

Aristotle’s classification of motions into those contrary to nature and those according to nature applies not only to the motions of the moved objects, but transfers also to the movers effecting motions. A mover can effect a motion which is contrary to its own nature. Aristotle’s example of such an unnatural mover is the lever, an object heavy by nature, with which loads can be lifted ( Physics 8.4, 255a20–23). Although such movers can effect motions in the contrary direction to the motion at the head of the causal chain (levers are operated by the downward push of something heavy at the other end), the crucial consideration for Aristotle in this case is that the original, initiating cause of the causal chain should effect the motion according to its nature. Taken together, these considerations imply that we have a complete account of the physical domain once we have a thorough description of what is natural to the entities in that domain, together with a specification of all the circumstances in which they operate. [ 41 ]

Bk. 8 of the Physics argues for the additional thesis that for each motion, whether natural or contrary to nature, there needs to exist a mover. [ 42 ] In cases of forced motion, movers are present in a conspicuous way. This need not be so, however, in cases of natural motion. Apart from the cases where the nature of the entity is at the same time a moving and efficient cause—i.e., apart from living beings, whose nature, the soul, is both formal and efficient cause—the mover may be inconspicuous. This is eminently so in the remaining large class of natural motions, the natural motions of the elements. The nature of these elements, their inner principle of motion and rest is not the moving cause of the motions of the elements, Aristotle claims. If it were, then it would be up to the elementary masses to determine when they should perform their motions, but plainly this is not so. Moreover, the principle of causational synonymy rules out that any homogenous mass, without an internal demarcation into separate components, one moving and the other being moved, could move itself ( Physics 8.4, 255a5–18). This is so because, on the assumption that one part of a homogeneous body could move another part, the active component of change would be, in every aspect, indistinguishable from the part in which change is effected, and this in turn would mean that change would occur even though there would be no transmission of a causally relevant property from the active part to the passive. This implies that even though we may answer the question as to why the elements move to their natural places—the light bodies up and the heavy ones down—by an appeal to their respective natures as causes (“that it is simply their nature to move somewhere, [ 43 ] and this is what it is to be light and to be heavy,” Physics 8.4, 255b13–17), we do not thereby specify their moving causes. Their thrust being in a single direction, the elements cannot circumvent even rather simple obstacles they may encounter on their way (a sealed container can retain air under water, the roof stays put pressing down on the walls of a building etc.). Hence, whoever removes an obstacle to an element’s motion is causally responsible for the ensuing elemental motions. But even such a causally responsible agent will not qualify as the moving cause, without yet further qualifications. For the identification of the moving cause of these locomotions Aristotle invokes his distinction of two potentialities. Some heavy material can be potentially light, as it can be transformed into a light material in a process of generation, whereas the emerging light material is still potential in a sense until it has acquired its full-fledged status, which involves its having arrived at that region of the cosmos which is its natural place. This analysis, then, describes the natural locomotion of the elements as a possibly postponed, completing stage within a single overarching process, and hence in these cases Aristotle can identify the cause of the second stage of the process with the efficient cause of the first stage, the entity which generated the element in the first place ( Physics 8.4, 256a1).

Once it is established that there is a mover for each change, the finite causal chains [ 44 ] can be followed up to the primary instance of motion, which are eternal circular motions. (In particular the Sun’s course along the ecliptic is responsible for many sublunar changes, the cycle of the seasons being foremost among them.) Whether these circular motions require external movers, and ultimately, whether the universe is causally closed or needs some external causal influence for its preservation, depends on the status of these revolutions.

In this regard the very first thing to establish is that they cannot be constrained motions. [ 45 ] But natural motions are also in need of movers, as Physics 8.4 argues. This does not apply only to the natural motions of living beings, which are performed under the causal influence of their soul. The natural motions of the four sublunary elements are also caused by specific external causes responsible for these motions, and on the basis of these considerations Aristotle feels entitled to assert that every motion whatsoever—including also, then, the eternal circular motions—require a mover.

But the entities performing these eternal circular motions cannot possibly be moved by moving causes of the same kind as the movers of sublunary elemental motions. These entities are eternal and ungenerated bodies. Consequently, there is no entity that could produce them. Nothing can be responsible for the circular motion on account of generating these eternal and ungenerated bodies. Moreover, as they do not encounter any hindrance during their revolutions, there is no room for an accidental mover which would remove any obstacle in their way.

Although Aristotle’s physical treatises do not discuss in what particular way their movers are causally responsible for these eternal circular motions, the general framework set out apparently applies to them as well. In accordance with this, motion is an incomplete actuality of the potentiality of what is movable ( Physics 8.5, 257b6ff). This incomplete actuality is always dependent on the causal efficacy of the corresponding actuality of a mover. The example presented here is the process of heating a potentially hot item, caused to be hot by an actually hot thing. The division of roles guarantees that the same item cannot possibly be the mover and the moved entity at the same time. Consequently, these eternal circular motions are envisaged as having a cause responsible for their motion, the causal influence of which produces (and upholds) this motion continuously in them. Aristotle does not specify in any detail what exactly the actuality of the mover is; nor does he indicate what relationship there is between this actuality and the actuality that is being continuously communicated by the mover to the entities in eternal circular motion.

A further requirement is that the mover of these eternal circular motions has to be unmoved. [ 46 ] But then the actuality of this mover should not be restricted to a causally efficacious single property. Rather, the mover should be actual all way through. Any potentiality it might have would carry with it the jeopardy that it might undergo possible changes of its own. [ 47 ] This is ruled out to the extent that such a first cause cannot house motion even accidentally. [ 48 ] In other words, the mover cannot be related to the moving object in the way the soul of an animal is related to the moving animal; in the case of an animal wherever the living being, the animal, moves, its soul will follow suit and will also move,—accidentally—to the same place. [ 49 ]

Moreover, the entity causally responsible for the eternal circular motions in the world has to possess an infinite power, [ 50 ] which it communicates to the bodies it moves. As a result, this entity cannot be divisible and cannot have extension. Moreover, it must be located where the motion is quickest, at the periphery of the physical realm ( Physics 8.10).

All this testifies to the exceptional status of the first movement, and behind it, of the first mover in the universe. The mover of these spheres possesses nothing but actuality, but this actuality is not what is transmitted in the process of causation. As we have seen in Section 3 above, this would not be exceptional as such: locomotion need not be caused on the transmission model of causation. But locomotions, although caused without the transmission of an actuality of being located in any particular location, were understood to be embedded in larger patterns of causation which observe the principle of causational synonymy. It is precisely any such larger pattern of causation which is missing in the case of celestial motions. [ 51 ] Note furthermore that what we hear in Metaphysics 12.6, that the first mover moves as an object of love and striving, [ 52 ] comes perilously close to abandoning the claims of Physics bk. 8 to the effect that there is an unmoved mover serving as the efficient cause of the motions of the cosmos. Such doubts, however, should be dismissed. In these two contexts Aristotle gives distinct descriptions of some principle that is beyond the realm of physics. First, still connecting it to the framework of the Physics , he is characterizing a supra-physical entity without which the universe could not function or persist, and then, second, in the Metaphysics , he is offering an account of the causal efficacy of the supra-physical substance in terms of what this entity itself is. Small wonder that these two accounts situate the mode of operation of this entity in two different frames of physical causation.

action: poiein
activity: praxis
actuality: energeia or entelecheia
art, craft: technê
capacity: dunamis
cause: aitia or aition
change: kinêsis or metabolê to effect change or motion: kinein to undergo change or motion: kineisthai qualitative change: alloiôsis quantitative changes—growth: auxêsis; decay: phthisis locomotion: phora
to come to be: gignesthai
coming to be: genesis
force: bia forced: biâi
form: eidos or morphê
in so far as: hêi
genus, kind: genos
goal: telos
kind, species: eidos
known, knowable: gnôrimon more known, more knowable: gnôrimôteron
matter: hulê
magnitude: megethos
motion: kinêsis
nature: phusis natural: phusikos, phusei according to nature: kata phusin contrary to nature: para phusin
passion: paschein
to perish: phtheirein
perishing: phthora
place: pou (as one of the categories, literally: where) or topos
potentiality: dunamis
power: dunamis
quality: poion
quantity: poson
substance: ousia
time: pote (as one of the categories, literally: when) or chronos
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Aristotle, Physics , Books III–IV, translated with notes by Edward Hussey, Oxford: Clarendon Press (Clarendon Aristotle Series), 1983.
Aristotle, Physics , Book VIII, translated with commentary by Daniel W. Graham, Oxford: Clarendon Press (Clarendon Aristotle Series), 1999.
Aristotle, Physics , revised Greek text with introduction and commentary by William David Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936.
Philoponus, On Aristotle On Coming-to-Be and Perishing 1.1–5 , translated by C. J. F. Williams, London: Duckworth, 1997.
Theophrastus, On First Principles (known as his Metaphysics ), Greek Text and Medieval Arabic Translation, edited and translated with introduction, commentaries and glossaries by Dimitri Gutas, Leiden: Brill, 2010.
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–––, 2004, “ On Generation and Corruption I.5,” in Frans de Haas and Jaap Mansfeld (eds.), Aristotle : On Generation and Corruption I, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 171–193.
–––, 2018, “ Physics I.6,” in Diana Quarantotto (ed.), Arisotle’s Physics: A Systematic Exploration , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 154–177.
Coope, Ursula, 2004, “Aristotle’s account of agency in Physics III.3,” Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy , 20: 201–221.
–––, 2009, “Change and its relation to actuality and potentiality,” in Georgios Anagnostopoulos (ed.), A Companion to Aristotle , Chichester, West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 277–291.
Falcon, Andrea, 2005, Aristotle and the science of nature: Unity without uniformity , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
–––, 2015, “The argument of Physics VIII,” in Mariska Leunissen (ed.), Aristotle’s Physics: A critical guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 265–283.
Frede, Michael and Charles, David (eds.), 2000, Aristotle’s Metaphysics Lambda: Symposium Aristotelicum , Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Freeland, Cynthia A., 1987, “Aristotle on bodies, matter, and potentiality,” in Allan Gotthelf and James Lennox (eds.), Philosophical issues in Aristotle’s biology , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 392–407.
Furley, David, 1978, “Self-movers,” in G.E.R. Lloyd and G.E.L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle on mind and the senses , (Proceedings of the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 165–79; Reprinted in David Furley (ed.), Cosmic problems: Essays on Greek and Roman philosophy of nature , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989, pp. 121–31.
Gill, Mary Louise, 1980, “Aristotle’s theory of causal action in Physics III. 3,” Phronesis , 25: 129–47.
–––, 2009, “The theory of the elements in De caelo 3 and 4,” in Alan C. Bowen and Christian Wildberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De caelo, Leiden-Boston: Brill, pp. 119–161.
Hankinson, R.J., 2009, “Natural, unnatural, and preternatural motions: Contrariety and argument for the elements in De caelo 1.2–4,” in Alan C. Bowen and Christian Wildberg (eds.), New Perspectives on Aristotle’s De caelo, Leiden-Boston: Brill, pp. 83–118.
Judson, Lindsay, 1994, “Heavenly motion and the unmoved mover,” in Mary Louise Gill and James G. Lennox (eds.), Self-motion: From Aristotle to Newton , Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 155–171.
–––, 2015, “Aristotle’s astrophysics,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Volume 49), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 151–192.
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Kelsey, Sean, 2006, “Aristotle Physics I 8,” Phronesis , 51: 330–361.
–––. 2008, “The place of I 7 in the argument of Physics I,” Phronesis , 53: 180–208.
–––, 2010, “Hylomorphism in Aristotle’s Physics ,” Ancient Philosophy , 30: 107–124.
Kosman, L. Aryeh, 1969, “Aristotle’s definition of motion,” Phronesis , 14: 40–62.
Lorenz, Hendrik, 2019, “ Physics I.7, Part 2: The Principles of Natural Things—Two or Three?” in Katerina Ierodiakonou, Paul Kalligas and Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Aristotle’s Physics Alpha , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 262–285.
Makin, Stephen, 1990/1991, “An ancient principle about causation,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , 91: 135–52.
Marmodoro, Anna, 2007, “The union of cause and effect in Aristotle: Physics 3. 3,” Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (Volume 32), Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 205–232.
Matthen, Mohan and Hankinson, R.J., 1993, “Aristotle’s universe: Its form and matter,” Synthèse , 96: 417–435.
Menn, Stephes, 2019, “ Physics I.1: The Path to the Principles” in Katerina Ierodiakonou, Paul Kalligas and Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Aristotle’s Physics Alpha , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 19–52.
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Morison, Benjamin, 2019, “ Physics I.7, Part 1: The Complexity of a Subject in a Change” in Katerina Ierodiakonou, Paul Kalligas and Vassilis Karasmanis (eds.), Aristotle’s Physics Alpha , Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 229–261.
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–––, 1984, “Aristotle’s rationalist account of qualitative interaction,” Phronesis , 29: 1–16.
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Stavrineas, Stasinos, 2015, “Nature as a principle of change,” in Mariska Leunissen, ed., Aristotle’s Physics: A critical guide , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 46–65.
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Wardy, R., 1990, The chain of change: A study of Aristotle’s Physics VII , Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Waterlow, Sarah, 1982, Nature, change, and agency in Aristotle’s Physics, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Wildberg, Christian, 1988, John Philoponus’ criticism of Aristotle’s theory of aether (Peripatoi 16), Berlin: De Gruyter 1988.

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The Nature of Philosophy

Abstract: Links to lecture notes or tutorials are provided as an introduction to the subject of philosophy.

This course is designed as a first introduction to philosophical thought. Philosophy, here, is characterized as a fundamental inquiry into the ultimate assumptions or presuppositions of any subject.

We begin our philosophical quest by examining conventional and cultural foundations of our thought and action.

Online Notes in this Section:

The Divisions of Philosophical Inquiry : Philosophy, philosophical inquiry, and the main branches of philosophy are characterized.

Characteristics of a Philosophical Problem : A working definition of philosophy is proposed and a few philosophical problems are illustrated.

The Principle of Charity : The principle of charity is a presumption often made in philosophy whereby preconceptions about an argument, a topic, or a belief are set aside in the attempt to gain new understanding.

Philosophy: A Brief Guide for Undergraduates. A discussion of the fields philosophy, the uses of philosophy, and the philosophical curriculum from the American Philosophical Association .
Philosophy. A survey of the branches of philosophy, the history of philosophy, and main philosophical issues with references, readings, and links to other sites from the Wikipedia .

“Contrary to any other academic discipline, which deals with questions within a specific area, philosophy has no subject matter specific to it. Rather, philosophers ask fundamental questions that range over all human knowledge. Therefore, unlike other academic subjects, which have foundational principles needing to be understood and even memorized by students, philosophy has no established principles or even basic conceptual structures common to all philosophy. Instead, its nature is an intellectual journey of pursuing truth or wisdom based on rational scrutiny. Furthermore, although no definition of philosophy has been accepted by all philosophers, we may take the following definition as our starting-point: philosophy is rational enquiry into fundamental questions or issues about the world and human beings so that our beliefs of them can rest upon a firm foundation by clearing away errors about the true, the good, and the beautiful in the world.” Xuetai Qi, “Introducting Chinese Students to Western Philosophy,” APA Newsletter , (Fall 2008) Vol. 8 No. 1.

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Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy

Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer (eds.), Nietzsche's Metaphilosophy: The Nature, Method, and Aims of Philosophy , Cambridge University Press, 2019, 284pp., $99.99 (hbk), ISBN 9781108422253.

Reviewed by Guy Elgat, School of the Art Institute of Chicago

The editors of this volume, Paul S. Loeb and Matthew Meyer, have gathered a number of exciting essays on the general topic of Nietzsche's metaphilosophy -- a topic which has not enjoyed such detailed and close treatment in Anglo-American scholarship as is provided here. The editors and the contributors are therefore to be thanked for their hard work.

The volume is divided into four parts. The first, "Evolving Metaphilosophies", puts special emphasis on Nietzsche's "free spirit" works and on how his views about philosophy changed across time. Meyer's excellent paper argues for the striking thesis (based on his book) that Nietzsche "constructs these [middle period, free spirit] texts to tell a story" (24) of the Aufhebung of traditional truth-seeking philosophy into the philosophy of the creative, artistic spirit in BGE, what signals a return to Nietzsche's original views in BT, PTAG, and the second UM. According to this interpretation, Nietzsche "does not write the free spirit works as a straightforward record of what he thinks at a given time" (24), but rather performatively enacts the will to truth's undermining of itself by its exposing of its own moral underpinnings. A problem with this is that only a handful of the middle period's aphorisms deal with morality's death at its own hands. That would make the majority of the free spirit writings redundant: it is not clear how they are supposed to fit in the "story" (32) Nietzsche allegedly tells. Relatedly, Nietzsche, when looking back on his writings, tends in many cases to continue adhering to his previously formulated ideas, and when he criticizes them, it is not so much their content which he finds objectionable but the medium (see, e.g. GM P 4). In addition, Meyer's claim that Nietzsche "consciously constructed" (32) this Bildungsroman sits uncomfortably with the EH (Clever, 9) reflections where Nietzsche says that the organizing idea of the thinker lies beneath the surface of consciousness.

Meyer further claims that in GS Nietzsche "develops a position that conflicts with Human ", for in GS we have an attempt to "achieve some sort of reconciliation between philosophy and art" (30). But this issue has been on Nietzsche's mind already at the time of HH (e.g., HH 222). It is possible that this is a matter of change in priorities: while in HH art was supposed to be in service of truth and science, in his later thinking, as Marco Brusotti explains in his helpful contribution, the scholarly work of the sciences is seen as preparatory for the future artistic/creative philosopher.

Antoine Panaïoti's provocative paper, which in a way complements Meyer's, argues for a radical thesis according to which what he calls the "Analytical Nietzsche approach" (the scholarly approach to Nietzsche's writings that has become "dominant" in "contemporary English-language Nietzsche reception") is deeply misguided (42). Specifically, the Analytical Nietzsche is " metaphilosophically discontinuous with Nietzsche; it assumes the appropriateness of precisely that conception of philosophy that Nietzsche contests" (62). Moreover, the Analytical approach reinforces precisely the conception of philosophy that Nietzsche resisted and thus transforms Nietzsche "into an enemy of the future he envisioned" (ibid.) Nietzsche's metaphilosophy is radically different from the Analytic view, Panaïoti claims, in that the former, in contrast to the latter, emphasizes the axiological, legislative, intuitive, inspiration-based, personal, and creative (59-60).

This is an exciting criticism, but one which I cannot fully share (due perhaps to professional bias). First, the metaphilosophy ascribed here to Nietzsche is mostly based on either his early writings or on his remarks in BGE regarding the philosophers of the future where indeed the philosopher is seen as an intuitive, creative spirit. In other words, it almost completely discounts Nietzsche's own practice as a philosopher in the free spirit writings and even later in the Genealogy and Twilight , for example. Second, and perhaps more importantly, Panaïoti describes Analytic Nietzsche's metaphilosophy as the view that philosophy "ought at least to be 'continuous' with the social and natural sciences in its methods and its findings. Philosophy, on this account, ought to follow the sciences' lead" (60). [1] But Nietzsche himself emphatically identifies with the methods of science (AC 13, 59; TI, Reason, 3). Moreover, as mentioned, Brusotti argues that Nietzsche also thinks that the philosophers of the future should base their acts of value creation on the basis of the results of the various sciences (GM I 17 Note), and to that extent their legislations should be "continuous" with the sciences' findings. Of course, "Analytic" interpretations of Nietzsche are not done in the same style or rhetorical register that Nietzsche employs in his texts, nor are they typically interested in such features of his writings, but this does not in itself entail that they operate with a radically different conception of what the aim (or an aim) of philosophy is (e.g., a more naturalistic moral psychology and ethics). Nevertheless, I think it is true that "Analytic" scholars of Nietzsche would not count as philosophers of the future in Nietzsche's eyes.

The second part of the volume, "The Nature of Philosophy", opens with an informative essay by Rebecca Bamford in which she explores his "free spirit" works and highlights ways in which Nietzsche understands the interrelations of philosophy and science. In this way, Bamford's essay could also serve to balance Panaïoti's view.

Loeb's rich contribution offers a detailed exegesis of BGE 211 in which Nietzsche provides the most explicit characterization in his late period of the 'genuine' philosophers of the future, the central trait of which is that they unleash their will to power by creating values. Loeb analyzes the differences between the genuine philosopher and the "priestly" and "laborer" philosopher. A central question he addresses is how to think about Nietzsche himself: should we view him as a genuine philosopher or as a mere laborer and as such merely concerned with surveying, analyzing and abbreviating past value creations? Loeb argues that for the most part Nietzsche remained a laborer, with the exception that he also served as a kind of prophet of the genuine philosopher of the future. But this in my view does not emphasize enough how the very act of heralding the future philosophers is a legislative, creative act. Drawing on his work on Thus Spoke Zarathustra , Loeb also provocatively argues that Nietzsche himself did not create new values but left that job to the "character" Zarathustra. This is a peculiar claim which assumes that a sharp and clear line could be drawn between Nietzsche's own views and those of his philosophical creation.

Robert B. Pippin's dense contribution interrogates Nietzsche's perplexing claims regarding the significance of the mask so as to better grasp Nietzsche's conception of philosophy and religion in BGE. Pippin focuses on an apparent tension in Nietzsche's treatment of religion: on the one hand, in BGE 61 Nietzsche claims religion is beneficial, but in BGE 62 criticizes it for turning humanity into a "sublime monstrosity". How to resolve this tension? Pippin claims, without expounding, that while these views are logically compatible, "it is baffling to think through concretely how this could be anything other than a mere logical possibility" (120). I fail to see the problem here, but find Pippin's suggested Straussian solution to the tension intriguing: Nietzsche's disparaging of religion is a mask employed to produce "such a thorough alienation of the conventionally religious that they will dismiss the Nietzschean critique, and so their religion can continue to play whatever positive role Nietzsche really wants it to play" (122).

The third part, "The Method of Philosophy", begins with Mark Alfano's essay. Alfano delectably focuses not so much on Nietzsche's view about what philosophy is or should be in general, but about Nietzsche's conception of his own philosophical practice which involves, Alfano argues, expressing one's own perspective and engaging the feeling and values of one's readers so as to shift their perspectives insofar as this has epistemological payoff. A question arises as to whether (and how) the adept perspective-shifter can integrate the views seen from previous perspectives or whether he or she is just "stuck" at any given point in time in the perspective currently occupied. The former must be possible if perspective-shifting is not to be epistemically pointless (for some discussion see Elgat 2017, pp. 146-7).

Tsarina Doyle discusses Nietzsche's will to power naturalism and how this approach promises to explain values and norms in a manner which does away with the familiar dualism of reasons and causes. Doyle's discussion, unfortunately, reads like a condensed summary of earlier work and is thus very difficult to follow and so properly assess its riches.

Paul Katsafanas' entry on Nietzsche's moral "methodology" is exquisite and is in my mind one of the best short introductory pieces to Nietzsche's critique of moral philosophy, summarizing some of the main ideas of Katsafanas' earlier work. However, much like Doyle's paper, it does not really focus on Nietzsche's metaphilosophy, strictly speaking, and seems a bit out of place in the collection.

The fourth and last part is "The Aims of Philosophy". In the first essay João Constâncio zooms in on GS 373 and intriguingly suggests that Nietzsche operates with an aesthetic conception of philosophy grounded centrally in the concept of taste . He argues that "good taste" (GS 373) for Nietzsche is very much Kantian in that like the latter's reflective judgment of taste it involves a plurality of perspectives and yet does not advance us towards knowledge "even one tiny bit" (202). This contrasts sharply with Alfano's view with which I side: after all, towards the end of GS 373 Nietzsche claims that the mechanistic perspective would have "conceptually grasped, understood, recognized [begriffen, verstanden, erkannt]" (GS 373, my translation) nothing of music, which implies that a different or broader perspective would have been more successful with respect to these cognitive goals.

Beatrix Himmelmann compares Nietzsche to Heidegger in terms of their rejection of metaphysics and in terms of their conceptions of finitude, ethics and politics, with a focus on Nietzsche's immanent philosophy of the will to power, which she favorably contrasts to Heidegger's quasi-transcendental fixation with Being. Though the paper proclaims to discuss "Nietzsche's metaphilosophy" (207), this is not exactly carried out. Himmelmann claims that for Nietzsche everything is will to power, and wills to power are what they are only in relation to other centers of power. This could potentially imply a conception of philosophy as itself a kind of force that operates at the level of specific interventions the meaning of which is to be interpreted contextually.

Oddly enough, the collection does not explore in detail Nietzsche's meta-philosophical claim that philosophy has been nothing but a kind of personal, moral confession (BGE 6). Scott Jenkins' thought-provoking paper can be seen as addressing this lacuna insofar as it focuses on Nietzsche's claims (Jenkins focuses on a Nachlass note) that traditional metaphysics is a product of metaphysicians' ressentiment . In brief, the idea is that traditional metaphysicians suffer from the world of appearance and, driven by ressentiment , take revenge upon it by means of inventing another metaphysical reality that is valued by them as better or higher. Jenkins helpfully examines the ways this idea resembles the ressentiment -motivated slave revolt, and explains that "By imagining the perishing of all things as an act of punishment , and endorsing that punishment, the metaphysician partially satisfies his ressentiment toward the world" (235). Yet who is the punishing agency in the case of metaphysicians such as, say, Kant or Schopenhauer? And is imagining the perishing of the world by some "cataclysmic event" (235) really part of traditional metaphysics? Furthermore, Jenkins ties ressentiment 's revenge too closely to the possibility of making the target of one's revenge suffer (233). The world of appearance, however, cannot suffer. Jenkins claims that the world can nevertheless be destroyed (235), but this obviously does not address the problem. Here, the tendency of ressentiment to imagine its target as liable to suffering might be of help (see GM III 15 and Elgat 2017, p. 31).

Jacqueline Scott's paper ends the volume and attempts to draw from Nietzsche's "tragic philosophy" (247) lessons that could be applied to our "racialized lives" (248) and the "profession of philosophy" (262). Scott understands Nietzsche's tragic philosophy to address the "problem of decadence": "we must create values to hold off suicidal despair, but any values we create will decay" (250). To better conceptualize the tragic philosopher she draws heavily on GS 382 where Nietzsche puts forward the ideal of a "spirit who plays naively -- that is, not deliberately but from overflowing power and abundance -- with all that was hitherto called holy, good . . ." (GS 382). But how is this to apply to the problem of racism? Scott's suggestions to adopt Nietzsche's tragic philosophy, experiment with our racial identities, and reverse values (262), while intriguing, remain vague. What does it mean to address racism "not deliberately", but "naively?" Should we be naïve about how we experiment with our racial identities? Can we afford to? What would it mean, in this case, to reverse our values and "play" with "all that was hitherto called holy, good"? Wouldn't that entail reversing our valuation of racial equality and justice? Should, perhaps, only racists become Nietzschean, adopt Nietzsche's tragic philosophy, and reverse what they think is "good"? Scott obviously does not call for such revaluations, but this only shows how applying Nietzsche's radical ideas to a liberal, egalitarian agenda might be more than problematic.

All in all, this is a valuable collection of essays that scholars interested in the topic should find useful in orienting their thinking on this issue.

AC The Anti-Christ , in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, And Other Writings, J. Norman, trans., Cambridge University Press, 2005.

BGE Beyond Good and Evil , W. Kaufmann, trans., Vintage, 1966.

BT Birth of Tragedy , S. Ronald, trans., Cambridge University Press, 1999.

EH Ecce Homo , W. Kaufmann, trans., Vintage, 1967.

GM On the Genealogy of Morals , W. Kaufmann and R.J. Hollingdale, trans., Vintage, 1967.

GS Gay Science , W. Kaufmann, trans., Vintage, 1974.

HH Human all too Human , R. Hollingdale, trans., Cambridge University Press, 1986.

PTAG Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks , M. Cowan, trans., Gateway 1962.

TI Twilight of the Idols , in The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, And Other Writings, J. Norman, trans., Cambridge University Press, 2005.

UM Untimely Meditations , R. Hollingdale, trans., Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Z Thus Spoke Zarathustra , W. Kaufmann, trans., The Modern Library, 1995.

Elgat, Guy, Nietzsche's Psychology of Ressentiment: Revenge and Justice in On the Genealogy of Morals, London: Routledge, 2017.

[1] To be precise, this metaphilosophy is ascribed to 'mainstream' analytic philosophy, but I take the implication to be that this is also Analytic Nietzsche's metaphilosophy.

Goethe’s Philosophy of Nature

First Online: 16 December 2020

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Tim Mehigan 3 &
Peter Banki 4

Part of the book series: Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism ((PHGI))

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Mehigan and Banki examine the most important features of Goethe’s nature philosophy. As they contend, Goethe’s thought, though highly reflective, eschews the directly philosophical in its desire to penetrate more deeply into nature than had been possible in any previous philosophy or organized form of thought. Thus, while Goethe’s outlook has Platonic, Spinozistic, Romantic and even Kantian associations, in truth it must be seen as its own thing: a radical attempt to postulate and make palpable a vast cosmic ecology in which there is no separation between nature and culture and where the real source of human knowledge emerges from—and instantiates—the ethical.

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Materials for a Theory of Nature

Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979). Übers.: Der Spiegel der Natur: Eine Kritik der Philosophie (1981)

Hegelian Panentheism

See David Wellbery, “Augenmensch: Zur Bedeutung des Sehens im Werk Goethes”: Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte 75/1 (Sonderheft) (March 2001): 176.

“Zum Sehen geboren, /Zum Schauen bestellt” (“Born to see, /made for beholding”): Faust II: v. 11, 289–90. All translations unless otherwise indicated are by Mehigan and Banki.

For example, in Faust II, v. 4727: “Am farbigen Abglanz haben wir das Leben” (“Our lives are conducted in the reflected splendour of color”).

T.J. Reed, Goethe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 6.

All translations unless otherwise indicated are by Mehigan and Banki. Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Werke: Hamburger Ausgabe in 14 Bänden , ed. Erich Trunz (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuchverlag, 1994), Vol. 3: Faust I: v. 382–3. Hereafter, Werke .

Goethe, Werke (Ibid.), Vol. 12, 365–547.

Albert Schweitzer, Goethe: Five Studies , trans., Charles Joy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1961).

Bacon’s program is mentioned, with restraint, in Maxim 506 (Goethe, Werke [ op. cit. ], Vol. 12, 434).

See Hans-Georg Gadamer, 1989. Truth and Method , trans., Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (London and New York: Continuum, 1989), 273–5.

Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind: An Introduction to Metaphysics , trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Carol Publishing, 1992), 126.

See, for example, Leif Weatherby, Transplanting the Metaphysical Organ: German Romanticism between Leibniz and Marx (New York: Fordham University Press, 2016).

This is Luke’s translation (Johann Wolfgang Goethe, Goethe: Selected Verse , ed. David Luke (London: Penguin, 1964), 185): “‘In the beginning was the Word .’ Here I am stuck already! Who will help me on? To set so high a value on ‘word’ is impossible: I must translate it in some other way, if the spirit is giving me real enlightenment. It is written: ‘In the beginning was Mind .’ Consider the first line well, let your pen not move on too fast! Is it by Mind that all things are done and made? It should read: ‘In the beginning was Energy .’ And yet, at the very moment of writing it down, something warns me not to leave it at that. The spirit moves me! I suddenly see the answer, and boldly write: ‘In the beginning was the Deed .’”

The preparation for this reflexive turn in Goethe’s writing may well be the Römische Elegien , which Nicholas Boyle aptly describes as poems which are “as much … about thinking as they poems about sensual experience” (Nicholas Boyle, Goethe: The Poet and the Age [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991], 633).

For Tantillo, indeed, Werther’s self-absorption even leads to his self-destruction (Astrida Orle Tantillo, Goethe’s Modernisms [New York: Continuum, 2010]), 101.

What then postdates this period is consolidation at the summit of this development and the finalizing of projects: the first version of Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre in 1821 and its extension in 1829, and the completion of Faust II in 1831, a year before his death.

Heinrich Heine, Zur Geschichte der Religion und Philosophie in Deutschland , ed. Jürgen Ferner (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1997).

Goethe Werke ( op. cit. ), 55; Goethe, Schriften zur Morphologie, ed. Michael Holzinger (Berlin: Berliner Ausgabe, 2016), 6–7. Hereafter, Morphologie .

Cf. Rudolf Clausius, “Über die bewegende Kraft der Wärme und die Gesetze, welche sich daraus für die Wärmelehre selbst ableiten lassen.” Annalen der Physik 79 (1850): 368–397, 500–524.

Tantillo, Goethe’s Modernisms ( op. cit. ), 5.

Goethe, Werke , 56; Goethe, Morphologie ( op. cit. ), 7.

Blumenbach, one of the founders of physical anthropology, had posited the notion of a Bildungstrieb or formative drive ( nisus formativus ). He had argued that it is a mark of living beings to possess such a drive and that their structure, function and powers can only be fully understood in line with this drive.

This is richly evident in the question of originating causes, in which Blumenbach professes a high interest but from which Goethe turns completely away. As we will outline in relation to the Maxims and Reflections , Goethe considers that the only proper starting point for philosophy—in accordance with the view of the ancients, particularly Aristotle—is the direct experience of natural objects. Thus, instead of grounding his scientific project in the search for causes, Goethe assigns priority to the context in which phenomena may be observed . In On Morphology Goethe therefore notes, “We will not be looking for causes, but rather for the conditions under which these phenomena appear” (Goethe, The Essential Goethe , ed. Matthew Bell [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016]).

Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Judgment , trans. J.H. Bernard (2nd ed. revised). (London: Macmillan, 1914), 345–346. A version of this argument was recently put forward by Dalia Nassar in a lecture to the Annual Conference of the Society for German Idealism and Romanticism (2018), December 6–7, 2018, Department of Germanic Studies and Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney.

Friedrich Schlegel, KFSA 2, 182. Our translation.

Wilhelm von Humboldt, “Ideen zu einem Versuch, die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen.” in Werke in fünf Bänden, Band 1 (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), 64.

Goethe, Aus meinem Leben. Dichtung und Wahrheit, ed. Peter Sprengel, Münchner Ausgabe, Vol. 16 (München: Hanser, 1985), 496 f.

The concept of the Bildungsroman was first introduced by Karl Morgenstern 25 years after the publication of the novel (Tobias Boes, “Modernist Studies and the Bildungsroman: A Historical Survey of Critical Trends”, Literature Compass 3/2 (2006): 230–243), but it was not made canonical until Wilhelm Dilthey employed it in his biography of Friedrich Schleiermacher (1870).

Wilhelm Dilthey, Das Erlebnis und die Dichtung. Lessing, Goethe, Novalis, Hölderlin (Leipzig: Teubner, 1922), 394.

Goethe, The Essential Goethe ( op. cit .), 936.

Kant, The Critique of Practical Reason , ed./trans., Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 23.

Goethe, The Essential Goethe ( op. cit. ), 1621–1622.

Goethe, Ibid., 1792.

Maxim 512, p. 435.

Goethe, Werke ( op. cit .), Vol. 2, 18; v. 17–20.

Schweitzer, Goethe: Five Studies ( op. cit. ), 113.

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Mehigan, T., Banki, P. (2020). Goethe’s Philosophy of Nature. In: Millán Brusslan, E. (eds) The Palgrave Handbook of German Romantic Philosophy. Palgrave Handbooks in German Idealism. Palgrave Macmillan, Cham. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-53567-4_17

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The Nature of Philosophy: Anxiety Essay

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Introduction

Descartes’ method, plato and aristotle philosophy, works cited.

Rene Descartes is one of the most outstanding philosophers who contributed to the development of philosophy. The foundations of the philosophy and methodology of Descartes lay in the disclosure and presentation of the particular basics and consequences. Descartes created his first outstanding work, Discourse on the Method and Meditations on First Philosophy , in which he analyzed the concept of “universal science” (Mathesis Universalis), which has its roots in the Aristotelian hypothesis of the main organon of knowledge (Descartes 20). Developing the methodology of cognition, Decartes strived to understand the incomprehensible truth about the world’s functioning. The unknown has always been terrifying for people’s minds. That is why philosophers strive to find the questions which potentially cannot be answered. Therefore, as was mentioned by Harry Frankfurt, philosophy is created through anxiety born of an understanding of the limitation of knowledge.

The anxiety in philosophical views can be seen in many directions of modern society. The key aim of any philosophy is to define the processes of cognition functioning that are impossible to explain scientifically. The philosophy of Rene Descartes is one of the foundations of European rationalism. It is based on the search for irrefutable foundations for any knowledge. The philosopher sought to achieve absolute truth, reliable and logically unshakable. Descartes’s main focus was to develop the method of cognition through which humans comprehend the substance. The philosopher stated that “for to be possessed of a vigorous mind is not enough; the prime requisite is rightly to apply it” (Descartes 48). The problem of the method of Descartes’ philosophy was to bring the potency of the mind to the perception of the basis of any phenomenon in the world, in order to perceive the apparent truths. The philosopher called the ability of the mind to perceive the basis of something in its evident simplicity “intellectual intuition” (Descartes 65). According to the philosopher, everything can be questioned in search of absolute truth.

The only undeniable fact is human thinking and desire to understand the substance of things. The presence of thinking convinces people of their existence. Descartes expressed this belief in the famous aphorism “I think, therefore I am” (23). This truth was irrefutable and, therefore, is the first point on which the worldview of Descartes was built. In his opinion, humanity has no other criterion of clarity, and all philosophical positions should be built on it.

Descartes also discussed the existence of God in his philosophical positions. From the philosophers’ point of view, people recognize themselves as imperfect only in comparison with the all-perfect being (Descartes 75). Such an understanding could only be implanted in the minds of the people by God. This means that the idea of “God as a perfect existence is already proof of being” (Descartes 88). Considering God as a universal basis, the philosopher showed that there are concepts that people’s cognition cannot comprehend. In other words, there always should be the presence of some inevitable force which is the starting point of knowledge. Such an approach helps to overcome the fear of unknown and related to it anxiety and existential depression. Thus, the anxiety and inability to comprehend and interpret many notions of creation and existence empowered Descartes’s philosophical exploration.

The anxiety and existential depression in philosophy is a moving engine of progress. For example, in Plato’s philosophy, the only way to avoid anxiety and understand cognition is through Beauty. Plato, in his writings, focused on Beauty and the importance of its search in the surrounding world and within oneself (Leigh 48). Contemplating and accepting physical beauty, the Soul is able to turn to the beauty of art and science. Having overcome this frontier, the Soul moves on to a positive assessment of good morals, helping to climb the “golden ladder” to the world of Higher ideas.

Another example is the philosophical approach of Aristotle analyzing the nature of cognition. According to the philosopher, the Soul distinguishes the existence of matter “spending a lot of time in mistakes to achieve something reliable in all respects about the soul is certainly the most difficult thing” (Leigh 89). Thus, the Soul suffers a lot before understanding the essence of being. In order to avoid these sufferings, related anxiety, and existential depression, the Soul should implement the forms of truly scientific knowledge. These are the concepts that define the nature of things through rational thinking. In other words, logic is the key element preserving people from continuous suffering.

The analysis of the major argument presented by Descartes, and other philosophers, supports Frankfurt’s idea that modern philosophy is born out of anxiety. Therefore, the beginning of philosophy is not a surprise but anxiety. Despair and fear provoke human thought to acquire new forces, leading to new sources of truth. Striving to avoid anxiety, people continue to think. The desire to find the answer to existential concepts leads people to philosophical discussions. As was mentioned earlier, many philosophers’ theories were created in attempts to explain the incomprehensible from the physical perspective notions. Being afraid of the unknown, people long to find the truths which can eliminate their anxiety. This is the reason why there are so many different philosophical theories. Even though philosophers’ profound experiences and developments exist, people probably will never be able to avoid the anxiety caused by the fear of unknown.

Leigh, Fiona. Themes in Plato, Aristotle, and Hellenistic Philosophy . Institute of Classical Studies Publishing, 2021.

Descartes, Rene. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy . Translated by Donald Cress, Hackett Publishing Company, 1998.

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Depths of Damnation: Dante’s Inferno and its Psychological Revelations

This essay about Dante’s “Inferno” examines its profound exploration of sin, punishment, and human nature. Written in the 14th century, the poem presents a meticulously structured depiction of Hell, categorizing sins and their corresponding punishments with vivid symbolism. Beyond theological insights, “Inferno” reflects Dante’s political critiques and personal convictions, shaped by his exile from Florence. The poem’s rich symbolism and narrative depth invite readers to contemplate broader themes of morality, justice, and the complexities of human relationships. Through its poetic imagery and psychological resonance, “Inferno” continues to resonate as a timeless masterpiece, challenging readers to confront their own beliefs about sin and redemption while offering profound insights into the human condition.

How it works

Dante Alighieri’s “Inferno,” a cornerstone of Western literature penned in the early 14th century, transcends its medieval origins to offer a timeless exploration of sin, punishment, and human nature. In this epic poem, Dante undertakes a perilous journey through Hell guided by Virgil, encountering a meticulously structured realm where the consequences of earthly transgressions unfold in vivid, symbolic detail.

Central to the narrative is Dante’s intricate categorization of sin, each circle of Hell delineated to reflect the moral hierarchy of his time.

From the least severe sins in the upper circles—such as lust and gluttony—to the deepest recesses reserved for treachery and betrayal, “Inferno” presents a stark tableau of divine justice and moral reckoning. This hierarchical framework not only serves as a didactic tool but also reveals Dante’s profound theological reflections on the nature of sin and the human condition.

Symbolism in “Inferno” further enriches its narrative tapestry, imbuing each circle of Hell with layers of meaning that resonate beyond the literal punishments depicted. The journey through Hell can be interpreted as an allegory for the soul’s descent into sin and separation from divine grace, with each punishment serving as a mirror to human frailty and spiritual unrest. Moreover, the characters and landscapes encountered—from the tragic figures like Francesca da Rimini to the monstrous guardians and demons—symbolize broader themes of moral decay, justice, and the consequences of unchecked human desire.

Beyond its theological dimensions, “Inferno” reflects Dante’s deep-seated political and personal convictions, shaped by his exile from Florence and the tumultuous politics of his time. The poem’s critique of contemporary leaders and institutions—whether in the portrayal of corrupt popes or fallen political figures—underscores Dante’s vision of a harmonious society governed by justice and divine order. Through his protagonist’s journey, Dante explores the intersection of political power and moral authority, challenging readers to reflect on the ethical responsibilities of both leaders and citizens alike.

In addition to its moral and political allegory, “Inferno” offers profound insights into the human psyche and existential dilemmas. Dante’s portrayal of Hell as a psychological landscape—where souls are tormented not only by external punishments but also by their own guilt and remorse—speaks to universal themes of human suffering and the quest for spiritual redemption. The poem’s exploration of love, betrayal, and the complexities of human relationships further underscores its relevance as a psychological and philosophical inquiry into the human condition.

Moreover, Dante’s use of poetic imagery and narrative structure in “Inferno” showcases his mastery of form and language, elevating the poem beyond mere theological treatise to a work of enduring literary merit. The vivid descriptions of Hell’s torments and landscapes evoke a visceral response from readers, drawing them into Dante’s moral universe and challenging them to confront their own beliefs about sin, judgment, and salvation.

Ultimately, “Inferno” stands as a testament to the enduring power of literature to provoke thought, inspire introspection, and illuminate the darker recesses of the human soul. Through its blend of theological insight, political critique, and psychological depth, Dante’s epic poem continues to captivate readers across centuries, inviting them on a transformative journey of moral exploration and spiritual awakening. As such, “Inferno” remains not only a literary masterpiece but also a timeless meditation on the perennial themes of sin, redemption, and the eternal quest for meaning in the face of mortality.

In conclusion, Dante’s “Inferno” offers readers a profound journey through the depths of Hell, where they encounter the consequences of human frailty and the complexities of moral judgment. It is a work that challenges assumptions, provokes introspection, and invites contemplation—an enduring testament to the power of literature to illuminate the human experience and provoke questions about the nature of sin, virtue, and the quest for spiritual enlightenment.

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Narrative Summary of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

This book, written in 1918, challenges traditional philosophical problems and attempts to show that these issues are rooted in misunderstandings of the logic of language. Wittgenstein argues that what can be said clearly, must be said clearly, and what cannot be spoken of, must be silenced. He explores the essential nature of language and how it functions as a representation of reality.

Main Parts:

Language and Logic: Wittgenstein explores the logical structure of propositions and the relationship between language and reality. He proposes that language is a picture of reality, and that the logical structure of the picture must be identical to the logical structure of the fact it represents.
Objects and Atomic Facts: He introduces the concept of “objects” as the fundamental building blocks of reality. These objects are simple and indivisible, and they combine to form “atomic facts”.
Truth-Functions and Propositions: He argues that all propositions, even complex ones, can be built up from elementary propositions by using truth-functions (like negation, conjunction, and disjunction).
Limits of Language and the Mystical: Wittgenstein contends that language can only represent the world “from without,” and cannot represent its own logical form. This means that certain concepts, like ethics and the meaning of life, are inexpressible in language, and must be accessed through other means.

View on Life:

Realism: Wittgenstein believes in a world that exists independently of our perception. He rejects idealism and emphasizes the existence of a “reality” that is not dependent on our minds.
Transcendental Ethics: He argues that ethics and aesthetics are transcendental and cannot be expressed in language. They are matters of “showing,” not “saying.”
Limits of Reason: He believes that the boundaries of language define the limits of our world and of our thinking. He emphasizes the importance of recognizing these limits and accepting the existence of things that cannot be fully captured by language.
The Picture as a Model of Reality: Wittgenstein uses the analogy of a picture to illustrate how language functions as a representation of reality. The elements of the picture correspond to objects in the world, and the relationship between the elements represents the relationships between objects.
The Blind Spot: He points out that we cannot “see” our own eyes within our field of vision. This analogy is used to illustrate the impossibility of a “metaphysical subject” that exists outside the world.
The Game of Language: He suggests that language is a game, where we use symbols according to certain rules. This game analogy highlights the importance of understanding the logic of language in order to avoid philosophical errors.

Challenges:

The Problem of Generality: Wittgenstein grapples with the question of how to express general propositions, such as “All humans are mortal.” He rejects traditional methods and seeks to develop a new logic that can account for the inherent complexity of general statements.
The Problem of Identity: He challenges the concept of identity, arguing that it is not a real property of objects, but rather a reflection of how we use language to describe them.
The Problem of the “Causal Nexus”: He rejects the idea of a necessary causal link between events, arguing that such a link cannot be inferred from our experience.
The Conflict Between Language and Reality: Wittgenstein explores the tension between language, which is a limited representation of the world, and reality, which is vast and ultimately inexpressible. He argues that our attempts to describe the world in language are always incomplete.
The Conflict Between Traditional Philosophy and the Logic of Language: He challenges the assumptions of traditional philosophical thought, arguing that many philosophical problems arise from a misunderstanding of the logic of language.
The Ascent to Truth: The Tractatus can be read as a journey from misunderstandings of language and reality to a deeper understanding of their limitations.
The Throw Away of the Ladder: Wittgenstein’s goal is to help the reader “climb out” of the confusion of traditional philosophical thought. Once the reader understands his propositions, they must be discarded in order to achieve a true understanding of the world.

Point of View:

The Logical Point of View: Wittgenstein’s perspective is that of a logician, seeking to understand the nature of language and its relationship to reality.
The Transcendent Perspective: He suggests that while we cannot fully capture the mystical or ethical dimensions of life in language, they can be experienced through other means.

How it’s Written:

Aphoristic Style: Wittgenstein uses a series of numbered propositions, each presenting a distinct idea or insight.
Precise Language: He employs precise and often technical language, striving for clarity and avoidance of ambiguity.
Example from the text: “The world is everything that is the case.” (1) This proposition establishes the starting point of his inquiry, emphasizing the connection between language and reality.
Serious and Analytical: The Tractatus is a highly serious and analytical work, with a focus on logical rigor and clarity.
Detached and Objective: Wittgenstein strives for objectivity in his writing, presenting his ideas in a detached and impersonal manner.

Life Choices:

The Choice to be Silent: Wittgenstein argues that we must be silent about those things that cannot be expressed in language. This suggests a commitment to honesty and to recognizing the limitations of our knowledge.
The Choice to Seek Understanding: He encourages the reader to engage in the process of seeking understanding through logical analysis and the contemplation of the world.
The Importance of Language: Wittgenstein emphasizes the fundamental role of language in our understanding of the world, but he also warns us about the limits of language.
The Value of Silence: He suggests that silence can be a source of insight and a way to access truths that cannot be expressed in words.
The Importance of Clarity: He advocates for clear and unambiguous thinking and communication.

Characters:

Ludwig Wittgenstein: The author himself, a philosopher seeking to clarify the relationship between language and reality.
The Reader: Wittgenstein addresses the reader directly, guiding them through his arguments and challenging them to question their assumptions.
The Limits of Language: The book explores the limitations of language to represent reality fully and accurately.
The Nature of Reality: It offers a unique perspective on the nature of reality, emphasizing the importance of objects and atomic facts.
The Mystical and the Inexpressible: Wittgenstein’s work suggests that some of the most profound aspects of life, such as ethics and the meaning of life, transcend language and can only be accessed through other means.
The Importance of Clarity and Logic: He stresses the importance of clear and precise thinking, and the need to avoid the errors that arise from misunderstandings of language.

Principles:

The Picture Theory of Language: Language functions as a picture of reality, and the logical structure of the picture must correspond to the logical structure of the fact it represents.
The Principle of Logical Atomism: Reality is composed of simple, indivisible objects that combine to form atomic facts.
The Principle of Verification: The meaning of a proposition lies in its truth-conditions, and these conditions must be verifiable through experience or logical analysis.
The Principle of Silence: We must be silent about those things that cannot be spoken of.

Intentions:

Wittgenstein’s intentions: He sought to clarify the relationship between language and reality, and to demonstrate that many philosophical problems are rooted in misunderstandings of the logic of language.
The reader’s intentions: The reader may seek to gain a deeper understanding of the nature of language, reality, and the limits of human knowledge.

Unique Vocabulary:

Sachverhalt: An atomic fact, the simplest unit of reality.
Gegenstand: An object, the fundamental building block of reality.
Tatsache: A fact, a complex combination of Sachverhalte.
Satzzeichen: A propositional sign, the symbol that represents a proposition.
Wahrheitsfunktion: A truth-function, a logical operation that combines propositions.
Tautologie: A tautology, a proposition that is true in all possible circumstances.
Kontradiktion: A contradiction, a proposition that is false in all possible circumstances.
Transcendental: Beyond the realm of experience or language.
The Story of the Two Youths, their Horses and Lilies: This story is used to illustrate the concept of internal relationships and the shared logical structure between seemingly different elements.
The Story of the Black Spot on White Paper: This analogy is used to explain the concept of truth and how the sense of a proposition is determined by its truth-conditions.
The Importance of Logical Analysis: Wittgenstein stresses the importance of analyzing language to understand its structure and limitations.
The Limits of Representation: He argues that language can only represent reality “from without,” and that we cannot fully grasp the essence of the world through language.
The Power of the Mystical: He suggests that the mystical, the inexpressible, can be accessed through other means, such as contemplation and experience.

Facts and Findings:

The Importance of Elementary Propositions: Wittgenstein argues that all propositions can be built up from elementary propositions, which assert the existence of atomic facts.
The Logical Nature of Mathematics: He contends that mathematics is a logical method, and that its propositions are equations that express the substitutability of expressions.
The Lack of a Causal Nexus: He rejects the idea of a necessary causal link between events, arguing that such a link cannot be inferred from our experience.

Statistics:

The Number of Truth-Possibilities: For n elementary propositions, there are 2n possible truth-possibilities.
The Number of Possible Groups of Truth-Conditions: For n elementary propositions, there are Ln possible groups of truth-conditions.

Points of View:

The Logical Point of View: Wittgenstein writes from the perspective of a logician, seeking to understand the nature of language and its relationship to reality.
The Transcendent Perspective: He suggests that while language cannot fully capture the mystical or ethical dimensions of life, they can be experienced through other means.

Perspective:

The Perspective of Limited Knowledge: Wittgenstein’s work emphasizes the inherent limitations of our knowledge, suggesting that we can only understand the world through the lens of language, which is always incomplete.
The Perspective of the Mystical: He suggests that there are truths that transcend language and can only be accessed through other means, such as contemplation and experience.

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The church I grew up in opposes IVF. Are my infertility struggles part of God’s design?

Me after an egg retrieval — just one step on our long road of fertility treatments.

Most people in Los Angeles spend their Saturdays at the beach in the summer. I spend mine sitting on a bench outside a fertility clinic, praying to be pregnant.

It’s been almost four years since my husband, Anthony, and I started trying for a baby. Like many couples, we thought time was on our side, so we spent our 20s getting degrees and advancing our careers. Kids would happen “someday”; we assumed we’d have two or three. In the meantime, we relished becoming the fun uncle, and the cool aunt.

A few weeks after my 30th birthday, I scheduled an appointment to remove my IUD. Anthony had just turned 34. “Hopefully I’ll see you in a couple of months!” my gynecologist said before sending us off with recommendations for prenatal vitamins. Little did she know we would see her and so many other doctors frequently in the coming years, but never once for a pregnancy.

According to reproductive endocrinologists, our issue is likely egg quality — though anyone who has experienced infertility knows this is often code for “we can’t figure it out.”

Medical research for infertility is wildly underfunded despite declining fertility rates across the globe. A 2023 news release from the World Health Organization states that 17.5% of couples struggle to conceive. For some, the diagnosis is straightforward — endometriosis , blocked fallopian tubes, male factor infertility . For others, the diagnosis is unexplained, as has been the case for us.

At the beginning of 2023, after two years of failing to get pregnant on our own, Anthony and I turned to in vitro fertilization (IVF) as a last resort. Until then, the cost had made IVF seem like an impossible option: in Los Angeles, one IVF cycle can be over $25,000. Many health insurance plans don’t cover fertility treatments, including ours. But if I’ve learned anything about infertility, it’s that it will make you both desperate and willing to do whatever it takes to have a baby. For us, this has meant taking out loans, borrowing money from family and working second jobs.

If I’ve learned anything about infertility, it’s that it will make you both desperate and willing to do whatever it takes to have a baby. For us, this has meant taking out loans, borrowing money from family and working second jobs.

Still, the bills are suffocating, especially when you’re paying for something that doesn’t always work — like at our most recent appointment when my body didn’t respond to the birth control pills (yes, birth control is, ironically, used to help regulate your ovaries), and we were forced to cancel that IVF cycle. At the clinic where we go, we pay a package fee for every egg retrieval and embryo transfer. If a cycle is canceled because my body doesn’t respond to the medication, we back pay for all my appointments and blood work, which are now a la carte services. Two 15-minute appointments ran us $1,300.

My fertility treatments cause bloating — among numerous other physical and emotional side effects.

The stress and grief Anthony and I have experienced in our journey to become parents is unlike anything I could have anticipated. It’s taken a toll on our mental health, our marriage and our bodies. Yet, in recent weeks, I’ve found this stress and pain to be exacerbated by current religious debates about the ethics of IVF and reproductive assistance in the United States, especially because I grew up in the church.

Two of the churches I attended as a child belong to the Southern Baptist Convention (SBC), which recently voted against the use of assisted reproductive technology. Their biggest concern is embryo banking — the creating and freezing of multiple embryos — since they believe embryos are human beings.

The report advocates “for the government to restrain actions inconsistent with the dignity and value of every human being, which necessarily includes frozen embryonic human beings.” It also emphasizes adherence to what the SBC perceives as “natural” reproductive methods, viewing IVF as an artificial intervention in God’s design. I have to wonder, though: Was it God’s design for my husband and me to have difficulty conceiving?

I have to wonder: Was it God’s design for my husband and me to have difficulty conceiving?

While I no longer belong to any church or believe in the doctrines of the SBC, I feel overwhelmed and devastated for congregants who’ve used IVF to have their babies, or those who are in the throes of infertility. They must now wrestle with ethics and possible shaming from pastors and other church members, especially if they currently have frozen embryos waiting to be transferred. And with more than 13 million members, the SBC does not exist in a silo; its opinions hold weight, especially on the political stage. A day after the report, Senate Republicans blocked a bill that would have protected IVF access across the nation.

I wish my two frozen embryos were human babies; I really do. But the statistics don’t favor this wish. A 2018 study conducted by Reproductive Medicine Associates and presented at the annual meeting of the American Society for Reproductive Medicine found that three chromosomally normal embryos are needed for one live birth (a 94.9% chance of pregnancy). Sometimes it takes less, but often it takes more.

Last fall, for example, our first egg retrieval failed. I cried for weeks. The retrieval was textbook, and I had 19 follicles going into the surgery. But from those 19, doctors were only able to create one embryo. It arrested, or stopped developing, within hours.

Embryo banking has never been an ethical concern for Anthony or me or the other people we’ve met doing IVF because we all know that our embryos are not compatible with life until they are reinserted into the uterus. Even then, the embryo has to implant, and the cells must continue to divide to form a fetus. So much can go wrong between transfer day and birth, especially for infertility patients. To have a chance at a family, creating multiple embryos is necessary. For cancer patients, too, embryo banking is a gift as it allows them to preserve their fertility.

I also wish the SBC was correct in its assumption that IVF “routinely creates more embryos than can reasonably be implanted.” This may be true sometimes, but it isn’t our story. Anthony and I will have one embryo left after we transfer our first embryo this summer. Our doctor tells us there is a 60% chance it will lead to a pregnancy. We will likely need at least one more egg retrieval to have more than one child.

Back on the bench outside the fertility clinic, I think about how my parents raised me to believe that God can heal and perform miracles. According to the Bible stories I learned as a girl, Jesus walked on water and raised Lazarus from the dead. But my parents also taught me that God created the brains responsible for inventing modern medicine and that ignoring the medical interventions available to us would be like choosing to drown despite a nearby life raft.

“We commit to pray to our God who hears, sees, and remembers on behalf of those couples struggling with infertility” is how the SBC resolution ends. Anthony and I will continue to pray, too. But we will also rely on IVF.

Kayti Christian is a writer and editor living in Los Angeles. She is represented by Sallyanne Sweeney with MMB Creative and is currently writing a memoir about IVF and infertility. Find her writing about infertility on substack .

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CULTURE AND DIALOGUE JOURNAL: PHILOSOPHY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Culture and Dialogue provides a forum for researchers from philosophy as well as other disciplines who study cultural formations dialogically, through comparative analysis, or within the tradition of hermeneutics. The journal publishes one volume of two issues each year. One issue welcomes manuscripts that consider the broad theme of “culture and dialogue” in all its forms, from all perspectives, and through all methods. The other issue is thematic and seeks to bring manuscripts together with a common denominator such as “Philosophy and the Dialogue,” “Art in Conversation,” “Comparing Cultures,” or “Dialogical Ethics.” The theme of the thematic issue is announced through dedicated calls for papers.

The journal seeks submissions on the philosophy of Artificial Intelligence. Among relevant topics are:

The nature of AI

Computational Theory of Mind

Strong and Weak AI

Ethics of AI and robotics

Surveillance and privacy

Bias in decision systems

Machine Ethics

Consciousness

Catastrophism

Human/robot interaction and dialogue

AI and philosophy of economics (employment, automation)

AI and philosophy of education (teaching, learning)

AI, art and aesthetics

Non-western philosophical perspectives on AI

Cultural and dialogical aspects

AI and science-fiction

The future of AI

Essays should normally be between 5,000 and 10,000 words in length and written according to the specifications of The Chicago Manual of Style. The deadline for submissions is 15 September 2024.Please submit prospective papers via our submission portal: https://www.editorialmanager.com/cadbrill/default.aspx

All information can be found at: https://brill.com/CAD

Flyer: https://pdflink.to/9b2258b1/

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1 mln yuan rewards for papers in top journal spark debate.

Reports that teams led by two Chinese mainland professors have each been awarded 1 million yuan ($138,000) for publishing papers in Nature, a leading international science journal, have sparked heated discussion in academic circles.

While some said universities have the right to reward scholars in any way they want, others questioned whether the practice goes against government efforts to move away from an overemphasis on the publication of papers in academic evaluation.

According to media reports, Zhu Jiapeng, a professor at Nanjing University of Chinese Medicine, and his team were given 1 million yuan by the university for publishing a paper in Nature. They became the first people from the university to publish a paper in the journal in 70 years.

Peng Li, who was an associate professor at Guizhou University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, and his team were also awarded 1 million yuan for publishing a paper in Nature. They were the first people from Guizhou province to publish a paper in the journal.

Liu Xingde, the president of Guizhou University of Traditional Chinese Medicine, said the reward was for outstanding academic results and the contribution Peng has made in medicine.

Peng has since been promoted to full professor and deputy director of the medical studies laboratory at the hospital affiliated with the university.

Zhu said academic papers were like a "spell" for researchers. Writing papers had given him pain, headaches and also joy, he said, asking people to pay more attention to his studies rather than the fact he had a paper published in a top journal.

According to a notice issued by the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Science and Technology, universities should stop using papers listed in the Science Citation Index as the top criterion in the evaluation of academic research. However, the notice also stressed that the authorities encourage academic researchers to publish high-level, high-quality and innovative academic papers in international journals.

Tian Wentao, a PhD candidate at a university in Hunan province, said he knows how hard it is to get papers published in top journals like Nature, as they only publish innovative and influential papers that require a massive amount of time-consuming work.

However, the researchers are generally not rewarded enough for their contributions, at least financially, which results in a lack of motivation to work on arduous but pioneering problems, he said.

"Giving high bonuses to such researchers is a great way to pay them back for their hard work and encourage other researchers to work on groundbreaking subjects," Tian said.

A PhD graduate from Central South University in Changsha, Hunan, surnamed Liang said there is nothing wrong with universities giving money to researchers who have published papers in top journals.

"Although the authorities have stressed making academic papers less important in talent evaluation, they are still widely used in getting funds and higher professional titles," he said. "They are also the proof that your hard-earned academic results are recognized."

Liang said people do not realize how hard it is to publish a paper in Nature or Science, especially for researchers from lesser known universities, because most academic resources are allocated to China's top universities.

Chu Zhaohui, a researcher at the Chinese Academy of Educational Sciences, said publishing in top journals can increase the reputation of a university, increasing its competitiveness in student enrollment and in getting resources and funds from the government, which is why the two universities gave such large cash rewards to the researchers.

Xiong Bingqi, director of 21st Century Education Research, said he disagrees with the universities' practice.

Medical universities and hospitals are notorious for placing too great an emphasis on the publication of academic papers, he said, and many paper retractions and frauds in recent years have happened in the medical sector.

That is why people should not equate academic achievements with publishing papers, Xiong added.

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Guiding humanity beyond the moon: OHIO researchers push to revolutionize human space biology

What actually happens to the human body in space? While scientists and researchers have heavily researched how various factors impact the human body here on Earth, the amount of information available about changes that occur in the body in space is not as well-known. Scientists, including OHIO’s Nate Szewczyk and several of his trainees, have been studying for years how the body, specifically on the molecular side, changes in space. Recently, a new package of papers has been published in “Nature” journals depicting how the modern tools of molecular biology and precision medicine can help guide humanity into more challenging missions beyond where we’ve already been.

The package of papers, titled “Space Omics and Medical Atlas across orbits,” includes manuscripts, data, protocols, and code, representing the largest-ever compendium of data for aerospace medicine and space biology. Over 100 institutions from more than 25 countries worked together to coordinate the release of this molecular, cellular, physiological, phenotypic, and spaceflight data.

Szewczyk, a professor in the Department of Biomedical Sciences and a principle investigator in the Ohio Musculoskeletal and Neurologic Institute, coauthored seven different articles including: “ Spaceflight induces changes in gene expression profiles linked to insulin and estrogen ,” “ Astronaut omics and the impact of space on the human body at scale ,” “ Understanding how space travel affects the female reproductive system ,” “ Transcriptomics analysis reveals molecular alterations underpinning spaceflight dermatology ,” “ Aging and putative frailty biomarkers are altered by spaceflight ,” and “ Ethical considerations for the age of non-governmental space exploration .”

In addition to coauthoring several papers, Szewczyk also involved his trainees on six of the papers. The trainees include OHIO medical students Anthony Carano and Caroline Coffey; Alexia Tasoula, a Ph.D. student in the translational biomedical sciences program; post-doctoral research Craig Willis, an OHIO alum and current assistant professor at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom; as well as Dr. Henry Cope, researcher with the National Health Service in the United Kingdom.

Their articles highlight research from how spaceflight induced changes in insulin and estrogen signaling in rodents and humans, to ethical considerations for commercial spaceflight, and known and potential impacts of spaceflight on reproduction.

“We’ve studied worms for years but now have the ability to study people,” Szewczyk said. “We are at a place, particularly with NASA and the commercial sector, where we can focus on using more modern omics techniques to try and better understand changes in astronauts themselves, which can revolutionize their health.”

Szewczyk, known for his work researching worms in space, highlights the significance of these creatures as the first multicellular animals to have their genome sequenced. Leveraging genomics tools and techniques developed through worm studies, researchers have been able to delve into the molecular changes experienced by organisms in space. He notes that for over two decades, worms have been sent into space to observe gene expression alterations, paving the way for these similar studies in humans.

But as space flight becomes more commercialized and more people outside of just NASA’s astronauts pursue orbit, the need to understand the molecular level of humans in space becomes more important in ensuring their health and safety.

According to Szewczyk, the U.S. is growing in its space-based economy and as a result of that, there is now increased interest in commercial space flight. In Ohio, there is a new space park in Columbus set up by the commercial company Voyager Space.

“The more commercial space flight grows, the more important understanding people’s omics is,” Szewczyk explained. “Space medicine is evolving from something that really only NASA was responsible for since they were the only organization sending people into space, to something more common as commercial space flight grows. We are seeing an increase in this type of flight from SpaceX and other companies and it is crucial that those entering space are prepared. Flight providers must provide medical coverage for their participants. When people go to the International Space Station (ISS), it is governed by certain rules and regulations, whereas with commercial space flight, these same guidelines don’t necessarily apply. There is interest to grow space medicine and advance techniques for looking at health in space, especially as more people are able to go into orbit.”

Szewczyk's impact extends far beyond the laboratory as he actively advocates for open science and international collaboration, particularly in the field of space research. As co-chair of the NASA GeneLab Animal Analysis Working Group, he promotes the sharing of scientific knowledge among international space agencies, exemplified by initiatives like integrating the European Space Agency and the Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) into NASA working groups. Moreover, his involvement in a JAXA Flagship Project includes leading efforts to harmonize ethical concerns and research methodologies for precision health in astronauts across multiple space agencies, including NASA, ESA, and JAXA.

“Humans are humans regardless of where they are from or currently live and the way space impacts them is ultimately the same,” Szewczyk said. “So the more we can all work together to compare how astronauts and those visiting space react in space, the better we can work to ensure safety and determine what guidelines need put in place for their health while in space and returning.”

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I thought my son loved our family trips. Now I see I was just being selfish

How Taiwan won the hearts of my American kids

CULTURE AND DIALOGUE JOURNAL: PHILOSOPHY AND ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Text: A A A Print Society

Picturesque scene of wild elk living in Tiaozini Wetland

Yak-riding race held in Lhasa

In Numbers: 'China Travel' becomes a global buzzword

Miniature art exhibition restores lifestyle of Hong Kong People

Gorgeous scenery of Qumar River, north headwater of Yangtze River

Wild animals appear at the foot of Kunlun Mountains

Rescue work underway in First Ancestral Hall of Hakka

Guilin combats the city's most severe flooding since 1998

Badain Jaran Desert gets on 'green' look

China-Malaysia ties in numbers

30th Beijing International Book Fair kicks off

Hong Kong streets decorated to celebrate HKSAR's 27th anniversary

Huangmao cross-sea channel fully connected

Rescue teams rush to transfer flood-trapped people in Guilin

Chinese vocational school student ranks 12th in Alibaba Global Math Competition

World's largest liquid air energy storage demonstration project expected to be commissioned by end of the year

Shenzhen Window of the World celebrates 30th anniversary

In Numbers: C919 sees more take off

In Numbers: Chinese economy extends upward trend

Photo exhibition on China-Laos Railway opens to public

Flood in Fuzhou turns Jinshan into 'isolated temple'