causes of terrorism essay

Terrorism Essay for Students and Teacher

500+ words essay on terrorism essay.

Terrorism is an act, which aims to create fear among ordinary people by illegal means. It is a threat to humanity. It includes person or group spreading violence, riots, burglaries, rapes, kidnappings, fighting, bombings, etc. Terrorism is an act of cowardice. Also, terrorism has nothing to do with religion. A terrorist is only a terrorist, not a Hindu or a Muslim.

Types of Terrorism

Terrorism is of two kinds, one is political terrorism which creates panic on a large scale and another one is criminal terrorism which deals in kidnapping to take ransom money. Political terrorism is much more crucial than criminal terrorism because it is done by well-trained persons. It thus becomes difficult for law enforcing agencies to arrest them in time.

Terrorism spread at the national level as well as at international level.  Regional terrorism is the most violent among all. Because the terrorists think that dying as a terrorist is sacred and holy, and thus they are willing to do anything. All these terrorist groups are made with different purposes.

Causes of Terrorism

There are some main causes of terrorism development  or production of large quantities of machine guns, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, nuclear weapons, missiles, etc. rapid population growth,  Politics, Social, Economic  problems, dissatisfaction of people with the country’s system, lack of education, corruption, racism, economic inequality, linguistic differences, all these are the major  elements of terrorism, and terrorism flourishes after them. People use terrorism as a weapon to prove and justify their point of view.  The riots among Hindus and Muslims are the most famous but there is a difference between caste and terrorism.

The Effects Of Terrorism

Terrorism spreads fear in people, people living in the country feel insecure because of terrorism. Due to terrorist attacks, millions of goods are destroyed, the lives of thousands of innocent people are lost, animals are also killed. Disbelief in humanity raises after seeing a terrorist activity, this gives birth to another terrorist. There exist different types of terrorism in different parts of the country and abroad.

Today, terrorism is not only the problem of India, but in our neighboring country also, and governments across the world are making a lot of effort to deal with it. Attack on world trade center on September 11, 2001, is considered the largest terrorist attack in the world. Osama bin Laden attacked the tallest building in the world’s most powerful country, causing millions of casualties and death of thousands of people.

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Terrorist Attacks in India

India has suffered several terrorist attacks which created fear among the public and caused huge destruction. Here are some of the major terrorist attacks that hit India in the last few years: 1991 – Punjab Killings, 1993 – Bombay Bomb Blasts, RSS Bombing in Chennai, 2000 – Church Bombing, Red Fort Terrorist Attack,2001- Indian Parliament Attack, 2002 – Mumbai Bus Bombing, Attack on Akshardham Temple, 2003 – Mumbai Bombing, 2004 – Dhemaji School Bombing in Assam,2005 – Delhi Bombings, Indian Institute of Science Shooting, 2006 – Varanasi Bombings, Mumbai Train Bombings, Malegaon Bombings, 2007 – Samjhauta Express Bombings, Mecca Masjid Bombing, Hyderabad Bombing, Ajmer Dargah Bombing, 2008 – Jaipur Bombings, Bangalore Serial Blasts, Ahmedabad Bombings, Delhi Bombings, Mumbai Attacks, 2010 – Pune Bombing, Varanasi Bombing.

The recent ones include 2011 – Mumbai Bombing, Delhi Bombing, 2012 – Pune Bombing, 2013 – Hyderabad Blasts, Srinagar Attack, Bodh Gaya Bombings, Patna Bombings, 2014 – Chhattisgarh Attack, Jharkhand Blast, Chennai Train Bombing, Assam Violence, Church Street Bomb Blast, Bangalore, 2015 –  Jammu Attack, Gurdaspur Attack, Pathankot Attack, 2016 – Uri Attack, Baramulla Attack, 2017 – Bhopal Ujjain Passenger Train Bombing, Amarnath Yatra Attack, 2018 Sukma Attack, 2019- Pulwama attack.

Agencies fighting Terrorism in India

Many police, intelligence and military organizations in India have formed special agencies to fight terrorism in the country. Major agencies which fight against terrorism in India are Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS), Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), National Investigation Agency (NIA).

Terrorism has become a global threat which needs to be controlled from the initial level. Terrorism cannot be controlled by the law enforcing agencies alone. The people in the world will also have to unite in order to face this growing threat of terrorism.

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Causes of Terrorism Essay

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Introduction

Political causes, social causes, economic reasons.

Terrorism activities are spread all over the world. People from various parts of the globe throw bombs and other war devices towards innocent citizens claiming one reason or the other. Terrorism is defined as violent actions that are aimed at instilling fear to people as a means of coercing them to submit to ideologies of a certain group. Though people have argued that terrorism is thriving nowadays because morality, religion and social order have failed, some feel there is more than just that. It should be noted that terrorist attacks do not take into account the welfare of non-combatants and are carried out due to political, social or economical reasons.

Many people feel that they are being oppressed by their governments and that it is their duty to extricate themselves from the repressive regimes. Using labeling theory, it can be noted that some people want to be identified as the ones who liberated the country. As a result, these people will use terrorism to compel other citizens to stop cooperating with the government. The labeling theory further explains that this group considers it an achievement when they are identified as terrorists. This is the kind of terrorism that took place in 2001 in the United States.

Arguably, this is the main cause of terrorism in the world. The neutralizing theory outlines that criminals use various reasons to validate their actions. In this regard, terrorists have been known to use religious teachings in justifying their atrocities. There are those people who believe that their religion is the most upright one. These people would want every other person to accept their definition and opinion about religion. They divide people into we and them where “we” are those who agree with their ideologies and “them” refers to the rest of the people. However, it is important to note that these people do not represent the beliefs of their religion per se, but rather an interpretation of a certain group about religion. On the other hand, differential association theory states that there are people who just join terrorist groups because they will want to be associated with certain people. To these group of people, social solidarity is far much important than anything else.

Economic empowerment has been the cause of resistance since time immemorial. Communists and people who subscribe to Karl Marx’s ideas believe that rich people or governments oppress the poor ones. Therefore, they believe that there is nothing to loose by joining resistance groups. On the contrary, they have a common consensus that they have everything to gain if they fight for their rights. Just as outlined by the self-control theory, people who lack self control easily join the terrorist groups. It is important to note that the availability of old weapons in developing countries, which are easily acquired, has contributed to terrorism. On the same note, rewarding of perpetrators of terrorism by the terrorist groups highly influences terrorism. As depicted by social learning theory, increase in crime rewards leads to increase in criminal activities.

Terrorism is a reality that has to be faced by every nation. Nowadays, it not only occurs in specific nation as it used to be, but rather in the whole world. In fact, terrorism has become very dynamic nowadays and no single explanation can be used to explain it. Gone are the days when it was associated majorly with religion. Consequently, the society should be prepared to address this issue for it is increasingly becoming common.

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IvyPanda. (2022, May 7). Causes of Terrorism. https://ivypanda.com/essays/causes-of-terrorism/

"Causes of Terrorism." IvyPanda , 7 May 2022, ivypanda.com/essays/causes-of-terrorism/.

IvyPanda . (2022) 'Causes of Terrorism'. 7 May.

IvyPanda . 2022. "Causes of Terrorism." May 7, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/causes-of-terrorism/.

1. IvyPanda . "Causes of Terrorism." May 7, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/causes-of-terrorism/.

Bibliography

IvyPanda . "Causes of Terrorism." May 7, 2022. https://ivypanda.com/essays/causes-of-terrorism/.

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What Motivates Terrorists?

Ideology is not the only or even the principal reason why individuals join terrorist groups.

This article is the first in a two part series on rehabilitating former terrorists and turning them into citizens. In the essay below, Jessica Stern examines why some Muslims join terrorists organization in the first place.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia claims to be able to counteract terrorists’ radicalization—to turn them away from violence and return them to society. A number of other governments, in the Middle East, in Europe, and in Southeast Asia, have initiated their own similar efforts.

In the face of today’s global security threats, these efforts raise a critical question: Is it in fact possible to counter-radicalize terrorists and their potential recruits?

Any terrorism prevention or rehabilitation effort must be based first and foremost on a clear understanding of what motivates people to join terrorist movements and what motivates them to leave. Terrorist movements often arise in reaction to a perceived injustice, as a means to right some terrible wrong, real or imagined. Yet ideology is not the only, or even the most important, factor in an individual’s decision to join a terrorist group.

In interviewing terrorists, I have found that operatives are often more interested in the expression of a collective identity than they are in the group’s stated goals. The reasons some people choose to become terrorists are as varied as the reasons other people choose their professions: market conditions, social networks, contact with recruiters, education, and individual preferences. Counter-radicalization programs need to take account—and advantage—of these variations.

Don’t Know Much about Ideology

Terrorists—even those in leadership roles—are often somewhat hazy about their group’s purported objectives. A "questionnaire" (circa 1990-1993) asked Al Qaeda leaders, "What is your position on battle participation in Afghanistan and for what reasons?" There was virtually no agreement among the five responding Al Qaeda leaders (including Osama bin Laden) about Al Qaeda’s goals, calling into question the principal aim of the group.

That lack of agreement about the group’s goals, coupled with the constant shifts in Al Qaeda’s agenda, suggests that we should be skeptical that the group’s principal aim is to achieve its stated goals. Perhaps its actual goal, like that of many organizations, is to satisfy the needs—spiritual, social, financial, and physical—of the group’s members.

In a survey of 516 Guantánamo detainees, researchers at the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point found that knowing another member of Al Qaeda was a better predictor of who became a terrorist than was believing in the idea of jihad. Interestingly, terrorists who claim to be motivated by religious ideology are often ignorant about Islam. Our hosts in Riyadh told us the vast majority of “beneficiaries,” as its administrators call participants, did not have much formal education or proper religious instruction and had only a limited and incomplete understanding of Islam.

Is it in fact possible to counter-radicalize terrorists and their potential recruits?

In the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, second- and third-generation Muslim youth are rebelling against what they perceive as culturally-contaminated, "soft" Islam, as practiced by their parents and promoted in the local mosque. They prefer the "purer" Islam they discover through their studies on the Internet or in some cases, via imams from the Middle East.

Lack of knowledge about Islam makes youth vulnerable to "training" by barely-educated, self-appointed imams. For example, in the Netherlands, the Hofstadt Group—comprised mostly of young Dutch nationals of Moroccan parentage—designed what a police intelligence officer described as a "Do-it-Yourself" version of Islam, based in part on what the group learned about Takfiri ideology on the Internet and in part on the "teachings" of a self-taught Syrian imam who was a former drug dealer.

Such true believers are good candidates for the kind of ideological reeducation that was part of the program of Task Force 134 in Iraq—a task force responsible for overseeing detainees—as well as similar programs in Saudi Arabia and Singapore. A Saudi official told the group of us who visited the Care Rehabilitation Center in Riyadh that the main reason for terrorism was ignorance about the true nature of Islam. Clerics at the center teach that only the legitimate rulers of Islamic states, not individuals such as Osama Bin Laden, can declare a holy war.

They preach against Takfiri ideology and the selective reading of religious texts to justify violence. One participant in the program told us, "Now I understand that I cannot make decisions by reading a single verse. I have to read the whole chapter."

The Saudi government refers to ignorance about the true nature of Islam, and "intellectual abnormality" as "the main reason for terrorism."

In Europe, Muslim youth describe themselves, often accurately, as victims of prejudice both in the workplace and in society more generally. Surveys carried out by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (now subsumed by the Fundamental Rights Agency), showed that minorities and migrants experience greater levels of unemployment, receive lower wages, and are over-represented in the least-desirable jobs.

After the murder of Theo van Gogh, the native Dutch, who are famously proud of their tolerance, grew visibly less so: they started complaining about rising rates of criminality among Dutch Moroccan youth and the rhetoric of radical imams who preach that homosexuality is a sickness or a sin. Rightly perceiving that this growing prejudice against Muslims could become a source of social conflict, local governments and nongovernmental organizations put in place various programs to integrate young immigrants into broader Dutch society.

Group dynamics are as important as social grievances. Young people are sometimes attracted to terrorist movements through social connections, music, fashion, or life-style; only later do they come fully to understand the group’s ideology and goals. Al Qaeda-affiliated groups have been begun using anti-American hip-hop music or "jihad rap" in their recruitment videos.

For example, Abu Mansour al-Amriki has been using hip-hop in the propaganda videos he has made with al Shabab in Somalia. Other music groups promoting violence against the "kufur," or unfaithful, include Soldiers of Allah (whose music is wildly popular, even though the group is now defunct) and Blakstone, a British rap group.

The first- and second- generation Muslim children I interviewed for a study of the sources of radicalization in the Netherlands seemed to think that talking about jihad was cool, in the same way that listening to gangster rap is in some youth circles. Most of these children will not turn to violence, but once youth join an extremist group, the group itself can become an essential part of their identity, maybe even their only community. And so counter-radicalization requires finding new sources of social support for them.

The Saudi program takes great pains to reintegrate participants into the families and communities they belonged to before their radicalization by encouraging family visits and getting the community involved in follow-up after the youth are released. The program rightly assumes that social connections are key to both radicalization and deradicalization.

Then there are economics. "Jihad" can also be a job. There is no correlation between poverty and terrorism if we look globally, at least according to the studies carried out thus far. But that doesn’t mean that poor people, in countries with high levels of unemployment, aren’t particularly vulnerable to recruitment, especially as cannon fodder.

Of the twenty-five thousand suspected insurgents and terrorists detained in Iraq as of 2007, 78 percent were unemployed, and nearly all of them were underemployed, according to General Douglas Stone, who was then in charge of Task Force 134. Because these insurgents took up the "job" of fighting a military occupation, typically targeting soldiers rather than civilians, at least some of them could conceivably "rehabilitate" themselves once the occupation ends.

Christopher Boucek, an expert on Saudi Arabia and Yemen at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, says the Advisory Committee, which helps run the rehabilitation program, has reported that detainees are typically in their twenties and come from large lower- or middle-class families, with only 3 percent coming from high-income backgrounds. Boucek says that according to Saudi officials, one-quarter of the program participants who had participated in jihad had prior criminal histories, approximately half for drug-related offenses. Only 5 percent of detainees were prayer leaders or had other formal religious roles.

For such individuals, job training, career counseling, and assistance in finding productive work may be the best counter-radicalization strategy—at least as important as religious reeducation.

Psychologists who study terrorism have been claiming for decades that there is no terrorist personality and that terrorists are psychologically "normal." Even if that were true, it seems highly unlikely that a person would remain "normal" after having spent several years killing innocents.

Anyone who has ever sat down with a professional terrorist knows, in her bones, that while group dynamics may be the most important factor, individual psychology is not irrelevant, even if we cannot yet measure how. For example, one does not need to spend many days in the Gaza Strip before one begins to get a sense of the impact of constant fear and humiliation—issues that terrorists emphasize in interviews about why they got involved in terrorism. If terrorism can be a source of validation, then surely helping adherents come to terms with the humiliation they have experienced could be part of the "cure." To that end, the Saudi rehabilitation program includes classes in self-esteem.

Some individuals join terrorist groups or movements as true believers in an idea, but evolve, over time, into professional killers. Once that happens, the emotional and material benefits of belonging can become more important than the spiritual benefits of belief. This suggests that some terrorists might develop enduring reasons—perhaps even a compulsion—to pursue violence.

Such individuals should be detained preventively and the keys thrown away, as some governments do with sexual predators. But in cases in which the law precludes indefinite detention, governments may be forced to release suspects. In those instances, officials will have to choose whether to ignore the threat posed by these people or work with other governments to develop tools to reduce the risk of violence. Governments must consider difficult tradeoffs. On the one hand, how great is the chance that graduates of deradicalization programs will return to terrorism or other forms of violent crime?

On the other hand, are incarcerated terrorists recruiting in prison among the ordinary criminals or guards, or can preventive detention, or the prison itself, become a symbol of injustice to potential recruits?

This understanding—that ideology is not the only, or even the principal, reason that individuals are drawn to terrorist groups—needs to be incorporated into our counter-terrorism efforts, especially when we consider counter-radicalization. It also makes clear that even if terrorists achieve their purported objectives, they may stick with the fight for the fun or the profit.

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A consortium of researchers dedicated to improving the understanding of the human causes and consequences of terrorism

Explaining terrorism: causes, processes and consequences.

This volume comprises some of the key essays by Professor Crenshaw, from 1972 to the present-day, on the causes, processes and consequences of terrorism.

Since the early 1970s, scholars and practitioners have tried to explain terrorism and to assess the effectiveness of government responses to the threat. From its beginnings in a small handful of analytical studies, the research field has expanded to thousands of entries, with an enormous spike following the 9/11 attacks. The field of terrorism studies is now impressive in terms of quantity, scope, and variety. Professor Crenshaw had studied terrorism since the late 1960s, well before it was topical, and this selection of her work represents the development of her thought over time in four areas:

• defining terrorism and identifying its causes
• the different methods used to explain terrorism, including strategic, organisational and psychological approaches
• how campaigns of terrorism end
• how governments can effectively contribute to the ending of terrorism.

This collection of essays by one of the pioneering thinkers in the field of terrorism studies will be essential reading for all students of political violence and terrorism, security studies and IR/politics in general.

Publication Information

Crenshaw, Martha. 2011. Explaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes and Consequences. London and New York: Routledge.

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Essay on Terrorism

India has a lengthy history of terrorism. It is a cowardly act by terrorist organisations that want to sabotage the nation's tranquillity. It seeks to instil fear among the population. They seek to maintain a permanent climate of dread among the populace to prevent the nation from prospering. Here are a few sample essays on Terrorism .

100 Words Essay on Terrorism

Terrorism is the use of violence and intimidation in the pursuit of political and personal aims. It is a global phenomenon that has affected countries worldwide, causing harm to innocent civilians, damaging economies, and destabilizing governments. The causes of terrorism are complex and can include religious extremism, political oppression, and economic inequality.

Terrorist groups use a variety of tactics, including bombings, kidnappings, and hijackings, to achieve their goals. They often target symbols of government and military power, as well as civilians in crowded public spaces. The impact of terrorism on society is devastating, leading to loss of life, injury, and psychological trauma.

Combating terrorism requires a multifaceted approach, including intelligence gathering, law enforcement, and military action. Additionally, addressing underlying issues such as poverty and political marginalization is crucial in preventing the radicalization of individuals and the emergence of terrorist groups.

200 Words Essay on Terrorism

Terrorism is a complex and ever-evolving threat that affects countries and communities around the world. It involves the use of violence and intimidation to achieve political or ideological goals. The causes of terrorism can vary, but often include religious extremism, political oppression, and economic inequality.

To truly understand the impact of terrorism, it's important to consider not only the physical harm caused by terrorist attacks but also the emotional and psychological toll it takes on individuals and communities. The loss of life and injury caused to innocent civilians is devastating and can leave families and communities reeling for years to come. In addition, terrorism can cause physical damage to infrastructure and buildings, as well as economic disruption, leading to decreased tourism and investment.

To effectively combat terrorism, it's important to take a holistic approach that addresses not only the immediate threat of terrorist attacks but also the underlying issues that can lead to radicalization and the emergence of terrorist groups. This can include addressing poverty and economic inequality, promoting political and religious tolerance, and providing support and resources to individuals and communities at risk of radicalization.

It's also important to remember that the fight against terrorism is not just the responsibility of governments and law enforcement agencies, but also of individuals and communities. By promoting understanding and compassion, and by standing up against hate and extremism, we can all play a role in preventing terrorism and creating a more peaceful world.

500 Words Essay on Terrorism

According to a United Nations Security Council report from November 2004, terrorism is any act that is "intended to result in the death or serious bodily harm of civilians or non-combatants to intimidate the population or to compel the government or an international organisation to do or abstain from doing any act."

The Origins of Terrorism

The development or production of massive numbers of machine guns, atomic bombs, hydrogen bombs, nuclear weapons, missiles, and other weapons fuels terrorism. Rapid population growth, political, social, and economic problems, widespread discontent with the political system, a lack of education, racism, economic inequality, and linguistic discrepancies are all important contributors to the emergence of terrorism. Sometimes one uses terrorism to take a position and stick with it.

The Effects Of Terrorism

People become afraid of terrorism and feel unsafe in their nation. Terrorist attacks result in the destruction of millions of items, the death of thousands of innocent people, and the slaughter of animals. After seeing a terrorist incident, people become less inclined to believe in humanity, which breeds more terrorists.

Different forms of terrorism can be found both domestically and overseas. Today, governments worldwide are working hard to combat terrorism, which is an issue in India and our neighbouring nations. The 9/11 World Trade Centre attack is considered the worst terrorist act ever. Osama bin Laden attacked the tallest building in the world’s most powerful country, causing millions of casualties and the death of thousands of people.

The major incidents of the terrorist attack in India are—

12 March 1993 - A series of 13 bombs go off, killing 257

14 March 2003 - A bomb goes off in a train in Mulund, killing 10

29 October 2005 Delhi bombings

2005 Ram Janmabhoomi attack in Ayodhya

2006 Varanasi bombings

11 July 2006 - A series of seven bombs go off in trains, killing

26 November 2008 to 29 November 2008 - A series of coordinated attacks killed at least 170.

According to this data, India has experienced an upsurge in terrorist activity since 1980. India has fought four wars against terrorism , losing more than 6000 persons in total. Already, we have lost around 70000 citizens. Furthermore, we lost over 9000 security staff. In this country, about 6 lakh individuals have undergone.

Agencies In India Fighting Terrorism

There are numerous organisations working to rid our nation of terrorism. These organizations operate continuously, from the municipal to the national levels. To stop local terrorist activity, police forces have various divisions.

The police departments have a specialized intelligence and anti-terrorism division that is in charge of eliminating Naxalites and other terrorist organizations. The military is in charge of bombing terrorist targets outside of our country. These departments engage in counterinsurgency and other similar operations to dismantle various terrorist organisations.

There are numerous organisations that work to prevent terrorism. Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) , National Investigation Agency (NIA) , and Research and Analysis Wing are a few of the top organizations (RAW) . These are some of the main organizations working to rid India of terrorism.

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• > The Cambridge History of Terrorism
• > The History of Terrorism in Pakistan

Book contents

• The Cambridge History of Terrorism
• Copyright page
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• Part I Introduction
• Part II Frameworks and Definitions
• Part III Historical Case Studies in Terrorism
• 7 Terrorism in Israel/Palestine
• 8 Terrorism in the Basque Country
• 9 Terrorism in African History
• 10 The History of Terrorism in Pakistan
• 11 Political Violence in Ireland
• 12 Terrorism in the Russian Empire
• 13 Terrorism in Post-Soviet Russia
• 14 Terrorism in the Netherlands
• 15 Terrorism: An American Story
• 16 Political Violence and Terrorism in Colombia
• 17 The Paths of Terrorism in Peru
• 18 Aiqtihams (Whirlwind Attacks)
• 19 Transnational Connections
• Part IV Thematic Essays
• Part V Conclusion

10 - The History of Terrorism in Pakistan

from Part III - Historical Case Studies in Terrorism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2021

Analysis of terrorism in Pakistan has often suffered from simplifications, generalisations and stereotyping. Seen either as an extension of global Islamic extremism or worse a nursery that breeds this transnational threat, the country has regularly been ostracised and chastised by the international community. Since Islamic extremism has widely been regarded as a malevolent force that can only be perceived in apocalyptic terms, Pakistan therefore has attracted the attention of a number of alarmists and doomsday prophets. This negative attention has subsequently produced a discourse on one of the most dangerous countries in world that narrowly focuses on the security threat posed by Pakistan. Such superficial and shallow engagement with the problem is deeply unfair, as it selfishly presents terrorism in the country as a danger to the rest of the world and cruelly ignores its primary affectees – the people of Pakistan.

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• The History of Terrorism in Pakistan
• By Dayyab Gillani
• Edited by Richard English , Queen's University Belfast
• Book: The Cambridge History of Terrorism
• Online publication: 07 May 2021
• Chapter DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108556248.010

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Defining terrorism is a tedious and confusing task as there is a lack of consensus at the international level. However several efforts have been made in this regard.

Table of Contents

Defining Terrorism

An agreed, comprehensive definition of terrorism has never been created by the international community. The United Nations’ attempts to define the term during the 1970s and 1980s failed mostly because of disagreements among its members over the use of violence in conflicts over self-determination and national liberation. Due to these differences, a conclusion cannot be reached.

According to the FBI: “Terrorism is the unlawful use of force or violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or social objectives.”

Causes of Terrorism

There are many causes for terrorism such as:

Political causes

Insurgency and guerrilla warfare, a type of organized conflict, were the contexts in which terrorism was first theorized. A non-state army or organization committing political violence. Because they dislike the current system, they pick terrorism. They oppose the current social structure and wish to change it.

Religious reasons

In the 1990s, experts started to claim that a brand-new sort of terrorism propelled by religious zeal was on the increase. They cited groups like Al Qaeda, the Japanese cult Aum Shinrikyo, and Christian identity movements. Religious concepts like martyrdom were viewed as especially hazardous.

Socio-Economic

According to socio-economic theories, persons who experience different types of deprivation are more likely to turn to terrorism or are more open to being recruited by groups that use terrorist tactics. Lack of political freedom, lack of access to education, and poverty are a few examples.

Types of Terrorism

The following are the various types of terrorism.

Ethno-Nationalist Terrorism

According to Daniel Byman, ethnic terrorism is the premeditated use of violence by a subnational ethnic group to further its cause. Such violence typically aims at either the establishment of a separate State or elevating one ethnic group above another.

Activities by Tamil nationalist groups in Srilanka are an example of Ethno-Nationalist terrorism.

Hoffman claims that those who engage in terrorism who are either wholly or partially driven by religious imperative view violence as a sacramental or heavenly responsibility. Religious terrorism is more destructive in nature because it adopts different justifications and modes of legitimization than other terrorist organizations.

Ideology oriented

Several ideologies have been used to legitimize terrorism. They include:

Left-Wing Extremism

The idea focuses on overthrowing the state through an armed struggle and establishing a communist state.

Right Wing Terrorism

Right-wing organizations typically aim to preserve the status quo or go back to a scenario from the past that they believe should have been preserved.

They might compel the government to seize a piece of land or to step in to defend the rights of a minority that is being “oppressed” in a neighboring nation.

State Sponsored Terrorism

State-sponsored terrorism and proxy war are as old as organized warfare itself. According to Walter Laqueur, these customs were in place in antiquity in the Eastern Empires, Rome and Byzantium, Asia, and Europe.

Impacts of Terrorism

It seriously jeopardizes global peace and security and undercuts the fundamental principles of growth, peace, and humanity. Terrorist activities not only have a catastrophic human cost in terms of lives lost or permanently changed, but they also endanger political stability and economic and social advancement.

Often, terrorist attacks disregard international boundaries.CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives) materials are used in terrorist attacks that have devastating effects on infrastructure and communities.

Measures To Counter Terrorism

• The United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) is responsible for leading and coordinating the UN system’s efforts to prevent and combat terrorism and violent extremism worldwide.
• Under UNOCT, the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) encourages global collaboration in the fight against terrorism and assists the Member States in putting the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy into practice.
• The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime’s (UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) is a key player in global efforts.
• International standards are established by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) , a global organization that monitors money laundering and terrorist funding with the goal of preventing these illicit actions and the harm they do to society.

A combined effort at the international level is the need of the hour to tackle the perils of terrorism. Terrorism of any form is unacceptable in a civilized society.

Article written by: Vivek Rajasekharan

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Examining the Causes and Effects of Terrorism

• Article contents
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Victor Asal, Examining the Causes and Effects of Terrorism, International Studies Review , Volume 13, Issue 2, June 2011, Pages 318–321, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2486.2011.01017.x

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Before 2001, the circle of people studying terrorism and counterterrorism was a fairly small one being led by people like Martha Crenshaw, Bruce Hoffman, Walter Enders, Todd Sandler, and Brian Jenkins and could be found in a small set of journals. The circle studying these topics using quantitative methods was smaller still ( Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley's 2006 review of the literature found only 3% of articles were empirically based), with much of it being done by a small number of scholars such as Enders, Sandler, Leonard Weinberg and their collaborators ( Silke 2004; Lum et al. 2006). For terrorism research as a whole, this changed radically after 9/11. Lum, Kennedy, and Sherley, surveying more than 14000 articles about terrorism written between 1971 and 2003 for a Campbell Collaboration literature review, found that more than half of these articles were written after the attacks (2006, p. 7). The amount of this research that is quantitatively based in whole or in part, while growing, is still a very small part of this growth ( Lum et al. 2006). The two books reviewed here are part of this growing trend but focus on very different parts of the world and on a very different research questions.

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• Topic 1. Contemporary issues relating to conditions conducive both to the spread of terrorism and the rule of law
• Topic 2. Contemporary issues relating to the right to life
• Topic 3. Contemporary issues relating to foreign terrorist fighters
• Topic 4. Contemporary issues relating to non-discrimination and fundamental freedoms
• Module 16: Linkages between Organized Crime and Terrorism
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• 1. The Many Forms of Violence against Children
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Module 14: Victims of Terrorism

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E4J University Module Series: Counter-Terrorism

Introduction and learning outcomes.

• Definition of 'victim'

Effects of terrorism: A trauma and victimological perspective

• Access to Justice (victim's perspective)
• Recognition of the victim within the judicial process
• Legal framework
• International and regional human rights instruments
• International human rights law
• Regional human rights instruments
• Crime prevention and criminal justice mechanisms
• International and regional instruments governing victims of terrorism
• National approaches
• Key challenges in securing reparation

Exercises and case studies

Possible class structure, core reading, advanced reading, student assessment, additional teaching tools.

Published in July 2018.

  This module is a resource for lecturers  

Before considering the applicable legal frameworks and some key recurring issues for victims of terrorist attacks, it is important to identify some of the effects that the resultant violations and trauma may have on the victims themselves. Sometimes, in the counter terrorism context, such factors are not always as prominent as they should be, even though, ultimately, a primary objective of rule of law based counter-terrorism efforts is to prevent victimization.  In order to fully provide access to justice for victims, however, an understanding of the harm they have suffered, and the needs that arise because of that harm, is essential.

Notably, the impacts identified in this section are not intended to represent the specific experiences of all survivors of terrorist acts, but rather are descriptive of a range of responses which survivors might experience. Traumatic responses will differ between individuals and may be influenced by several factors, including the age and gender of the survivor, together with any political, religious or cultural affiliations which they hold (Baker, 1992, p. 83; Spiric et al., 2010, pp. 411-412). In addition, the socio-political-cultural context within which the trauma occurs will inform the way in which survivors interpret and respond to their experiences (Aroche and Coello, 2004, p. 56). These factors are discussed further in the context of the interrelationship between individual and societal trauma and are demonstrated through a case study example of the use of torture.

The potential effects on victims of terrorism can be devastating and multiple; it may be experienced at many interrelated levels - individually, collectively and societally. From a victimological perspective, there are three circles of 'personal victimization' which are determined in accordance with their proximity to the direct victim: " primary or first order victimization , experienced by those who suffer harm directly, whether it is injury, loss or death; secondary or second order victimization , experienced by family members, relatives or friends of primary victims; and tertiary or third order victimization , experienced by those who observe the victimization, are exposed to it through TV or radio coverage of the victimization, or help and attend to victims" (Erez, 2006, p. 20). (Italics added).

Unlike the effects of accidental injury or disease, research on the effects of crime has stressed mental, psychological and social effects, in contrast to physical or financial effects. This is attributable to the fact that crime is "qualitatively different from being the victim of an accident or disease, because it includes someone deliberately or recklessly harming you" (Shapland and Hall, 2007, p. 178). For the sake of completeness, both the potential physical and psychological consequences of terrorism are highlighted here. (See e.g. General Assembly, Human Rights Council report 19/38, para. 4).

Trauma and the individual

The physical consequences of terrorism-related acts and violations can include broken bones, soft tissue injuries, disability, long-term, chronic pain and sensory disturbance. Victims may experience visceral symptoms, including cardiovascular and respiratory difficulties, intestinal and urological problems and genital complaints (IRCT, 2009(a), Part C, sects. I, II and VI). They may also suffer somatic symptoms, including headaches and back pain (Hoge, 2007). Where abuses have included rape or other forms of sexual violence, survivors may also experience gynaecological, rectal and internal haemorrhaging (Tompkins, 1995, p. 857). Medical consequences can include the contraction of sexually transmitted disease including HIV and other chronic infections, cervical cancer (directly linked to HPV, or Genital Human Papilloma Virus infection, see Ghoborah, Huth and Russet, pp. 198-199), fistula, pregnancy, miscarriage, throat agitation and reproduction problems, together with somatic symptoms such as chronic pelvic pain and hormone dysfunction (Ingeborg, 2005, pp. 73-75; Bell, 2005, p. 117; Clifford, 2008).

At a psychological level, trauma can engender "a metamorphosis of the psyche… mental decomposition and collapse" (Vinar, 2005, p. 313). This in turn can affect a survivor's sense of self (Kira, 2002, p. 54), producing identity disorientation and essentially eliciting "the devastation of one's core identity" (Rauchfleisch, 1996, cited in Hárdi and Kroó, 2011, p. 133). Man-made trauma, such as that associated with terrorism, can shatter core beliefs, including belief in the world as a just place ('the existential dilemma') (Herlihy and Turner, 2006, p. 84; Ramsay, Grost-Unsworth and Turner, 1993, p. 55), in others as kind and trustworthy individuals, and in the inviolability of the self (IRCT, 2009(b), pp. 6-7; Agger, 1992, p. 13). Survivors of terrorist acts - such as hostage taking, hijacking or kidnapping - may experience fear, shock, anxiety, shame, guilt and self-blame, anger, hostility, rage and resentment (Schmid, 2006, p. 7), together with a sense of disempowerment and helplessness. Survivors may also suffer grief for the loss of others and the self, anxiety, depression (including suicidal ideation), emotional numbness and difficulties in recollection (Brewin, 2007, pp. 227-228; Duke et al., 2008, pp. 310-320; Smith and Patel, 2008). Some victims may also experience post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) which, in addition to depressive symptoms, may also include intrusive phenomena such as flashbacks and nightmares, and which may persist for months or years (Shapland and Hall, 2007, p. 178).

Notably, while PTSD is one of the most commonly diagnosed mental health disorders in survivors of atrocities, the diagnosis itself is controversial amongst some clinical experts and there is disagreement as to its cross-cultural applicability (Hárdi and Kroó, 2011, p. 136; Becker, 2003; OHCHR Professional Training Series No. 8/Rev.1, para. 237). Others criticize the diagnosis because it does not reflect the political, societal or cultural context of abuse suffered by victims (Herman, 1997, pp. 118-120; Aroche and Coello, 2004), the limited list of symptoms which the diagnosis encompasses and its perceived inability to encapsulate and reflect the full symptomology of the survivor (Silove, 1999, p. 201; Hárdi and Kroó, 2011). For others still, PTSD is the 'medicalization' of what they understand to be a natural response to a deeply traumatic experience (Becker, 2003).

Research conducted on the effect of terrorist attacks on victims has revealed that acts of terrorist violence often produce high proportions of significantly affected victims, i.e. that they tend to be at the higher end on the scale of effects. For example, "[a] longitudinal psychiatric evaluation of 32 victims of a bomb attack in a Paris subway in December 1996 found 39% were rated as having PTSD after six months, with 25% still having PTSD at 32 months" (Shapland and Hall, 2007, p. 200, citing Jehel, 2003). Similarly, a study conducted by Bleich et al. concerning responses of victims of terrorism in Israel, reported that of those who responded to questions about emotional harm, over three quarters (77%) had at least some traumatic stress symptoms and almost one-tenth (9.4%) had acute stress, with over half (59%) reporting feelings of depression. It was found that the level of exposure and objective risk of an attack were not related to stress (Erez, 2006, p. 93). One explanation for this is that any victim of crime may suffer consequential effects as a response, which includes "changes in perceived risk of future victimisation" (Shapland and Hall, 2007, p. 178). As Schmid has observed, "[t]he degree of terror as well as the resilience of the individual survivor play a role [in the degree of symptoms experienced as a result of terrorist attacks." (Schmid, 2006, p. 7).

Where abuse has included forms of sexual violence, survivors may also experience sexual dysfunction, fear of intimacy, self-loathing and rejection of their body, which in turn can engender self-injurious behaviour (Yohani and Hagen, 2010, pp. 208-209).

Where injuries and abuses are perpetrated within an ongoing conflict setting, or where there is otherwise insecurity and/or destruction of the healthcare infrastructure, physical and psychological symptoms may be exacerbated by prevailing unsanitary conditions and a lack of access to clinical services or necessary medication. In the case of survivors of rape, clinical needs may go unreported due to shame and fears of social stigmatisation (Andrews, Qian and Valentine, 2002, reported in Bogner, Herlihy and Brewin, 2007), leaving survivors at risk of further injury and/or death because of unsafe, non-sterile abortion practices, infection, and suicidal ideation.

Trauma and society

In addition to the psychological impact of terrorism-related violations experienced at an individual level, affected societies may suffer collective trauma which is particularly the case where attacks are targeted against a particular group or community. (See Alexander, 2012, who explores the development of social and cultural trauma; see also Weine, 1998, p. 1721). In such a situation, the sense of group identity and allegiance is heightened (Aroche and Coello, 2004, p. 56), producing collective solidarity, identity and mutual support (Modvig and Jaranson, 2004, p. 37). Because of that heightened allegiance, when the group, or members of it, are attacked, it may collectively experience symptoms of psychological trauma (De Jong, 2004, p. 165 and 168).

Manifestations of trauma at a societal level can include varying forms of community dysfunction. Abuses such as torture or ethnically-targeted violence may create "an order based on imminent pervasive threat, fear, terror, and inhibition,… a state of generalized insecurity, terror, lack of confidence, and rupture of the social fabric" (Lecic and Bakalic, 2004, p. 97; Kira, 2002; IRCT, 2009(a)). Societies that witness the perpetration of atrocities such as war rape and other forms of violence against community and family members may experience severe trauma (Hagen and Yohani, 2010, p. 19). Collectively, communities enter into shock, which is compounded by grief for the loss of the victim through either death, the debilitating physical and psychological impact of the violation, or, in the case of rape, familial and community rejection (Yohani and Hagen, 2010, pp. 208 and 214; Hagen and Yohani, 2010, p. 19).

Linking individual and societal trauma

Whilst the perpetration of atrocities can generate trauma at the individual and societal levels, the respective nature of individual and collective trauma may differ. Individual and collective trauma reactions can be influenced by factors such as the specific targeting of abuse and the duration or intensity of the stressor. These factors in turn affect the degree of life threat - i.e. the assessed risk of surviving the event - and hence the resulting trauma response. In particular, individually-targeted violations are more likely to represent a threat of imminent death than a repressive, longer-term and chronic stressor targeted at a specific community (Modvig and Jaranson, 2004, p. 37). Notably, while mass conflict or a prevailing threat of terrorist attack is recognized as having a widespread, psychological impact upon society, its effects will not necessarily be uniform, but will be dependent upon the extent to which specific groups were affected (Aroche and Coello, 2004, p. 57).

Far from being conceptualized discretely, however, individual and societal forms of trauma are understood as interlinked and interdependent trauma responses. Gross violations of human rights can affect the individual not only as an individual per se , but also as a member of a community or of society more generally. In particular, community or societal allegiance or affiliation, as aspects of social and cultural identity, form part of the individual's personal identity system. Clinical literature describes a 'layering' of trauma, reflecting to some extent the 'victimization circles' referred to above, such that an individual, as a member of a particular group or of society more broadly, may experience the first phase of the traumatisation process with the onset or increase in group repression or persecution (which may include elements of social and political change). The period during which the individual personally becomes a victim of serious human rights violations marks the second phase in the traumatisation process. A third phase - characterized by dislocation and exile - arises where the victim is forced to flee their home to avoid the threat of harm (van der Veer, 1998, p. 5). Moreover, the societal response to individual and collective trauma has a significant impact on the rehabilitation of individual survivors.

The combined impact of these elements can be illustrated by the example of torture. The issue of conflict-related sexual violence is discussed separately, later in this Module, and illustrates the interrelationship between individual and collective aspects of trauma.

Broader human rights impact

Victims, whether directly or indirectly affected, may suffer social effects, "involving changes to the victim's lifestyle, normally to avoid the situation or context in which the offence occurred. Social effects are very disruptive to the victim's lifestyle and may affect earning potential" (Shapland and Hall, 2007, p. 178). Trauma can also "impact upon the roles of parent, spouse, employee, employer, citizen etc." (Baker, 1992, p. 86), engendering a deterioration in social, educational and occupational functioning (IRCT, 2009(a), p. 7), leading to social withdrawal and isolation, as well as impacting upon societal and cultural aspects of personal identity (Kira, 2002).

In addition, there are often financial costs of terrorism that are directly associated with individuals wanting to take additional crime preventive measures. There can also be wider socio-economic effects associated with terrorism, such as businesses closing and, therefore, an increase in poverty and unemployment. In turn, as result of increased levels of poverty and unemployment in one study this was linked to an increase in property crime. An atmosphere of political violence as underpins terrorism, may also lead to an increase of violence within the affected society (Erez, 2006, p. 93). Research has further documented the powerful anxiety-inducing effect of the media when reporting on traumatic events such as terrorist attacks which, in turn, may have an adverse negative psychological effect on members of the wider population. Severe circumstances such as an active threat of terrorism "tend to increase the prevalence, and possibly also change the impact, of victimisation" (Shapland and Hall, 2007, p. 199).

Furthermore, there are several other ways in which terrorist activities and threats may have a wider impact on a person's life and community which impairs or prevents their enjoyment of other economic, social and cultural rights. Some of the primary ones are examined in below.

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Before the terrorist attacks in the United States on 11 September 2001, the subject of terrorism did not loom large in philosophical discussion. Philosophical literature in English amounted to a few monographs and a single collection of papers devoted solely, or largely, to questions to do with terrorism. Articles on the subject in philosophy journals were few and far between; neither of the two major philosophy encyclopedias had an entry. The attacks of September 11 and their aftermath put terrorism on the philosophical agenda: it is now the topic of numerous books, journal articles, special journal issues, and conferences.

While social sciences study the causes, main varieties, and consequences of terrorism and history traces and attempts to explain the way terrorism has evolved over time, philosophy focuses on two fundamental—and related—questions. The first is conceptual: What is terrorism? The second is moral: Can terrorism ever be morally justified?

Philosophers have offered a range of positions on both questions. With regard to the problem of defining terrorism, the dominant approach seeks to acknowledge the core meaning “terrorism” has in common use. Terrorism is understood as a type of violence. Many definitions highlight the experience of terror or fear as the proximate aim of that violence. Neither violence nor terror is inflicted for its own sake, but rather for the sake of a further aim such as coercion, or some more specific political objective. But there are also definitions that sever the conceptual connection of terrorism with violence or with terror. With regard to the moral standing of terrorism, philosophers differ both on how that is to be determined and what the determination is. Consequentialists propose to judge terrorism, like everything else, in light of its consequences. Nonconsequentialists argue that its moral status is not simply a matter of what consequences, on balance, terrorism has, but is rather determined, whether solely or largely, by what it is. Positions on the morality of terrorism range from justification when its consequences on balance are good, or when some deontological moral requirements are satisfied, to its absolute, or almost absolute, rejection.

Philosophers working in applied philosophy have also sought to complement the discussions of terrorism in general with case studies—studies of the role and rights and wrongs of terrorism in particular conflicts, such as “the Troubles” in Northern Ireland (George 2000; Simpson 2004; Shanahan 2009), the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (Ashmore 1997; Gordon and Lopez 2000; Primoratz 2006; Kapitan 2008; Law (ed.) 2008), and the bombing of German cities in World War II (Grayling 2006; Primoratz 2010).

1.1.1 The reign of terror

1.1.2 propaganda by the deed, 1.1.3 the state as terrorist, 1.1.4 terrorists and freedom fighters, 1.2.1 violence and terror, 1.2.2 wide and narrow definitions, 1.2.3 some idiosyncratic definitions, 2.1 complicity of the victims, 2.2.1 terrorism justified, 2.2.2 terrorism unjustified, 2.3.1 basic human rights and distributive justice, 2.3.2 supreme emergency and moral disaster, 2.3.3 terrorism absolutely wrong, books, book chapters, and articles, special journal issues, other internet resources, related entries, 1. the conceptual issue.

The history of terrorism is probably coextensive with the history of political violence. The term “terrorism”, however, is relatively recent: it has been in use since late 18th century. Its use has repeatedly shifted in some significant respects. Moreover, in contemporary political discourse the word is often employed as a polemical term whose strong emotional charge occludes its somewhat vague descriptive meaning. All this tends to get in the way of sustained rational discussion of the nature and moral standing of terrorism and the best ways of coping with it.

1.1 “Terrorism” from the French Revolution to the early 21st century

When it first entered public discourse in the West, the word “terrorism” meant the reign of terror the Jacobins imposed in France from the fall of 1793 to the summer of 1794. Its ultimate aim was the reshaping of both society and human nature. That was to be achieved by destroying the old regime, suppressing all enemies of the revolutionary government, and inculcating and enforcing civic virtue. A central role in attaining these objectives was accorded to revolutionary tribunals which had wide authority, were constrained by very few rules of procedure, and saw their task as carrying out revolutionary policy rather than meting out legal justice of the more conventional sort. They went after “enemies of the people”, actual or potential, proven or suspected; the law on the basis of which they were operating “enumerated just who the enemies of the people might be in terms so ambiguous as to exclude no one” (Carter 1989: 142). The standard punishment was death. Trials and executions were meant to strike terror in the hearts of all who lacked civic virtue; the Jacobins believed that was a necessary means of consolidating the new regime. This necessity provided both the rationale of the reign of terror and its moral justification. As Robespierre put it, terror was but “an emanation of virtue”; without it, virtue remained impotent. Accordingly, the Jacobins applied the term to their own actions and policies quite unabashedly, without any negative connotations.

Yet the term “terrorism” and its cognates soon took on very strong negative connotations. Critics of the excesses of the French Revolution had watched its reign with horror from the start. Terrorism came to be associated with drastic abuse of power and related to the notion of tyranny as rule based on fear, a recurring theme in political philosophy.

In the second half of the 19th century, there was a shift in both descriptive and evaluative meaning of the term. Disillusioned with other methods of political struggle, some anarchist and other revolutionary organizations, and subsequently some nationalist groups too, took to political violence. They had come to the conclusion that words were not enough, and what was called for were deeds: extreme, dramatic deeds that would strike at the heart of the unjust, oppressive social and political order, generate fear and despair among its supporters, demonstrate its vulnerability to the oppressed, and ultimately force political and social change. This was “propaganda by the deed”, and the deed was for the most part assassination of royalty or highly placed government officials. Unlike the Jacobins’ reign of terror, which operated in a virtually indiscriminate way, this type of terrorism—as both advocates and critics called it—was largely employed in a highly discriminate manner. This was especially true of Russian revolutionary organizations such as People’s Will or Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR): they held that it was morally justified to assassinate a government official only if his complicity in the oppressive regime was significant enough for him to deserve to die, and the assassination would make an important contribution to the struggle. Their violence steered clear of other, uninvolved or insufficiently involved persons. Some instances of “propaganda by the deed” carried out by French and Spanish anarchists in the 1880s and 1890s were indiscriminate killings of common citizens; but that was an exception, rather than the rule. The perpetrators and some of those sympathetic to their cause claimed those acts were nevertheless morally legitimate, whether as retribution (exacted on the assumption that no member of the ruling class was innocent) or as a means necessary for the overthrow of the unjust order. Accordingly, in their parlance, too, the term “terrorism” implied no censure. When used by others, it conveyed a strong condemnation of the practice.

The terrorism employed by both sides in the Russian Revolution and Civil War was in important respects a throwback to that of the Jacobins. The government set up in Russia by the victorious Bolsheviks was totalitarian. So was the Nazi rule in Germany. Both sought to impose total political control on society. Such a radical aim could only be pursued by a similarly radical method: by terrorism directed by an extremely powerful political police at an atomized and defenseless population. Its success was due largely to its arbitrary character—to the unpredictability of its choice of victims. In both countries, the regime first suppressed all opposition; when it no longer had any opposition to speak of, political police took to persecuting “potential” and “objective opponents”. In the Soviet Union, it was eventually unleashed on victims chosen at random. Totalitarian terrorism is the most extreme and sustained type of state terrorism. As Hannah Arendt put it, “terror is the essence of totalitarian domination”, and the concentration camp is “the true central institution of totalitarian organizational power” (Arendt 1958: 464, 438). While students of totalitarianism talked of terrorism as its method of rule, representatives of totalitarian regimes, sensitive to the pejorative connotation of the word, portrayed the practice as defense of the state from internal enemies.

However, state terrorism is not the preserve of totalitarian regimes. Some non-totalitarian states have resorted to terrorism against enemy civilians as a method of warfare, most notably when the RAF and USAAF bombed German and Japanese cities in World War II (see Lackey 2004). Those who designed and oversaw these campaigns never publicly described them as “terror bombing”, but that was how they often referred to them in internal communications.

After the heyday of totalitarian terrorism in the 1930s and 1940s, internal state terrorism continued to be practiced by military dictatorships in many parts of the world, albeit in a less sustained and pervasive way. But the type of terrorism that came to the fore in the second half of the 20th century and in early 21st century is that employed by insurgent organizations. Many movements for national liberation from colonial rule resorted to it, either as the main method of struggle or as a tactic complementing guerrilla warfare. So did some separatist movements. Some organizations driven by extreme ideologies, in particular on the left, took to terrorism as the way of trying to destroy what they considered an unjust, oppressive economic, social and political system. This type of terrorism is, by and large, indiscriminate in its choice of target: it attacks men and women of whatever political (or apolitical) views, social class, and walk of life; young and old, adults and children. It shoots at people, or blows them up by planting bombs, in office buildings, markets, cafes, cinemas, places of religious worship, on buses or planes, or in other vulnerable public places. It also takes people hostage, by hijacking planes and in other ways.

As “terrorism” has by now acquired a very strong pejorative meaning, no-one applies the word to their own actions or to actions and campaigns of those they sympathize with. Insurgents practicing terrorism portray their actions as struggle for liberation and seek to be considered and treated as soldiers rather than terrorists or criminals. They often depict their enemy—the alien government, or the agencies of the social, political and economic system—as the “true terrorists”. For them, the test of terrorism is not what is done , but rather what the ultimate aim of doing it is. If the ultimate aim is liberation or justice, the violence used in order to attain it is not terrorism, whereas the violence aiming at maintaining oppression or injustice, or some of the “structural violence” embodying it, is. On the other hand, governments tend to paint all insurgent violence with the brush of “terrorism”. Government spokespersons and pro-government media typically assume that terrorism is by definition something done by non-state agents, and that a state can never be guilty of terrorism (although it can sponsor terrorist organizations). For them, the test of terrorism is not what is done , but who does it. When a state agency uses violence, it is an act of war, or reprisal, or defense of the security of the state and its citizens; when an insurgent group does the same, it is terrorism. Under these circumstances, one person’s terrorist is indeed another’s freedom fighter, and public debate about terrorism is largely conducted at cross purposes and to little effect. Attempts of the United Nations to propose a definition of “terrorism” that could be accepted by all states and embedded in international law so far have been frustrated by the same sort of relativism. Islamic countries would accept no definition that allowed national liberation movements in the Middle East and Kashmir to be portrayed as terrorist, whereas Western countries would accept no definition that allowed for state agencies to be guilty of terrorism.

1.2 Two core traits of terrorism and two types of definition

The evaluative meaning of “terrorism” has shifted considerably more than once. So has its descriptive meaning, but to a lesser degree. Whatever else the word may have meant, its ordinary use over more than two centuries has typically indicated two things: violence and intimidation (the causing of great fear or terror, terrorizing). The dominant approach to the conceptual question in philosophical literature reflects this. Terrorism is usually understood as a type of violence. This violence is not blind or sadistic, but rather aims at intimidation and at some further political, social, or religious goal or, more broadly, at coercion.

That is how (political) “terrorism” is defined by Per Bauhn in the first philosophical book-length study in English:

The performance of violent acts, directed against one or more persons, intended by the performing agent to intimidate one or more persons and thereby to bring about one or more of the agent’s political goals (Bauhn 1989: 28).

Another good example of a mainstream definition is provided in C.A.J. Coady’s article on terrorism in the Encyclopedia of Ethics :

The tactic of intentionally targeting non-combatants [or non-combatant property, when significantly related to life and security] with lethal or severe violence … meant to produce political results via the creation of fear (Coady 2001: 1697).

Yet another example is the definition proposed by Igor Primoratz:

The deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use, against innocent people, with the aim of intimidating some other people into a course of action they otherwise would not take (Primoratz 2013: 24).

These definitions put aside both the question of who the actor is and the question of what their ultimate objectives are, and focus on what is done and what the proximate aim of doing it is. They present terrorism as a way of acting that could be adopted by different agents and serve various ultimate objectives (most, but perhaps not all of them, political). It can be employed by states or by non-state agents, and may promote national liberation or oppression, revolutionary or conservative causes (and possibly pursue some nonpolitical aims as well). One can be a terrorist and a freedom fighter; terrorism is not the monopoly of enemies of freedom. One can hold high government or military office and design or implement a terrorist campaign; terrorism is not the preserve of insurgents. In this way much of the relativism concerning who is and who is not a terrorist that has plagued contemporary public debate (see 1.1.4 above) can be overcome.

Beyond concurring that violence and intimidation constitute the core of terrorism, the definitions quoted above differ in several respects. Does only actual violence count, or do threats of violence also qualify? Must terrorist violence be directed against life and limb, or does violence against (some) property also count? Does terrorism always seek to attain some political goal, or can there be non-political (e.g. criminal) terrorism? All these points are minor. There is also one major difference: while Coady and Primoratz define terrorism as violence against non-combatants or innocent people, respectively, Bauhn’s definition includes no such restriction. Definitions of the former type can be termed “narrow”, and those of the latter sort “wide”. Philosophical literature on terrorism abounds in instances of both types.

Should we adopt a wide or a narrow definition? A wide definition encompasses the entire history of “terrorism” from the Jacobins to the present, and is more in accord with current ordinary use. A narrow definition departs from much ordinary use by restricting terrorist violence to that directed at non-combatants or innocent persons. Thus it leaves out most of 19th century “propaganda by the deed” and political violence perpetrated by Russian revolutionaries which they themselves and the public called terrorist.

For these reasons, historians of terrorism normally work with a wide definition, and social scientists do so much of the time. But philosophers may well prefer a narrow definition. They focus on the moral standing of terrorism and need a definition that is particularly helpful in moral discourse. Morally speaking, surely there is a difference—for some, a world of difference—between planting a bomb in a government building and killing a number of highly placed officials of (what one considers) an unjust and oppressive government, and planting a bomb in a tea shop and killing a random collection of common citizens, including children. While both acts raise serious moral issues, these issues are not identical, and running them together under the same heading of “terrorism” will likely hamper, rather than help, discerning moral assessment.

Narrow definitions are revisionary, but (unlike those discussed in the next section) not implausibly so. They focus on the traits of terrorism that cause most of us to view the practice with deep moral repugnance: (i) violence (ii) against non-combatants (or, alternatively, against innocent people) for the sake of (iii) intimidation (and, on some definitions, (iv) coercion). In highlighting (ii), they relate the issue of terrorism to the ethics of war and one of the fundamental principles of just war theory, that of non-combatant immunity. They help distinguish terrorism from acts of war proper and political assassination, which do not target non-combatants or common citizens. It does not matter very much whether the victims of terrorism are described as “non-combatants” or “innocent people”, as each term is used in a technical sense, and both refer to those who have not lost their immunity against lethal or other extreme violence by being directly involved in, or highly responsible for, (what terrorists consider) insufferable injustice or oppression. In war, these are innocent civilians; in a violent conflict that falls short of war, these are common citizens.

Talk of involvement of individuals and groups in injustice or oppression raises the question: is the injustice or oppression at issue, and thus the standing of those implicated in it, to be determined by some objective criteria, or from the point of view of those who resort to violence? Coady chooses the former option. He approaches terrorism from the standpoint of just war theory and its principle of noncombatant immunity. “Combatants” is a technical term designating agents of aggression or, more broadly, “dangerous wrongdoers” or “agents of harm”; they are legitimate targets of potentially lethal violence. All others are noncombatants, and enjoy immunity from such violence (Coady 2004). This approach may not be difficult to apply in war, where the wrong or harm at issue is either aggression that needs to be repelled, or systematic and large-scale violations of human rights that provide the ground for humanitarian intervention. Issues of injustice or oppression that arise in an internal conflict that falls short of war, however, tend to be highly contentious: what some consider an imperfect, but basically morally legitimate political and social order, others may see as the epitome of injustice and oppression that must be overthrown, if need be by violence. Under such circumstances, when a highly placed political official is killed by insurgents, that may be characterized (and condemned) by many as an act of terrorism, while the insurgents and those sympathetic to their struggle may reject this characterization and portray (and justify) the killing as political assassination.

In order to avoid this kind of relativism, Primoratz puts forward a view that in one important respect takes on board the standpoint of the terrorist. The direct victims of terrorism are innocent in the sense of not being responsible, on any credible understanding of responsibility and liability, for the injustice or oppression the terrorists fight against—not responsible at all, or at least not responsible to the degree that makes them liable to be killed or maimed on that account. The injustice or oppression at issue need not be real; it may be merely alleged (by the terrorists). Being responsible for a merely alleged great injustice or oppression is enough for losing one’s immunity against violence, as far as the type of immunity and innocence relevant to defining terrorism is concerned. According to the traditional version of just war theory one does not lose immunity against acts of war only by fighting in an unjust war, but by fighting in any war. Similarly, one does not lose immunity against political violence only by holding office in or implementing policies of a gravely unjust government, but by holding office in or implementing policies of any government: as King Umberto I of Italy said after surviving an assassination attempt, such risk comes with the job. Members of these two classes are not considered innocent and morally protected against violence by those attacking them; the latter view their acts as acts of war proper or of political assassination, respectively. If the terrorists subscribe to a credible view of responsibility and liability, then, when they attack common citizens, they attack people innocent from their own point of view, i.e., innocent even if we grant the terrorists their assessment of the policies at issue. (This is not to say that those who consider a government to be gravely unjust have a moral license to kill its officials, but only that if they do so, that will not be terrorism, but rather political assassination. We can still condemn their actions if we reject their judgment of the policies at issue, or if we accept that judgment, but believe that they should have opposed those policies by nonviolent means. But we will not be condemning their actions qua terrorism.)

On this account, not only real, but also merely alleged injustice or oppression counts in determining the innocence of the victims and deciding which acts are acts of terrorism; thus such decisions are not hostage to endless debates about the moral status of contested policies. Nevertheless, a residue of relativity remains. The account presupposes a certain understanding of responsibility and liability: a person is responsible for a state of affairs only by virtue of that person’s voluntary, i.e., informed and free, act or omission that has a sufficiently strong connection with that state of affairs, and thereby becomes liable to some proportionately unfavorable response. Provided the terrorists accept some such understanding of responsibility and liability, they kill and maim people they themselves must admit to be innocent. To be sure, some militant organizations resort to violence which we perceive as terrorist, yet object to the label. They profess a view of responsibility and liability based on extremely far-fetched connections between states of affairs and human choices and actions, and argue that entire social classes or nations are responsible for certain policies and practices and all their members are liable to be attacked by deadly violence (for more on this, see 2.1 below). Such arguments can only be regarded as preposterous. We should insist on viewing their actions as terrorist, although they reject this description. It is not clear how this residue of relativity could be removed (Primoratz 2013: 16–21).

Some object to defining “terrorism” as violence against non-combatants or innocent persons. They argue that doing so runs together the question of the nature of terrorism and that of its moral status, and begs the moral issue by making terrorism unjustified by definition. We should rather keep these questions separate, and take care not to prejudge the latter by giving a wrong answer to the former. What is needed is a morally neutral definition of terrorism, and that means a wide one (Corlett 2003: 114–20, 134–35; Young 2004: 57). But it is doubtful that “terrorism” can be defined in some morally untainted way. The wide definitions these philosophers adopt contain the word “violence”, which is itself morally loaded. A narrow definition is not completely morally neutral, as violence against the innocent is clearly morally wrong. But what is clear is that such violence is prima facie wrong. The definition implies a general presumption against terrorism, not its sweeping moral condemnation in each and every instance, whatever the circumstances and whatever the consequences of desisting from it. The definition does not rule out that in certain circumstances it might not be wrong, all things considered. Ethical investigation is not preempted: a particular case of terrorism still needs to be judged on its merits.

Another way of settling the issue of wide vs. narrow definition is offered by Georg Meggle. He adopts a wide definition of terrorism, and goes on to distinguish two different types: terrorism in the strong sense, which deliberately, recklessly, or negligently harms innocent people, and terrorism in the weak sense, which does not. Obviously, the moral assessment of the two types of terrorism is going to be significantly different (Meggle 2005).

The vast majority of cases almost anyone without an ax to grind would want to classify as “terrorism” exhibit the two traits implied in ordinary use and highlighted by mainstream philosophical definitions such as those quoted above: violence and intimidation. But philosophical literature also offers definitions that leave out one or the other core component.

Some seek to sever the connection between terrorism and violence. Carl Wellman defines terrorism as “the use or attempted use of terror as a means of coercion”. Terrorism is often associated with violence, but that is because violence is a very effective means of intimidation. Yet “violence is not essential to terrorism and, in fact, most acts of terrorism are nonviolent” (Wellman 1979: 250–51). The last claim seems false on any non-circular interpretation. There may be many acts generally considered terrorist that do not involve actual violence, but are meant to intimidate by threatening it; but that is not enough to support the notion of “non-violent terrorism”, which seems odd. So does Wellman’s example of “classroom terrorism”: a professor threatens to fail students who submit their essays after the due date, causes panic in class, and thereby engages in terrorism.

Robert E. Goodin offers a similar account, emphasizing the political role of terrorism: terrorism is “a political tactic, involving the deliberate frightening of people for political advantage” (Goodin 2006: 49). This, he claims, is the distinctive wrong terrorists commit. Whereas on Wellman’s account one can commit an act of terrorism without either engaging in or threatening violence, merely by making a threat in order to intimidate, on Goodin’s account one need not even make a threat: one acts as a terrorist by merely issuing a warning about the acts of others that is meant to intimidate. This, too, seems arbitrary, although it makes sense as a step in an argument meant to show that “ if (or insofar as ) Western political leaders are intending to frighten people for their own political advantage, then (to that extent ) they are committing the same core wrong that is distinctively associated with terrorism” (Goodin 2006: 2).

It has also been suggested that terrorism need not be understood as inducing terror or fear. According to Ted Honderich, terrorism is best defined as “violence, short of war, political, illegal and prima facie wrong” (Honderich 2006: 88). This definition might be thought problematic on several counts, but the idea of “terrorism” without “terror” seems especially odd. The two are connected etymologically and historically, and this connection is deeply entrenched in current ordinary use. Intimidation is not the morally salient trait of terrorism ( pace Goodin), but it is one of its core traits that cause most of us to condemn the practice. We might consider severing the connection if Honderich offered a good reason for doing so. But he supports his highly revisionary definition by the puzzling claim that to define terrorism as violence meant to intimidate is to imply that terrorism is particularly abhorrent and thereby “in effect … invite a kind of prima facie approval or tolerance of war” (Honderich 2006: 93).

2. The moral issue

Can terrorism be morally justified? There is no single answer to this question, as there is no single conception of what terrorism is. If we put aside definitions that depart too much, and for no compelling reason, from the core meaning of “terrorism” (such as those cited in 1.2.3), we still need to decide whether the question assumes a wide or a narrow understanding of terrorism. A narrow conception of terrorism seems to be better suited to ethical investigation (1.2.2). Moreover, philosophers who work with a wide definition typically hold that terrorism that targets non-combatants or innocent persons is much more difficult to justify than “selective” terrorism which attacks only those who cannot plausibly claim innocence of the injustice or oppression at issue (and which accordingly does not count as “terrorism” on a narrow definition of the term). The present discussion therefore focuses on terrorism understood as violence against innocent civilians or common citizens, intended to intimidate and thereby to achieve some further (political) objective or, more broadly, to coerce.

One might try to justify some acts or campaigns of violence of this kind in two ways. One could argue that the victims may be non-combatants or common citizens, but nevertheless are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorists are fighting against. Alternatively, one could concede the innocence of the victims and argue that attacks on them are nevertheless justified, either by their consequences on balance, or by some deontological considerations.

If the former line of argument is successful, will it prove too much? In showing that an instance of violence was justified because those targeted were not really innocent, we will have shown that the act or campaign of violence at issue was actually not a case of terrorism. This may be merely a matter of semantics. There is a much more damaging objection. A terrorist act is characteristically the killing or injuring of a random collection of people who happen to be in a certain place at a certain time. Arguments to the effect that those people are not innocent of the wrongs the terrorist fights against will therefore have a very wide reach, and accordingly will be based on some simplistic conception of collective responsibility. These arguments will be of the sort offered, for example, by the 19th century anarchist Emile Henry. He planted a bomb at the office of a mining company which, if it had exploded, would have killed or injured a number of people who did not work for the company, but lived in the same building. He also planted a bomb in a café that did go off, injuring twenty people, one of whom later died of his injuries. At his trial, Henry explained: “What about the innocent victims? […] The building where the Carmeaux Company had its offices was inhabited only by the bourgeois; hence there would be no innocent victims. The whole of the bourgeoisie lives by the exploitation of the unfortunate, and should expiate its crimes together” (Henry 1977: 193). When commenting on the second attack, he said:

Those good bourgeois who hold no office but who reap their dividends and live idly on the profits of the workers’ toil, they also must take their share in the reprisals. And not only they, but all those who are satisfied with the existing order, who applaud the acts of the government and so become its accomplices … in other words, the daily clientele of Terminus and other great cafés! (Henry 1977: 195)

This is an utterly implausible view of responsibility and liability. It claims that all members of a social class—men and women, young and old, adults and children—are liable to be killed or maimed: some for operating the system of exploitation, others for supporting it, and still others for benefiting from it. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant the anarchist’s harsh moral condemnation of capitalist society, not every type and degree of involvement with it can justify the use of extreme violence. Giving the system political support, or benefiting from it, may be morally objectionable, but is surely not enough to make one liable to be blown to pieces.

Another, more recent example, is provided by Osama Bin Laden. In an interview in the aftermath of the attacks on September 11, 2001 he said:

The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims (Bin Laden 2005: 140–141).

This, too, is a preposterous understanding of responsibility and liability. For it claims that all Americans are eligible to be killed or maimed: some for devising and implementing America’s policies, others for participating in the political process, still others for paying taxes. Even if, for the sake of argument, we grant Bin Laden’s severe condemnation of those policies, not every type and degree of involvement with them can justify the use of lethal violence. Surely voting in elections or paying taxes is not enough to make one fair game.

Attempts at justification of terrorism that concede that its victims are innocent seem more promising. They fall into two groups, depending on the type of ethical theory on which they are based.

2.2 Consequentialism

Adherents of consequentialism judge terrorism, like every other practice, solely by its consequences. Terrorism is not considered wrong in itself, but only if it has bad consequences on balance. The innocence of the victims does not change that. This is an instance of a general trait of consequentialism often highlighted by its critics, for example in the debate about the moral justification of legal punishment. A standard objection to the consequentialist approach to punishment has been that it implies that punishment of the innocent is justified, when its consequences are good on balance. This objection can only get off the ground because consequentialism denies that in such matters a person’s innocence is morally significant in itself.

Those who consider terrorism from a consequentialist point of view differ in their assessment of its morality. Their judgment on terrorism depends on their view of the good to be promoted by its use and on their assessment of the utility of terrorism as a means of promoting it. There is room for disagreement on both issues.

Kai Nielsen approaches questions to do with political violence in general and terrorism in particular as a consequentialist in ethics and a socialist in politics. The use of neither can be ruled out categorically; it all depends on their utility as a method for attaining morally and politically worthwhile objectives such as “a truly socialist society” or liberation from colonial rule. “When and where [either] should be employed is a tactical question that must be decided … on a case-by-case basis … like the choice of weapon in a war” (Nielsen 1981: 435). Nielsen has a wide definition of terrorism, but his examples show that the innocence of the victims of terrorism makes no difference to its justification—that is, that his conclusions apply to terrorism in both the wide and narrow sense. In his view,

terrorist acts must be justified by their political effects and their moral consequences. They are justified (1) when they are politically effective weapons in the revolutionary struggle and (2) when, everything considered, there are sound reasons for believing that, by the use of that type of violence rather than no violence at all or violence of some other type, there will be less injustice, suffering and degradation in the world than would otherwise have been the case (Nielsen 1981: 446).

Historical experience, in Nielsen’s view, tells us that terrorism on a small scale, used as the sole method of struggle in order to provoke the masses into revolutionary action, is ineffective and often counterproductive. On the other hand, terrorism employed in conjunction with guerrilla warfare in a protracted war of liberation may well prove useful and therefore also justified, as it did in Algeria and South Vietnam. (For an earlier statement of the same view, see Trotsky 1961: 48–59, 62–65.)

Nicholas Fotion also uses a wide definition of terrorism. He, too, is a consequentialist (although some of his remarks concerning the innocence of many victims of terrorism might be more at home in nonconsequentialist ethics). But he finds standard consequentialist assessments of terrorism such as Nielsen’s too permissive. If some types of terrorism are justifiable under certain circumstances, such circumstances will be extremely rare. Terrorists and their apologists do not perform the requisite calculations properly. One problem is the “higher good” to be promoted by terrorism: more often than not, it is defined in ideological terms, rather than derived from settled preferences or interests of actual people. But for the most part Fotion discusses the issue of means. If a terrorist act or campaign is to be justified instrumentally, it must be shown (1) that the end sought is good enough to justify the means, (2) that the end will indeed be achieved by means of terrorism, and (3) that the end cannot be achieved in any other way that is morally and otherwise less costly. Terrorists not only, as a matter of fact, fail to discharge this burden; Fotion argues that, with regard to terrorism that victimizes innocent people, it cannot be discharged. All direct victims of terrorism are treated as objects to be used—indeed, used up—by the terrorist. But

in being treated as an object, the innocent victim is worse off than the (alleged) guilty victim. Insofar as the latter is judged to have done a wrong, he is thought of as a human. […] For the terrorist the innocent victim is neither a human in this judgmental sense nor a human in the sense of simply having value as a human being. Of course the terrorist needs to pick a human being as a victim … because [that] brings about more terror … But this does not involve treating them as humans. Rather, they are victimized and thereby treated as objects because they are humans (Fotion 1981: 464).

In reply, terrorists can claim that they advisedly sacrifice valued human beings for a higher good. But for this claim to carry any conviction, they would have to show that they have no alternative. Yet, Fotion argues, they always have the alternative of taking on the opponent’s military establishment, and often also have the option of going after government officials responsible for the wrongs they object to, instead of attacking innocent persons. That kind of terrorism may sometimes be justified, whereas terrorism that targets innocent people never is.

2.3 Nonconsequentialism

Within a nonconsequentialist approach to morality, terrorism is considered wrong in itself, because of what it is, rather than only because (and insofar as) its consequences are bad on balance. But this is not to say that this approach leaves no room whatever for morally justifying certain acts or campaigns of terrorism. Indeed, nonconsequentialist discussions of terrorism also present a range of positions and arguments.

A nonconsequentialist might try to justify an act or campaign of terrorism in one of two ways. One might invoke some deontological considerations, such as justice or rights, in favor of resorting to terrorism under certain circumstances. Alternatively, one might argue that the obvious, and obviously very weighty, considerations of rights (of the victims of terrorism) and justice (which demands respect for those rights) may sometimes be overridden by extremely weighty considerations of consequences—an extremely high price that would be paid for not resorting to terrorism. For the rejection of consequentialism is of course not tantamount to denying that consequences of our actions, policies, and practices matter in their moral assessment; what is denied is the consequentialists’ claim that only consequences matter.

Virginia Held operates with a broad notion of terrorism, but her justification of terrorism is meant to apply to terrorism that targets common citizens. Her discussion of the subject focuses on the issue of rights. When rights of a person or group are not respected, what may we do in order to ensure that they are? On one view, known as consequentialism of rights, if the only way to ensure respect of a certain right of A and B is to infringe the same right of C , we shall be justified in doing so. Held does not hold that such trade-offs in rights with the aim of maximizing their respect in a society are appropriate. Yet rights sometimes come into conflict, whether directly or indirectly (as in the above example). When that happens, there is no way we can avoid comparing the rights involved as more or less stringent and making certain choices between them. That applies to the case of terrorism too. Terrorism obviously violates some human rights of its victims. But its advocates claim that in some circumstances a limited use of terrorism is the only way of bringing about a society where human rights of all will be respected.

Even when this claim is true, that is not enough to make resort to terrorism justified. But it will be justified if an additional condition is met: that of distributive justice. If there is a society where the human rights of a part of the population are respected, while the same rights of another part of the population are being violated; if the only way of changing that and ensuring that human rights of all are respected is a limited use of terrorism; finally, if terrorism is directed against members of the first group, which up to now has been privileged as far as respect of human rights is concerned—then terrorism will be morally justified. This is a justification in terms of distributive justice, applied to the problem of violations of human rights. It is more just to equalize the violations of human rights in a stage of transition to a society where the rights of all are respected, than to allow that the group which has already suffered large-scale violations of human rights suffer even more such violations (assuming that in both cases we are dealing with violations of the same, or equally stringent, human rights). The human rights of many are going to be violated in any case; it is more just, and therefore morally preferable, that their violations should be distributed in a more equitable way (Held 2008).

It might be objected that in calling for sacrificing such basic human rights as the right to life and to bodily security of individual victims of terrorism for the sake of a more just distribution of violations of the same rights within a group in the course of transition to a stage where these rights will be respected throughout that group, Held offends against the principles of separateness of persons and respect for persons (Primoratz 1997: 230–31). In response, Held argues that

to fail to achieve a more just distribution of violations of rights (through the use of terrorism if that is the only means available) is to fail to recognize that those whose rights are already not fairly respected are individuals in their own right, not merely members of a group … whose rights can be ignored.

An argument for achieving a just distribution of rights violations is not necessarily about groups; it can be an argument about the rights of individuals to fairness (Held 2008: 89–90). (For further objections to Held’s argument, see Steinhoff 2007: 125–30; Brooks 2010; Nath 2011.)

In Held’s justification of terrorism, it is justice that requires that inescapable violations of human rights be more evenly distributed. There is a different way of allowing for the use of terrorism under certain circumstances within a nonconsequentialist approach to the ethics of violence. It could be argued that, as far as justice and rights are concerned, terrorism (or, in Held’s terminology, the kind of terrorism that targets the innocent) is never justified. Furthermore, considerations of justice and rights carry much greater weight than considerations of good and bad consequences, and therefore normally trump the latter in cases of conflict. However, in exceptional circumstances considerations concerning consequences—the price of not resorting to terrorism—may be so extremely weighty as to override those of justice and rights.

Michael Walzer offers an argument along these lines in his discussion of “terror bombing” of German cities in World War II. In early 1942, it seemed that Britain would be defeated by Germany and that its military could not prevail while fighting in accordance with the rules of war. Britain was the only remaining obstacle to the subjugation of most of Europe by the Nazis. That was “an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives, an ideology and a practice of domination so murderous, so degrading even to those who might survive, that the consequences of its final victory were literally beyond calculation, immeasurably awful” (Walzer 2000: 253). Thus Britain was facing a “supreme emergency”: an (a) imminent threat of (b) something utterly unthinkable from a moral point of view. In such an emergency—a case of the “dirty hands” predicament that so often plagues political action (see Walzer 1973)—one may breach a basic and weighty moral principle such as civilian immunity, if that is the only hope of fending off the threat. So for more than three years, the RAF, later joined by the USAAF, deliberately devastated many German cities, killed about 600,000 civilians and seriously injured another 800,000 in an attempt to terrorize the German people into forcing their leadership to halt the war and surrender unconditionally. By early 1943 it was clear that Germany was not going to win the war, and all subsequent terror bombing lacked moral justification. But in its first year, in Walzer’s view, the terror bombing of Germany was morally justified as a response to the supreme emergency Britain was facing. Walzer then expands the notion of supreme emergency to apply to a single political community facing the threat of extermination or enslavement, and eventually to a single political community whose “survival and freedom” are at stake. For “the survival and freedom of political communities—whose members share a way of life, developed by their ancestors, to be passed on to their children—are the highest values of international society” (Walzer 2000: 254).

Here we have two different conceptions of supreme emergency. The threat is imminent in both, but the nature of the threat differs: it is one thing to suffer the fate the Nazis had in store for peoples they considered racially inferior, and another to have one’s polity dismantled. By moving back and forth between these two types of supreme emergency under the ambiguous heading of threat to “the survival and freedom of a political community”, Walzer seeks to extend to the latter the moral response that might be appropriate to the former. Yet whereas genocide, expulsion, or enslavement of an entire people might be thought a moral disaster that may be fended off by any means, its loss of political independence is, at most, a political disaster. If a polity to be dismantled lacks moral legitimacy, its demise may well be a moral improvement. But even if a polity does have moral legitimacy, a threat to its “survival and freedom” falls short of “an ultimate threat to everything decent in our lives”. If so, its military cannot be justified in waging war on enemy civilians in order to defend it. (On supreme emergencies see, for instance, Statman 2006; Kaplan 2011.)

There is another, less permissive position constructed along similar lines, but based on a more austere view of what counts as a moral disaster that might justify resort to terrorism. Contrary to what many fighters against social or economic oppression, colonial rule, or foreign occupation believe, evils of such magnitude that they can justify indiscriminate killing and maiming of innocent people are extremely rare. Not every case of oppression, foreign rule, or occupation, however morally indefensible, amounts to a moral disaster in the relevant sense. Nor does every imminent threat to “the survival and freedom of a political community” qualify, contrary to what Walzer has argued. However, if an entire people is subjected to extermination, or to an attempt at “ethnically cleansing” it from its land, then it is facing a true moral disaster and may properly consider terrorism as a method of struggle against such a fate. In view of their enormity and finality, extermination and “ethnic cleansing” of an entire people constitute a category apart. To be sure, resorting to terrorism in such a case will be morally justified only if there are very good grounds for believing that terrorism will succeed where nothing else will: in preventing imminent extermination or “ethnic cleansing”, or stopping it if it is already under way. Cases where both conditions are met will be extremely rare. Indeed, history may not offer a single example. But that does not mean that no act or campaign of terrorism could ever satisfy these conditions and thus turn out to be justified. Accordingly, terrorism is almost absolutely wrong (Primoratz 2013: chapter 6).

Both the “supreme emergency” and the “moral disaster” view will justify a resort to terrorism only when that is the only way to deal with the emergency, or to prevent the disaster, respectively. Just how certain must we be that terrorism will indeed achieve the goal, while no other method will? One might argue that when in extremis , we cannot apply stringent epistemic standards in deciding how to cope—indeed, if we cannot really know what will work, we must take our chances with what might. This is Walzer’s view: in such a predicament, we must “wager” the crime of terrorism against the evil that is otherwise in store for us. “There is no option; the risk otherwise is too great” (Walzer 2000: 259–260). It may be objected that this position highlights the enormity of the threat, while failing to give due weight to the enormity of the means proposed for fending off the threat—the enormity of terrorism, of deliberately killing and maiming innocent people. When that is taken into account, the conclusion may rather be that even in extremis , if terrorism is to be justified, the reasons for believing that it will work and that nothing else will must be very strong indeed.

Some hold that terrorism is absolutely wrong. This position, too, comes in different versions. Some philosophers work with a wide definition of terrorism, and argue that under certain circumstances “selective” terrorism that targets only those seriously implicated in the wrongs at issue may be justified (Corlett 2003, Young 2004). This seems to suggest that terrorism which is not selective in this way—that is, terrorism in the narrow sense—is never justified. Yet this does not follow: there is still room for arguing that terrorism of the latter type can be justified by further considerations, such as those of “supreme emergency” or “moral disaster”.

Per Bauhn does not leave it at that. He attempts to show that terrorism that targets non-combatants or common citizens can never be justified by deploying a slightly amended version of Alan Gewirth’s ethical theory. Freedom and safety are fundamental prerequisites of action and therefore must be accorded paramount weight. The need to protect them generates a range of rights; the right pertinent here is “an absolute right not to be made the intended victims of a homicidal project” all innocent persons have (Gewirth 1981: 16). When the absolute status of this right is challenged by invoking supreme emergency or moral disaster, Bauhn argues that there is a moral difference between what we are positively and directly causally responsible for, and what we are causally responsible for only indirectly, by failing to prevent other persons from intentionally bringing it about. We are morally responsible for the former, but (except in certain special circumstances) not for the latter. If we refuse to resort to terrorism in order not to target innocent persons, and thus fail to prevent some other persons from perpetrating atrocities, it is only the perpetrators who will be morally responsible for those atrocities. Therefore we must refuse (Bauhn 1989: chapter 5).

Some philosophers base their absolute rejection of terrorism on the slippery slope argument, and argue that “the appeal to supreme emergency is too dangerous to be allowed as a publicly available vindication for terrorism, no matter how rare the circumstances are meant to be” (Coady 2021: 143–44).

Stephen Nathanson seeks to ground the absolute immunity of civilians or common citizens and the absolute prohibition of terrorism which it entails in a rule-consequentialist ethical theory (Nathanson 2010: 191–208). Adopting civilian immunity, rather than adopting any other rule regulating the matter or having no rule at all, is the best way to reduce the killing and destruction in armed conflict. Moreover, the best consequences will be achieved by adopting it as an absolute rule, rather than as a rule allowing for exceptions in supreme emergencies. The idea of supreme emergency is vague. The criteria for proffering supreme emergency exemptions are liable to be applied in arbitrary and subjective ways. Finally, there is the slippery slope argument: “permitting [departures from the rule of civilian immunity, including terrorism] even under the direst circumstances will lower the bar for justifying such acts … broadcast the message that such behavior may sometimes be justified and … thus lend its weight to increasing the use of such methods” (Nathanson 2010: 207).

However, one can adopt rule-consequentialism as one’s ethical theory and yet view the immunity of civilians or common citizens and the attendant prohibition of terrorism as very stringent, but not absolute moral rules. Thus Richard B. Brandt and Brad Hooker do not view this immunity as absolute. They argue that a set of moral rules selected because of the good consequences of their adoption should include a rule that allows and indeed requires one to prevent disaster even if that means breaking some other moral rule. Even such a stringent moral rule as the prohibition of deliberate use of violence against innocent people may be overridden, if the disaster that cannot be prevented in any other way is grave enough. (See Brandt 1992: 87–88, 150–51, 156–57; Hooker 2000: 98–99, 127–36). There is thus some convergence at the level of practical conclusions between their understanding of the immunity of civilians or common citizens and the “moral disaster” position outlined above (2.3.2).

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Acknowledgments

Thanks to Andrew Alexandra, Tony Coady, and Thomas Pogge for helpful comments on a draft of this article.

Copyright © 2022 by Igor Primoratz < igorprim @ gmail . com >

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• v.15(1); 2018 Feb

Terrorism in Pakistan: the psychosocial context and why it matters

Asad tamizuddin nizami.

1 Assistant Professor, Institute of Psychiatry, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Benazir Bhutto Hospital, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan; email moc.liamg@imazindasard

Tariq Mahmood Hassan

2 Assistant Professor, Providence Care Mental Health Services, Kingston, Canada

Sadia Yasir

3 Consultant Psychiatrist, Shifa International Hospital, Shifa College of Medicine, Islamabad, Pakistan

Mowaddat Hussain Rana

4 Director General, Centre for Trauma Research and Psychosocial Interventions, National University of Sciences and Technology (NUST), Islamabad, Pakistan

Fareed Aslam Minhas

5 Head Institute of Psychiatry, World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Mental Health, Benazir Bhutto Hospital, Rawalpindi Medical College, Rawalpindi, Pakistan

Terrorism is often construed as a well-thought-out, extreme form of violence to perceived injustices. The after effects of terrorism are usually reported without understanding the underlying psychological and social determinants of the terrorist act. Since ‘9/11’ Pakistan has been at the epicentre of both terrorism and the war against it. This special paper helps to explain the psychosocial perspective of terrorism in Pakistan that leads to violent radicalisation. It identifies the terrorist acts in the background of Pakistan's history, current geopolitical and social scenario. The findings may also act as a guide on addressing this core issue.

Most nations are unable to reach a consensus on a legally binding definition of ‘terrorism.’ The term seems emotionally charged and, as such, governments have been devising their own definitions. So far the United Nations has been unable to devise an internationally agreed-upon definition of terrorism. Terrorism is suggested to be ‘the use of intimidation or fear for advancement of political objectives’ (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2006 ). Since the ‘9/11’ incident, Muslim countries in particular feel emotionally threatened with the word terrorism and perceive it as synonymous with the acts of terror carried out by so-called Muslim extremist groups. This is further complemented in the media by the unjust linking of such horrendous terror attacks to Islamic Jihad.

Terrorism has brought an enormous burden on South Asian countries through the adverse impacts on their social, economic, political and physical infrastructure. Pakistan has suffered particularly excessively from the social, economic and human costs due to terrorism (Daraz et al , 2012 ). Surprisingly, Pakistan is portrayed as being on the front line in the international war against terrorism and at the same time has been wrongly labelled as a sponsor of international terrorism. Terrorism in Pakistan is a multidimensional phenomenon and, among many precipitating factors, the psychosocial factors play an important role. This paper attempts to address what we believe are significant psychosocial determinants to terrorism in Pakistan.

Historical developments

Pakistan is a Muslim majority nation in South East Asia with India to its east, Iran and Afghanistan to its west, China and the landlocked Asian countries to its north and the Arabian Sea to its south. Pakistan gained independence from British colonial rule in 1947 and is the only Muslim country with nuclear weapons – a nuclear device was detonated in 1998 – and is thus part of the informally named ‘nuclear club.’ Pakistan is a federation of four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and Balochistan), a capital territory (Islamabad) and a group of federally administered tribal areas in the north west, along with the disputed area of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.

Pakistan is the world's sixth most populous country with an average population density of 229 people per km 2 (World Bank indicators; http://www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/urban-population-growth-annual-percent-wb-data.html ). Since independence in 1947, Pakistan has been challenged not only by the trauma inflicted by its colonial occupiers but also by the mass murder of people migrating to the ‘new’ country. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, looted, raped or burnt alive. At the same time, the stability of this fledgling country was significantly hampered by the lack of resources. Just a few years later, due to political instability and separatist movements and terrorism, the east wing of the country was separated from Pakistan; this paved the way to the creation of a new country, Bangladesh, in 1971 (Wadhwani, 2011 ).

The Soviet–Afghan war, which began in 1979, provided a breeding ground for terrorism in the region. A fundamental change was witnessed that altered the very character of the existing Pakistani society. Withdrawal of the Soviets revealed a Pakistani society that had been forced into one of violence and weaponisation, plaguing Pakistan with so-called ‘Kalashnikov culture’ and ‘Talibanisation’ (Wadhwani, 2011 ).

Pakistan's social landscape has for the most part been plagued with illiteracy, disease, insecurity and injustice. Since the 9/11 incident, Pakistan has been intricately linked with the many facets of the ‘war on terrorism.’ Some argue that Pakistan is a breeding ground for terrorist outfits, but it is certain that all of this havoc has resulted in the significant loss of innocent lives as well as loss of economic revenue. These fragile conditions provide a fertile ground for terrorism to grow.

Psychological influence

The act of carrying out terrorist activity does not come from a single moment of inspiration but rather from a complex process of cognitive accommodation and assimilation over accumulating steps. It is wrongly reductionist to label the terrorists as mad or psychopaths (Atran, 2003 ; Horgan, 2008 ). Terrorists’ motivation may involve a deep, underlying quest for personal meaning and significance. Several analyses of such motives have appeared in recent years. There are differences in these analyses regarding the type and variety of motivational factors identified as critical to terrorism. Some authors identified a singular motivation as crucial; others listed a ‘cocktail’ of motives (Sageman, 2004 ; Bloom, 2005 ).

The socioeconomic adversity combined with political challenges were bound to have a detrimental impact on the psyche of the average Pakistani. A terrorist adopts a dichotomous way of identifying their victims, the black-and-white thought that ‘I am good’ and ‘you are evil,’ with no intermediary shades of grey. This thinking leaves no doubt in their minds and they find it easier to kill their opponents with little or no sense of remorse or guilt.

The unmanned army drone strikes killed and maimed thousands of innocent civilians in poor and difficult to access regions of Pakistan. This infuriated people, leading them to take up arms against the perceived aggressors. This triggering of the relatives of the deceased to engage in such activity is the culture of revenge in Pakistan, which unfortunately can last for generations.

Self-sacrifice and martyrdom has been explicitly used in almost all religions and is aggressively exploited by terrorist outfits who groom suicide bombers using the ideology of Islamist martyrdom (Atran, 2003 ). Some have argued that suicide bombers may actually be clinically suicidal and attempting to escape personal impasse (Lankford, 2013 ). In grooming young impressionable adolescents, extremist organisations brainwash these adolescents into believing that the ultimate self-sacrifice by suicide bombing will elevate their stature in the eyes of God and send them straight to heaven. This is associated with massive financial compensations to the deceased family. Terrorist organisations in Pakistan, through this process of brainwashing, have been able to convert young impressionable Muslim adolescents into a ‘suicide bomber in six weeks’ (Nizami et al , 2014 ). In the current scenario of the existing war on terror, this complex process of recruiting young adolescents as suicide bombers seems irreversible.

The contribution of the religious schools

In the West, Madrassas (Islamic religious schools) have gained a reputation of being a sinister influence on young impressionable Muslims. These institutions are not completely regulated and can vary from a single room to large institutions offering schooling and boarding to hundreds of students at a time. A survey of just over 50 000 households in Pakistan found that children in Urdu-medium government schools and madrassas were from poorer households than those in English-medium private schools. The primary reason for parents to send their children to madrassas as opposed to mainstream schools was that these institutions provided a good Islamic education. The second most common reason was that the madrassa provided education that is low in cost along with the provision of food and clothing (Cockcroft et al , 2009 ).

Another survey indicated that in Pakistan only a minority of the religious schools promoted an extremist view of Islam (Bano, 2007 ). An interrogation of 79 terrorists involved in anti-Western attacks found that very few had attended a madrassa. This suggests that terrorist groups may selectively recruit better qualified people for technically demanding tasks (Bergen & Pandey, 2006 ). However, the religious seminaries have been implicated as playing the role of recruitment centres for the suicide bombers (Nizami et al , 2014 ).

In an effort to break this incorrect perception the Darul Uloom Deoband, the largest Islamic seminary in the world, hosted an anti-terrorist conference in 2008. This was attended by 6000 Imams declaring that ‘Islam is a religion of mercy for all humanity. Islam sternly condemns all kinds of oppression, violence and terrorism. It has regarded oppression, mischief, rioting and murder among sins and crimes’ (Press Trust of India, 2008 ). However, it is yet to be ascertained how many religious schools in Pakistan adopted this school of thought. With the revolution in the world of information technology, experts agree that the internet played an important role in the radicalisation and self-recruitment process into terrorist groups. Messages and videos on jihadi websites target the ‘soft spots’ of potential recruits and inflame their imagination (Kruglanski & Fishman, 2009 ).

The link between terrorism and mental disorder

With both mental disorder and terrorism in Pakistan being highly prevalent, it would be a fair assumption that the two may have a causal relationship. Walter Laqueur wrote that ‘all terrorists believe in conspiracies by the powerful, hostile forces and suffer from some form of delusion and persecution mania… The element of… madness plays an important role in terrorism’ (Silke, 2003 ).

However, apart from certain pathological cases, a causal connection between an individual's mental disorder and engagement in terrorist activity could not be established (Daraz et al , 2012 ). However, there can be a connection between an individual engaging in terrorist activity and developing a mental disorder as mental disorders worsen in stress, anxiety and depression.

The adverse impacts of terrorism lead the masses towards anomie and create the tendency towards suicide and mental illnesses (Daraz et al , 2012 ). Poor health, depressive symptoms, risky behaviours in young adults, personality variables, social inequalities, criminality, social networks and international foreign policy have all been proposed to be influential drivers for grievances that lead to radicalisation and terrorism (La Free & Ackerman, 2009 ).

It may well be that individuals with mild depression would be a better target for gradual psychological moulding. Female suicide bombers who are predominantly motivated by revenge as opposed to their male counterparts may have some degree of clinical depression (Jacques & Taylor, 2008 ). Personality traits are useless as predictors for understanding why people become terrorists. However, personality traits and environmental conditions are the contributing factors for terrorism (Horgan, 2008 ). There are protective and modifiable risk factors early on the path towards radicalisation. The benefits of early intervention have far reaching implications for preventing significant depressive symptoms, promoting wellbeing and perhaps social capital (Bhui et al , 2014 ).

By understanding, appreciating and addressing the psychosocial factors contributing to terrorism in Pakistan, one may find long-lasting solutions to the fall out on Pakistan's war against terror. This war has led to a loss of innocent human lives, compounded by the deep psychological scars for survivors which will undoubtedly persist for generations to come. An ongoing, concerted effort to gain peace and security in the region is essential and is the only way to counteract the revenge attacks and further brainwashing of young impressionable youths. These psychological determinants, however, are markedly different than terrorist activities in Western countries, where it seems that a different set of psychological rules apply.

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war on terrorism

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war on terrorism , term used to describe the American-led global counterterrorism campaign launched in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 . In its scope, expenditure, and impact on international relations , the war on terrorism was comparable to the Cold War ; it was intended to represent a new phase in global political relations and has had important consequences for security, human rights , international law , cooperation, and governance .

The war on terrorism was a multidimensional campaign of almost limitless scope. Its military dimension involved major wars in Afghanistan and Iraq , covert operations in Yemen and elsewhere, large-scale military-assistance programs for cooperative regimes, and major increases in military spending. Its intelligence dimension comprised institutional reorganization and considerable increases in the funding of America’s intelligence -gathering capabilities, a global program of capturing terrorist suspects and interning them at Guantánamo Bay , expanded cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies, and the tracking and interception of terrorist financing. Its diplomatic dimension included continuing efforts to construct and maintain a global coalition of partner states and organizations and an extensive public diplomacy campaign to counter anti-Americanism in the Middle East . The domestic dimension of the U.S. war on terrorism entailed new antiterrorism legislation, such as the USA PATRIOT Act ; new security institutions, such as the Department of Homeland Security ; the preventive detainment of thousands of suspects; surveillance and intelligence-gathering programs by the National Security Agency (NSA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and local authorities; the strengthening of emergency-response procedures; and increased security measures for airports, borders, and public events.

The successes of the first years of the war on terrorism included the arrest of hundreds of terrorist suspects around the world, the prevention of further large-scale terrorist attacks on the American mainland, the toppling of the Taliban regime and subsequent closure of terrorist-training camps in Afghanistan , the capture or elimination of many of al-Qaeda ’s senior members, and increased levels of international cooperation in global counterterrorism efforts.

However, critics argued that the failures of America’s counterterrorism campaign outweighed its successes. They contended that the war in Afghanistan had effectively scattered the al-Qaeda network, thereby making it even harder to counteract, and that the attacks in Afghanistan and Iraq had increased anti-Americanism among the world’s Muslims, thereby amplifying the message of militant Islam and uniting disparate groups in a common cause. Other critics alleged that the war on terrorism was a contrived smokescreen for the pursuit of a larger U.S. geopolitical agenda that included controlling global oil reserves, increasing defense spending, expanding the country’s international military presence, and countering the strategic challenge posed by various regional powers.

By the time of U.S. Pres. George W. Bush ’s reelection in 2004, the drawbacks of the war on terrorism were becoming apparent. In Iraq , U.S. forces had overthrown the government of Saddam Hussein in 2003, and U.S. war planners had underestimated the difficulties of building a functioning government from scratch and neglected to consider how this effort could be complicated by Iraq’s sectarian tensions, which had been held in check by Saddam’s repressive regime but were unleashed by his removal. By late 2004 it was clear that Iraq was sinking into chaos and civil war; estimates of the number of Iraqi civilians killed during the period of maximum violence—roughly 2004 to 2007—vary widely but generally exceed 200,000. U.S. casualties during this period far outnumbered those suffered during the initial 2003 invasion. Afghanistan, which for several years had seemed to be under control, soon followed a similar trajectory, and by 2006 the U.S. was facing a full-blown insurgency there led by a reconstituted Taliban.

The Bush administration faced domestic and international criticism for actions that it deemed necessary to fight terrorism but which critics considered to be immoral, illegal, or both. These included the detention of accused enemy combatants without trial at Guantánamo Bay and at several secret prisons outside the United States, the use of torture against these detainees in an effort to extract intelligence, and the use of unmanned combat drones to kill suspected enemies in countries far beyond the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan.

By the last years of Bush’s presidency, public opinion had turned strongly negative concerning his handling of the Iraq War and other national security matters. This discontent helped Barack Obama , an outspoken critic of Bush’s foreign policy , win the presidency in 2008. Under the new administration, the expression war on terrorism —still closely associated with Bush policies—quickly disappeared from official communications. Obama made the rejection explicit in a 2013 speech in which he stated that the United States would eschew a boundless, vaguely defined “global war on terrorism” in favour of more focused actions against specific hostile groups. Under Obama, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were gradually wound down, although at the end of Obama’s presidency in 2016 there were still U.S. troops in both countries.

It is worth noting that beneath Obama’s rejection of the war on terrorism as a rhetorical device and as a conceptual framework for national security there were important continuities with the policies of his predecessor. The Obama administration, for example, greatly expanded the campaign of targeted killings carried out with drones, even eliminating several U.S. citizens abroad whom it deemed threatening. Special operations forces were greatly expanded and increasingly deployed to conduct low-profile military interventions in countries outside of acknowledged war zones. And U.S. security agencies continued to exercise the wide-ranging surveillance powers that they had accumulated during the Bush administration despite protests from civil liberties groups.

Terrorism: Perspectives from the Behavioral and Social Sciences (2002)

Chapter: 2. origins and contexts of terrorism, 2 origins and contexts of terrorism.

As seems inevitable, when ambiguous and alarming events occur and unfold, many single and oversimplified explanations appear, and these represent, in part, attempts to reduce uncertainty and anxiety. Thus, the causes of terrorism suggested include “poverty,” “inequality,” “globalization,” “technology,” “energy,” “oil,” “Islam,” “Islamic fundamentalism,” and “psychopathy,” among others. There are also widespread challenges to each of these causes on both scientific and ideological grounds.

In approaching the daunting questions of origins and contexts we are guided by the following first principles:

The search for a single or even a few causes is misguided. The factors influencing contemporary terrorism are a blend of historical, economic, political, cultural, motivational, and technological factors, to name only the most obvious.

The logic of cause-followed-by-effect is inappropriate to the understanding of origins and contexts of terrorism. Causes differ qualitatively in their generality as determinants. Some are remote background conditions, others are facilitating circumstances, others are precipitating factors, and still others are inhibitory factors. The most appropriate way to organize these factors is in a nesting or combinatorial way. Each adds its value at a different level and significance to work toward more complete accounts and explanations.

At the very least it is essential to separate the origins and context issue into two distinguishable levels: (a) the historical, social, political, and cultural conditions that constitute a favorable soil in which terrorism can take root and grow, provide a continuously changing mix of support and discouragement for terrorism, and constitute one of the main audiences for terror-

ists and (b) the immediate motivational, ideological, group, and organizational determinants of terrorist activities themselves. The explanations at each level are separate, though they overlap and articulate with one another as one regards the total picture. We employ this distinction in our own account, treating the more general conditions first and the immediate ones afterward.

IMPERIALISM, COLONIALISM, AND GLOBALIZATION

The impulse for territorial expansion, conquest, and domination is as old as history itself. The ways in which this impulse has expressed itself, however, reveal vast differences. For comparative purposes, we mention three variations.

Imperialism is, above all, a system based on military conquest, territorial occupation, and direct governmental/military control by the dominant imperial power. This characterization clearly applies to the classical Roman, Ottoman, Spanish, and Soviet empires, and it is also evident but not so unequivocal in other cases, such as the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The political sovereignty of occupied regions is not a salient issue; that notion does not apply to militarily occupied and controlled territories. Imperial powers are also dominant economically, but the mechanisms are extraction and exploitation of resources through the mechanisms of expropriation, direct control of economic activities, and coercion (including slavery in some cases).

If we regard the eighteenth-, nineteenth-, and twentieth-century European cases as the major referents, colonialism overlaps with but is distinguishable in important ways from imperialism. Military conquest, settlement, territorial acquisition, and administrative rule—sometimes military, sometimes civil—is the essence, but in practice the administrative rule varied from direct rule resembling imperialism to indirect rule involving a symbiotic relationship between colonial rulers and indigenous authorities. Nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonialism also involved more striking economic contrasts between the technological and industrial superiority of the (developed) colonial powers and the (undeveloped) colonial countries. The resultant pattern was the extraction of primary products necessary for

industrial production (e.g., cotton from India and Egypt) or for consumption in the colonizing countries (e.g., tea, sugar, coffee, spices).

After the effective demise of British, French, Dutch, and Belgian colonialism in the decades after World War II, there was acceleration in the development of the form of international organization described as globalization . Globalization is something of a misnomer, because economic, political, and cultural penetration around relevant parts of the globe is observable through several millennia. Since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 1989-1990, the world system has also been called “the American hegemony.” This is also misnamed, because the dominant powers are a complex combination of North American, West European, and East Asian powers. Nevertheless, the role of the United States is paramount. The contemporary global mode is one of economic influence, realized through greater economic productivity (and its concomitant, wealth) based on a superior, science-based technology. This influence is realized and exercised by the mechanisms of trade among nations, capital and financial investment, and power in the international monetary system.

There is also an aspect of military domination, but this is primarily realized not through military conquest and administration of occupied territory, but through a technologically superior arsenal of weaponry, occasional wars and “peacekeeping” interventions, and, above all else, military intimidation. American hegemony also has a less tangible political-ideological ingredient, namely, a conviction of the moral superiority of a particular (American) version of democracy and its accompanying characteristics of personal liberty, constitutional rights of citizens, and mass political participation. This ideological dimension affects U.S. foreign policies toward other nations, generally favoring nations like itself politically and distancing itself from or applying pressures on nations unlike itself. The final aspect is a cultural one, consisting mainly of the effective export of cultural and materialist values through the worldwide American domination of the mass media, especially television.

In that part of the world that currently commands the nation’s special attention—referred to variously as the Arabic or Islamic world—we observe a long period of interaction, penetration, and conflict with the West. Especially in the late eighteenth century, there was exposure to and borrowing of West-

ern military and other technology and such ideas as democracy, nationalism, and the rights of women, as travel, commercial activity, and communication increased. The forces of modernization, however they may be defined, are thus several centuries old; an informative account of the historical process is found in Lewis (2002). Of special subsequent significance was the century-long (1830 through the end of World War I) colonization and political control of North Africa and the Near East countries of Syria, Lebanon, and modern Iraq, Jordan, and the Palestine mandate. In the twentieth-century, commercial and cultural penetration and influences have accelerated, dramatically in the case of the exploitation of oil but more generally as well.

IMPACTS ON “RECEIVING” SOCIETIES

The general impacts of the complex of influences imposed by more powerful societies are both to dislocate and to provide alternatives to the traditional ways of life in the affected societies. Economic production is transformed, systems of wagelabor increased, existing patterns of inequality altered, economic expectations stirred, and political institutions modified or displaced. Traditional and authoritarian political values and institutions are shaken by exposure to ideas of freedom, rights, and democracy. Competing religious forces, especially nonreligious secularism, are introduced. And especially recently, commercial and cultural penetration has exposed the world, and notably the non-Western world, to a range of materialistic values and aspirations that are evidently unattainable in those societies in the historical short run.

A political corollary of these modernizing influences is that, under conditions of domination by and acculturation to a more powerful society, the receiving society experiences an increase in the growth, complexity, and magnitude of political divisions. Some of these are “class” in nature, as new groups—for example, a new middle class, a paid laboring class, or the unemployed—come into being and develop interests in common. Other divisions are cultural in nature, as groups crystallize along the dimension of how much and in what ways they want to be modernizers (e.g., democratic, capitalistic, secular) and how

much and in what ways they want to preserve a traditional way of life.

All these impacts are observable in dramatic form in the world’s Islamic societies. They combine with several additional features of these societies to make for very high levels of discontent and combustibility.

Almost all of the Islamic societies in the world fall into the category of rapidly growing populations that have relatively high proportions of young people compared with those of working age, but low proportions of elderly people. The Muslim population is the most rapidly growing religiously defined category in the world, doubling perhaps every 25 years at current rates. These populations have been growing on an average of more than 3 percent per year, although fertility is declining in many of them (Roudi, 2002). These patterns yield large families in which younger siblings in particular are likely to suffer from lack of parental investment of resources and emotional care.

Such societies have few resources to devote to education, so their high numbers of young people cannot be trained to participate in advanced economic activities. It is hard for such countries to guarantee employment for their youth, who experience high rates of unemployment, engage in criminal activity or gang violence, or must otherwise migrate to the richer countries, where they work in low-level jobs. Such poor countries are also often obliged to spend substantial sums on police control and national defense against neighboring poor countries, in which they employ local youth in low-level military jobs.

The majority of the world’s Muslims are poor and live in countries characterized by great inequalities of wealth (World Bank, 2002). The ratio of children to workers in the Muslim world is very high, especially because there are so few women in the labor force, so the actual ratios of children to workers are almost double the child to adult ratio. Finally, high growth ratio produces large numbers of children in families, and this may spread thin the family’s financial and emotional resources. Some research suggests that later-born children in families are more rebellious. This suggests the possibility that in a population in which many families have many children, the level of rebelliousness in the society may be higher (Sulloway, 1996; Skinner, 1992; Paulhus et al., 1999; Zweigenhaft and Von Ammon, 2000).

The relevance of these outcomes to an understanding of

social unrest is clear. Unemployed young males with poor local prospects will feel angry and frustrated. They can seek a future in military endeavors, emigrate to take menial work, or become involved in criminal activity in a foreign and often culturally inhospitable environment. Sexual frustration may also be part of the picture. Marriage is often a high-cost matter in these countries because it requires substantial outlays for parents and elaborate ceremonies. Young women have restricted choices in the local marriage market because of the male exodus and little hope of employment themselves unless they also emigrate (especially if local customs deter them from entering the labor market).

Looking at these demographic and economic realities, it is clear that the majority of Muslims in the world experience a high level of absolute poverty. These poor compare themselves with the rich in their own societies and with an unrealistic view of Western culture gleaned from films and television, and thus they also experience a high level of relative deprivation. This combination is a sure recipe for social unrest in general. Insofar as these conditions are blamed on the United States and the West in general—as they typically are—they also provide a favorable atmosphere for supporting violence against these enemies, as well as a potential recruiting ground for recruits to this cause. To note this is not to argue that poverty causes terrorism, but that it is one ingredient in a volatile mix of causes.

REACTIONS TO IMPACTS

It is a reasonable historical generalization that those who are dominated—or who believe themselves to be dominated—by stronger outside powers come to resent and oppose their oppressors. Especially under conditions of imperialist and colonial domination, in which direct force is used against the population, this discontent can often be held in check, at least temporarily. When societies experience economic and cultural domination without direct military occupation and political control, the opportunities to express discontent publicly are usually more readily available.

This rejection of outside domination is not surprising and can be readily appreciated. It is not as frequently appreciated

that the hatred of outside domination is typically only half the picture. The other half is conveyed by the idea of ambivalence .

To bring the point closer to home, anticolonial ideologies are mainly negative toward the colonial powers. But they also contain the seeds of positive attraction. A remote but telling instance of this is found in the cargo cults, a widespread religious phenomenon mainly in colonial Melanesia. These movements, which were millenarian, envisioned the end of the world accompanied by the arrival of Western ships or airplanes loaded with tinned foods, transistor radios, and other Western items. At the millenarian moment, too, white Westerners would be destroyed, and the true believers would survive in a world of Western plenty (Worsley, 1957). Further evidence of this type of ambivalence is provided by the fact that colonial societies, once independent, frequently establish institutions and retain political and other values resembling those of their former conquerors.

A similar ambivalence toward the United States is now found throughout the world, including (perhaps especially) Muslim societies. On one hand there is America the demon, the rich, godless, morally and sexually corrupt, imperialist country that has come to its wealth by exploitation, a power that dominates the world and forms alliances with the ruling elites in their own societies, a nation that is hypocritical in its assertions of equality when it is plagued with racism and poverty, and the power that is primarily responsible for the existence and support of Israel. Side by side with this, however, is a utopian America, as the immigrant communities of Detroit, Brooklyn, and Los Angeles typify. America is a place to come to, a place of wealth and consumption where the payoff for hard work is leisure and opportunity, and where freedom is buttressed by myriad choices in both the market and in the polity. This positive side of the ambivalence, moreover, stands in stark contrast to what almost all Muslims can realistically aspire to in their own societies.

Typically, it is psychologically difficult to hold both sides of an ambivalent attitude at the same time, and it usually is resolved by rigidly accentuating one side to the exclusion of the other. In anti-American Muslim ideologies this appears to be the case, with vitriolic hostility as the conspicuous and exclusive element and the admiration and envy suppressed. Insights that

take account of this element of ambivalence signal a potential chink in the armor of what appear to be exclusively hostile attitudes, yield a more realistic grasp of the social psychology of protest and resentment, and instruct Americans as to the half-truth of the question asked by some in the wake of September 11: “Why do they hate us so much?”

CULTURAL CONTEXT

The complex of economic, political, and cultural penetration does not occur in a vacuum. It is always interpreted and reacted to in the framework of the cultural milieu it affects—accepted, altered, synthesized, or rejected, all in complex ways. An inevitable accompaniment of the process is the widespread perception that the domestic culture is under threat of extinction. The reactions to this perception are, as indicated, multiple, but, in light of the religious character of much of recent terrorism, we take special note of what have been called revivalist or fundamentalist reactions. This variant of terrorism in particular has developed in the context of a wider Islamic revival.

Revivalist or fundamentalist movements are efforts to restore an often-imagined indigenous culture, especially its religion, to a pure and unadulterated form. Their elements have been found in American Indian movements such as the ghost dance (Mooney, 1896) and peyote religion (Slotkin, 1956), revivalist cults, nationalist movements in colonial societies, revivalist and fundamentalist Christian movements, and in some extreme Western political movements such as fascism. The typical ingredients of such movements are:

A totalistic worldview rooted in a sacred religious system.

A profound sense of threat, angst, and apprehension about the destruction of their society, culture, and way of life.

A specification of certain agents who are assigned total responsibility for this deterioration.

An unqualified, and absolute, sense of rage that is felt to be morally legitimate.

A utopian view of their own culture and society—perhaps referring to an imagined, glorious past—standing in

point-by-point opposition to the decaying and threatening world they confront (Smelser, 1962:120-29; Juergensmeyer, 2000).

The historical picture in many Muslim societies is not different from this general pattern. The analogy is not between cults and terrorism as such, but between nativistic movements and Islamic revivalism, which provides a fertile ground for religiously based terrorism. The penetration of Muslim societies by Western values during the past few centuries has occurred in the context of Islam, one of the world’s great religions, dedicated to the transcendence of God and the observance of Islamic law. It is also a religion with a proselytizing tradition and a centuries-long history of both conquest of and humiliation by Western Christian and Eastern Orthodox powers—a history actively remembered in detail in Muslim societies to this day. It is, finally, a religion with a keen sense of infidels, both inside and outside Islam. All these features have conditioned the reactions to the West in Muslim societies, including the Islamic revival.

Revivalist-like movements of a totalistic sort—i.e., to “Islamize” the religious community by imposing Islamic norms throughout all spheres of life—antedate deep Western influences. Among these are the Safavid movement that eventually became the basis of the Shiite state in Iran. There were also a number of nineteenth-century antecedents, and the early twentieth century witnessed the rise and consolidation of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and its subsequent underground offshoots (Voll, 1994).

The widespread Islamic revival in contemporary times partakes of elements of these earlier movements but has added new and different ingredients (Maddy-Weitzman, 1996). Some of these ingredients include: (a) It expresses the feelings of humiliation at the loss of the supremacy of Islam, the imposition of European commercial and colonial power, and the Euro-American domination in world affairs. Its enemies are foreign infidels, non-Muslims in their midst, representatives of more moderate forms of Islam, and secular dictatorial regimes in their own societies. (b) It expresses a fear of cultural extinction by the spread of an American consumerist lifestyle, and of individualistic values disrespectful of the old hierarchies of society. (c) It typically takes hold in countries ruled by regimes that repress

even legitimate forms of domestic political opposition (Abootalebi, 1999).

On the more constructive side, the goal of the revivalist movements is the creation of an ideal Islamic society, in which morals are pure and the community just, and all live in a state that protects a Muslim way of life, defends it against enemies, and aggrandizes the domain of Islam. Revivalists regard this envisioned society as a comprehensive alternative to nationalism or capitalism. In the main, the movements are carried by self-declared charismatic teachers, ideologues, community organizers, and political activists. The followers are diverse, consisting of petit bourgeois bazaaris (small businessmen, peddlers, craftsmen, and workers) and maktabis (clerks, teachers, and students) and sometimes the professional middle classes (McCauley, in press; Library of Congress, 1999; Maddy-Weitzman, 1996; Hamzeh, 1997; Sivan, 1997; Abootalebi, 1999; Alam, 2000). The movements have become extensively institutionalized in schools, mosques, clinics, study groups, women’s auxiliaries, and economic enterprises. Some groups take the form of political lobbies and parties, and some have paramilitary forces (Hamzeh, 1997). They constitute opposition movements to domestic governments, as in Turkey, Egypt, Algeria, and Indonesia, or to foreign rulers or occupiers, as in Palestine, Chechnya, Xinjiang, and Kashmir (Sivan, 1997; Alam, 2000).

The revivalist movements represent a small part of Islam in general. It is not difficult to appreciate, however, why Muslim terrorists have taken on the ideology of militant revivalism as their major guiding belief system. It provides a meaningful account of what is wrong in their world and legitimizes their extreme and violent political actions. To say this is neither to assert that Islam “causes” terrorist behavior nor to say that terrorists are simply “exploiting” Islamic beliefs to rationalize their destructive ends. Rather, the presence of extreme Islamic fundamentalism, like the demographic, economic, and political realities found in most Muslim societies, is part of the fertile seedbed in which a particular ideologically based brand of terrorism finds a supportive audience and some recruits. We emphasize, however, that Islam-inspired terrorists are a minority of terrorists, considered worldwide, and that the vast majority of Islamic peoples have no connection with and do not sympathize with terrorism; this relationship is represented in Figure 2-1.

FIGURE 1 Islam and Terrorism*

*Indicative only: Not to scale

STATELESSNESS AND STATES

Recent terrorist activity in general and the particular organization of Al Qaeda have cemented the view that the “new terrorism” involves a distinctive asymmetry: a stateless and nonterritorially bounded organization that wages war against a state, and vice versa. In domestic terrorism the terrorist organization typically operates within a state but itself is not a state. In international terrorism, the organization may operate within the confines of a single state, but it typically involves a far-flung organization or network of organizations, operating out of the territories of whatever states will harbor, tolerate, or cannot detect it. Corollaries of this view are: (a) that these organizations are out of range of institutions of truce, international diplomacy, alliances, and treaties, all of which are peaceful alternatives to warlike violence; (b) that, unlike states, these organizations do not face the “conservatizing” influences imposed by the state’s necessity to maintain law and order and manage politically negotiated relationships among diverse groups (except in the most totalitarian of societies, and to a limited degree in these); and (c) that they are relatively unreach-

able militarily because they are moving and semivisible targets, forever changing their form and moving from state to state and from place to place within states. This view contains much truth, but it must be qualified in two ways: first, that all “states” are not states as we understand them, and, second, that the relations between states and terrorist organizations are highly variable.

The standard Western model of a state is that it is a discrete, territorially bounded, politically sovereign unit with a legal monopoly over force and violence, responsible for law and order in its domestic population, and the focus of the solidarity, culture, and identity of its citizens. Regarding the panoply of states and other organizations in the contemporary world, we must conclude that the state is not a unitary thing that is either present or absent but is a continuum. The West still has many states that approximate the model—despite the intrusions of globalization on all states—but Afghanistan, Algeria, Colombia, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, the former Yugoslavia, and Zaire, while in the United Nations as states, do not, for various reasons, meet the understood conditions. Much has been made recently of the notion of “failed states” to describe the nondevelopment of modern states in the non-Western (including the Muslim) world in the political science literature (Zartman, 1995; Rubin, 2002). Finally, many “nonstate actors” take on state-like roles—United Fruit in Honduras, Aramco in Saudi Arabia—as did the East India Company in an earlier era of British colonialism.

In addition, whatever their approximation to the standard model, states have variable, not fixed, relations with terrorist networks. At one extreme there is the Taliban, which had supportive, hand-in-glove relations with Al Qaeda. Pakistan has had a vacillating relationship with terrorist organizations. Egypt has allowed their terrorists to leave to fight as terrorists in other places but curtailed their activities radically at home. Finally, when Libya at its inception entered the United Nations as a state, it had almost no attributes of a state and has only slowly developed those characteristics. Its international capriciousness during the first two decades of the regime of Muammar al Qaddafi—including some “state terrorism”—drew military attacks from the United States and sanctions from the international community. Since the end of the cold war, Libya has evolved more toward statehood and membership in the world

of states. No longer a pawn in the cold war and facing internal threats from Islamic opposition groups, Libya is not now considered a major part of the worldwide terrorist threat and, indeed, actively collaborated with the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks.

To realize this double variability—of states themselves and of state-terrorist relations—is at one level heartening. Since all states maintain some kind of relations with terrorist organizations if they are in their midst—supporting, neglecting, opposing, suppressing—this means that foreign policy exercised through state-state relations has variable potential to operate as one form of constraint, albeit uncertain, against terrorism and terrorist activities.

MOTIVATIONS FOR TERRORISM

We now shift from an emphasis on the broader origins and contexts of terrorism to individual terrorists in their group and organizational settings. We have already touched on background reasons for supporting or joining terrorism, such as economic desperation, political repression, and the ready presence of a framing religious ideology. We now turn to more immediate psychological motives, while fully aware of the slipperiness of this exercise. The perils are that (a) human variation is such that there is no single, “typical” terrorist psychology; (b) many terrorists are psychologically inaccessible and when accessible often secretive and nonyielding; and (c) Western psychological concepts and assessments often are not readily exportable and applicable to cultures very different from their own.

I NDIVIDUAL M OTIVATIONS

With respect to motivational profiles, work by Jerrold Post and others has suggested some similarities among members of given terrorist organizations, as well as some differences among the prototypical membership of different organizations. For instance, members of the German Red Army Faction and the Italian Red Brigades were likely to come from broken homes, and members of the Basque ETA group have come dispropor-

tionately from mixed Spanish-Basque parentage. “Comparable data are not available for Shi’ite and Palestinian terrorists, but specialists share the impression that many of their members come from the margins of society and that belonging to these fundamentalist and nationalist groups powerfully contributes to consolidating psychosocial identities at a time of great societal instability and flux” (Post, 1990:31). In all events, generalizations of this sort must always be tempered by the recognition that the composition of terrorist organizations is diverse and that well-educated and wealthy individuals are also represented, particularly in leadership ranks. More recent research on terrorists has rejected the idea that psychopathy is a key feature of terrorist motivations (McCauley and Segal, 1987; Ruby, 2002; Crenshaw, 1981; Post, 2001).

Leaving aside considerations of pathology or normality, the identity conferred by participating in a terrorist organization can be quite glamorous and appealing. As Post observed about one youthful recruit of a terrorist organization, “Before joining the group, he was alone, not particularly successful. Now he is engaged in a life and death struggle with the establishment, his picture on the ‘most wanted’ posters. He sees his leaders as internationally prominent media personalities. Within certain circles he is lionized as a hero” (Post, 1990:36).

Glorification of and personal salvation through violence is not limited to Islamic terrorists. Salvation as a voluntary martyr to violence or suffering has a religious history with roots in the theology of Christianity, Judaism, and Islam, as well as analogs in Buddhism. It is only because terrorists and their source populations on one hand, and target populations on the other, share these cultural precepts that such acts have the psychological impact that they do. Self-fulfillment through perpetration of violence also has a history, going back at least to nineteenth-century anarchists, early elements of Soviet communism, and some elements of the cowboy culture. Similarly, utopian visions achieved through apocryphal transformation are not limited to Islam but are common both in mainstream and sectarian aspects of Christianity and Judaism. They are also found in cultures outside the province of the three major Near Eastern religions, although it is not always clear that they have appeared entirely independently of their influence (examples are Melanesian cargo cults and the ghost dance of American Indians).

The glamour of the terrorist identity depends to a large extent on the terrorists’ success. For example, following the tremendous media attention accorded the Palestinian cause in the wake of the killing of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics by the Black September faction of the Palestine Liberation Organization, thousands of Palestinians rushed to join the terrorist organizations (Hoffman, 1998:74). It is evident that joining a terrorist group is not related uniquely to any given motivational profile. The search for identity is probably important, but so is the venting of anger, the power motive, and the glamour and aura of heroism and martyrdom—all operating in the context of situational opportunities.

I NSTILLING T ERRORIST O BJECTIVES : T HE P ROCESS OF B ECOMING A T ERRORIST

Why do individuals relinquish the societal values they have been brought up to cherish and adopt an extremist value system that may condone the killing of innocents? Studies of brainwashing, religious conversion, cults, as well as of terrorist groups per se provide a likely answer. It has to do with extreme forms of group influence and social pressures for conformity. The objectives are to isolate the individual from other belief systems, to delegitimize and dehumanize potential targets, to tolerate no uncertainty in rejecting or even killing skeptics, and to adore a leader. All these, taken together, create a separate, closedminded social reality at variance with the social reality of origin or the social reality of alternative cultures.

As Ehud Sprinzak notes: “Ideological terrorism does not emerge from a vacuum or from an inexplicable urge on the part of a few unstable radicals to go berserk. . . . In the main, the process does not involve isolated individuals who become terrorists on their own because their psyche is split or they suffer from low esteem and need extravagant compensation. Rather, it involves a group of true believers. An understanding of this group process seems to be much more important than an understanding of individual terrorists’ personal psychology” (1990:78). Once in the grasp of the group, it matters less what motivation may have brought the individual there in the first place (McCauley, in press).

An extreme illustration of this process is suicide bombing. Ariel Merari, an empirical investigator of suicide terrorism in

the Middle East and Sri Lanka, writes (personal communication, January 10, 2002):

The key to creating a terrorist suicide is the group process. Terrorist suicide is an organizational rather than an individual phenomenon. To the best of my knowledge, there has not been a single case of suicide terrorism which was done on the suicide’s personal whim. In all cases, it was an organization that decided to embark on this tactic, recruited candidates, chose the target and the time, prepared the candidate for the mission, and made sure that he/she would carry it out (often via a back-up detonation device activated via remote control in case the would-be terrorist got cold feet after all). The three critical elements in the preparation are boosting motivation, group pressure (e.g., mutual commitment), and creating a point of no return (public personal commitment) by videotaping the candidate declaring that he is going to do it and having him write last letters to family and friends.

T ERRORISM AS A P UBLIC P HENOMENON

One intrinsic objective for terrorists is the drawing of attention to themselves or their cause, not only among their supportive constituencies but also from the whole world. News of terrorists in the media and in public awareness is omnipresent. It is inconceivable to think of a public event—the Olympics, an economic summit, any official gathering—without worrying about security and the threat of terrorist activity. The amount of publicity and literature devoted to terrorism in the past six months is unprecedented. Osama bin Laden was a contender for Time magazine’s “Man of the Year” status, which was ultimately awarded to New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani. The basis for inclusion was related to terrorism in both cases.

The tremendous attention-getting potential of terrorism may have given rise in the 1990s to a new brand of terrorism that Ehud Sprinzak (2001) recently called “the megalomaniac hyperterrorist,” by which he means “self-annointed individuals with larger-than-life callings: Ramzi Youssef (the man behind the 1993 World Trade Center bombing), Shoko Asahara (leader of Aum Shinrikyo and architect of the 1995 gas attack in Tokyo subway station), Timothy McVeigh (the 1995 Oklahoma City bomber), Osama bin Laden (likely planner of the September 11 carnage),” Igal Amir, who assassinated Itzhak Rabin—all mani-

festing in some degree a desire to use catastrophic attacks in order to write a new chapter in history.

Whereas attention-getting in and of itself may be gratifying to terrorist leaders, successful terrorism sometimes advances terrorists’ real-world objectives. High-casualty suicidal terrorist attacks on U.S. and French targets in Lebanon contributed to the decisions of those countries to withdraw their forces. Hezbollah, or the Party of God, is regarded in Lebanon (nearly universally) as the successful vanquisher of the Israeli occupation. Perhaps not coincidentally, 18 months after the slaughter of the Israeli athletes in Munich, Yasser Arafat was invited to address the UN General Assembly. Attention to Islam and Muslim values and traditional Islamic ways is on the rise among young generations of Muslims worldwide. The interest in Islam as a culture is rising, and the call for reexamination of U.S. foreign policy in regard to Muslim countries is no doubt related to attention that terrorist attacks have drawn to these issues.

ORGANIZATION OF TERRORISM: NETWORKS

The preferred organizational form for terrorism is organizational networks or, perhaps better, networks of network-based organizations (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001; Kerbs, 2001). Like other aspects of terrorism these networks are relatively unfamiliar to those who study organizations, who have focused more on formal organizations, such as corporations, hospitals, universities, civil service bureaucracies, voluntary organizations, and organizations that direct the activities of social movements. As a result, there are only some, mainly indirect insights about terrorist organizations from the literature on formal organizations (Crenshaw, 1987).

The characteristics of terrorist organizations can be understood by tracing out the implications of the fact that terrorism must be simultaneously invisible and at the same time coordinated for preparing and executing terrorist activities. Consistent with these purposes, terrorist organizations must maintain extreme secrecy, avoid record-keeping, and minimize any paper trails that could reveal their internal movements, plans, and intentions. The last is extremely difficult to ensure completely,

because of the necessity to rely on computer and telephone—in addition to handwritten and face-to-face—communication as a part of organizational coordination, and the necessity to rely on financial transaction institutions to shift resources from place to place and on credit cards to facilitate movements of their personnel by cars, buses, trains, and airplanes.

The foreign affairs or external political exigencies of terrorist organizations are limited and concern mainly their relations with the host states in which they are located. If they are unknown to those states—rarely if ever the case—then questions of foreign relations with them are moot, because terrorist organizations avoid routine interactions with governing regimes. However, host states usually know about, tolerate, protect, or promote terrorist organizations for their own political purposes. This means establishing relations with terrorist organizations, taking an interest in and perhaps influencing their activities, thus forcing the terrorist organizations to observe and perhaps play along with various state-related realities (Crenshaw, 1985).

Because much of the glue of terrorist organizations is commitment to an extreme ideology in a group with extreme solidarity, this generates a special range of issues of maintaining internal control. They must recruit those whom they regard as ideologically committed and ideologically correct. While there have been news reports that claim to trace associations between individual terrorists and specific schools or other social ties, the panel is not confident that these purported ties are sufficient evidence to make conclusive statements.

Regardless of where recruits come from, the leaders must dedicate some of their organizational activities to maintaining that loyalty and commitment and preventing backsliding among members who are frequently living in societies with values, ways of life, and institutions that are different from their own and may be found seductive. The need to maintain various kinds of discipline through intense personal ties, hierarchical control, and surveillance is very strong. Organizations must ensure that information flows but also that it is kept secret. They must coordinate extremely complex activities of destruction. And they must ensure steadiness of ideological commitment (Della Porta, 1992).

There are several associated points of vulnerability of terrorist organizations, many of which involve failures of information flow, security of information, and coordination of activities.

One additional vulnerability, characteristic of all ideologically extreme and rigid organizations, is the constant danger of schismatic ideological tendencies from within (Schiller, 2001). Demanding extreme conformity, such organizations constantly face problems of internal deviation, mutual accusations among both leaders and followers that they are less than true believers, the splitting off of factions based on ideological differences, and the political intrigues that are involved in preventing such splits and dealing with them once they have occurred (Ansell, 2002).

Direct knowledge about these organizational dynamics is very frail, mainly because it is so difficult to study organizations that are bent on secret operations and concealment of information. Such knowledge must usually come from defectors, detainees who cooperate, and agents who have been able to infiltrate. However, the world has experienced many other kinds of secret, network-based organizations, and a base of knowledge about them and their operations has accumulated (Kerbs, 2001). Among these organizations are spy networks, gang rings such as the Mafia, drug-trafficking organizations, Communist cells, sabotage operations undertaken during wartime and during the cold war period, and extremist social and political movement organizations. In addition, network analysis as a field of study in sociology, social psychology, and elsewhere has yielded a great deal of theoretical and empirical knowledge during recent decades, and some aspects of this general knowledge might also be brought to bear. See, for example, the work of Carley (2001).

We conclude this long section on origins, contexts, motives, and organization of terrorism by noting a number of potential limitations on and vulnerability of contemporary terrorism: (a) their partial dependence on “domestic” friendly audiences, whose support and applause can wane if the terrorists appear to be inept or gratuitously excessive in their activities; (b) their dependence on states within which they operate—variable in terms of their precise relationship with those states—which may constrain their activities in light of their own “state” interests in the international arena; (c) extreme ideological/religious rigidity and backsliding, both of which have the potential to generate schisms within the terrorist organizations; (d) motivational failings, reversals, and defections, always a possibility when so much psychic energy is invested in an extreme cause; and (e) organizational failures, especially in flows of information in a dispersed, secretive network.

The events and aftermath of September 11, 2001, profoundly changed the course of history of the nation. They also brought the phenomenon known as terrorism to the forefront of the nation's consciousness. As it became thus focused, the limits of scientific understanding of terrorism and the capacity to develop policies to deal with it became even more evident. The objective of this report is to bring behavioral and social science perspectives to bear on the nature, determinants, and domestic responses to contemporary terrorism as a way of making theoretical and practical knowledge more adequate to the task. It also identifies areas of research priorities for the behavioral and social sciences.

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