research paper about peace and order

An official website of the United States government, Department of Justice.

Here's how you know

Official websites use .gov A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.

Secure .gov websites use HTTPS A lock ( Lock A locked padlock ) or https:// means you’ve safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

NCJRS Virtual Library

Peace and order as part of national development, additional details, no download available, availability, related topics.

• DOI: 10.52006/MAIN.V3I3.273
• Corpus ID: 234406705

Implementation of the Community Peace and Order and Public Safety Program in Negros Occidental, Philippines

• Rhumyla G. Nicor-Mangilimutan , Maria Nove A. Mejica , Merlita V. Caelian
• Published 30 December 2020
• Political Science, Sociology

Tables from this paper

30 References

The implementation of the anti-drug war campaign of the philippine government, the role of mayors and barangay captains in the philippines' anti-drugs campaign, implemented crime prevention strategies of pnp in salug valley, zamboanga del sur, philippines, implementation of curfew ordinances in cabanatuan city, nueva ecija, drug surrenderers and crime statistics during the implementation of project double barrel (pdb) in the philippines, a comparative study of urban crime between malaysia and nigeria.

• Highly Influential

The Development of a Community-Based Drug Intervention for Filipino Drug Users

Do barangays really matter in local services delivery some issues and policy options, drug addiction in urban life of bangladesh: a sociological study for exploring the causes, the scaling of crime concentration in cities, related papers.

Showing 1 through 3 of 0 Related Papers

Implementation of Barangay Peace and Order Programs: a Situational Analysis

Total Page： 16

File Type： pdf , Size： 1020Kb

• Abstract and Figures
• Public Full-text
• Cruising Guide to the Philippines Cruising Guide to the Philippines For Yachtsmen By Conant M. Webb Draft of 06/16/09 Webb - Cruising Guide to the Phillippines Page 2 INTRODUCTION The Philippines is the second largest archipelago in the world after Indonesia, with around 7,000 islands. Relatively few yachts cruise here, but there seem to be more every year. In most areas it is still rare to run across another yacht. There are pristine coral reefs, turquoise bays and snug anchorages, as well as more metropolitan delights. The Filipino people are very friendly and sometimes embarrassingly hospitable. Their culture is a unique mixture of indigenous, Spanish, Asian and American. Philippine charts are inexpensive and reasonably good. English is widely (although not universally) spoken. The cost of living is very reasonable. This book is intended to meet the particular needs of the cruising yachtsman with a boat in the 10-20 meter range. It supplements (but is not intended to replace) conventional navigational materials, a discussion of which can be found below on page 16. I have tried to make this book accurate, but responsibility for the safety of your vessel and its crew must remain yours alone. CONVENTIONS IN THIS BOOK Coordinates are given for various features to help you find them on a chart, not for uncritical use with GPS. In most cases the position is approximate, and is only given to the nearest whole minute. Where coordinates are expressed more exactly, in decimal minutes or minutes and seconds, the relevant chart is mentioned or WGS 84 is the datum used. See the References section (page 157) for specific details of the chart edition used. [Show full text]
• Toward an Enhanced Strategic Policy in the Philippines Toward an Enhanced Strategic Policy in the Philippines EDITED BY ARIES A. ARUGAY HERMAN JOSEPH S. KRAFT PUBLISHED BY University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies Diliman, Quezon City First Printing, 2020 UP CIDS No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, without written permission from the publishers. Recommended Entry: Towards an enhanced strategic policy in the Philippines / edited by Aries A. Arugay, Herman Joseph S. Kraft. -- Quezon City : University of the Philippines, Center for Integrative Studies,[2020],©2020. pages ; cm ISBN 978-971-742-141-4 1. Philippines -- Economic policy. 2. Philippines -- Foreign economic relations. 2. Philippines -- Foreign policy. 3. International economic relations. 4. National Security -- Philippines. I. Arugay, Aries A. II. Kraft, Herman Joseph S. II. Title. 338.9599 HF1599 P020200166 Editors: Aries A. Arugay and Herman Joseph S. Kraft Copy Editors: Alexander F. Villafania and Edelynne Mae R. Escartin Layout and Cover design: Ericson Caguete Printed in the Philippines UP CIDS has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. TABLE OF CONTENTS Acknowledgements ______________________________________ i Foreword Stefan Jost ____________________________________________ iii Teresa S. Encarnacion Tadem _____________________________v List of Abbreviations ___________________________________ ix About the Contributors ________________________________ xiii Introduction The Strategic Outlook of the Philippines: “Situation Normal, Still Muddling Through” Herman Joseph S. Kraft __________________________________1 Maritime Security The South China Sea and East China Sea Disputes: Juxtapositions and Implications for the Philippines Jaime B. [Show full text]
• PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS and RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist NOT FOR SALE a PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist NOT FOR SALE Punong Barangay Tasks and Responsibilities Checklist Copyright@2018 Local Government Academy (LGA) Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) All rights reserved. All rights reserved. No portions of this book may be copied or reproduced in books, pamphlets, typewritten, xeroxed, or in any other form for distribution or sale, without permission from the Academy. ISBN: 978-971-0576-81-4 Printed and bounded in Manila, Philippines. Published by: Local Government Academy Department of the Interior and Local Government 8/F Agustin I Bldg., F. Ortigas, Jr. Road, (formerly Emerald Ave.) Ortigas Center, Pasig City 1605 Philippines Tel Nos. (632) 634-8430 / 634-8436 www.lga.gov.ph Technical Working Group: Alfonso A. Maralli, Jr. Sally S. Jumalon Maria Louisa B. Bite Cover and Layout: Iris A. Igrobay PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist TABLE OF CONTENTS I Messages iii - vi II List of Acronyms vii III Tasks and Responsibilities as Mandated by the Local Government Code 1 IV Tasks and Responsibilities Pursuant to Presidential Directives 5 V List of Presidential Directives and DILG Memorandum Circulars 31 i PUNONG BARANGAY TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES Checklist MESSAGE The public offices are public trusts. They are a manifestation of the will of the people. This is at the very core of democracy that we enjoy today. Both local and national officials are in the same situation, they are accountable to the people, the constituents that voted for them. The funds that are utilized are from the people and the natural resources that belong to the nation and its future generations. [Show full text]
• Tourism and Crime: Evidence from the Philippines Kyoto University Tourism and Crime: Evidence from the Philippines Rosalina Palanca-Tan,* Len Patrick Dominic M. Garces,* Angelica Nicole C. Purisima,* and Angelo Christian L. Zaratan* Using panel data gathered from 16 regions of the Philippines for the period 2009–11, this paper investigates the relationship between tourism and crime. The findings of the study show that the relation between tourism and crime may largely depend on the characteristics of visitors and the types of crime. For all types of crime and their aggregate, no significant correlation between the crime rate (defined as the number of crime cases divided by population) and total tourist arrivals is found. However, a statistically significant positive relation is found between foreign tour- ism and robbery and theft cases as well as between overseas Filipino tourism and robbery. On the other hand, domestic tourism is not significantly correlated with any of the four types of crimes. These results, together with a strong evidence of the negative relationship between crime and the crime clearance efficiency, present much opportunity for policy intervention in order to minimize the crime externality of the country’s tourism-led development strategy. Keywords: tourism, crime, negative externality, sustainable development Introduction The tourism industry in the Philippines has expanded rapidly in recent years due primar- ily to intensified marketing of the country’s rich geographical and biological diversity and of its historical and cultural heritage. In 2000–10, the tourism sector consistently made substantial contribution to the Philippine economy, averaging about 5.8% of gross domes- tic product (GDP) on an annual basis. [Show full text]
• ADDRESSING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE in the PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES Second-Largest Archipelago in the World Comprising 7,641 Islands ADDRESSING ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE IN THE PHILIPPINES PHILIPPINES Second-largest archipelago in the world comprising 7,641 islands Current population is 100 million, but projected to reach 125 million by 2030; most people, particularly the poor, depend on biodiversity 114 species of amphibians 240 Protected Areas 228 Key Biodiversity Areas 342 species of reptiles, 68% are endemic One of only 17 mega-diverse countries for harboring wildlife species found 4th most important nowhere else in the world country in bird endemism with 695 species More than 52,177 (195 endemic and described species, half 126 restricted range) of which are endemic 5th in the world in terms of total plant species, half of which are endemic Home to 5 of 7 known marine turtle species in the world green, hawksbill, olive ridley, loggerhead, and leatherback turtles ILLEGAL WILDLIFE TRADE The value of Illegal Wildlife Trade (IWT) is estimated at $10 billion–$23 billion per year, making wildlife crime the fourth most lucrative illegal business after narcotics, human trafficking, and arms. The Philippines is a consumer, source, and transit point for IWT, threatening endemic species populations, economic development, and biodiversity. The country has been a party to the Convention on Biological Diversity since 1992. The value of IWT in the Philippines is estimated at ₱50 billion a year (roughly equivalent to $1billion), which includes the market value of wildlife and its resources, their ecological role and value, damage to habitats incurred during poaching, and loss in potential [Show full text]
• S5-28 5.3 NEEDS ANALYSIS in Order to Comprehensively Sketch The The Study for Socio-Economic Reconstruction and Development of Conflict-Affected Areas in Mindanao in the Republic of the Philippines SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER 5.3 NEEDS ANALYSIS In order to comprehensively sketch the structure and depth of development needs in CAAM, various needs identified through the surveys were ranked and categorized. In doing so, the concept of a three-layer structure is introduced. First, the needs expressed by people were classified into the layer of “development needs,” as show in the right column of Table 5.3-1. Then, the “development needs” were grouped based on their similarity and proximity, and raised into the layer of “sectors.” Finally, these sectors were further combined to form the highest layer of “categories.” As a result, various development needs were then converged into the four broad need categories of: Basic Social Services, Public Facilities, Economic Infrastructure, and Livelihood. This process of categorization and structure construction were also repeated in the analysis of the IBNA. Table 5.3-1 Need Category and Sector of CAAM CATEGORY SECTOR DEVELOPMENT NEEDS Electrification Basic Utilities Water Systems Educational Facilities Day Care Centers Deployment of teachers Madrasahs Education Non-Formal Education Scholarships BASIC SOCIAL School buildings SERVICES School Dormitories School Pathways Barangay Pharmacies Health Centers Health Hospitals Medical Assistants Medicine and Medical Supplies Sanitary Toilets Housing/Sanitation Core Shelters PUBLIC FACILITIES Garbage Facilities Environment Reforestation [Show full text]
• Resettlement Action Plan THE PREPARATORY STUDY FOR CENTRAL LUZON LINK EXPRESSWAY PROJECT IN THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES RESETTLEMENT ACTION PLAN August 2011 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES Resettlement Action Plan CHAPTER 1 Description of the Project....................................................................................................1 CHAPTER 2 Objectives of the Resettlement Action Plan........................................................................6 CHAPTER 3 Relocation Policy.................................................................................................................6 CHAPTER 4 Summary of Relocation and Assets.....................................................................................9 CHAPTER 5 Household Survey Result..................................................................................................16 CHAPTER 6 Legal Framework...............................................................................................................25 CHAPTER 7 Compensation and Livelihood Restoration Plan...............................................................35 CHAPTER 8 Relocation Site Development Plan....................................................................................42 CHAPTER 9 PAP’s Willingness to Relocation and Preferred Sites.......................................................51 CHAPTER 10 Stakeholders Meeting/Consultation Meeting....................................................................52 CHAPTER 11 Grievance Redressing [Show full text]
• Download Document (PDF | 853.07 3. DAMAGED HOUSES (TAB C) • A total of 51,448 houses were damaged (Totally – 14,661 /Partially – 36,787 ) 4. COST OF DAMAGES (TAB D) • The estimated cost of damages to infrastructure, agriculture and school buildings amounted to PhP1,399,602,882.40 Infrastructure - PhP 1,111,050,424.40 Agriculture - PhP 288,552,458.00 II. EMERGENCY RESPONSE MANAGEMENT A. COORDINATION MEETINGS • NDRRMC convened on 17 December 2011which was presided over by the SND and Chairperson, NDRRMC and attended by representatives of all member agencies. His Excellency President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III provided the following guidance to NDRRMC Member Agencies : ° to consider long-term mitigation measures to address siltation of rivers, mining and deforestation; ° to identify high risk areas for human settlements and development and families be relocated into safe habitation; ° to transfer military assets before the 3-day warning whenever a typhoon will affect communities at risks; ° to review disaster management protocols to include maintenance and transportation costs of these assets (air, land, and maritime); and ° need to come up with a Crisis Manual for natural disasters ° The President of the Republic of the Philippines visited RDRRMC X on Dec 21, 2011 to actually see the situation in the area and condition of the victims particularly in Cagayan de Oro and Iligan City and issued Proclamation No. 303 dated December 20, 2011, declaring a State of National Calamity in Regions VII, IX, X, XI, and CARAGA • NDRRMC formally accepted the offer of assistance from [Show full text]
• Crime Rate in Ozamiz City, Philippines Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 186-215, August 2015 Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies Vol. 4 No. 1, pp. 186-215, August 2015 ISSN 2350-7020 (Print) ISSN 2350-7020 (Print) ISSN 2362-9436 (Online) ISSN 2362-9436 (Online) doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.7828/jmds.v4i1.847 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.7828/jmds.v4i1.847 Crime Rate in Ozamiz City, Philippines Mercy O. Caba-ong1, Jose F. Cuevas Jr.1, Angelita B. Alvarico1, Marie Rosellynn C. Enguito2 1College of Criminology, Misamis University, Ozamiz City, Philippines 2Misamis University Research Center, Misamis University, Ozamiz City, Philippines Corresponding author: Mercy O. Caba-ong, email: [email protected] Abstract Data about the crime rate are relevant in improving the crime control programs in a locality. The purpose of this paper was to determine the crime rate in Ozamiz City from the calendar year 2010 to 2013. This study also aimed to compare the volumes of the index and non-index crimes, respectively and to obtain the percentage breakdown of these offenses per year. The paper also examined the spatiotemporal patterns of index crimes. Incidents of crime reported and docketed in the police blotter were retrieved from Ozamiz City Police Station. Case investigators were also interviewed to verify the data. Findings showed a decreased crime rate in 2010 relative to 2011, a most notable decline in 2012, and the sharpest increase in 2013. Among the index crimes, physical injuries had the highest crime volume, followed by theft and robbery. Despite the lower rate of non-index crimes compared to index crimes, illegal logging, riding motor vehicles without the plate number, driver‟s license and registration could not be disregarded. [Show full text]
• Integrated Natural Resources and Environmental Management Project Rehabilitation and Improvement of Liguron Access Road in Talakag, Bukidnon Initial Environmental Examination January 2018 PHI: Integrated Natural Resources and Environmental Management Project Rehabilitation and Improvement of Liguron Access Road in Talakag, Bukidnon Prepared by Municipality of Talakag, Province of Bukidnon for the Asian Development Bank. i CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (as of 30 November 2017 Year) The date of the currency equivalents must be within 2 months from the date on the cover. Currency unit – peso (PhP) PhP 1.00 = $ 0.01986 $1.00 = PhP 50.34 ABBREVIATIONS ADB Asian Development Bank BDC Barangay Development Council BUB Bottom-Up Budgeting CDORB Cagayan De Oro River Basin CNC Certificate of Non-Coverage CSC Construction Supervision Consultant CSO Civil Society Organization DED Detail Engineering Design DENR Department of Environment And Natural Resources DILG Department of Interior and Local Government DSWD Department of Social Welfare and Development ECA Environmentally Critical Area ECC Environmental Compliance Certificate ECP Environmentally Critical Project EHSM Environmental Health and Safety Manager EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIS Environmental Impact Statement EMB Environmental Management Bureau ESS Environmental Safeguards Specialist GAD Gender and Development IEE Initial Environmental Examination INREMP Integrated Natural Resources and Environment Management Project IP Indigenous People IROW Infrastructure Right of Way LIDASAFA Liguron-Dagundalahon-Sagaran Farmers Association LGU Local Government Unit LPRAT Local Poverty Reduction Action Team MKaRNP Mt. Kalatungan Range Natural [Show full text]
• SC70 Doc. 69.2 Original language: English SC70 Doc. 69.2 CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED SPECIES OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA ____________________ Seventieth meeting of the Standing Committee Rosa Khutor, Sochi (Russian Federation), 1-5 October 2018 Reports of regional representatives ASIA 1. This document has been submitted by Kuwait. 2. General information: Regional Representative: Chain, Indonesia, Kuwait Alternate Regional Representative: Japan, Nepal, Republic of Korea Number of Parties in the Region: 38 Parties providing information for this Report: Afghanistan, Bahrain, China, Indonesia, Iraq, Japan, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Syrian Arab Republic, United Arab Emirates, and Yem en 3. Introduction: This report summarized the activities of Parties between 69th Standing Committee Meeting (November 2017, Rosa Khutor) and 70th Standing Committee Meeting (October 2018, Rosa Khutor, Sochi). 4. Activities within each party 4.1 Afghanistan: 1.Participation in CITES meeting None 2.Cooperation with the parties and other None 3.Implimentation of CITES, including conservation, legislation and law enforcement activities a.Wild Animal Protection and hunting regulation law Afghanistan developed Wild Animal Protection and hunting regulation law, this law is currently drafted, on September, 2018 Afghanistan conducted more from three coordination meeting with relevant organization, asspacilly Ministry of agriculture irrigation and water regarding specification of National Environmental SC70 Doc. 69.2 – p. 1 Protection Agency (NEPA) and Ministry of Agriculture irrigation and livestock (MAIL) role in the implementation of this law to finalize as soon as possible. After adoption of this law, Afghanistan will be able to regulate wild animal illegal hunting, trapping and preventing the extinction of endangered species b. [Show full text]
• State Terrorism in the Philippines Unmasking the Securitized Terror Behind ‘War on Drugs’ MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 Leiden University, The Hague Campus State Terrorism in the Philippines Unmasking the securitized terror behind ‘War on Drugs’ Master Thesis, Spring 2017 George Plevris (s1722026) Supervisor: Dr. M. Kitzen Second Reader: Liesbeth van der Heide University of Leiden- The Hague Campus Master MSc. Crisis & Security Management May 2017 Leiden University 1 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 By the end of this paper, I believe you will come to the same observation that I arrived: Terror (-ism) is the finest tool of political and social governance a state can deploy. If executed well, it does not only achieve the goal of submission of the audience, but it eliminates the latter’s tool of resistance: hope. Leiden University 2 MSc. Crisis & Security Management Thesis - Spring 2017 Abstract Typically, modern states have the monopoly on legitimate violence drawn from their sovereignty and democratic rule of law, on the behest of their citizens. This ‘legitimate’ violence however has seen a rise in the last two decades, and taken forms of intricate civil wars, wars on crime, wars on drugs and wars on terror. Yet, despite outcries for violations of laws and human rights, of crimes against humanity and war crimes, policies of extreme violence performed by the democratic states are hardly ever labeled as state terrorism. This paper will explore the scholarship of state terrorism, often a contested topic among academic and experts, and will approach the issue through the current ‘war on drugs’ raging in the Philippines. The theoretical premise that I will carve out aims to explore and acknowledge the existence of state terror but also the difficulty in naming it. [Show full text]

• Subscribe to updates
• Latest news
• Media centre
• News archive
• Nobel Peace Prize shortlist
• Upcoming events
• Recorded events
• Annual Peace Address
• Event archive
• Project archive
• Latest publications
• Publication archive
• Current staff
• Alphabetical list
• Global Fellows
• Practitioners in Residence
• Replication data
• Annual reports
• How to find

The Pillars of Protest: Demands, Strategy, Composition and Organization

Dahl, Marianne; Haakon Gjerløw & Ida Rudolfsen (2024) The Pillars of Protest: Demands, Strategy, Composition and Organization. PRIO Paper . Oslo: PRIO.

This report examines the relationship between mass mobilization and democratic change, drawing on previous research and new data. We focus on four central aspects determining mass mobilization success: Movement demands, campaign strategy, the social composition of the campaign and level of organization. Mass movements are more likely to succeed when they call for the end of the regime through non-violent strategies, mobilize large numbers of people using diverse tactics, engage a broad coalition that cuts across social divisions, and are grounded in or supported by existing organizational networks. These factors are crucial because they affect two essential elements for success: the size of the movement and the likelihood of loyalty shifts within the regime.

Marianne Dahl

Research Director

Haakon Gjerløw

Senior Researcher

Ida Rudolfsen

Evaluation of the Peace and Order and Public Safety Plan: Its Relation to the Crime Prevention Priority Issues of the Province of Albay

• JPAIR Multidisciplinary Research 41(1):74-87
• 41(1):74-87
• CC BY-NC 4.0
• This person is not on ResearchGate, or hasn't claimed this research yet.

Abstract and Figures

Discover the world's research

• 25+ million members
• 160+ million publication pages
• 2.3+ billion citations

• Thomas Knock

• Josefin Månsson
• Mats Ekendahl
• Woodrow Wilson

• Suzanne Fraser
• Recruit researchers
• Join for free
• Login Email Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google Welcome back! Please log in. Email · Hint Tip: Most researchers use their institutional email address as their ResearchGate login Password Forgot password? Keep me logged in Log in or Continue with Google No account? Sign up

Academia.edu no longer supports Internet Explorer.

To browse Academia.edu and the wider internet faster and more securely, please take a few seconds to  upgrade your browser .

Enter the email address you signed up with and we'll email you a reset link.

• We're Hiring!
• Help Center

COMMUNITY POLICING TOWARDS PEACE AND ORDER IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF DONSOL

Related Papers

Judge Eliza B. Yu

International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology

Dr Dr Motsamai John Modise MJ

This article integrates police responsibilities, operational independence, police powers, arrest and custody, criminal investigation, and improving police professionalism in order to fulfill law and order goals. The article's goal is to outline the environment in which the police function. The upkeep of order is one of the State's primary functions, if not its primary function. As a result, we begin by looking into the ideas of order and disorder. In order to foster respect and ensure that actions are consistent with widely held beliefs of human rights, the second section explains the problems and examines the connection between those rights and the police. Understanding Policing is an attempt to integrate the professional police and human rights viewpoints while serving as a brief introduction to each of these genres of literature. The article attempts to lay out the essential obligations of law enforcement in society as well as the principles and values that ought to direct them. The major objective of the article is to raise police professionalism. Instead of taking a legalistic stance, understanding policing assesses the likelihood that police will uphold human rights in practice. This suggests that we will surpass the standards established by other countries.

SMCC Higher Education Research Journal

Gian Venci Alonzo

tanveer bhat

fachrul rozi

This research aimed to provide clarity about obstacles of the National Police Commission in its efforts to improve the performance and solutions of these matters. This research utilized a normative-empirical method. The data collection was done by interviews and library research. The findings of this research were; 1) the lack of budget resulted to the limitations of the National Police Commission in carrying out their duties, 2) the budget that is still managed by the coordinator minister for political, legal, and security affairs affected the national police commission’s flexibility in managing management institutions and work programs, 3) lack of personnel from national police commission was one of significant obstacles because several people in the National Police Commission were not likely to carry out effective tasks towards thousands of police from the headquarters, regional police and resort police.

Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden eBooks

Aaron Bielejewski

SSRN Electronic Journal

Tunde Otubu

Kamran Adil

International Journal of Research -GRANTHAALAYAH

Sherill A . Gilbas

This paper highlights the trust, respect, safety and security ratings of the community to the Philippine National Police (PNP) in the Province of Albay. It presents the sectoral ratings to PNP programs. The survey utilized a structured interview with 200 sample respondents from Albay coming from different sectors. Male respondents outnumbered female respondents. The majority of the respondents are 41-50 years old, at least high school graduates and are married. The respondents gave the highest net rating on respect, followed by net rating on trust and the lowest net rating on safety and security on the performance of the PNP. Moreover, a high net rating on commitment of support to the identified programs of the PNP was also attained from the respondents. The highest net rating of support is given to the PNP’s anti-illegal drugs program, followed by anti-terrorism, anti-riding in tandem and anti-illegal gambling programs. The ratings of the PNP obtained from the different sectors of...

International Journal of Advanced Research in Management and Social Sciences

Maita P Guadamor

The Philippine National Police as one of the bureaus of the Department of Interior and Local Government as mandated under Republic Act 6975 has given the functions to enforce all laws and ordinance relative to the protection of lives and properties, maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to ensure public safety; investigate and prevent crimes, effect the arrest of criminal offenders, bring offenders to justice and assist in their prosecution; perform such other duties and exercise all other functions as may be provided by law. This undertaking involved all the sixty (60) police officers who are assigned in the Tuguegarao City Police Station (TCPS), fifteen (15) residents in each of the forty nine (49) barangays which consists of at least three (3) barangay police/tanods, all barangay chairmen, and at least 11 residents in each barangay. A total of one hundred percent of the police officers which composes set A of respondents and seven hundred thirty five (735) residen...

Loading Preview

Sorry, preview is currently unavailable. You can download the paper by clicking the button above.

RELATED PAPERS

Filius Populi

Flinders Journal of History and Politics

Glenn Varona

International Police Science Association IPSA

Mamdooh Abdelmottlep

Bryan M Sims

IOER International Multidisciplinary Research Journal

IOER International Multidisciplinary Research Journal ( IIMRJ)

Philipp Lottholz

reydel galia

Suraj Kumar

International Police Science Association (IPSA)

What is to Be Done About Crime and Punishment?

Robert Reiner

Muhammad Ali Nekokara

Community Police and citizen participation in security matters: proposal for the creation of a Community Council and Police (Atena Editora)

Atena Editora

Kausar Uddin

Social Policy & Administration

Barry Loveday

Clifford Shearing

IJMRAP Editor

Ananda Devi D Almase

Jasmina Arnež

Sonoka O'Connor

Przegląd Strategiczny

Włodzimierz Fehler

Melody Utang

Jayson Sopsop

Artur Victoria

RELATED TOPICS

•   We're Hiring!
•   Help Center
• Find new research papers in:
• Health Sciences
• Earth Sciences
• Cognitive Science
• Mathematics
• Computer Science
• Academia ©2024

• Washington DC, USA
• Activities in Singapore and Beijing, China
• Brussels, Belgium
• New Delhi, India
• Beirut, Lebanon
• Berlin, Germany

U.S.-Australia Alliance Force Posture, Policy, and Planning: Toward a More Deliberate Incrementalism

A confluence of factors has made Australia less reluctant to increase the scope for U.S. forces to operate in and from Australian territory, but U.S. and Australian national defense postures are not yet in closer alignment. Practical steps are needed that reflect Australia’s current policy realities.

Alliance Future: Rewiring Australia and the United States

The Carnegie Asia Program’s “Alliance Future” project aims to ensure that Canberra and Washington are working to operationalize and integrate their alliance in new ways. The project explores how to undertake difficult reforms, forge new modes of cooperation, harmonize outdated regulations, better align national strategies, address sovereignty concerns and risk thresholds, and ultimately reform the alliance for a more competitive era.

Introduction

In Article II of the Australia, New Zealand, and United States (ANZUS) Security Treaty—which is nearly identical to Article III of the founding document of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 1 —Australia and the United States pledged that “in order more effectively to achieve the objective of this Treaty the Parties separately and jointly by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.” 2 Since 2020, Australia and the United States have announced a number of force posture initiatives that, at first glance, seem to increase the importance of the “collective” rather than “individual” elements of this pledge. Yet, in light of the low level of prior force posture cooperation, changes over the years since have been significant more for their novelty than for their overall effect on the U.S. force posture in the Indo-Pacific or Australia’s national defense effort.

A confluence of factors has made Australia less reluctant to increase the scope for U.S. forces to operate in and from Australian territory, but there is no sign that this will bring U.S. and Australian national defense postures into closer alignment. Indeed, statements from the Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN)—between the U.S. secretaries of state and defense and Australian ministers for foreign affairs and defense—in 2023 and 2024 have actually dropped references to multilateral deterrence that had been included from 2020 to 2022. Australia’s own reconsideration of its national force structure and posture in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review (DSR) and 2024 National Defence Strategy (NDS) continues to conceive of Australian posture and defense strategy on purely national lines.

To maintain the momentum of practical cooperation since 2020, Australian and U.S. policymakers should seek pragmatic steps that evolve cooperation with, rather than against, the grain of Australia’s current policy realities. In particular, they should focus on cooperation that reflects overlapping national interests in operations closer to Australia, and on strengthening deterrence by facilitating horizontal rather than vertical escalation.

The Legacy of History: Allies in Permanent Separation

The basis of the U.S.-Australia alliance is the ANZUS Treaty, signed in 1952 by the United States, Australia, and New Zealand. (U.S. commitments to New Zealand would later be suspended by the United States in 1986 over a nuclear dispute, so that for Australia the treaty is now the basis for two bilateral alliances.) In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the short-lived and ill-fated Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO) temporarily complemented ANZUS, but the institutions it created were carefully limited to its own, separate treaty commitments and relationships. Instead, the 1952 Radford-Collins Agreement between the U.S. and Australian navies embodied an approach of minimal coordination, based on geographic division into different zones of responsibility 3 —rather than integration as in NATO (or the U.S.-South Korea alliance) or allocation of different roles in the same geographic area (as in the U.S.-Japan alliance). Politically, Australia’s post-Vietnam War defense identity was closely linked to the concept of defense “self-reliance,” which meant that Australia sought to be able to defend itself against regional threats (in particular, Indonesia) without having to rely on assistance from U.S. combat forces. 4

This is not to say that the Australian and U.S. defense and intelligence communities did not develop close ties. Of particular importance are the Joint Facilities in Australia (including satellite and submarine communications) and joint military operations after the September 11, 2001, attacks in various conflicts across the Middle East. Australia and the United States continued to coordinate maritime surveillance in Southeast Asia, but since the end of the Vietnam War, the focus of their defense preparations lay on different threats in different parts of the Indo-Pacific area. They therefore never developed structures for, or even habits of, coordinating regional force posture (let alone force structure).

In 2012, a new era seemed to dawn as Australia and the United States embarked on the Force Posture Initiative (FPI), the centerpiece—and ostensibly only the first component—of which were rotational training deployments of U.S. marines to Australia’s Northern Territory. However, the initiative is best understood as a political gesture of support for then U.S. president Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” rather than a reassessment of Australia’s own strategic policy and approach to the alliance. By emphasizing Australia’s “full knowledge and concurrence” regarding U.S. operations on Australian territory, a 2012 statement to parliament placed FPI cooperation firmly into the context of the long-standing cooperation on the Joint Facilities. 5 Australia’s subsequent 2013 Defence White Paper showed no significant reassessment of the role of the alliance or the U.S. presence in Australia’s approach to regional security. 6

Despite the perception of a close alliance, Australia and the United States must clear higher hurdles than in other alliances to embark on closer force posture integration. These include the lack of relevant policy legacy and traditions, Australian concerns about entrapment and sovereignty implications, the lack of a shared sense of threat and urgency (at least within the wider system of government in Canberra), and traditionally limited U.S. policy attention to the management of the Australian alliance. 7

Not surprisingly, even though the allies had flagged further naval and air cooperation when announcing the FPI in 2012, little of substance eventuated beyond cooperation on new space surveillance radars in Northern Australia—and long negotiations on cost-sharing. When U.S. officials floated the possibility of deploying U.S. bombers in 2015—or new intermediate-range missiles in 2019—Australian ministers were quick to publicly squash such suggestions. 8 The conservative Liberal-National Coalition’s 2016 Defence White Paper emphasized upholding global “rules-based order” as the central task for the Australian Defence Force (ADF), deliberately eschewing the traditional policy prioritization of developments in Australia’s own region. In short, nothing about Australian defense policy in the years following the FPI in 2012 suggested that Australia and the United States had moved to a changed understanding of the nature of their alliance, a shared recognition of the threat coming from China, a greater sense of the joint military steps necessary to meet this threat, or more urgency in doing so.

Progress Since 2020: Cooperation Without Alignment

In 2019, the AUSMIN communiqué did not even mention deterrence, nor did it reference new developments on force posture cooperation. 9 This all changed in 2020, which emerged as a watershed year for greater progress on force posture cooperation as well as political commitment to multilateral deterrence. The allies announced work on a classified “Statement of Principles on Alliance Defense Cooperation and Force Posture Priorities in the Indo-Pacific,” with the aim to “deter coercive acts and the use of force.” 10 Initial signs of this increased cooperation included Australian-led contracts for infrastructure to host four tanker aircraft at its Tindal air base south of Darwin, 11 as well as U.S. investment in military fuel storage in the port of Darwin. 12 In 2021—in addition to the announcement of the Australia-UK-U.S. security agreement (AUKUS)—Australia and the United States also agreed to create “a combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise to support high‑end warfighting and combined military operations in the region.” 13 A subsequent agreement in 2022 expanded the Australian air base at Tindal to enable it to host six B-52 bombers, 14 and both countries announced plans for further joint enhancement of Australian bases, fuel, and ordnance storage sites to enable operations by U.S. air and land forces. 15 In 2023, the allies announced that the United States would establish Submarine Rotational Force – West, with up to four Virginia-class submarines stationed in Perth from 2027 as part of AUKUS. 16 The same year, they also announced regular rotations of U.S. Army watercraft to Australia, the scoping of upgrades to Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) Bases Curtin and Scherger, the establishment of a guided weapons production and maintenance capability, plans to produce guided multiple launch rocket systems, and the maintenance, repair, overhaul, and upgrade of Mk-48 torpedoes and SM-2 missiles in Australia. 17

Yet this seemingly rapid progress, at least compared to the period from 2012 to 2019, is not due to a fundamental reassessment of the alliance and how it relates to Australia’s own defense policy, structure, and posture. Rather, it is best explained by the erosion of the political, policy, institutional, and international barriers and concerns that had led Australia to be reluctant to agree to greater cooperation in earlier years. One key development was Chinese economic and political coercion of Australia. This significantly shifted the public’s perception of—and policy debate on—China as a threat to Australia, and undercut the argument that Australia’s economic relationship with China would benefit from, or even require, political distance from the United States. 18 The 2020 Defence Strategic Update, produced by then prime minister Scott Morrison’s government, provided greater focus—and a greater sense of urgency—on conflict with China in national defense policy settings, and it placed deterrence at the core of Australia’s national defense discourse. 19 Since then, the Australian Department of Defence has been slowly developing institutional processes and expertise in assessing the implications of major war that might see U.S. forces operating from Australia. This is reinforced by the 2023 DSR, which recommended a so-called net assessment–based planning model and for the government to endorse defense planning scenarios. In Washington, AUKUS certainly increased the priority of Australia-related issues for busy Pentagon executives. And while Australia has always been sensitive to regional perceptions, the participation of Australian tanks transported from Darwin on a U.S. vessel to exercises in Indonesia, 20 as well as the first-ever visit of a U.S. B-52 bomber to Indonesia, 21 seem to signal Jakarta’s growing comfort with increased U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation.

However, despite being more receptive to an increased U.S. presence in Australia, major defense policy statements by the governments of both Morrisson and his successor, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, have continued to place Australian security in a local context. Australia’s own concept of security is based on self-reliant operations for local “deterrence by denial” and its own defense, rather than to ensure the success of multilateral deterrence. 22 Seemingly major new capability decisions do not fundamentally change this predominantly local outlook. Despite the political significance of the AUKUS partnership, the practical reality is that shifting to nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) will mostly preserve Australia’s ability to operate the same way it always has with its fleet of conventionally powered submarines in more benign times. Hence, it represents continuity rather than change in Australia’s naval ambitions. 23 And while the acquisition or deployment of Tomahawk (or other long-range) missiles is of strategic significance in Europe, Japan, and South Korea, because it opens new escalation options against an adversary’s homelands, the same is not true for Australia. There, the decision to acquire these systems is part of a broader realization that the ADF’s guided missile arsenal was—in range and capability—inadequate for the geographic expanses of Australia’s northern approaches.

The 2023 DSR and 2024 NDS are important reality checks on Australia’s ambitions for—and, indeed, the limited importance of—force posture integration in Australia’s national policy. Both place the concept of “denial” in the country’s northern approaches at the core of Australian defense planning. In many ways, this is an updated and more proactive version of Australia’s posture in its seminal 1987 Defence White Paper. 24 In conjunction with its increased willingness to host U.S. long-range air and submarine forces, as well as U.S. Army watercraft, Australia’s national-level force structure and posture development could be seen as complementary to that of the United States—an Australian version of the old U.S.-Japan “shield and sword” division of labor. 25

Yet neither the 2023 DSR nor the 2024 NDS describes the intent or direction of Australia’s defense policy in this way. Instead, the (rather vague) concept of deterrence is linked to the (equally vague) concept of denial, 26 and neither discusses it in meaningful ways as part of multilateral- or alliance-level deterrence of conflict in the wider Indo-Pacific. That Australia would work with “the US and other key partners to make a credible contribution to a favourable regional strategic balance” and that it would “[deepen] defence engagement to enhance and maintain the capability to make greater contributions to collective deterrence” is all the 2024 NDS has to offer on that matter. 27 Indeed, where the NDS actually specifies the basic security threat to Australia, it consistently refers to “strategic competition” between the United States and China, 28 rather than a possible Chinese effort to deter or defeat the United States and its allies in an attempt to establish regional hegemony. And in a return to language similar to that used before 2020, the 2023 and 2024 AUSMIN communiqués announced additional practical force posture cooperation without making a link between that cooperation and deterrence or countering coercion. 29

It is not surprising, then, that neither the 2023 DSR nor the 2024 NDS reference alliance “roles and missions” as something that should be taken into account in Australian defense planning. Remarkably, Australian strategic guidance today thus has less to say on how possible commitments to broader Indo-Pacific security should factor into Australian force structure and posture than, for example, the 2000 Defence White Paper, which laid out broad guidance on how forces should be designed to meet Australian strategic interests through coalition operations in the South West Pacific, Southeast Asia, and globally. 30 Of course, that approach reflected a time when Australia could think of contributions to regional conflicts as a contingency quite separate from the defense of its own territory. And there may well be U.S.-Australia agreements on cooperation that still remain classified. But neither caveat changes the fact that the vast majority of Australian staff officers, defense planners, and public servants—who must make myriad practical decisions that collectively shape Australian force posture and structure outcomes—do so with less of an explicit policy framework on how Australia’s national objectives align with alliance cooperation than their predecessors had two decades ago.

Despite the awakening of Australian defense policy to the possibility of major war with China, 31 Australia’s own policy does not articulate a strategic concept for force posture cooperation, let alone a shared concept for escalation or the management of escalation stemming from the role of U.S. long-range forces operating out of Australia. 32 Of note, the practical progress in recent years was almost contained to areas where Australia’s interests for its own local defense overlapped with U.S. interests in long-range operations. The need to develop runways and fuel and armament storage at Australia’s northern bases, for example, has been long recognized in Australian policy. 33 The increased training and industrial opportunities that come from hosting U.S. SSNs in Australia are key elements in the so-called optimal pathway for Australia’s acquisition of its own SSNs. The reorganization of Australia’s army for littoral operations in the South Pacific aligns its own practical challenges more closely with those of the U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Army in the Indo-Pacific. 34 And the importance of Australia creating armaments production capabilities that are less reliant on overseas supply mirrors U.S. interests in broadening and expanding production capacities globally.

Hence, while the U.S.-Australia alliance may be drifting toward closer force posture cooperation, it remains adrift insofar as practical cooperation is driven by largely coincidental overlap of national interests, rather than by a shared understanding of the practical needs for deterrence and escalation management—let alone a joint concept for major war. Indeed, progress may already be slowing. And increased force posture cooperation has not been seriously tested by the need to manage either a regional crisis or a political crisis—such as a radically changed approach to the region or to allied burden-sharing if former president Donald Trump returns to the White House — that may well arise, if not between the allies then in terms of domestic Australian politics.

Toward a More Deliberate Model of Incrementalism

The manner of practical cooperation in every alliance reflects its history and allies’ strategic cultures and traditions. NATO collaboration grew over time among allies that deliberately defined themselves as a political-military community. Cooperation in the U.S.-Japan alliance reflects Tokyo’s strong legalistic approach to practical cooperation. And the U.S.–South Korea alliance is still trying to shed the last vestiges of an era when Seoul was almost without any say in its own defense. In comparison, the U.S.-Australia alliance is largely a blank slate. The United States and Australia are unlikely to ever hold an equivalent to a NATO summit, where, at least every few years, decisions are made on strategy, force posture, and structure that can deliberately reshape the political and practical direction of alliance cooperation. 35

Indeed, unlike NATO or the U.S-Japan alliance, Australia and the United States never refer to their joint decisions or posture as being of “the Alliance.” 36 The idea that the U.S.-Australia alliance might express a collective identity or community committed to joint action—and, hence, one that should developed shared strategic concepts, plans, and understandings as a basis for closer integration—remains alien to Canberra’s approach to cooperation with Washington. Instead, Australia’s political and strategic culture has created a narrative on local defense self-reliance, and the evolution of alliance cooperation on the Joint Facilities toward full knowledge and concurrence between nominally equal partners—as part of the country’s long maturation from a colony into an independent nation.

Unfortunately, however, alliance cooperation driven by bottom-up, practical cooperation has a tendency to overstep political bounds, leading to tensions if such boundaries are then reestablished. For example, after U.S. bombers returned to the UK in 1946, difficult negotiations regarding U.S. operations from the UK were a sore point in U.S.-UK relations throughout the 1950s. 37 Norwegian intelligence’s cooperation with the CIA on the ill-fated U-2 flight of Gary Powers in 1960 reinforced the Norwegian government’s determination to impose stricter political control on the activities of U.S. forces from Norway. 38 And in 2013, the frigate HMAS Sydney was temporarily embedded in the U.S. Seventh Fleet 39 —a decision that, according to Canberra lore, was initiated by both navies and blindsided Canberra policymakers. Joint naval patrols or operations in the region, despite their shared interest in maintaining a national regional presence, have remained a notable gap in U.S.-Australia cooperation ever since. More recently, scholar Ashley Townshend observed that the extent of practical cooperation between the RAAF and visiting U.S. bomber task forces may well already outpace the political intent behind incremental steps that officials agreed to. 40

If Australia and the United States are to avoid a similar crisis and maintain the limited momentum since 2020, they need to find a politically feasible framework to progress and guide the deepening of their force posture cooperation. Discussions of “roles and missions” run against the grain of Australia’s own national guidance and defense policy identity. And seeking to develop joint strategy and agreed-upon plans for top-down guidance of practical cooperation, based on a politically difficult presumption of joint action, would likely bring to the fore political ambiguity about Australia’s integration with preparations for U.S. vertical escalation.

Instead, both allies should consider practical cooperation in areas that reflect Australia’s preparations for major war in its immediate neighborhood; that support multilateral deterrence by facilitating politically palatable horizontal, rather than vertical, escalation; and that help move force posture cooperation from enabling U.S. activities on Australian territory toward greater overall alignment of both countries’ defense preparations. With this in mind, both allies should consider the following five directions to provide greater focus, purpose, and direction to force posture and structure cooperation.

 Try to Say a Little More Each Time

The United States and its Indo-Pacific allies have been grappling with how to best balance a rising China for years. Recently, they have often embraced the buzzy concept of integrated deterrence. Yet they have not coalesced on a shared concept of deterrence and escalation that would direct how they think about the coherence and complementarity of their respective national force structure and posture developments. Australia and the United States first started to draw an explicit link between multilateral deterrence and their force posture initiatives in the AUSMIN communiqué of 2020, but they subsequently dropped that reference in 2023 and 2024. Despite the seemingly ever-increasing length of these communiqués, they continue to contain little that would indicate a shared understanding, or even a sustained conversation, about the foundations of strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Such understandings do not arise easily. There is little appetite in Canberra to embark on the development of a document akin to NATO’s Strategic Concept or the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, which would only serve to foreground fundamental disagreements, both between the allies and within Canberra itself, on deterrence and alliance strategy. But one way for both allies to work toward narrowing differences and identifying shared tenets is by aiming to say a little more each time their ministers meet at their regular summits. Over time, restating the enduring principles that relate to deterrence and strategic stability can establish a canon on which future work and practical implementation can be based. NATO, for example, has developed a set of longstanding statements about the nuclear aspects of its deterrence. “The strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the Alliance” dates to the Cold War; “Missile defence can complement the role of nuclear weapons in deterrence; it cannot substitute them” dates to the 2012 Defence and Deterrence Posture Review ; and that UK and French nuclear forces contribute to deterrence through “separate centres of decision-making . . . by complicating the calculations of potential adversaries” dates to the Ottawa Summit of 1974. All of these principles are again included verbatim in NATO’s 2023 communiqué following the summit in Vilnius. 41

For the United States and Australia, such an approach should focus on issues that both allies can agree on, that avoid traditionally sensitive questions (such as the geographic scope of the ANZUS treaty commitment), and that provide more explicit strategic rationale for ongoing cooperation. For example, a general statement such as “The ability of U.S. forces to reinforce the western Pacific is an important element of crisis management, strategic stability, and allied security” might be seen as stating the obvious, but it would be a useful opportunity to engage political decisionmakers and the Australian public on the strategic benefit of force posture cooperation. Given that Australian governments have, for many years, acknowledged the importance of U.S. extended deterrence in deterring nuclear attacks on Australia, the allies might consider regular statements such as “As long as nuclear weapons exist, U.S. nuclear forces remain an important element of strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific.” This would provide a basis for both public and policy discussions on Australia’s possible role, without prejudging that there should be any role at all beyond the operation of Joint Facilities. 42 And though Australian defense policy statements have been largely silent on the limits of self-reliance, a statement such as “While Australia’s self-reliant defense posture is an important contribution to allied burden-sharing, possible adversaries should not doubt U.S. ability and willingness to support its allies’ defense” would mirror language used by Australia in the past, 43 while opening up the policy space for discussions of closer U.S.-Australia operational cooperation on continental defense.

Focus on Overlapping Operational Needs and Challenges

Although Australia’s defense policy as laid out in the DSR and NDS is largely silent on how it relates to U.S. military strategy in the Indo-Pacific, an ADF that is prepared to defend Australia is broadly consistent with U.S. aims. Australia’s main value to the United States in case of a major war is as a secure base area for long-range operations into Southeast Asia and southern China. 44 But Australia is hardly the only U.S. ally where the question of practically and politically balancing local defense with supporting offensive operations against a possible adversary’s territory is extremely challenging policy waters to navigate. 45

While the agreement to prepare hardstands for U.S. B-52 bombers at RAAF Base Tindal attracted relatively little political attention in Australia, that is likely because AUKUS has become the focal point for public debate over alliance cooperation instead. In contrast, joint approaches to developing basic infrastructure at Australia’s chain of so-called bare bases in its remote North or the combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise are less likely to run into political challenges. These plans are consistent with what Australia has identified as operational priorities for the defense of Australia itself—and Australian policy never interpreted defense self-reliance to mean strategic autonomy. That said, it is notable that the 2024 NDS does not include a statement on Australia’s aim to defend itself without relying on U.S. combat forces, which existed in varying formulations in all Defence White Papers from 1976 to 2013. 46 In reality, the ADF is almost certainly too small for the likely demands of defending the continent, even against the limited air, maritime, or special forces threats that China might project from the South China Sea or possible future regional bases against the Australian homeland and vital shipping routes. 47

With the presence of Chinese SSNs in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the threat of cruise missiles and to shipping extends all around the Australian coastline, including the major population centers and defense facilities in the southeast and in Canberra. These are difficult and uncomfortable challenges for Australia, but would be a useful focal point for discussions on how to better align U.S. and Australian force posture for major conflict. This is not to say that Washington could, would, or should directly make up for inadequacies in yet another ally’s defense preparations. But the United States has a lot to benefit from Australia realizing and addressing its limitations, and it has relevant experience that could be helpful.

The defense of the U.S. West Coast and Australia’s east and southeast present very similar challenges in terms of their geographic distance from adversary bases but increasing vulnerability to cruise missiles launched from SSNs or long-range bombers. While Australia is a similar size to the continental United States, the RAAF’s roughly one hundred fast jets lacks the home-defense squadrons that the United States maintains through its National Guard. 48 Australia’s planned six NASAMS fire units will likely not just be inadequate for the number of facilities that need protection, 49 but also are ostensibly being acquired to defend forward-based land forces rather than, for example, irreplaceable submarine and naval bases in Sydney and Perth. Joint examination of these issues, including drawing on the analytical work that underpins the U.S. homeland cruise missile defense program, 50 could identify additional specific investments or preparations that would benefit both sides’ wider operational objectives.

A second focal point arises from the decision to create a combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise, though which Australia and the United States have already taken the first steps toward the development of a wartime host nation support (WHNS) model for the alliance. The practical implementation of WHNS often reflects the broader characteristics of the respective alliance. NATO integration, for example, led to the creation of German logistics units equipped to service American equipment to support the flow of U.S. reinforcements to West Germany during the Cold War; 51 WHNS in South Korea to this day includes the Korean Service Corps, a U.S. Army logistics battalion staffed with personnel of locally recruited South Korean nationals. 52 Australia may balk at the suggestion of creating units to serve other countries’ forces, but both countries should consider the operational and political benefits. Such an arrangement may also help with public support, insofar as it would give Canberra both direct and indirect influence on the operation of U.S. forces from Australia. Public consultation in Australia certainly suggests that there is significant support for closer integration within the alliance, if concerns about Australian sovereignty are clearly addressed. 53

Third, the United States and Australia should also examine the overlap of their respective strategic and operational objectives in the South Pacific. For Australia, preparing for littoral warfare in the islands to its northeast has become a central focus since the 2023 DSR. In a departure from its previous emphasis on stabilization operations, Australian policy now reflects the need to deal with the possibility of a Chinese military presence or projection into its immediate neighborhood—concerns that were heightened by the close relationship between China and Vanuatu under former prime minister Manasseh Sogavare. 54 Direct confrontation between Australia and China in the region could arise from a range of scenarios short of major war, such as Chinese gray-zone challenges to Australian forces supporting Pacific fisheries protection. Ethnic Chinese communities in the region have repeatedly been targeted when law and order broke down (for example, in the Solomon Islands in 2006, 55 2019, 56 and 202 57 ), where the future deployment of Australian and other regional police and military forces in support of local authorities could raise the specter of a competing intervention by the People’s Liberation Army. 

In major war, the southwest Pacific is significant for its geographic position along key sea lines of communication that would support the U.S. war effort, notably the lines between Hawaii and Townsville (where the great circle route passes through the Solomon Islands) and Townsville to Manus (and on to Guam or Palau), which passes east of the Papua New Guinea mainland. As in World War II, North Queensland would likely become the key staging area for U.S. operations from Australia, which is reflected in plans to move the combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise from its initial location in Victoria to a future “Logistics Support Area” in Queensland. 58

U.S. convoys passing through the southwest Pacific would need protection against overt and covert Chinese lodgments in the islands. Australia would have an interest in playing a major role in this, not least because U.S. rules of engagement may well be more tolerant of collateral damage to South Pacific nations and their local shipping than Australia would be comfortable with. Hence, examining the relationship between U.S. plans and concepts for strategic sea transport and force protection and Australia’s increased focus on littoral operations in the same region would be a worthwhile area for joint planning and force posture cooperation. As convoys would also require protection against Chinese SSNs further into the central Pacific, there is scope for including New Zealand and France in broader discussions as well.

Facilitate Europe’s Participation in Multilateral Deterrence

New Zealand and France, however, are just some of the third partners that are relevant to the broader deterrence aims of U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation. At the 2022 AUSMIN summit, Australia and the United States invited Japan to participate in aspects of their force posture cooperation. 59 But while this was politically significant toward cementing the trilateral Australia-U.S.-Japan relationship, operating from Australia is realistically more relevant to Japan for training opportunities than in actual contingencies.

European countries, on the other hand, are also growing more concerned about the implications of the Indo-Pacific on their own security, and increasingly willing to signal this through regional deployments. In 2024, European Air Transport Command, which coordinates strategic lift and tanker assets across most European Union (EU) member states, supported the concurrent deployment of fifty European fighter aircraft and helicopters to exercises across the Indo-Pacific. 60 Notably, aircraft from Spain, Italy, France, Germany, and the UK, as well as the Italian aircraft carrier Cavour , participated in the 2024 iteration of Exercise Pitch Black in Darwin. 61 While Europe’s military significance in the Indo-Pacific remains limited, it has potential to contribute to multilateral deterrence through its economic importance to China—and increasingly through the revival of its defense industrial base, which would be of particular consequence in a protracted conflict.

While the strategic significance of U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation is often seen primarily though the extent to which it supports deterrence through possible vertical escalation, there are also important benefits from supporting threats of horizontal escalation. European countries signaling their concerns through deployments to the Indo-Pacific is valuable to the United States, Australia, and regional stability more broadly, as it makes Beijing less likely to assume that it could limit the economic costs of precipitating a crisis or that it could politically isolate the United States from its allies to the point where they might withhold practical support through access to their defense industry or by backfilling other U.S. commitments. In a context where Australia’s government may be inclined toward caution and limited commitment, being part of a broader international coalition signaling its concern about possible Chinese aggression could ease the way for Canberra to action bilateral U.S.-Australia cooperation.

The signaling value of European deployments would thus be of greatest value in an actual crisis, which would arise at short notice if China made visible preparations for a major operation against Taiwan. 62 There are, however, not many destinations to which European nations could send forces in such a crisis to signal their concern. In political terms, they would likely seek control over the decision to becoming actively engaged; in practical terms, ramp space in Japan, Hawaii, or Guam would mostly be taken by U.S. forces. Politically and operationally, Australia is thus a highly plausible and mutually beneficial destination for such deployments. In a crisis situation, European deployments would help shore up Australia’s own commitment, complicate Chinese calculations, and—if it came to war—even relatively small numbers of European fighter aircraft could contribute to the defense of northern Australia.

To date, European naval and air deployments to the Indo-Pacific have typically been planned long in advance, and conducted with numerous engagement stops along the way. In a crisis, the creation of an air tanker bridge between Europe and Australia that relies solely on European, Australian, and U.S. air bases and tanker aircraft would be important for the rapid movement of not just European but also European-based U.S. fighter and strategic transport aircraft into the Indo-Pacific. As a first step toward leveraging their own cooperation to further broaden multilateral deterrence, the United States and Australia should engage their EU partners (as represented in the European Air Transport Command) and the UK to test the implementation of such a transcontinental air bridge, possibly as part of the next iteration of Exercise Pitch Black.

Consider the Benefits of UK Involvement in Force Posture Cooperation

Given its role as a major European military power, its national commitments in the region (including the Five Power Defence Arrangements between Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Singapore, and the UK), and its air bases (especially in Cyprus and Diego Garcia), the UK would be a key partner in leveraging U.S.-Australia cooperation into broader coordination with like-minded European countries. But through its involvement in Submarine Rotational Force – West as part of AUKUS, the UK is also already a direct part of U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation. Australia and the United States should thus consider the broader benefits of involving the UK as a partner with unique contributions to offer.

One, often underappreciated, benefit of including the UK in AUKUS is that it has significant experience with the creation of multinational integrated military capability, including the kind of mixed crewing envisaged as part of the AUKUS optimal pathway. Such experience does not always transfer easily within the U.S. military and policy system and its relatively separate Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific policy communities. But it would be especially useful to Australia, given its own limited experience with force integration in peacetime. In particular, this includes U.S.-UK carrier integration 63 through which British pilots have operated off U.S. carriers and U.S. Marine Corps F-35s have been integrated with HMS Queen Elizabeth to enable the UK to retain essential capabilities after it decommissioned old carriers 64 —as well as multinational formations including NATO’s Standing Naval Forces and the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force.

While British deployments to Australia in a crisis would be much smaller than those from the United States, involving the UK in, for example, discussions about the combined logistics, sustainment, and maintenance enterprise would enable deeper consideration of how to support and facilitate the deployment of other countries’ forces. From a purely Australian perspective, a greater understanding of the UK’s decades-long and seemingly quite complex experience with U.S. nuclear and conventional bombers operating from its territory would also be useful in developing political and policy mechanisms to facilitate such deployments in Australia. Off the record, senior UK officials have described arrangements that give the UK a right of veto over U.S. operations from British bases. 65 The UK did, for example, impose conditions on U.S. operations from British bases during the 1973 Yom Kippur War, which led the United States to eschew their use. 66 But while former UK prime minister Margaret Thatcher is quoted as saying that “under the Churchill-Truman arrangements, there are no circumstances in which American aircraft based in this country may be used without our consent in military operations planned by the United States,” declassified records do not show any U.S. agreement to binding limits on the use of UK bases for nuclear operations in wartime. 67

Develop Graduated Response Plans for the Alliance

Since the time of SEATO, which is now beyond living memory, Australia and the United States have had no experience of developing politically endorsed, alliance-level operational plans for future contingencies. While it is perhaps natural for academic and policy debates to gravitate toward the highest level of escalation—including what role U.S. long-range air strikes from Australia against the Chinese mainland may play at the conventional-nuclear threshold 68 —that is not a politically useful starting point to commence such planning in practice. Instead, Australia and the United States should examine the example of NATO’s graduated response plans (GRPs) as a model for deepening joint planning in the alliance.

The GRPs were created after Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014. Before that point, there had been no political consensus in NATO on the need for operational plans to reinforce allies on the Eastern flank. 69 In 2014, NATO agreed on the need to plan for the reinforcement of allies—up to the point where hostilities commenced, as there was not yet political agreement on alliance strategy during such a conflict. 70 The GRPs identified what reinforcements might be necessary given the geographic and strategic situations in different parts of the alliance, the logistics of how they could be deployed, the political and military decision points and their timing, and what authorities alliance commanders should assume over national forces as a crisis progressed. 71 Political consensus on the need for actual defense plans only arose after Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine in 2022, 72 but the GRPs enabled NATO to quickly activate tens of thousands of personnel to support its eastern member states.

The development of a U.S.-Australia GRP would thus sidestep politically difficult questions about the overall aims and conduct of a conflict with China, and instead address a whole host of practical questions that would arise well in advance of the outbreak of war. For a start, the development of joint operational plans at the alliance level, in the absence of standing alliance commands, would itself be useful to develop political-military mechanisms in the alliance. By identifying decision points and their operational and political significance, the development of the GRP would help address concerns that closer alliance cooperation would be incompatible with the ability of Australia to make sovereign decisions in a crisis. And the development of the plans would help surface differences or draw attention to issues that would be most inconvenient to first face in an actual crisis. These questions include: What first-mover advantage might there be for deploying forces in a littoral context? What would be the role of and what would happen to forward deployed forces—for example, in the South China Sea—as a crisis develops? When and where should allied submarines surge deployments closer to the conflict zone? Would there be a need to reinforce the Christmas and Cocos Islands, which currently do not have a permanent garrison? At what point might the allies consider deploying naval mines before the outbreak of hostilities? What is the signaling value of deploying U.S. long-range bombers? And does it matter whether these bombers would be nuclear capable or not (a question of interpretation that does not seem to have a clear answer in current U.S. policy or practice)?

By developing the GRP, Australia and the United States would also have to address how their national command-and-control (C2) arrangements would relate to each other. So far, public discussion has mostly focused on the extent to which RAAF assets would be used to support the ingress and egress of U.S. long-range bombers to and from Australia in the context of major war. The example of Norway during the Cold War, however, demonstrates that C2 at the intersection of major strategic commands can also raise very significant challenges in a naval context. These included reconciling the U.S. Marine Corps’ geographically expansive doctrinal approach to providing organic air defense for its reinforcements to northern Norway with local air defense arrangements, and the risk of naval forces straying into coastal defense zones under a different local command. 73 Similar challenges would likely arise as U.S. convoys passed through Australian land and naval deployment zones in the southwest Pacific, where even Australia’s own national plans for joint C2 during such operations remain murky at best.

The GRP should be politically endorsed by both allies and facilitated by table-top exercises with actual decisionmakers, which, in turn, would help improve their understanding of the operational and strategic demands of common deterrence and defense. This could build on the political endorsement of ADF planning scenarios introduced in the 2023 DSR. Major exercises—Talisman Sabre in particular—should then start to reflect key elements of the GRP to demonstrate and test the allies’ willingness and ability to implement them, 74 even if later stages of the exercises may still reflect more politically fictitious (and, hence, palatable) scenarios of actual conflict.

Despite the progress made since 2020, U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation remains limited by the lack of alliance institutionalization and political agreement, especially domestically in Australia, on its aims and objectives. This is not helped by the fact that the deployment to Australia of U.S. long-range naval and air strike forces tends to draw attention to thorny questions of vertical escalation as part of that cooperation. But at a more fundamental level, Australian willingness to participate in these activities is itself a form of deterrence by horizontal escalation, which is more politically palatable and relevant for Australia’s contribution to multilateral deterrence.

In the next phase of U.S.-Australia force posture cooperation, success should not just be measured by increased U.S. activity in Australia. Rather, it should be judged by whether it leads to greater complementarity between U.S. and Australian force postures and structures in general, and the extent to which it facilitates the contribution by third countries, especially in Europe, to multilateral deterrence. Although the 2023 DSR and 2024 NDS had little to say on the alliance’s implications for Australia’s national defense effort, the new direction they set for the ADF has widened the door for greater alignment between both allies’ defense preparations. The United States and Australia should grasp this opportunity for the next phase of their force posture cooperation.

1 The only difference, apart from its use of commas, is that the ANZUS treaty refers to a singular objective, whereas the North Atlantic Treaty uses the plural. See: “The North Atlantic Treaty,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, April 4, 1949, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_17120.htm .

2 “Security Treaty Between Australia, New Zealand and the United States of America,” Parliament of Australia, September 1, 1951, https://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Joint/Completed_Inquiries/jfadt/usrelations/appendixb .

3 At the time, Australia signed as a representative of the UK and New Zealand navies as well, with whom it was cooperating in the ANZAM framework. See: “The History of the Radford-Collins Agreement,” Sephamore 15, RAN Seapower Centre, 2007, https://seapower.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Semaphore_2007_15.pdf .

4 Stephan Frühling, “Australian Defence Policy and the Concept of Self-Reliance,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 5 (2014): 531–547.

5 Stephen Smith, ‘Ministerial Statement: Full Knowledge and Concurrence’, Parliament of Australia, June 26, 2013, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id%3A%22chamber%2Fhansardr%2F4d60a662-a538-4e48-b2d8-9a97b8276c77%2F0016%22 .

6 See, for example: “The 2013 Defence White Paper,” special issue, Security Challenges 9, no. 2 (2013).

7 Stephan Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia,” Survival 60, no. 5 (2018): 199–218.

8 Michael Vincent, “Tony Abbott Confirms US Has No Plans to Send B-1 Bombers to Australia, Says Defence Official, ‘Misspoke,’” ABC News, May 14, 2015, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-15/pm-confirms-b-1-bombers-not-heading-to-australia/6471528 ; Ed Johnson, “Australia Won’t Consider Hosting U.S. Missiles, PM Morrison Says,” Bloomberg, August 4, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-08-05/as-pentagon-mulls-missiles-in-asia-australia-unlikely-to-host .

9 “Joint Statement: Australia-US Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2019,” Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, August 4, 2019, https://www.foreignminister.gov.au/minister/marise-payne/media-release/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2019 .

10 “Joint Statement Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2020,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, July 28, 2020, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/joint-statement-ausmin-2020 .

11 “RAAF Base Tindal Redevelopment Stage 6 and United States Force Posture Initiative Airfield Works,” Australian Department of Defence, https://web.archive.org/web/20230314153517/https:/defence.gov.au/id/RAAF-Tindal/Default.asp .

12 “East Arm Fuel Storage Works Get Underway,” Australian Defence Magazine , January 28, 2022, https://www.australiandefence.com.au/defence/estate/east-arm-fuel-storage-works-get-underway .

13 “Joint Statement Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2021,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, September 16, 2021, https://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/united-states-of-america/ausmin/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2021 .

14 Thomas Newdick, “Australian Airbase Gets Upgrades for American Bomber Deployments,” War Zone, October 31, 2022, https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/australian-airbase-gets-upgrades-for-american-bomber-deployments .

15 “Joint Statement Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2022,” Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, December 6, 2022, https://www.dfat.gov.au/international-relations/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2022 .

16 “Submarine Rotational Force – West,” Australian Department of Defence, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/taskforces/aukus/submarine-rotational-force-west#:~:text=From%20as%20early%20as%202027,West%20(SRF%2DWest) .

17 Tom Corben and Alice Nason, “AUSMIN 2023 Explained,” United States Studies Centre, August 4, 2023, https://www.ussc.edu.au/ausmin-2023-explained .

18 Polling by the Lowy Institute is available at: “Lowy Institute Poll 2024,” https://poll.lowyinstitute.org/ .

19 “2020 Defence Strategic Update,” Australian Department of Defence, July 1, 2020, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2020-defence-strategic-update .

20 Julian Bajkowski, “Australian Army M1A1 Abrams Tanks Sent to Indonesia,” Mandarin, August 25, 2023, https://www.themandarin.com.au/228608-australian-army-m1a1-abrams-tanks-sent-to-indonesia/ .

21 5th Bomb Wing Public Affairs, “First-Ever USAF B-52 Deployment Concludes in Indonesia,” Minot Air Force Base, https://www.minot.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/3449163/first-ever-usaf-b-52-deployment-concludes-in-indonesia/#:~:text=The%20exercise%2C%20which%20lasted%20about,said%20U.S.%20Air%20Force%20Capt .

22 Of note, this is not a new issue in Australian defense policy: As early as 1946-47, a central (and ultimately unresolved) question was whether Australia’s post-war focus on the defence of Southeast Asia should be seen as an expression of its own, local defence needs, or as the most efficient contribution it could make in light of global deterrence. See: Stephan Frühling, A History of Australian Strategic Policy Since 1945 (Canberra: Defence Publishing Service, 2009), 10–18.

23 See, for example: Peter Jennings and Marcus Hellyer, eds., “Submarines: Your Questions Answered,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, November 4, 2020, https://www.aspi.org.au/report/submarines-your-questions-answered .

24 “The Defence of Australia”, Australian Department of Defence, 1987, https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/wpaper1987.pdf .

25 Ankit Panda, “US-Japan Alliance: Still ‘Sword and Shield’?”, The Diplomat, November 14, 2014, https://thediplomat.com/2014/11/us-japan-alliance-still-sword-and-shield/ .

26 “2023 Defence Strategic Review, Australian Department of Defence, 2023, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/defence-strategic-review , 49; “2024 National Defence Strategy,” Australian Department of Defence, 2024, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/strategic-planning/2024-national-defence-strategy-2024-integrated-investment-program , 21-25.

27 “2024 National Defence Strategy,”, 23, 46.

28 Ibid., 6, 11–13, 21.

29 “Joint Statement on Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2023,” Australian Department of Defence, July 29, 2023, https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2023-07-29/joint-statement-australia-united-states-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2023 ; “Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2024,” Australian Department of Defence, August 7, 2024 https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/statements/2024-08-07/joint-statement-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin-2024 .

30 Under what has been sometimes called the concentric circles model, the 2000 Defence White Paper departed from earlier policy by requiring the ADF to be sized and developed not just for the defense of Australia but also to have air and naval forces that could make a “major contribution” to the external defense of neighboring countries, and “significant contribution” to regional coalitions beyond. See: “Defence 2000: Our Future Defence Force,” Australian Department of Defence, 2000, https://www.defence.gov.au/sites/default/files/2021-08/wpaper2000.pdf , 46–67. In practical terms, this built on earlier guidance in 1997 that had explicitly required ADF capabilities acquired for the defense of Australia to be fitted with systems that would enable their operation alongside U.S. forces globally, even if those would not have been required for local contingencies. See: “Australia’s Strategic Policy,” Australian Department of Defence, 1997, 36. For a discussion of Australia’s strategic policy at the time, see: Hugh White, “Strategic Interests in Australian Defence Policy: Some Historical and Methodological Reflections,” Security Challenges 4, no. 2 (2008): 63–79.

31 While the scenarios that underpin the 2023 DSR are unclassified, the implications from the document are that they cover a range of situations including and up to that of major war, and that the demands of the latter should be given greater emphasis.

32 For example, see: Ashley Townshend, David Santoro, and Toby Warden, “Collective Deterrence and the Prospect of Major Conflict,” United States Studies Centre, September 12, 2023), https://www.ussc.edu.au/collective-deterrence-and-the-prospect-of-major-conflict , 10–12; Kelsey Hartigan, “Full Knowledge and Concurrence: Key Questions for US-Australia Extended Deterrence and Escalation Management Consultations,” United States Studies Centre, August 22, 2023, https://www.ussc.edu.au/key-questions-for-us-australia-extended-deterrence-and-escalation-management-consultations ; Ashley Townshend, “How to Manage the Risks and Requirements of U.S.-Australia Force Posture Cooperation,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 20, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/10/how-to-manage-the-risks-and-requirements-of-us-australia-force-posture-cooperation?lang=en ; Frühling, “Is ANZUS Really an Alliance? Aligning the US and Australia”; Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil, “Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century,” in Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century , eds. Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil (Canberra: ANU Press, 2021), https://press.anu.edu.au/publications/alliances-nuclear-weapons-and-escalation#tabanchor , 201–210.

33 See, for example: Alan Hawke and Ric Smith, “Australian Defence Force Posture Review,” Australian Department of Defence, March 30, 2012, https://www.defence.gov.au/about/reviews-inquiries/adf-posture-review .

34 Kapil Kajal, “Sea Change: Australian Army Starts Shift Towards littoral operations,” Janes, July 3, 2023, https://www.janes.com/osint-insights/defence-news/land/sea-change-australian-army-starts-shift-towards-littoral-operations .

35 In recent years, the range of decisions taken at both the 2014 Wales and 2022 Madrid Summits arguably did so. See: John R. Deni, “NATO’s New Trajectories after the Wales Summit,” Parameters 44, no. 3 (2014): 57–65; Nicholas Williams and Simon Lunn, “Reflections on NATO’s Madrid Summit: Deterrence Through Confrontation?,” European Leadership Network, September 16, 2022, https://europeanleadershipnetwork.org/commentary/natos-madrid-summit-deterrence-through-confrontation/ .

36 See, for example: “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee (‘2+2’),” U.S. Department of Defense, July 28, 2024, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3852169/joint-statement-of-the-security-consultative-committee-22/ .

37 Ken Young, The American Bomb in Britain: US Air Forces’ Strategic Presence, 1946–64 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016).

38 Rolf Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War in the High North (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 1991), 171–184.

39 “HMAS Sydney to Join US Aircraft Fleet in Yokosuka, Japan’, News.com.au, April 26, 2013, https://www.news.com.au/national/hmas-sydney-to-join-us-aircraft-fleet-in-yokosuka-japan/news-story/275feccc33be7aab12865fa42ed4aa30 .

40 Townshend, “How to Manage the Risks and Requirements of U.S.-Australia Force Posture Cooperation.”

41 “Vilnius Summit Communiqué,” NATO, July 11, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_217320.htm .

42 For the argument that Australia should provide more verbal (and practical) support to U.S. nuclear deterrence, see: Peter Dean, Stephan Frühling, and Andrew O’Neil, “Australia and the US Nuclear Umbrella: From Deterrence Taker to Deterrence Maker,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 78, no. 1 (2024): 22–39.

43 For a discussion of past Defence White Papers, see: Frühling, “Australian Defence Policy and the Concept of Self-Reliance.”

44 Andrew Carr, “A Model Alliance? The Strategic Logic of US-Australia Cooperation,” Washington Quarterly 44, no. 4 (2021): 51–66.

45 Stephan Frühling and Andrew O’Neil, Partners in Deterrence: US Nuclear Weapons and Alliances in Europe and Asia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2021).

46 The 2016 Defence White Paper made just one reference to the need for self-reliance, but did not explicitly define the terms.

47 Michael Pezzullo, “The Long Arc of Australian Defence Strategy,” Strategist (blog), Australian Strategic Policy Institute, May 11, 2024; Stephan Frühling, “Australian Hard Power: A Question of Scale,” in A Hard Look at Hard Power , ed. Gary J. Schmitt (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2020), 15–54.

48 As U.S. defense planning focused again on major war with Russia or China after 2014, U.S. homeland defense squadrons received radar and other upgrades to improve their ability in the counter–cruise missile defensive role: John A. Tirpak, “Saving Old Fighters,” Air and Space Forces Magazine , July 28 2017, https://www.airandspaceforces.com/article/saving-old-fighters/ . Analysis by the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) has identified an enduring need for 140 non-stealth fighters for homeland defense against cruise missiles: Mark Gunzinger, Carl Rehberg, Jacob Cohn, Timothy A. Walton, and Lucas Autenried, “An Air Force for an Era of Great Power Competition,” CSBA, March 29, 2019, https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/an-air-force-for-an-era-of-great-power-competition , 126 –129.

49 Each fire unit consists of several launchers, sensors, and a command-and-control node and is thus able to defend a local area: “2022-23 Major Projects Report,” Australian Auditor-General’s Office, 2024, https://www.anao.gov.au/sites/default/files/2024-02/Auditor-General_Report_2023-24_14_pdss_7.pdf , 179.

50 Jason Sherman, “DOD Launches Domestic Cruise Missile Defense Program to Protect U.S. Cities, ‘Critical’ Sites,” Inside Defense, September 5, 2023, https://insidedefense.com/share/218957 .

51 For background, see: “International Agreements: The U.S.-German Wartime Host Nation Support Agreement,” U.S. General Accounting Office, November 3, 1987, https://www.gao.gov/products/nsiad-88-20fs .

52 Michael J. Lee, “The Korean Service Corps Battalion,” Army Sustainment 46, no. 6 (Nov/Dec 2014): 26–28.

53 Caitlyn Byrne, Peter J. Dean, Stephan Frühling, and Andrew O’Neil, “‘An Incomplete Project’: Australians’ Views of the US Alliance,” United States Studies Centre, December 5, 2022, https://www.ussc.edu.au/an-incomplete-project-australians-views-of-the-us-alliance .

54 Frances Mao, “China Gains a Foothold in Australia’s Backyard,” BBC, March 30, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-60896824 .

55 Dan Harrison, “Honiara Burns as Rioters Return,” Age , April 20, 2006, https://www.theage.com.au/national/honiara-burns-as-rioters-return-20060420-ge25qq.html .

56 Anouk Ride, “Riots in Solomon Islands: The Day After,” Australian Institute of International Affairs, December 26, 2019, https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/riots-solomon-islands-day-after/ .

57 Kirsty Needham, “Explainer: What Is Behind Unrest in the Solomon Islands,” Reuters, November 30, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/what-is-behind-unrest-solomon-islands-2021-11-29/ .

58 “Fact Sheet: 2023 Australia – U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN),” U.S. Department of Defense, July 29, 2023, https://www.defense.gov/News/Releases/Release/Article/3476036/fact-sheet-2023-australia-us-ministerial-consultations-ausmin/ .

59 “Joint Statement on Australia-U.S. Ministerial Consultations (AUSMIN) 2022,” Australian Department of Defence.

60 “Indo-Pacific Activities: EATC Unparalleled 24/7 Support (1),” European Air Transport Command, https://eatc-mil.com/post/indo-pacific-activities-eatc-unparalleled-24-7-support .

61 “Exercise Pitch Black 2024 Takes Off,” Australian Department of Defence, July 11, 2024, https://www.defence.gov.au/news-events/releases/2024-07-11/exercise-pitch-black-2024-takes .

62 For a discussion of this issue, see: Stephan Frühling, “Multilateralizing Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific: How Europe Can Contribute to Regional Deterrence,” Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, March 23, 2022, https://hcss.nl/report/multilateralizing-maritime-security-in-the-indo-pacific/ .

63 “UK and US Extend Carrier Cooperation Agreement,” UK Government, July 13, 2021, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-and-us-extend-carrier-cooperation-agreement .

64 Defence Committee, “Indispensable Allies: US, NATO and UK Defence Relations,” Eighth Report of Session 2017–19, UK House of Commons, June 26, 2018, https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201719/cmselect/cmdfence/387/387.pdf , 21.

65 Interviews by author, London, 2015.

66 Richard Norton-Taylor, “Declassified Papers Reveal UK Political Concerns Over US Attack on Gaddafi,” Middle East Eye, December 28, 2018, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/declassified-papers-reveal-uk-political-concerns-over-us-attack-gaddafi .

67 Young, The American Bomb in Britain: US Air Forces’ Strategic Presence, 1946–64 , 222–246.

68 See, for example: Townshend, “How to Manage the Risks and Requirements of U.S.-Australia Force Posture Cooperation”; Hartigan, ‘Full Knowledge and Concurrence: Key Questions for US-Australia Extended Deterrence and Escalation Management Consultations.”

69 Maria Mälksoo, “NATO’s New Front: Deterrence Moves Eastward,” International Affairs 100, no. 2 (2024): 531–547.

70 Sten Rynning, “Deterrence Rediscovered: NATO and Russia,” in Deterrence in the 21st Century—Insights from Theory and Practice , eds. Frans Osinga and Tim Sweijs (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2020), 29–45.

71 For a discussion of the tensions between political and operational considerations that the GRP had to manage, see: Sten Rynning, ‘NATO: Ambiguity About Escalation in a Multinational Alliance,” in Alliances, Nuclear Weapons and Escalation: Managing Deterrence in the 21st Century , eds. Frühling and O’Neil, 67–76 .

72 Nele Loorents, “NATO’s Regional Defence Plans,” Washington Summit Series no. 5, International Centre for Defence and Security, July 2024, https://icds.ee/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/2024/07/No-5_NATOs-Regional-Defence-Plans_Nele-Loorents.pdf .

73 Jacob Børresen, “Alliance Naval Strategies and Norway in the Final Years of the Cold War,” Naval War College Review 64, no. 2 (2011): 97–116.

74 On the political and deterrence value of exercises, see: Beatrice Heuser and Harold Simpson, “The Missing Political Dimension of Military Exercises,” RUSI Journal 162, no. 3 (2017): 20–28; Beatrice Heuser, Tormod Heier, and Guillaume Lasconjarias, eds., “Military Exercises: Political Messaging and Strategic Impact,” Forum Paper 26, NATO Defense College, April 24, 2018, https://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1157 .

More work from Carnegie

Two years after its passage, the U.S.-led migration pact unites American leaders to promote safe, legal migration.

• Katie Tobin

If-then commitments are an emerging framework for preparing for risks from AI without unnecessarily slowing the development of new technology. The more attention and interest there is in these commitments, the faster a mature framework can progress.

• Holden Karnofsky

As the Kremlin’s antagonism toward Ukraine and the West sharpens, it will be critically important for policymakers and warfighters to anticipate, monitor, and respond to Russia’s military reconstitution progress in the years ahead.

• Dara Massicot

In Syria’s border regions, changes in demographics, economics, and security mean that an inter-Syrian peace process will require consensus among main regional powers that Syria must remain united, that no one side can be victorious, and that perennial instability threatens the region.

• Kheder Khaddour , 
• Armenak Tokmajyan

Maintaining an edge in defense science and technology is one part of the U.S. and Australian strategy to deter war or increase the likelihood of victory in war.

• Jennifer Jackett

Thank you for visiting nature.com. You are using a browser version with limited support for CSS. To obtain the best experience, we recommend you use a more up to date browser (or turn off compatibility mode in Internet Explorer). In the meantime, to ensure continued support, we are displaying the site without styles and JavaScript.

• View all journals
• Explore content
• About the journal
• Publish with us
• Sign up for alerts
• 16 September 2024

When physicists strove for peace: past lessons for our uncertain times

• Roberto Lalli 0 &
• Jaume Navarro 1

Roberto Lalli is Ikerbasque research professor in the history of science at the Polytechnic University of Turin, Italy.

You can also search for this author in PubMed   Google Scholar

Jaume Navarro is historian of science at the University of the Basque Country, Leioa, Spain.

Physicists were among those trying to build bridges during the cold war. Credit: Bettmann/Getty

You have full access to this article via your institution.

After Russia invaded Ukraine in February 2022, the International Union of Pure and Applied Physics (IUPAP), then celebrating its 100th anniversary, issued a statement condemning the war. It noted its commitment to “embrace and promote scientific collaboration across the world as a driver for peace” .

This rhetorical relationship between science and peace is not new. Throughout history, many people have said that science is intrinsically universal, and that its supposed neutral language and methods provide common ground for transnational communication. This universalism, so the argument goes, can in turn favour peaceful relations among peoples and nations. But none of this is a given 1 . A book we edited, Globalizing Physics , published earlier this year, explores the many ways that physicists, both individually and collectively, navigated the rocks and whirlpools of geopolitical tensions throughout the twentieth century — sometimes successfully, sometimes less so.

Idealism and realism

The story of how, from a shaky beginning, IUPAP became an agent of international diplomacy, shows how internationalism and universalism must be nurtured by scientists in the changing cultural, economic and political situations into which they are inserted. It has lessons well beyond the boundaries of physics in the tense geopolitics of today.

IUPAP arose in the ashes of war. Soon after the end of the First World War, a movement sprung up to create international scientific unions under the umbrella of the International Research Council (IRC), with the idea of forging collaboration between nations and, indirectly, securing lasting peace. IUPAP was part of that movement. It was formally established in 1922 as an association of national physics committees. It held its first general assembly in 1923 with 16 members — 12 from Europe, plus Canada, Japan, South Africa and the United States.

‘Shut up and calculate’: how Einstein lost the battle to explain quantum reality

Things didn’t start well. For all the fine internationalist sentiment, the IRC’s statutes were shaped by punitive attitudes from France and Belgium against Germany, and were explicit about excluding the war’s defeated parties 2 . This exclusionary policy was particularly frustrating for IUPAP, given the central role of the German-speaking physics community in the disruptive advances in quantum physics and elsewhere of the 1920s. It resulted in IUPAP being, by the 1930s, almost totally defunct.

In 1931, the IRC became the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU), dropping its policy and giving more freedom to the individual scientific unions 3 . What could have been an opportunity to revive IUPAP was scuppered, this time by Germany. German-speaking physicists were organized into several scientific bodies, and the two most influential, the German Physical Society and the German Society for Technical Physics, could not decide who should represent them. This problem compounded with the consolidation of the Nazis in power and the emergence of the nationalistic scientific movement called Deutsche Physik (German Physics) 4 in the mid-1930s.

Transatlantic shift

In 1931, the US physicist Robert Millikan assumed the IUPAP presidency. He had grand plans to give the union a purpose through the organization of conferences, particularly a large one to be held in Chicago, Illinois, in 1933. His idea was not only to promote internationalism, but also to shift the union’s focal point from Europe to the United States. The difficult economic circumstances of the Great Depression meant that his plans did not come to fruition. Together with the tensions surrounding Germany, this resulted in a widespread pessimism about the future of IUPAP.

Physicist Henri Abraham (1868–1943). Credit: Volgi archive/Alamy

This wasn’t because there was no international collaboration in physics. Atomic and nuclear physics were booming as quantum theory and the theory of relativity were being consolidated and technologies such as radio broadcasting emerged. Niels Bohr, a pioneer of quantum theory whose institute in Copenhagen had been a hub of neutral internationalism during the 1920s and early 1930s, was nominated as president of IUPAP in 1934. But he turned the position down, fearing the loss of his neutral reputation were he to be associated with it.

As a tragic symbol of IUPAP’s failure to bolster international cooperation in its early years, the union’s secretary-general and probably its most active member from its inception, the French physicist Henri Abraham, was murdered in the Auschwitz concentration camp, Poland, in 1943.

Cold war diplomacy

In the aftermath of the Second World War, physicists found themselves in a transformed public and political landscape. The development and deployment of nuclear weapons had significantly altered their public image, and they were now regarded as integral to state power and security. This shift occurred in a world marked by ideological, political, economic and military competition between East and West, as well as by the onset of decolonization. Consequently, the role and purpose of IUPAP had to be reconfigured.

Learning from past mistakes, the IUPAP secretary-general in 1946–47, Paul Ewald — a German-born crystallographer who had emigrated to the United Kingdom in 1937 to escape the Nazi regime — proposed the inclusion of physicists from defeated countries as soon as possible. This led to the immediate entrance of Italy and, soon after, West Germany and Japan — West Germany even before it became a sovereign state — in the union.

The spy who flunked it: Kurt Gödel’s forgotten part in the atom-bomb story

Despite these efforts, IUPAP national members initially belonged to the Euro–Atlantic political alliance, alongside a few non-aligned countries. This was mostly owing to the isolationist policies of the Soviet Union, which began to shift only after the death of its leader Joseph Stalin and the end of the Korean War in 1953. IUPAP officials actively worked to change the situation by forging contacts with physicists from the Eastern Bloc. Nevill Mott, the UK physicist who was IUPAP’s president from 1951 to 1957, declared that involving Soviet physicists was a major goal of his presidency, and the Italian physicist Edoardo Amaldi was elected president in 1957 because it was thought that he could create favourable conditions for a Soviet national committee to join.

That did eventually happen in 1957, followed by the participation of other countries in the Soviet sphere of influence. This eastwards expansion rewrote IUPAP’s international role. Physicists began to view its meetings and commissions as valuable venues for East–West encounters during a period of tense international relations, effectively engaging in what is now termed science diplomacy 5 . Throughout the Cold War, IUPAP officials could not, and did not, ignore the diplomatic implications of their activities. In 1969, associate secretary-general Larkin Kerwin even announced that IUPAP’s unofficial goal was to contribute to “general international understanding” 6 .

Disputed delegations

Political authorities in territories whose independence was contested during the cold war were interested in joining international scientific institutions as a way to gain recognition. This issue emerged soon after the entrance of the Soviet Union. IUPAP officials had to address the ‘two-China’ problem, with parallel membership requests, first from the Chinese Physical Society in Beijing in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the second being a US-backed request from the Chinese Physical Society in Taipei, Taiwan (the Republic of China, or ROC).

A similar issue arose with the Physical Society of the German Democratic Republic — East Germany — which applied for representation separately from West Germany. These requests had potentially disruptive political implications, depending on how the term ‘national committee’ was to be interpreted.

The 1984 IUPAP general assembly had delegates from two Chinese physical societies. Credit: ICTP Photo Archive/Ludovico Scrobogna

Although governments had no official voice in IUPAP management, the issues at stake here were significant for many national authorities. Many physicists sided with their governments’ agendas, but others did not. Amaldi and other IUPAP officials acted independently, advocating the immediate acceptance of all three requests by 1960. This approach aimed to show that IUPAP could overcome cold war imperatives, behaving in a balanced way. Decades later, the admission of East Germany’s physical society was recognized by IUPAP officials in letters and public statements as a pivotal moment in establishing the union’s independence from governmental influence and defining its diplomatic role. IUPAP was among the first international organizations to officially acknowledge the German Democratic Republic as a separate entity.

However, IUPAP’s assertion that admitting the East German and Taiwanese societies was politically equivalent revealed a limited understanding of the distinct contexts of the German and Chinese situations. Unlike the Germanies, both the PRC and the ROC claimed to represent all of China, complicating their simultaneous membership in IUPAP. When IUPAP officials decided to accept both of these societies, the PRC’s physical society withdrew its request. Physicists from the PRC remained excluded from the union for almost 25 years.

Why Oppenheimer has important lessons for scientists today

Only in 1984 did the PRC’s physical society join IUPAP, following improved relations between the PRC and the United States, but also a lot of work on IUPAP’s side over the two decades, changing statutes and officially redefining membership, with ‘national committees’ being renamed ‘liaison committees’. The final inclusion of both societies became a testament to the physicists’ ability to achieve diplomatic results parallel to, and independently of, intergovernmental diplomacy.

The recognition in the late 1950s that IUPAP also had a diplomatic function led to demands that all IUPAP-sponsored conferences be open to all physicists worldwide, regardless of their country of origin. This involved the challenging task of securing visas for scientists to travel across the Iron Curtain. Beginning with a vocal protest by IUPAP officials against a NATO-imposed ban on East German scientists, these efforts evolved into a general principle known as the Free Circulation of Scientists , which was adopted by the ICSU and all its unions. Fostering this principle became a defining task of IUPAP until the end of the cold war, and was included as one of the organization’s main aims in its 1980s statutes.

Going global

As decolonization progressed and the cold war came to an end, IUPAP sought to represent physicists worldwide by enlarging its membership beyond the cold war blocs. This renewed challenges regarding IUPAP’s identity and the relationship between physics and politics.

From its inception, IUPAP was conceived of as a union about both pure and applied physics, but the meanings and the representations of both terms changed throughout the twentieth century. During the cold war, ‘pure’ was often used as a label to rhetorically exonerate physics from its pivotal role in the arms race, suggesting that physicists could find a common ground to transcend political tensions. Concurrently, the East–West competition for scientific supremacy disregarded the increasing reliance of physicists on more complex and expensive experimental equipment that necessitated collaboration across borders.

Furthermore, the image of physics as the ‘king of the sciences’ was rapidly fading away during this period 7 , and the significance of the discipline in the broader network of science and technology in developing countries could not be taken for granted. Two IUPAP commissions were created to address these concerns: the Commission on Physics Education in 1960, and the Commission on Physics for Development in 1981. Both still exist.

‘Stick to the science’: Nature’s podcast series on science and politics

Initially, this was marked by patronizing attitudes from many physicists in higher-income countries, who assumed that lower-income countries could not afford, and were generally not interested in, pure science, with their needs being more aligned with practical, industrial and technological advancements.

The first two International Conferences on Physics Education co-organized by IUPAP, held in 1960 in Paris and in 1963 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, highlighted this disconnect, revealing the need to not just improve physics education, but also broaden the profession beyond a pure science practised in specialized university departments. It took several decades for more-complex views to emerge regarding the relationship between physics education and developmental issues. Eventually, IUPAP physicists reconfigured the organization’s priorities, placing greater emphasis on industrial considerations, inclusivity and aligning with the sustainability agendas promoted by the United Nations in the 2000s 8 .

International scientific organizations such as IUPAP have functioned effectively as instruments of science diplomacy only when their scientists have explicit awareness of their diplomatic roles. That carries lessons into the present day. One guiding principle that has shaped IUPAP’s activities since the Second World War is to stop physicists being seen merely “cog[s] in the military machine”, Ewald said. Another, emerging from its disastrous experience in the years between the first and second world wars, is the commitment to avoid any form of boycott, with the goal of fostering international collaboration and, informally, being a diplomatic channel when others are blocked.

The recent response of IUPAP to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrates these principles. Although IUPAP condemned the war, it also issued a statement emphasizing the importance of keeping channels of scientific cooperation open across all political and ideological divides, and reiterating that barring scientists from scientific activity on the basis of their location is inappropriate.

There is an innate tension in these positions. Upholding them is perhaps feasible only because IUPAP does not engage in specific research projects, especially those with dual-use applications that are potentially both peaceable and non-peaceable. Lessons from IUPAP’s history might not be universally applicable, being rather specific to certain contexts of scientific cooperation and dialogue. But they do serve to illustrate an central principle: that scientific internationalism is not a given, but is the outcome of efforts from scientists both individually and collectively.

Nature 633 , 515-517 (2024)

doi: https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-024-02997-z

Somsen, G. J. Minerva 46 , 361–379 (2008).

Article   Google Scholar  

Schroeder-Gudehus, B. Les scientifiques et la paix: la communauté scientifique internationale au cours des années 20 (Montréal Univ. Press, 1978).

Google Scholar  

Greenaway, F. Science International: A History of the International Council of Scientific Unions (Cambridge Univ. Press, 1996).

Hentschel, K. (ed) Physics and National Socialism: An Anthology of Primary Sources (Birkhäuser, 1996).

Adamson, M. & Lalli, R. Centaurus 63 , 1–16 (2021).

Kerwin, L. Phys. Today 22 , 53–55 (1969).

Morus, I. R. When Physics Became King (Univ. Chicago Press, 2009).

Folarin, S., Akinlabi, E. & Atayero, A. (eds) The United Nations and Sustainable Development Goals (Springer, 2022).

Download references

Competing Interests

The authors declare no competing interests.

Related Articles

• Applied physics

Ultra-precise particle measurement thrills physicists: ‘The standard model is not dead’

News 17 SEP 24

Cooling positronium to ultralow velocities with a chirped laser pulse train

Article 11 SEP 24

Two-axis twisting using Floquet-engineered XYZ spin models with polar molecules

Signatures of magnetism control by flow of angular momentum

Article 04 SEP 24

On-chip topological beamformer for multi-link terahertz 6G to XG wireless

Article 14 AUG 24

China could start building world’s biggest particle collider in 2027

News 17 JUN 24

A triple rainbow all the way across the sky — 150 years ago

News & Views 17 SEP 24

Rapa Nui’s population history rewritten using ancient DNA

News & Views 11 SEP 24

Famed Pacific island’s population ‘crash’ debunked by ancient DNA

News 11 SEP 24

Associate or Full Professor Neuroimager Faculty Position - Mesulam Center (MCNADC)

Associate or Full Professor Tenure Track Faculty Position in Human Neuroimaging.

Chicago, Illinois

Northwestern University Feinberg School of Medicine - Mesulam Center

Assistant Professor Tenure-Track Faculty Positions

Nashville, Tennessee

Vanderbilt University

Faculty Positions in Biology and Biological Engineering: Caltech, Pasadena, CA, United States

The Division of Biology and Biological Engineering (BBE) at Caltech is seeking new faculty in the area of Molecular Cell Biology.

Pasadena, California

California Institute of Technology (Caltech)

Assistant Professor of Molecular and Cellular Biology

We seek applications for a tenure-track faculty position in the Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology.

Cambridge, Massachusetts

Harvard University - Department of Molecular and Cellular Biology

Husbandry Technician I

Memphis, Tennessee

St. Jude Children's Research Hospital (St. Jude)

Sign up for the Nature Briefing newsletter — what matters in science, free to your inbox daily.

Quick links

• Explore articles by subject
• Guide to authors
• Editorial policies