moral critical thinking definition

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critical thinking

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• Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Critical Thinking
• Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Critical Thinking
• Monash University - Student Academic Success - What is critical thinking?
• Oklahoma State University Pressbooks - Critical Thinking - Introduction to Critical Thinking
• University of Louisville - Critical Thinking

critical thinking , in educational theory, mode of cognition using deliberative reasoning and impartial scrutiny of information to arrive at a possible solution to a problem. From the perspective of educators, critical thinking encompasses both a set of logical skills that can be taught and a disposition toward reflective open inquiry that can be cultivated . The term critical thinking was coined by American philosopher and educator John Dewey in the book How We Think (1910) and was adopted by the progressive education movement as a core instructional goal that offered a dynamic modern alternative to traditional educational methods such as rote memorization.

Critical thinking is characterized by a broad set of related skills usually including the abilities to

• break down a problem into its constituent parts to reveal its underlying logic and assumptions
• recognize and account for one’s own biases in judgment and experience
• collect and assess relevant evidence from either personal observations and experimentation or by gathering external information
• adjust and reevaluate one’s own thinking in response to what one has learned
• form a reasoned assessment in order to propose a solution to a problem or a more accurate understanding of the topic at hand

Theorists have noted that such skills are only valuable insofar as a person is inclined to use them. Consequently, they emphasize that certain habits of mind are necessary components of critical thinking. This disposition may include curiosity, open-mindedness, self-awareness, empathy , and persistence.

Although there is a generally accepted set of qualities that are associated with critical thinking, scholarly writing about the term has highlighted disagreements over its exact definition and whether and how it differs from related concepts such as problem solving . In addition, some theorists have insisted that critical thinking be regarded and valued as a process and not as a goal-oriented skill set to be used to solve problems. Critical-thinking theory has also been accused of reflecting patriarchal assumptions about knowledge and ways of knowing that are inherently biased against women.

Dewey, who also used the term reflective thinking , connected critical thinking to a tradition of rational inquiry associated with modern science. From the turn of the 20th century, he and others working in the overlapping fields of psychology , philosophy , and educational theory sought to rigorously apply the scientific method to understand and define the process of thinking. They conceived critical thinking to be related to the scientific method but more open, flexible, and self-correcting; instead of a recipe or a series of steps, critical thinking would be a wider set of skills, patterns, and strategies that allow someone to reason through an intellectual topic, constantly reassessing assumptions and potential explanations in order to arrive at a sound judgment and understanding.

In the progressive education movement in the United States , critical thinking was seen as a crucial component of raising citizens in a democratic society. Instead of imparting a particular series of lessons or teaching only canonical subject matter, theorists thought that teachers should train students in how to think. As critical thinkers, such students would be equipped to be productive and engaged citizens who could cooperate and rationally overcome differences inherent in a pluralistic society.

Beginning in the 1970s and ’80s, critical thinking as a key outcome of school and university curriculum leapt to the forefront of U.S. education policy. In an atmosphere of renewed Cold War competition and amid reports of declining U.S. test scores, there were growing fears that the quality of education in the United States was falling and that students were unprepared. In response, a concerted effort was made to systematically define curriculum goals and implement standardized testing regimens , and critical-thinking skills were frequently included as a crucially important outcome of a successful education. A notable event in this movement was the release of the 1980 report of the Rockefeller Commission on the Humanities that called for the U.S. Department of Education to include critical thinking on its list of “basic skills.” Three years later the California State University system implemented a policy that required every undergraduate student to complete a course in critical thinking.

Critical thinking continued to be put forward as a central goal of education in the early 21st century. Its ubiquity in the language of education policy and in such guidelines as the Common Core State Standards in the United States generated some criticism that the concept itself was both overused and ill-defined. In addition, an argument was made by teachers, theorists, and others that educators were not being adequately trained to teach critical thinking.

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• What is Critical Thinking?

The ability to think critically calls for a higher-order thinking than simply the ability to recall information.

Definitions of critical thinking, its elements, and its associated activities fill the educational literature of the past forty years. Critical thinking has been described as an ability to question; to acknowledge and test previously held assumptions; to recognize ambiguity; to examine, interpret, evaluate, reason, and reflect; to make informed judgments and decisions; and to clarify, articulate, and justify positions (Hullfish & Smith, 1961; Ennis, 1962; Ruggiero, 1975; Scriven, 1976; Hallet, 1984; Kitchener, 1986; Pascarella & Terenzini, 1991; Mines et al., 1990; Halpern, 1996; Paul & Elder, 2001; Petress, 2004; Holyoak & Morrison, 2005; among others).

After a careful review of the mountainous body of literature defining critical thinking and its elements, UofL has chosen to adopt the language of Michael Scriven and Richard Paul (2003) as a comprehensive, concise operating definition:

Critical thinking is the intellectually disciplined process of actively and skillfully conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication, as a guide to belief and action.

Paul and Scriven go on to suggest that critical thinking is based on: "universal intellectual values that transcend subject matter divisions: clarity, accuracy, precision, consistency, relevance, sound evidence, good reasons, depth, breadth, and fairness. It entails the examination of those structures or elements of thought implicit in all reasoning: purpose, problem, or question-at-issue, assumptions, concepts, empirical grounding; reasoning leading to conclusions, implication and consequences, objections from alternative viewpoints, and frame of reference. Critical thinking - in being responsive to variable subject matter, issues, and purposes - is incorporated in a family of interwoven modes of thinking, among them: scientific thinking, mathematical thinking, historical thinking, anthropological thinking, economic thinking, moral thinking, and philosophical thinking."

This conceptualization of critical thinking has been refined and developed further by Richard Paul and Linder Elder into the Paul-Elder framework of critical thinking. Currently, this approach is one of the most widely published and cited frameworks in the critical thinking literature. According to the Paul-Elder framework, critical thinking is the:

• Analysis of thinking by focusing on the parts or structures of thinking ("the Elements of Thought")
• Evaluation of thinking by focusing on the quality ("the Universal Intellectual Standards")
• Improvement of thinking by using what you have learned ("the Intellectual Traits")

Selection of a Critical Thinking Framework

The University of Louisville chose the Paul-Elder model of Critical Thinking as the approach to guide our efforts in developing and enhancing our critical thinking curriculum. The Paul-Elder framework was selected based on criteria adapted from the characteristics of a good model of critical thinking developed at Surry Community College. The Paul-Elder critical thinking framework is comprehensive, uses discipline-neutral terminology, is applicable to all disciplines, defines specific cognitive skills including metacognition, and offers high quality resources.

Why the selection of a single critical thinking framework?

The use of a single critical thinking framework is an important aspect of institution-wide critical thinking initiatives (Paul and Nosich, 1993; Paul, 2004). According to this view, critical thinking instruction should not be relegated to one or two disciplines or departments with discipline specific language and conceptualizations. Rather, critical thinking instruction should be explicitly infused in all courses so that critical thinking skills can be developed and reinforced in student learning across the curriculum. The use of a common approach with a common language allows for a central organizer and for the development of critical thinking skill sets in all courses.

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Analyzing the basics of ethical thinking for leaders and organizations in society

This chapter will introduce the basic constructs of moral thinking. We will begin by defining the terms morality and ethics.  After creating a working knowledge of the terminology, we will look at the roots of moral decision-making in our society by tracing the factors contributing to the Western societal framework. We will examine the many characteristics, including inherent tensions, that determine individual morality and societal ethics while focusing on the inherent legacy and discussion in that interaction. At the end of this section, different conceptions of the more profound components of moral theory and its interaction in society will be introduced, with constructive and practical outcomes that will help us to determine how best to approach ethical outcomes. This will include suggestions on becoming more aware of moral decision-making and how to avoid potential problems organizations or leaders might face as they consider problems that we must address personally, professionally, and in a societal and/or global sense.

Key Definitions

What is Morality?

The constructs of human conduct and/or values.

What is Ethics?

The study of the constructs that determine what is good and evil in direct connection with moral principles and values

What is Moral Reasoning?

The factors, arguments, and thinking patterns that determine the constructs of human conduct and/or values

Let’s begin with basic definitions of the study of moral philosophy and “good” decision-making.  Morality is the term used to describe the constructs of human conduct and/or values.  At its base, morality is formulated on an understanding of preferred behavior, in both an individual and societal sense, depending on the context.  It is often in the interaction of personal and societal factors that thinkers have contemplated the depth and uniqueness of this study. Though many theorists differ in their interpretation of how morality is derived personally and collectively, experts generally agree that morality is a combination of reason and “sense” that we use or fall back on to determine right from wrong or our expectations of ourselves and others.  Using the writings of Plato in commentary on Socrates, the definition focuses on morality as the determination of “how we ought to live.”  This understanding of morality coincides with our beliefs about the future and how we conceive of how the world, the people, and the factors that determine that reality should come to be and the result we desire.

Ethics is the formal study of the personal and collective definitions of morality. Ethics focuses on how we, individually or collectively, conceive or determine morality. It represents the constant reevaluation and thinking behind the decisions that have led us to these conclusions.

“Ethics” is derived from the Greek term “ethos.” This term was most closely connected to the Greek concept of “proper character or manners.” The definition of ethics, whether used as a discipline or conceptually, is focused on pursuing objective truth to determine better outcomes daily for everyone, regardless of the factors or the results. Inherent in the study of ethics is a crucial understanding of the concept of objectivity.

Moral reasoning is the series of factors, arguments, and thinking patterns that humans use or engage in to determine what the basic values or constructs of proper moral judgments should be. Moral reasoning focuses on why and/or how we achieve the result of a proper way of living life.  Though this is complicated, we all engage in this reasoning daily and throughout our lives, whether we consciously know it or not.

Two questions are at the core of this evaluation:

• What is the best course of thought and action required to improve our awareness of this reasoning?
• How do we determine the best outcome personally and as we interact and build community with others?

These terms are crucial to consider as we work towards the conceptual goal of truth. It includes how to read individuals more carefully and diligently and how we know ourselves.  By paying more close attention to these constructs and studying them in greater depth, a good thinker can understand the factors that determine better decisions and, of course, avoid the prospect of decisions that could be very costly.

Crucial Moral Concepts

What is Virtue?

The concept of moral excellence or proper moral conduct

What are Values?

Characteristics of human thought and action that are intrinsically preferred or held in high esteem

Building on these definitions, we turn our attention to two concepts that are crucial to ethical study.  Virtue is defined as the concept of moral excellence or proper moral conduct.  This term is also applied to a field of ethical study called “virtue ethics.”  “Virtue” philosophical thinkers believe there is a core of attributes central to the human condition that we can determine or “call upon” as preferred attributes of human behavior.  These theories are most widely studied in the framework of Ancient Greek philosophers, including Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who is perhaps the most famous.  We will look at their views in the future.  Many of these thinkers believe that ethical thinking becomes self-evident as individuals learn more about themselves and their world.

From that wisdom development, concepts of preferred behavior emerge. A good example is courage. Using reason, it becomes clear that being courageous is always more desirable than being uncourageous. Though people can be “courageous” or “uncourageous,” conceptually, courageous behavior is often believed to be more virtuous or an element of proper moral conduct.  In our study, we pay particular attention or think about what determines a better or wiser thinker and what it requires of us.  In Damon Horowitz’s 3-minute talk on teaching philosophy in prison, listen to his assessment of the importance and power of philosophical training and thought as it relates to determining the practical nature of the definition of virtue.  What essential components of this conversation should we consider as we contemplate what it means to pursue ethical thinking?  Those components of wisdom or attributes observed in human experience often coincide with the concepts that thinkers of the ages have determined are central to the “virtue” ethical excellence elements.

The other term essential to the discussion of morality and decision-making is the definition of values.  The baseline definition of the term “values” pertains to human thought and action characteristics that are intrinsically preferred or held in high esteem.  For our purposes, consider the term “values” or “value” as the individual characteristics, like courage, that make up the concept of virtuous or proper moral conduct.  These two terms remind us that ideals or concepts may be present in our daily decision-making.  The key is to identify them, ensure those ideals are central to objective truth and not just what we want, and consciously allow them to guide us in all aspects of our lives.

Basic Constructs of Ethical Study

Descriptive Ethics + Analytical Ethics = Normative Ethics

The determination of values and/or virtues can be seen in the struggle of leaders and organizations over time.  In the Twentieth Century and the Twenty-First Century, unethical decisions have dominated the world, resulting in unethical outcomes.  In the wake of such damaging outcomes, people are more astutely focusing on ethics and ethical practice.  In doing so, they consider greater thoughtful procedures as they scope through risk management, organizational function and productivity, market positioning, and civic responsibility. What has emerged in greater clarity is the understanding that profits and ethical decision-making, at all levels, can be integrated partners if consistent and committed to long-term success is kept at the forefront of individual consciousness.

At the beginning of the study of ethical options, we need to define a framework to understand how to study ethics.  In doing this, it becomes clear that ethics is complicated and not merely a formulation of what is only “wrong” or “right” but a concentrated and in-depth study of the various segments of human thought and behavior.  I term this complexity the equation of ethical study.  There are three components:

• Descriptive ethics is the branch of ethical study that considers ethical analysis in the context of a neutral representation of the perceptions or facts of any ethical situation.  It involves a lengthy and careful attempt to identify the ethical issues and values inherent in the evaluation process.
• Analytical ethics centers on the argument and logic in the ethical opinions and assessments used to determine the ethical issues, values, or outcomes.  This approach builds on descriptive ethics by considering the construct of ethical determination in greater depth.  Analytical ethics considers the ethical outcome based upon other decisions, especially those decisions that are disconnected from others and the impact such decisions or outcomes might have in that consideration.
• Normative ethics approaches the study of ethics with the belief, according to Kitson and Campbell in Case Studies in Business Ethics (2001), of seeking “to develop and defend judgments of right and wrong, good and bad, and virtue and vice, to arrive at an understanding of truth.”  This final evaluation tool process focuses on determining the best possible outcome after solid and productive consideration of descriptive and analytical components.  Normative is usually the stage of the ethical evaluation process that most people are familiar with, as it often leads to a decision or determination of what is “right” or “wrong” for an individual, group, organization, or society.

As May describes in Case Studies in Organizational Communication , these three layers make up the many different conceptualizations inherent in ethical analysis.  All are equally important, but we must consider the ethical layers when considering descriptive and analytical ethical standing to make the best possible decision.

Prominent Ethical Tensions

Foundational vs. Situational Tensions

Individual vs. Community Tensions

Beyond these layers of ethical study, good critical thinkers must be aware of inevitable tensions between individuals crucial to ethical study evaluation.  Such tensions exist in our world and are at the root of ethical dilemmas.

The first tension focuses on the interaction between foundational and situational arguments.

• Foundational ethical arguments are built upon the idea that proper ethical formulation is based upon “universal” constructs of ethical thinking or objective conceptualization. From this standpoint, ethical evaluation is determined by an objective assessment that the individual or organization using this approach deems accurate, regardless of context or situation.
• Situational ethical arguments are formulated on the belief that ethical thinking is a product of consistent change and subjective conceptualizations based upon unique circumstances or each instance in which an ethical evaluation must occur. This presents tension as each perspective can often be at the root of ethical differences and misunderstandings.

The other tension highlights the moral stances of ideologies linked to individualism and collectivism.

• I ndividualistic ideology argues that proper ethical evaluation and determination are inherently formulated on the individual, entity, and responsibility.
• The collective ethical perspective argues the opposite.

Ethical decision-making is best constructed through understanding the soundest course of thought and evaluation through group affiliation and agreement. Thinkers must consider the interplay of the rights and responsibilities of individuals with the rights and responsibilities of communities found in any society or organization (of people).  A better understanding of the framework of ethical interaction allows us to contemplate productive outcomes more deeply for some of our most difficult moral problems. Awareness of these tensions is a start to becoming more productive in arriving at more ethical outcomes and defraying possible misunderstandings around the thoughts and behavior of those involved.

Moral Reasoning and Determination are not only…  A matter of opinion or personal taste.

This essential question is central to the discussion of moral decision-making:  isn’t morality simply a matter of opinion or personal taste?  This question represents a standard assumption on the part of many.  Other people view morality, ethical thinking, moral reasoning, virtue, and value or values, as simply relativistic or subjective. “ Relativistic ” refers to the belief that our understanding of truth (or what we believe in) is based on our evaluation or perspective. It can be argued that truth comes from a subjective conception, and this viewpoint carries great merit as we understand perception, thinking, and uniqueness. It is also true that moral reasoning or morality must probe more deeply than simply a belief or opinion we possess.  Good thinking requires that we investigate, process and evaluate as many components of possible ethical dilemmas and not only the use of our background, quick assessments, or sole emotional reactions to determine better practices or outcomes.

Relativistic statements of individuals must go further than a simple assertion that they might have on a subject; instead, as the philosopher Dr. James Rachels explains in The Elements of Moral Philosophy , we must employ moral reasoning and virtuous decision-making solidly and constructively, building on the reasoning that is supported by the soundness of thought and consistency of action.  This Starburst candy advertisement demonstrates how important it is to determine when an opinion or personal taste should lead us to evaluate the Truth and how we might begin to use reason to help us transcend evaluations that might be problematic or untrue.

Basic Ethical Constructs of the Western World

Though there are many codes of moral conduct and varying traditions of ethical perspective we could study, I have limited the scope of this course to a series of very strong contributors to our Western world to illustrate how ethical theory and conception have come to define our reality.  These factors have become prominent in some ethical determinations in the Western World and the world at large.  As we consider the climate of increasing globalized networks built upon some of these notions, it is increasingly essential to constructively understand and evaluate the roots of such basic conceptions of morality.

The long conversational history becomes apparent in tracing the background of morality and ethical conduct.  We can find those essential modern conceptions linked to the world of the ancient world of the Greeks and Romans.  Our presumptions of good business, proper conduct, and even the truth of reality have been shaped by the writings and beliefs of individuals predating the fourth century BC.  Central to the Greco-Roman world was the philosophical viewpoint that the meaning of life was somehow connected to this idea of creating a “better life” or moving towards a greater sense of “progress.”

This idea is still present in almost every aspect of our world and can be fundamentally seen in Western culture.  This concept of “ betterment ” or “good” living has impacted our decision-making, creating a society that focuses on growth and the belief that there are better ways to approach various subjects and our lives.

One key component of this Greek belief of “betterment” can be traced to their solid ethical notion of the citizenry and civic responsibility.  Citizens have rights given to them by circumstance or situation, but with rights come responsibilities required of those with privilege.  The Romans took this concept further, believing that the true notion of justice was steeped in ethical importance.  They attempted to set up courts and impartial authority figures connected with the Roman authorities who were tasked with helping those in conflict resolve their issues through productive and just outcomes.  The idea was that society only operates ethically when people are treated fairly and problems are solved to diminish conflict.

The second component is the influence of Christian values and virtues on the development of accepted social norms of thought and behavior in the Western world.  Regardless of one’s religious affiliation, the Western world has been developed using the beliefs Christian principles passed down since the Middle Ages by the Roman Catholic Church.

During this time, many social norms espoused by the Christian establishment became the backbone of European society. They laid the foundation for individual and organizational behavior through law or cultural expectations.  Many of those expectations often associated with Hebraic belief expectations, such as the Ten Commandments, were combined with the teachings of Jesus Christ found in the New Testament.  Those expectations became encapsulated in Christian creeds and lists of behavioral expectations, such as The Seven Deadly Sins , decided by Christian leaders through council decisions.  These decisions were often instituted as laws that kingdoms adopted.  Many concepts of societal values, such as true justice and characteristics of personal values, were taught, reinforced, and passed down from generation to generation, both societally and individually.  In addition, these values or moral expectations were also taught and reinforced in direct conjunction with the Church’s practices.

Beyond the first earlier Western influences we have discussed, there have also been economic ideologies that have come to shape moral thinking and evaluation.  Milton Friedman, one of the most prominent economists of the twentieth century, argued, in a famous 1970 essay termed Friedman’s Thesis , as well as his early text Capitalism and Freedom , “the social responsibility of business is to increase its profits” arguing that the role of a business should be to maximize profits and not to be concerned with elements of moral responsibility or participate in determining moral “rights” and “wrongs’ within society.  According to his evaluation, institutions, especially for-profit organizations, should only concern themselves with economic decisions that would increase the profitability of shareholders. In this way, morality and market interaction would dictate proper moral decision-making.

Organizations’ freedom to pursue their best interest, namely profit, should determine organizational attitude and behavior as long as they obey the law.  This belief functioned under the assumption that moral assessments should be reserved for the citizens who would make those decisions by purchasing the products or services presented and through the regulations created by legislators who represented those citizens.  This approach profoundly influenced how Western society determined the best moral course of action, arguing that the market would be the best assessor of moral attitude and behavior.

Another layer of this debate centers itself on the tension between philanthropy and charity.  Philanthropy, the offering of financial or resource help to an individual, organization, or society in need with some benefit for the giving organization or individual, has often been interpreted by many as a productive way to invest in a beneficial, moral manner to address critical ethical problems.  It has been argued as the best option for addressing moral and social needs.  In doing so, though, the belief is that what is beneficial for those who need the help should be linked to the benefit of the participating organization.  Charity, in contrast, is centered on the idea that benefits of any kind should be offered without the mutual requirement of exchange.  The debate over what is proper and productive “help” and the morality of how to best offer it as we consider economic results have been at the crux of moral evaluation in the Western world and linked to the debate around Friedman’s Thesis.  Some of that debate has been influenced by moral presumptions connected with the value of work and individual responsibility.  This also includes the assumption that profitability is most important and should influence how we evaluate the most moral course of action.

The moral complexity of individual and society in Western society…Pluralism, dualism, and monism

As alluded to in the last section, the complexity of the interaction of individual and societal beliefs is critical in understanding the context of Western ethical thinking.  Western society has consistently attempted, through the institution of such documents as the Magna Carta, the English Bill of Rights 1688, and The Constitution of the United States, to define the relationship more clearly between what is individually acceptable behavior and what is collectively accepted as permissible

Rousseau, the famous French-Swiss philosopher of the eighteenth century, referred to this as the concept of a social contract.  At the heart of this interaction is a societal moral value called justice.  Perhaps one of the most controversial legal thinkers of the twentieth century, John Rawls, a prominent professor of law and philosophy at Harvard, asserts that we must know the role of “institutions” or groups of people in moral decision-making.  At the root of the interaction of personal, institutional (which is best defined as any group of individuals), and society at large is the philosophical conception of whether Truth, defined objectively, can be found in a dualistic thinking framework or a monistic thinking conceptualization.

Dualism is the belief that two concepts, ideals, or factors determine truth by their interplay or lack therein, while monism refers to the belief that truth reflects one concept, ideal, or factor.  For a thinker, it is imperative to determine whether problem-solving considers a more dualistic, or perhaps even pluralistic, or multiple-factor approach or a more monistic framework.  As we struggle with proper judgments, one will inevitably conclude that proper conduct and decision-making, as well as good critical thinking, must incorporate a solid and reliable set of rules of conduct or expectations that is inclusive of as many approaches or perspectives as possible while considering the need to determine ethical goals or ideals to progress towards.

Dilemmas at the Heart of Ethical Thinking…

• Justice vs. mercy
• Truth vs. Loyalty
• Individual vs. community
• Short-term goals vs. long-term goals

To further our understanding of ethical thinking, it is useful to dissect moral problems within the context of “value pairings.”  To highlight some of the more critical Western societal values, Rushworth Kidder breaks ethical issues into four major categories that should help us assess moral decision-making.  In How Good People Make Tough Choices:  Resolving the Dilemmas of Ethical Living (1995), he argues that all complex ethical dilemmas have, at their core, many of the following series of troubling pairings that make it challenging to determine the best moral outcome.

Justice versus mercy forces us to consider how we should uphold proper expectations for attitudes and behaviors, emphasizing that everyone should receive what they deserve within society.  This includes the belief that taking responsibility for oneself is important while balancing the belief that it is valuable to consider when to offer leniency to those who might not deserve it or someone who hasn’t taken responsibility.

Truth (objective) versus loyalty presents the dilemma of determining when we or society should adhere to the truth regardless of loyalty and when loyalty to ourselves, others, or institutions might be the most moral course of action.

The construct of individual versus community tension compels us to consider the varied interests of the individual versus the needs and/or desires of a greater community.  This moral dilemma can be present in many different facets of society.

Finally, Kidder iterates that the final dilemma we should consider is the clash between short-term and long-term goal-setting .  There are often compelling cases for when we should choose short-term over long-term goals or vice versa, but knowing when to make the right decision in the right situation is often difficult to determine.  Considering these four dilemmas can not be understated when we evaluate the importance of better critical thinking with the result of more ethical outcomes.  Listen to Patrick Awuah’s discussion (17 minutes) as he uses his experience to emphasize the importance of being a “thinking, moral” leader and how one should look for opportunities to encourage those traits in others.  Making ethical decisions is not easy, but it is necessary.

The Origin of Ethical Determination

Differing perspectives on moral determination have been considered in Western society for centuries.  As a result, many different viewpoints have emerged over time.  It is essential to contemplate the thoughts of some of the greatest thinkers to analyze what is truly at the core of proper moral reasoning and understand what many people today might conclude.

David Hume , a Scottish philosopher of the Eighteenth Century, espoused the viewpoint that people determine what is “right” or “wrong” through experiences filtered by their senses.  Hume’s famous statement that humans are nothing more than “a bundle of perceptions” claims that the core of who we are as individuals is directly tied to our perceptions or how we interpret the world.  Though perception, as a process, may be considered universal in the sense that we, as humans, all participate in it or employ the phenomena, he is quick to point out that each one of us is diverse in those experiences.

Karl Marx, the famous Mid-Nineteenth Century philosopher, is known primarily for his work The Communist Manifesto. Marx wrote that the root of ethical thinking is humans’ economic constraints. The struggle over material goods between those who have and those who have not and how that relationship is worked in society outlines and determines ethical thinking or morality.

The last and most controversial is the work of psychologist and psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud .  Freud believed that ethical thinking is directly tied to our subconscious and found that we find the real motivations for ethical decision-making in the interaction of the id, ego, and superego.  Therefore, morality is based upon our “hidden desires” or “what we really want” when played out against other influences such as societal expectations and/or the interests of others; this reflects the central feature of who we are as individuals but also the weighs that interest against the interest of others.

By contemplating the potential motivating factors that determine ethical thinking in people, we become much more careful in thinking through matters pertaining to decision-making.  In Western society, many thinkers have come to radically different perspectives on what determines ethical thought and action.

Questions at the Root of the Ethical Decision-Making Process

At the root of ethical decision-making are four initial questions that must be contemplated to find answers.

• What does it mean to be good?
• What makes a life a good life?
• What characteristics make up a good human?
• What duties do we have to each other and ourselves?

Critical thinkers may use the following suggestions when confronted with questions.

First, there are no easy answers; attaining satisfactory answers is ongoing.  These questions must be revisited to gain insight and enhance growth over time.

Second, strong and solid reasons require significant thought and the ability to continually question notions that might even be held dear.  Process and result must both be considered. Last, these questions require us to keep ourselves in check by considering the interest of others.

Tough Outcomes May Emerge

Several potential outcomes emerge when important ethical questions are asked.  These questions can cause people to come to certain conclusions that may be unnerving. Additionally, the answers that people often struggle with produce actions and outcomes that present obstacles to moving along with better ethical thinking and problem-solving.

The first problem is the issue of blame .  At the root of blame is the shared realization that change is needed.  Change is often scary and threatening.  As individuals think about ethical issues, they are often confronted by their conscience or reason, prompting them to feel troubled by their thoughts or behaviors.  When integrated with the need to enact some form of change, discomfort can cause people to feel unmotivated or agitated.  It is probably safe to say that most humans do not like change, and this factor alone can cause uncomfortable situations or outcomes, but when we add the topic of moral assessment, there is added pressure and stress.  This video of a dog  illustrates the humorous interaction between the dog “Denver” and his master.  This is a microcosm (in a more humorous manner) of what people might experience.

The second potential problem centers on the issue of obligation or duty.   Ethical issues naturally imply that the change required might dictate a strong sense of obligation that may cause people not to think and act unfairly. Think of a person who has a renewed view of an issue or problem and throws themselves completely into that new approach without realizing that that renewed perspective may not solve ethical issues.  The complexities of obligation can create a crisis as people, in their new understanding, might be torn between loyalties to multiple viewpoints or viewpoints—thus causing even more potential dismay.

The third factor to consider is the issue of the emotional investment of those involved.  Ethical issues often carry with them inherent strong viewpoints and feelings that can surface and may cause individuals to avoid an accurate understanding of the outcomes present.  This emotional investment may lead to false admiration for those involved in the decision or leaders who enact what is perceived to be the better moral decision or process.  This can lead to an inaccurate result or view of the situation.

Last might be the ethical dilemma of not knowing the result that an ethical decision might produce .  How does one truly know that they are correct, or what we have come to think is the proper outcome will indeed yield that result?  The prospect of this can be frightening for many people.  The more we know how people react in circumstances linked to ethical tensions and outcomes, the better we identify these tendencies in ourselves and others and work to allay those fears.  This is perhaps one of the most important factors to consider and why an ethics-based education is essential.

Awuah, P. (2007, June). How to educate leaders? Liberal arts. Retrieved from https://www.ted.com/talks/patrick_awuah_on_educating_leaders

Denver Official Guilty Dog Video. (2011, March 08). Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch? v=B8ISzf2pryI

Horowitz, D. (2011, March). Philosophy in prison. Retrieved from https://www.ted.com/talks/damon_horowitz_philosophy_in_prison

Kitson, A., & Campbell, R. (2001). Case studies in business ethics. In A. Malachowski (Ed.), Business ethics: Critical perspectives on business and management (Vol. IV, pp. 7–12). London: Routledge.

May, S. (2012). Case studies in organizational communication: Ethical perspectives and practices. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

Rachels, S., & Rachels, J. (2019). The elements of moral philosophy. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Education.

Ronda, N. (2011, June 19). Starburst- Commercial [funny]. Retrieved from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jodb9lkwnd8

Chapter 2--Morality and Decision Making Copyright © 2018 by Christopher Brooks is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License , except where otherwise noted.

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Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow

Hanno Sauer, Moral Thinking, Fast and Slow , Routledge, 2019, 108pp., $70.00 (hbk), ISBN 9781138205147.

Reviewed by Brendan de Kenessey, University of Toronto

Though it is named after Daniel Kahneman's Thinking, Fast and Slow , the central thesis of Hanno Sauer's book is that Kahneman's distinction is too crude. Famously, Kahneman divided the cognitive mind into two parts: System I, a bundle of automatic, unconscious, modular processes that generate fast intuitive judgments; and System II, the system we use to reach judgments through slow, conscious, effortful thought. Sauer argues that we need a further distinction, originally proposed by the psychologist Keith Stanovich (2011): "System II" is composed of two dissociable sub-processes.

One sub-process, which retains the name "System II," enables us to activate, sustain, and manipulate representations in working memory. This is the kind of cognitive functioning measured by intelligence tests: "System II houses raw processing power, with little or no regard to how that power is used" (21-22). Hence the need for the second sub-process, which monitors and guides how System II's processing power is used. Sauer calls this "System III." System III's main job is to perform intuition override : to call an intuitive judgment into question, direct System II to critically reflect upon it, and -- if reflection shows the intuition to be unjustified -- overturn it (2). In a slogan: System II is clever, but it needs System III to be wise. [1]

The best evidence for the psychological reality of this distinction comes from cases of rationalization . The rationalizer uses conscious, complex reasoning to defend her preexisting view (System II) while failing to subject this view itself to reflective, critical scrutiny (System III). Sauer points to Jonathan Haidt's studies on moral dumbfounding (Haidt 2001) as a paradigm case (29-31). Haidt presented subjects with descriptions of harmless violations of moral taboos: for example, two siblings having consensual sex with contraception. The typical subject would try to justify their intuition that the act is wrong by pointing to some harm it would cause, only to be reminded by the experimenter that, as the case was described, the relevant harm would not occur. Crucially, even after all such attempts at justification failed, most subjects still stood by their intuition: "It's just wrong!" What's going on here? Sauer's plausible diagnosis is that these subjects are recruiting System II's intellectual horsepower in service of their intuitive judgments, without engaging the intuition-questioning capacities of System III. By showing how System III can break down while System II is hard at work, moral dumbfounding and other examples of uncritical rationalization provide evidence that these processes are distinct.

The primary aim of Sauer's book is to defend this "triple process theory" and show that it can help us to better understand moral cognition in particular. (Stanovich, the creator of the triple process theory, does not focus on moral judgment). Though moral judgment involves all three kinds of cognition, Sauer argues that "the key to competent moral judgment is how subjects manage and, if necessary, override their intuitions" (43). Thus his main task is to show how successful moral judgment depends on System III, as distinguished from System II. But the book also has a secondary aim: Sauer claims that the triple-process account of moral judgment has substantive normative implications. This normative argument will be the main focus of my critical comments. But first, let's return to Sauer's descriptive psychological project, which takes up the bulk of the book.

Chapter 1 begins with a concise summary of the classic distinction between System I and System II and how this distinction has been applied to moral judgment. This chapter is a quick, clear, up-to-date introduction to the dual-process literature that I would happily assign in a graduate seminar. Chapter 2 then presents the triple process theory and reviews the main lines of evidence in favor of distinguishing System III from System II. One line of evidence, already mentioned, comes from cases where System III breaks down while System II continues functioning. Beyond moral dumbfounding, other cases of selective System III breakdown include delusional disorders, in which subjects construct complex, coherent narratives to justify their delusional beliefs while appearing completely unable to question those beliefs (22), and moral disengagement, in which subjects construct rationalizations to make self-serving immoral behaviors appear morally justified (75-76). Another line of empirical support comes from individual differences (23-25): when a cognitive task requires one to override an initial snap judgment, subjects' success is best predicted not by their general cognitive ability (System II), but instead by their disposition to reflect critically (System III).

Having defended the triple process theory, Sauer sets out in Chapter 3 to apply it. One of these applications is the normative argument to which we will turn shortly. The other major task is to show how the triple process theory sheds light on the sources of error in moral judgment (56-83). This part of the chapter surveys a dizzying array of work on errors in moral judgment. I'll admit that here I began to lose the argumentative forest for the empirical trees. Some failures of moral judgment -- namely, those involving rationalization -- the triple process theory clearly helps to explain. But it was not apparent to me how the triple process theory adds to our understanding of some of the other moral errors Sauer reviews, such as zero-sum thinking (67-68), compassion fade (70), or ingroup bias (77-78). Sauer explains these errors by appeal to failures in "moral mindware," by which he means knowledge and concepts that aid moral judgment (see 64-65). But since the concept of "mindware" doesn't appeal to the System II / III distinction, I don't see why the same explanation wouldn't be available to a classic dual-process theorist. So, while I'm convinced that the triple-process approach is theoretically fruitful, I'm not sure that its explanatory reach is as broad as Sauer thinks.

Let me now turn to Sauer's argument that the triple process theory has substantive normative implications (46-56): "Triple Process moral psychology vindicates some moral judgments at the expense of others" (46). More specifically, his claim is that "the Triple Process account shows that progressive moral intuitions are epistemically and morally preferable to conservative moral intuitions" (46-47). Set aside the question of what moral views count as progressive vs. conservative: I am more interested in the form of Sauer's argument than the particular conclusion he uses it to support. [2]

The argument starts from experiments showing that subjects more disposed to engage in reflective, System III thinking are more likely to endorse progressive moral views, while less reflective subjects are more likely to endorse conservative views (53-54, 62-64). This empirical observation provides the basis for what Sauer calls a vindicating argument for progressivism (49). Subjects who are better at System III reflection are more successful in various non-moral cognitive tasks (23-25), indicating that reflective System III thinking is epistemically superior to mere System II rationalization. So, the data show that subjects who employ an epistemically superior method -- System III thinking -- are more likely to endorse progressive moral views. Since beliefs arrived at by an epistemically superior method are more likely to be true, we can conclude that progressive moral views are more likely to be true (49).

The question I want to ask is: can an argument of this form help to resolve any debates in moral philosophy? Suppose that A and B are philosophers who disagree about some moral claim p . A believes that p is true; B believes that p is false. Now, Sauer comes along and presents an experiment demonstrating that subjects who are better at System III reflection are more likely to agree with B that p is false, while subjects who are less reflectively disposed are more likely to agree with A that p is true. Upon hearing this, should A reduce her confidence in her belief that p ?

I don't think so, and here's why. Our hypothetical experiment shows that the experimental subjects who believe that p formed their beliefs by an epistemically inferior method, i.e. unreflective thought. Does this give us reason to think that A formed her belief that p by means of an epistemically inferior, because insufficiently reflective, method? Only if we assume that the method by which A formed her belief that p is the same as the method by which the experimental subjects formed their belief that p . But there is good reason to doubt this assumption. The experimental subjects came to believe that p after brief, casual contemplation at the prompting of an experimenter. By contrast, A is a professional philosopher. She's been thinking about whether p for years; she's read books and articles arguing for p and against p ; she's actively sought out objections to her view that p from colleagues like B; in the classroom, she's done her best to defend ~p against her students' objections. Not only are these epistemic methods different, they differ along exactly the dimension that is at issue: namely, System III reflection. To be trained as a philosopher is, in large part, to be trained in the use of System III. We are taught to call our most basic intuitions into question and to charitably consider the strongest arguments against our own views. So, granting that the subjects in our hypothetical experiment came to judge that p because they failed to reflect on their intuitions, I see no reason to infer that a philosopher who judges that p does so because she has failed to reflect on her intuitions. Most people unreflectively believe that they know that they have hands; that does not imply that Timothy Williamson's belief that he knows he has hands is unreflective.

The upshot is that Sauer's normative argument loses its force as soon as it is applied to any question about which philosophers disagree. Any such application will require an inferential step from "experimental subjects who judge that p are less reflective than experimental subjects who judge that ~p " to "philosophers who judge that p are less reflective than philosophers who judge that ~p ." But this inference is not warranted. If a question is up for serious philosophical debate, that is strong evidence that people actively engaged in System III reflection can reach conflicting verdicts about it. Now, if there is a moral view on which nearly everyone who engages in any System III reflection agrees, then Sauer's argument would support that view, since it would be reasonable to infer that anyone who believed the opposite view was being insufficiently reflective. Sauer's progressivism is so broadly defined that it may be such a case. But this shows the limits of the argument's reach: it can only be used to support a view that is already the philosophical consensus.

For similar reasons, I doubt that we will make much progress in moral philosophy by studying the cognitive biases of non-philosophers. Implicit in the broad debunking methodology pursued by Sauer and other moral psychologists (e.g. Greene 2008) are two assumptions that, at minimum, need more defense. The first is that the cognitive methods employed by philosophers are not significantly different from the cognitive methods of non-philosophers. This assumption is implicit in any inference from data about the latter to conclusions about the former. As I've said, I think this assumption is questionable. You don't have to believe that philosophers are paragons of epistemic virtue to think that the kind of cognitive work that goes into writing a dissertation is different from that involved in filling out a survey.

The second, and I think deeper, assumption underlying Sauer's methodology is a certain diagnosis of moral disagreement: moral disagreement is the product of flawed, biased cognition. If two people disagree about a moral question, that must be because one of them is subject to some cognitive "bug" (47). Thus the way to resolve a moral debate is to discover which side is committing a cognitive error. This motivates the debunking project: to resolve the philosophical debate about whether p , you pose the same question to experimental subjects, looking to uncover some bias or flaw in their thinking. Discovering that your subjects who endorse p are unreflective or subject to "contaminated moral mindware" (76), you infer that the philosophers who endorse p must be committing the same error, and declare victory for Team ~p . While I've argued that this inference is too hasty, I think it makes sense if you are convinced that most moral disagreements are explained by persistent cognitive biases.

I accept a different diagnosis of moral disagreement: moral philosophy is hard. [3] The moral truth is difficult to discover; even moral platitudes tend to resist easy explanation. When two philosophers disagree about a moral question, that isn't because one of them is secretly biased or thinking defectively. There is disagreement in moral philosophy for the same reason there is disagreement in any serious field of inquiry: the answers to the questions aren't obvious, and so intelligent, thoughtful, reflective people can assess the balance of evidence differently.

Greene, Joshua. 2008. The secret joke of Kant's soul. In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality: Emotion, Brain Disorders, and Development , pp. 35-80. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Haidt, Jonathan. 2001. The emotional dog and its rational tail. Psychological Review , 108: 814-834.

Stanovich, Keith. 2011. Rationality and the Reflective Mind . Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[1] Sauer also calls these "Type II" and "Type III" processing and, following Stanovich, "algorithmic" and "reflective" thinking.

[2] The brief answer is that Sauer interprets "progressivism" extremely broadly, and "conservatism" in roughly the way it is presently used in American politics: see p. 50.

[3] Here I'm indebted to a comment Sophie Horowitz made in a Q&A session several years ago, which went something like this: "I'd like to propose a different view: I call it 'Philosophy is Hard.'"

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47 Moral Thinking

Liane Young, Department of Psychology, Boston College, Chestnut Hill, MA

• Published: 03 June 2013
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This chapter presents several current models of moral thinking, with a focus on the cognitive processes that support people’s moral judgments and justifications. These models are not mutually exclusive; rather, based on recent evidence from psychology and neuroscience, they posit different cognitive processes as the primary source of moral thinking. This chapter therefore does not quantify the evidence for one model versus another but instead reviews evidence for each model separately. These models, discussed in turn, emphasize the role of conscious principled reasoning, emotional processing, theory of mind, and a domain-specific “moral faculty” that integrates information from other cognitive systems to compute specifically moral judgments.

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Critical Thinking and Moral Education

1988, Thinking: The Journal of Philosophy for Children

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MORE READABLE VERSION http://www.researchgate.net/publication/260123642 Critical thinking involves deliberate application of tests and standards to beliefs per se and to methods used to arrive at beliefs. Pedagogical license is authorization accorded to teachers permitting them to use otherwise illicit means in order to achieve pedagogical goals. Pedagogical license is thus analogous to poetic license or, more generally, to artistic license. Pedagogical license will be found to be pervasive in college teaching. This presentation suggests that critical thinking courses emphasize two topics: first, the nature and usefulness of critical thinking; second, the nature and pervasiveness of pedagogical license. Awareness of pedagogical license alerts the student to the need for critical thinking. CLEANER DOWNLOAD http://philpapers.org/archive/CORCTA-2.pdf

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Moral Reasoning

Moral Reasoning is the branch of philosophy that attempts to answer questions with moral dimensions.

Moral reasoning applies critical analysis to specific events to determine what is right or wrong, and what people ought to do in a particular situation. Both philosophers and psychologists study moral reasoning.

How we make day-to-day decisions like “What should I wear?” is similar to how we make moral decisions like “Should I lie or tell the truth?” The brain processes both in generally the same way.

Moral reasoning typically applies logic and moral theories, such as deontology or utilitarianism, to specific situations or dilemmas. However, people are not especially good at moral reasoning. Indeed, the term moral dumbfounding describes the fact that people often reach strong moral conclusions that they cannot logically defend.

In fact, evidence shows that the moral principle or theory a person chooses to apply is often, ironically, based on their emotions, not on logic. Their choice is usually influenced by internal biases or outside pressures, such as the self-serving bias or the desire to conform.

So, while we likely believe we approach ethical dilemmas logically and rationally, the truth is our moral reasoning is usually influenced by intuitive, emotional reactions.

Related Terms

Behavioral Ethics

Behavioral Ethics studies why and how people make the choices that they do.

Moral Emotions

Moral Emotions are the feelings and intuitions–including shame, disgust, and empathy–that play a major role in most of the ethical judgments and decisions people make.

Moral Philosophy

Moral Philosophy studies what is right and wrong, and related philosophical issues.

Moral Psychology

Moral Psychology encompasses both the philosophical and psychological study of the development of the moral sense and related matters.

Neuroethics

Neuroethics uses the tools of neuroscience to examine how we make ethical choices. It is also the investigation of the ethics of neuroscience.

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critical thinking

Definition of critical thinking

Examples of critical thinking in a sentence.

These examples are programmatically compiled from various online sources to illustrate current usage of the word 'critical thinking.' Any opinions expressed in the examples do not represent those of Merriam-Webster or its editors. Send us feedback about these examples.

Word History

1815, in the meaning defined at sense 1

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Critical Thinking

Critical thinking is a widely accepted educational goal. Its definition is contested, but the competing definitions can be understood as differing conceptions of the same basic concept: careful thinking directed to a goal. Conceptions differ with respect to the scope of such thinking, the type of goal, the criteria and norms for thinking carefully, and the thinking components on which they focus. Its adoption as an educational goal has been recommended on the basis of respect for students’ autonomy and preparing students for success in life and for democratic citizenship. “Critical thinkers” have the dispositions and abilities that lead them to think critically when appropriate. The abilities can be identified directly; the dispositions indirectly, by considering what factors contribute to or impede exercise of the abilities. Standardized tests have been developed to assess the degree to which a person possesses such dispositions and abilities. Educational intervention has been shown experimentally to improve them, particularly when it includes dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring. Controversies have arisen over the generalizability of critical thinking across domains, over alleged bias in critical thinking theories and instruction, and over the relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking.

2.1 Dewey’s Three Main Examples

2.2 dewey’s other examples, 2.3 further examples, 2.4 non-examples, 3. the definition of critical thinking, 4. its value, 5. the process of thinking critically, 6. components of the process, 7. contributory dispositions and abilities, 8.1 initiating dispositions, 8.2 internal dispositions, 9. critical thinking abilities, 10. required knowledge, 11. educational methods, 12.1 the generalizability of critical thinking, 12.2 bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, 12.3 relationship of critical thinking to other types of thinking, other internet resources, related entries.

Use of the term ‘critical thinking’ to describe an educational goal goes back to the American philosopher John Dewey (1910), who more commonly called it ‘reflective thinking’. He defined it as

active, persistent and careful consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further conclusions to which it tends. (Dewey 1910: 6; 1933: 9)

and identified a habit of such consideration with a scientific attitude of mind. His lengthy quotations of Francis Bacon, John Locke, and John Stuart Mill indicate that he was not the first person to propose development of a scientific attitude of mind as an educational goal.

In the 1930s, many of the schools that participated in the Eight-Year Study of the Progressive Education Association (Aikin 1942) adopted critical thinking as an educational goal, for whose achievement the study’s Evaluation Staff developed tests (Smith, Tyler, & Evaluation Staff 1942). Glaser (1941) showed experimentally that it was possible to improve the critical thinking of high school students. Bloom’s influential taxonomy of cognitive educational objectives (Bloom et al. 1956) incorporated critical thinking abilities. Ennis (1962) proposed 12 aspects of critical thinking as a basis for research on the teaching and evaluation of critical thinking ability.

Since 1980, an annual international conference in California on critical thinking and educational reform has attracted tens of thousands of educators from all levels of education and from many parts of the world. Also since 1980, the state university system in California has required all undergraduate students to take a critical thinking course. Since 1983, the Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking has sponsored sessions in conjunction with the divisional meetings of the American Philosophical Association (APA). In 1987, the APA’s Committee on Pre-College Philosophy commissioned a consensus statement on critical thinking for purposes of educational assessment and instruction (Facione 1990a). Researchers have developed standardized tests of critical thinking abilities and dispositions; for details, see the Supplement on Assessment . Educational jurisdictions around the world now include critical thinking in guidelines for curriculum and assessment. Political and business leaders endorse its importance.

For details on this history, see the Supplement on History .

2. Examples and Non-Examples

Before considering the definition of critical thinking, it will be helpful to have in mind some examples of critical thinking, as well as some examples of kinds of thinking that would apparently not count as critical thinking.

Dewey (1910: 68–71; 1933: 91–94) takes as paradigms of reflective thinking three class papers of students in which they describe their thinking. The examples range from the everyday to the scientific.

Transit : “The other day, when I was down town on 16th Street, a clock caught my eye. I saw that the hands pointed to 12:20. This suggested that I had an engagement at 124th Street, at one o'clock. I reasoned that as it had taken me an hour to come down on a surface car, I should probably be twenty minutes late if I returned the same way. I might save twenty minutes by a subway express. But was there a station near? If not, I might lose more than twenty minutes in looking for one. Then I thought of the elevated, and I saw there was such a line within two blocks. But where was the station? If it were several blocks above or below the street I was on, I should lose time instead of gaining it. My mind went back to the subway express as quicker than the elevated; furthermore, I remembered that it went nearer than the elevated to the part of 124th Street I wished to reach, so that time would be saved at the end of the journey. I concluded in favor of the subway, and reached my destination by one o’clock.” (Dewey 1910: 68-69; 1933: 91-92)

Ferryboat : “Projecting nearly horizontally from the upper deck of the ferryboat on which I daily cross the river is a long white pole, having a gilded ball at its tip. It suggested a flagpole when I first saw it; its color, shape, and gilded ball agreed with this idea, and these reasons seemed to justify me in this belief. But soon difficulties presented themselves. The pole was nearly horizontal, an unusual position for a flagpole; in the next place, there was no pulley, ring, or cord by which to attach a flag; finally, there were elsewhere on the boat two vertical staffs from which flags were occasionally flown. It seemed probable that the pole was not there for flag-flying.

“I then tried to imagine all possible purposes of the pole, and to consider for which of these it was best suited: (a) Possibly it was an ornament. But as all the ferryboats and even the tugboats carried poles, this hypothesis was rejected. (b) Possibly it was the terminal of a wireless telegraph. But the same considerations made this improbable. Besides, the more natural place for such a terminal would be the highest part of the boat, on top of the pilot house. (c) Its purpose might be to point out the direction in which the boat is moving.

“In support of this conclusion, I discovered that the pole was lower than the pilot house, so that the steersman could easily see it. Moreover, the tip was enough higher than the base, so that, from the pilot's position, it must appear to project far out in front of the boat. Morevoer, the pilot being near the front of the boat, he would need some such guide as to its direction. Tugboats would also need poles for such a purpose. This hypothesis was so much more probable than the others that I accepted it. I formed the conclusion that the pole was set up for the purpose of showing the pilot the direction in which the boat pointed, to enable him to steer correctly.” (Dewey 1910: 69-70; 1933: 92-93)

Bubbles : “In washing tumblers in hot soapsuds and placing them mouth downward on a plate, bubbles appeared on the outside of the mouth of the tumblers and then went inside. Why? The presence of bubbles suggests air, which I note must come from inside the tumbler. I see that the soapy water on the plate prevents escape of the air save as it may be caught in bubbles. But why should air leave the tumbler? There was no substance entering to force it out. It must have expanded. It expands by increase of heat, or by decrease of pressure, or both. Could the air have become heated after the tumbler was taken from the hot suds? Clearly not the air that was already entangled in the water. If heated air was the cause, cold air must have entered in transferring the tumblers from the suds to the plate. I test to see if this supposition is true by taking several more tumblers out. Some I shake so as to make sure of entrapping cold air in them. Some I take out holding mouth downward in order to prevent cold air from entering. Bubbles appear on the outside of every one of the former and on none of the latter. I must be right in my inference. Air from the outside must have been expanded by the heat of the tumbler, which explains the appearance of the bubbles on the outside. But why do they then go inside? Cold contracts. The tumbler cooled and also the air inside it. Tension was removed, and hence bubbles appeared inside. To be sure of this, I test by placing a cup of ice on the tumbler while the bubbles are still forming outside. They soon reverse” (Dewey 1910: 70–71; 1933: 93–94).

Dewey (1910, 1933) sprinkles his book with other examples of critical thinking. We will refer to the following.

Weather : A man on a walk notices that it has suddenly become cool, thinks that it is probably going to rain, looks up and sees a dark cloud obscuring the sun, and quickens his steps (1910: 6–10; 1933: 9–13).

Disorder : A man finds his rooms on his return to them in disorder with his belongings thrown about, thinks at first of burglary as an explanation, then thinks of mischievous children as being an alternative explanation, then looks to see whether valuables are missing, and discovers that they are (1910: 82–83; 1933: 166–168).

Typhoid : A physician diagnosing a patient whose conspicuous symptoms suggest typhoid avoids drawing a conclusion until more data are gathered by questioning the patient and by making tests (1910: 85–86; 1933: 170).

Blur : A moving blur catches our eye in the distance, we ask ourselves whether it is a cloud of whirling dust or a tree moving its branches or a man signaling to us, we think of other traits that should be found on each of those possibilities, and we look and see if those traits are found (1910: 102, 108; 1933: 121, 133).

Suction pump : In thinking about the suction pump, the scientist first notes that it will draw water only to a maximum height of 33 feet at sea level and to a lesser maximum height at higher elevations, selects for attention the differing atmospheric pressure at these elevations, sets up experiments in which the air is removed from a vessel containing water (when suction no longer works) and in which the weight of air at various levels is calculated, compares the results of reasoning about the height to which a given weight of air will allow a suction pump to raise water with the observed maximum height at different elevations, and finally assimilates the suction pump to such apparently different phenomena as the siphon and the rising of a balloon (1910: 150–153; 1933: 195–198).

Diamond : A passenger in a car driving in a diamond lane reserved for vehicles with at least one passenger notices that the diamond marks on the pavement are far apart in some places and close together in others. Why? The driver suggests that the reason may be that the diamond marks are not needed where there is a solid double line separating the diamond line from the adjoining lane, but are needed when there is a dotted single line permitting crossing into the diamond lane. Further observation confirms that the diamonds are close together when a dotted line separates the diamond lane from its neighbour, but otherwise far apart.

Rash : A woman suddenly develops a very itchy red rash on her throat and upper chest. She recently noticed a mark on the back of her right hand, but was not sure whether the mark was a rash or a scrape. She lies down in bed and thinks about what might be causing the rash and what to do about it. About two weeks before, she began taking blood pressure medication that contained a sulfa drug, and the pharmacist had warned her, in view of a previous allergic reaction to a medication containing a sulfa drug, to be on the alert for an allergic reaction; however, she had been taking the medication for two weeks with no such effect. The day before, she began using a new cream on her neck and upper chest; against the new cream as the cause was mark on the back of her hand, which had not been exposed to the cream. She began taking probiotics about a month before. She also recently started new eye drops, but she supposed that manufacturers of eye drops would be careful not to include allergy-causing components in the medication. The rash might be a heat rash, since she recently was sweating profusely from her upper body. Since she is about to go away on a short vacation, where she would not have access to her usual physician, she decides to keep taking the probiotics and using the new eye drops but to discontinue the blood pressure medication and to switch back to the old cream for her neck and upper chest. She forms a plan to consult her regular physician on her return about the blood pressure medication.

Candidate : Although Dewey included no examples of thinking directed at appraising the arguments of others, such thinking has come to be considered a kind of critical thinking. We find an example of such thinking in the performance task on the Collegiate Learning Assessment (CLA+), which its sponsoring organization describes as

a performance-based assessment that provides a measure of an institution’s contribution to the development of critical-thinking and written communication skills of its students. (Council for Aid to Education 2017)

A sample task posted on its website requires the test-taker to write a report for public distribution evaluating a fictional candidate’s policy proposals and their supporting arguments, using supplied background documents, with a recommendation on whether to endorse the candidate.

Immediate acceptance of an idea that suggests itself as a solution to a problem (e.g., a possible explanation of an event or phenomenon, an action that seems likely to produce a desired result) is “uncritical thinking, the minimum of reflection” (Dewey 1910: 13). On-going suspension of judgment in the light of doubt about a possible solution is not critical thinking (Dewey 1910: 108). Critique driven by a dogmatically held political or religious ideology is not critical thinking; thus Paulo Freire (1968 [1970]) is using the term (e.g., at 1970: 71, 81, 100, 146) in a more politically freighted sense that includes not only reflection but also revolutionary action against oppression. Derivation of a conclusion from given data using an algorithm is not critical thinking.

What is critical thinking? There are many definitions. Ennis (2016) lists 14 philosophically oriented scholarly definitions and three dictionary definitions. Following Rawls (1971), who distinguished his conception of justice from a utilitarian conception but regarded them as rival conceptions of the same concept, Ennis maintains that the 17 definitions are different conceptions of the same concept. Rawls articulated the shared concept of justice as

a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights and duties and for determining… the proper distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation. (Rawls 1971: 5)

Bailin et al. (1999b) claim that, if one considers what sorts of thinking an educator would take not to be critical thinking and what sorts to be critical thinking, one can conclude that educators typically understand critical thinking to have at least three features.

• It is done for the purpose of making up one’s mind about what to believe or do.
• The person engaging in the thinking is trying to fulfill standards of adequacy and accuracy appropriate to the thinking.
• The thinking fulfills the relevant standards to some threshold level.

One could sum up the core concept that involves these three features by saying that critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking. This core concept seems to apply to all the examples of critical thinking described in the previous section. As for the non-examples, their exclusion depends on construing careful thinking as excluding jumping immediately to conclusions, suspending judgment no matter how strong the evidence, reasoning from an unquestioned ideological or religious perspective, and routinely using an algorithm to answer a question.

If the core of critical thinking is careful goal-directed thinking, conceptions of it can vary according to its presumed scope, its presumed goal, one’s criteria and threshold for being careful, and the thinking component on which one focuses As to its scope, some conceptions (e.g., Dewey 1910, 1933) restrict it to constructive thinking on the basis of one’s own observations and experiments, others (e.g., Ennis 1962; Fisher & Scriven 1997; Johnson 1992) to appraisal of the products of such thinking. Ennis (1991) and Bailin et al. (1999b) take it to cover both construction and appraisal. As to its goal, some conceptions restrict it to forming a judgment (Dewey 1910, 1933; Lipman 1987; Facione 1990a). Others allow for actions as well as beliefs as the end point of a process of critical thinking (Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b). As to the criteria and threshold for being careful, definitions vary in the term used to indicate that critical thinking satisfies certain norms: “intellectually disciplined” (Scriven & Paul 1987), “reasonable” (Ennis 1991), “skillful” (Lipman 1987), “skilled” (Fisher & Scriven 1997), “careful” (Bailin & Battersby 2009). Some definitions specify these norms, referring variously to “consideration of any belief or supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it and the further conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey 1910, 1933); “the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning” (Glaser 1941); “conceptualizing, applying, analyzing, synthesizing, and/or evaluating information gathered from, or generated by, observation, experience, reflection, reasoning, or communication” (Scriven & Paul 1987); the requirement that “it is sensitive to context, relies on criteria, and is self-correcting” (Lipman 1987); “evidential, conceptual, methodological, criteriological, or contextual considerations” (Facione 1990a); and “plus-minus considerations of the product in terms of appropriate standards (or criteria)” (Johnson 1992). Stanovich and Stanovich (2010) propose to ground the concept of critical thinking in the concept of rationality, which they understand as combining epistemic rationality (fitting one’s beliefs to the world) and instrumental rationality (optimizing goal fulfillment); a critical thinker, in their view, is someone with “a propensity to override suboptimal responses from the autonomous mind” (2010: 227). These variant specifications of norms for critical thinking are not necessarily incompatible with one another, and in any case presuppose the core notion of thinking carefully. As to the thinking component singled out, some definitions focus on suspension of judgment during the thinking (Dewey 1910; McPeck 1981), others on inquiry while judgment is suspended (Bailin & Battersby 2009), others on the resulting judgment (Facione 1990a), and still others on the subsequent emotive response (Siegel 1988).

In educational contexts, a definition of critical thinking is a “programmatic definition” (Scheffler 1960: 19). It expresses a practical program for achieving an educational goal. For this purpose, a one-sentence formulaic definition is much less useful than articulation of a critical thinking process, with criteria and standards for the kinds of thinking that the process may involve. The real educational goal is recognition, adoption and implementation by students of those criteria and standards. That adoption and implementation in turn consists in acquiring the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker.

Conceptions of critical thinking generally do not include moral integrity as part of the concept. Dewey, for example, took critical thinking to be the ultimate intellectual goal of education, but distinguished it from the development of social cooperation among school children, which he took to be the central moral goal. Ennis (1996, 2011) added to his previous list of critical thinking dispositions a group of dispositions to care about the dignity and worth of every person, which he described as a “correlative” (1996) disposition without which critical thinking would be less valuable and perhaps harmful. An educational program that aimed at developing critical thinking but not the correlative disposition to care about the dignity and worth of every person, he asserted, “would be deficient and perhaps dangerous” (Ennis 1996: 172).

Dewey thought that education for reflective thinking would be of value to both the individual and society; recognition in educational practice of the kinship to the scientific attitude of children’s native curiosity, fertile imagination and love of experimental inquiry “would make for individual happiness and the reduction of social waste” (Dewey 1910: iii). Schools participating in the Eight-Year Study took development of the habit of reflective thinking and skill in solving problems as a means to leading young people to understand, appreciate and live the democratic way of life characteristic of the United States (Aikin 1942: 17–18, 81). Harvey Siegel (1988: 55–61) has offered four considerations in support of adopting critical thinking as an educational ideal. (1) Respect for persons requires that schools and teachers honour students’ demands for reasons and explanations, deal with students honestly, and recognize the need to confront students’ independent judgment; these requirements concern the manner in which teachers treat students. (2) Education has the task of preparing children to be successful adults, a task that requires development of their self-sufficiency. (3) Education should initiate children into the rational traditions in such fields as history, science and mathematics. (4) Education should prepare children to become democratic citizens, which requires reasoned procedures and critical talents and attitudes. To supplement these considerations, Siegel (1988: 62–90) responds to two objections: the ideology objection that adoption of any educational ideal requires a prior ideological commitment and the indoctrination objection that cultivation of critical thinking cannot escape being a form of indoctrination.

Despite the diversity of our 11 examples, one can recognize a common pattern. Dewey analyzed it as consisting of five phases:

• suggestions , in which the mind leaps forward to a possible solution;
• an intellectualization of the difficulty or perplexity into a problem to be solved, a question for which the answer must be sought;
• the use of one suggestion after another as a leading idea, or hypothesis , to initiate and guide observation and other operations in collection of factual material;
• the mental elaboration of the idea or supposition as an idea or supposition ( reasoning , in the sense on which reasoning is a part, not the whole, of inference); and
• testing the hypothesis by overt or imaginative action. (Dewey 1933: 106–107; italics in original)

The process of reflective thinking consisting of these phases would be preceded by a perplexed, troubled or confused situation and followed by a cleared-up, unified, resolved situation (Dewey 1933: 106). The term ‘phases’ replaced the term ‘steps’ (Dewey 1910: 72), thus removing the earlier suggestion of an invariant sequence. Variants of the above analysis appeared in (Dewey 1916: 177) and (Dewey 1938: 101–119).

The variant formulations indicate the difficulty of giving a single logical analysis of such a varied process. The process of critical thinking may have a spiral pattern, with the problem being redefined in the light of obstacles to solving it as originally formulated. For example, the person in Transit might have concluded that getting to the appointment at the scheduled time was impossible and have reformulated the problem as that of rescheduling the appointment for a mutually convenient time. Further, defining a problem does not always follow after or lead immediately to an idea of a suggested solution. Nor should it do so, as Dewey himself recognized in describing the physician in Typhoid as avoiding any strong preference for this or that conclusion before getting further information (Dewey 1910: 85; 1933: 170). People with a hypothesis in mind, even one to which they have a very weak commitment, have a so-called “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998): they are likely to pay attention to evidence that confirms the hypothesis and to ignore evidence that counts against it or for some competing hypothesis. Detectives, intelligence agencies, and investigators of airplane accidents are well advised to gather relevant evidence systematically and to postpone even tentative adoption of an explanatory hypothesis until the collected evidence rules out with the appropriate degree of certainty all but one explanation. Dewey’s analysis of the critical thinking process can be faulted as well for requiring acceptance or rejection of a possible solution to a defined problem, with no allowance for deciding in the light of the available evidence to suspend judgment. Further, given the great variety of kinds of problems for which reflection is appropriate, there is likely to be variation in its component events. Perhaps the best way to conceptualize the critical thinking process is as a checklist whose component events can occur in a variety of orders, selectively, and more than once. These component events might include (1) noticing a difficulty, (2) defining the problem, (3) dividing the problem into manageable sub-problems, (4) formulating a variety of possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (5) determining what evidence is relevant to deciding among possible solutions to the problem or sub-problem, (6) devising a plan of systematic observation or experiment that will uncover the relevant evidence, (7) carrying out the plan of systematic observation or experimentation, (8) noting the results of the systematic observation or experiment, (9) gathering relevant testimony and information from others, (10) judging the credibility of testimony and information gathered from others, (11) drawing conclusions from gathered evidence and accepted testimony, and (12) accepting a solution that the evidence adequately supports (cf. Hitchcock 2017: 485).

Checklist conceptions of the process of critical thinking are open to the objection that they are too mechanical and procedural to fit the multi-dimensional and emotionally charged issues for which critical thinking is urgently needed (Paul 1984). For such issues, a more dialectical process is advocated, in which competing relevant world views are identified, their implications explored, and some sort of creative synthesis attempted.

If one considers the critical thinking process illustrated by the 11 examples, one can identify distinct kinds of mental acts and mental states that form part of it. To distinguish, label and briefly characterize these components is a useful preliminary to identifying abilities, skills, dispositions, attitudes, habits and the like that contribute causally to thinking critically. Identifying such abilities and habits is in turn a useful preliminary to setting educational goals. Setting the goals is in its turn a useful preliminary to designing strategies for helping learners to achieve the goals and to designing ways of measuring the extent to which learners have done so. Such measures provide both feedback to learners on their achievement and a basis for experimental research on the effectiveness of various strategies for educating people to think critically. Let us begin, then, by distinguishing the kinds of mental acts and mental events that can occur in a critical thinking process.

• Observing : One notices something in one’s immediate environment (sudden cooling of temperature in Weather , bubbles forming outside a glass and then going inside in Bubbles , a moving blur in the distance in Blur , a rash in Rash ). Or one notes the results of an experiment or systematic observation (valuables missing in Disorder , no suction without air pressure in Suction pump )
• Feeling : One feels puzzled or uncertain about something (how to get to an appointment on time in Transit , why the diamonds vary in frequency in Diamond ). One wants to resolve this perplexity. One feels satisfaction once one has worked out an answer (to take the subway express in Transit , diamonds closer when needed as a warning in Diamond ).
• Wondering : One formulates a question to be addressed (why bubbles form outside a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , how suction pumps work in Suction pump , what caused the rash in Rash ).
• Imagining : One thinks of possible answers (bus or subway or elevated in Transit , flagpole or ornament or wireless communication aid or direction indicator in Ferryboat , allergic reaction or heat rash in Rash ).
• Inferring : One works out what would be the case if a possible answer were assumed (valuables missing if there has been a burglary in Disorder , earlier start to the rash if it is an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug in Rash ). Or one draws a conclusion once sufficient relevant evidence is gathered (take the subway in Transit , burglary in Disorder , discontinue blood pressure medication and new cream in Rash ).
• Knowledge : One uses stored knowledge of the subject-matter to generate possible answers or to infer what would be expected on the assumption of a particular answer (knowledge of a city’s public transit system in Transit , of the requirements for a flagpole in Ferryboat , of Boyle’s law in Bubbles , of allergic reactions in Rash ).
• Experimenting : One designs and carries out an experiment or a systematic observation to find out whether the results deduced from a possible answer will occur (looking at the location of the flagpole in relation to the pilot’s position in Ferryboat , putting an ice cube on top of a tumbler taken from hot water in Bubbles , measuring the height to which a suction pump will draw water at different elevations in Suction pump , noticing the frequency of diamonds when movement to or from a diamond lane is allowed in Diamond ).
• Consulting : One finds a source of information, gets the information from the source, and makes a judgment on whether to accept it. None of our 11 examples include searching for sources of information. In this respect they are unrepresentative, since most people nowadays have almost instant access to information relevant to answering any question, including many of those illustrated by the examples. However, Candidate includes the activities of extracting information from sources and evaluating its credibility.
• Identifying and analyzing arguments : One notices an argument and works out its structure and content as a preliminary to evaluating its strength. This activity is central to Candidate . It is an important part of a critical thinking process in which one surveys arguments for various positions on an issue.
• Judging : One makes a judgment on the basis of accumulated evidence and reasoning, such as the judgment in Ferryboat that the purpose of the pole is to provide direction to the pilot.
• Deciding : One makes a decision on what to do or on what policy to adopt, as in the decision in Transit to take the subway.

By definition, a person who does something voluntarily is both willing and able to do that thing at that time. Both the willingness and the ability contribute causally to the person’s action, in the sense that the voluntary action would not occur if either (or both) of these were lacking. For example, suppose that one is standing with one’s arms at one’s sides and one voluntarily lifts one’s right arm to an extended horizontal position. One would not do so if one were unable to lift one’s arm, if for example one’s right side was paralyzed as the result of a stroke. Nor would one do so if one were unwilling to lift one’s arm, if for example one were participating in a street demonstration at which a white supremacist was urging the crowd to lift their right arm in a Nazi salute and one were unwilling to express support in this way for the racist Nazi ideology. The same analysis applies to a voluntary mental process of thinking critically. It requires both willingness and ability to think critically, including willingness and ability to perform each of the mental acts that compose the process and to coordinate those acts in a sequence that is directed at resolving the initiating perplexity.

Consider willingness first. We can identify causal contributors to willingness to think critically by considering factors that would cause a person who was able to think critically about an issue nevertheless not to do so (Hamby 2014). For each factor, the opposite condition thus contributes causally to willingness to think critically on a particular occasion. For example, people who habitually jump to conclusions without considering alternatives will not think critically about issues that arise, even if they have the required abilities. The contrary condition of willingness to suspend judgment is thus a causal contributor to thinking critically.

Now consider ability. In contrast to the ability to move one’s arm, which can be completely absent because a stroke has left the arm paralyzed, the ability to think critically is a developed ability, whose absence is not a complete absence of ability to think but absence of ability to think well. We can identify the ability to think well directly, in terms of the norms and standards for good thinking. In general, to be able do well the thinking activities that can be components of a critical thinking process, one needs to know the concepts and principles that characterize their good performance, to recognize in particular cases that the concepts and principles apply, and to apply them. The knowledge, recognition and application may be procedural rather than declarative. It may be domain-specific rather than widely applicable, and in either case may need subject-matter knowledge, sometimes of a deep kind.

Reflections of the sort illustrated by the previous two paragraphs have led scholars to identify the knowledge, abilities and dispositions of a “critical thinker”, i.e., someone who thinks critically whenever it is appropriate to do so. We turn now to these three types of causal contributors to thinking critically. We start with dispositions, since arguably these are the most powerful contributors to being a critical thinker, can be fostered at an early stage of a child’s development, and are susceptible to general improvement (Glaser 1941: 175)

8. Critical Thinking Dispositions

Educational researchers use the term ‘dispositions’ broadly for the habits of mind and attitudes that contribute causally to being a critical thinker. Some writers (e.g., Paul & Elder 2006; Hamby 2014; Bailin & Battersby 2016) propose to use the term ‘virtues’ for this dimension of a critical thinker. The virtues in question, although they are virtues of character, concern the person’s ways of thinking rather than the person’s ways of behaving towards others. They are not moral virtues but intellectual virtues, of the sort articulated by Zagzebski (1996) and discussed by Turri, Alfano, and Greco (2017).

On a realistic conception, thinking dispositions or intellectual virtues are real properties of thinkers. They are general tendencies, propensities, or inclinations to think in particular ways in particular circumstances, and can be genuinely explanatory (Siegel 1999). Sceptics argue that there is no evidence for a specific mental basis for the habits of mind that contribute to thinking critically, and that it is pedagogically misleading to posit such a basis (Bailin et al. 1999a). Whatever their status, critical thinking dispositions need motivation for their initial formation in a child—motivation that may be external or internal. As children develop, the force of habit will gradually become important in sustaining the disposition (Nieto & Valenzuela 2012). Mere force of habit, however, is unlikely to sustain critical thinking dispositions. Critical thinkers must value and enjoy using their knowledge and abilities to think things through for themselves. They must be committed to, and lovers of, inquiry.

A person may have a critical thinking disposition with respect to only some kinds of issues. For example, one could be open-minded about scientific issues but not about religious issues. Similarly, one could be confident in one’s ability to reason about the theological implications of the existence of evil in the world but not in one’s ability to reason about the best design for a guided ballistic missile.

Critical thinking dispositions can usefully be divided into initiating dispositions (those that contribute causally to starting to think critically about an issue) and internal dispositions (those that contribute causally to doing a good job of thinking critically once one has started) (Facione 1990a: 25). The two categories are not mutually exclusive. For example, open-mindedness, in the sense of willingness to consider alternative points of view to one’s own, is both an initiating and an internal disposition.

Using the strategy of considering factors that would block people with the ability to think critically from doing so, we can identify as initiating dispositions for thinking critically attentiveness, a habit of inquiry, self-confidence, courage, open-mindedness, willingness to suspend judgment, trust in reason, wanting evidence for one’s beliefs, and seeking the truth. We consider briefly what each of these dispositions amounts to, in each case citing sources that acknowledge them.

• Attentiveness : One will not think critically if one fails to recognize an issue that needs to be thought through. For example, the pedestrian in Weather would not have looked up if he had not noticed that the air was suddenly cooler. To be a critical thinker, then, one needs to be habitually attentive to one’s surroundings, noticing not only what one senses but also sources of perplexity in messages received and in one’s own beliefs and attitudes (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Habit of inquiry : Inquiry is effortful, and one needs an internal push to engage in it. For example, the student in Bubbles could easily have stopped at idle wondering about the cause of the bubbles rather than reasoning to a hypothesis, then designing and executing an experiment to test it. Thus willingness to think critically needs mental energy and initiative. What can supply that energy? Love of inquiry, or perhaps just a habit of inquiry. Hamby (2015) has argued that willingness to inquire is the central critical thinking virtue, one that encompasses all the others. It is recognized as a critical thinking disposition by Dewey (1910: 29; 1933: 35), Glaser (1941: 5), Ennis (1987: 12; 1991: 8), Facione (1990a: 25), Bailin et al. (1999b: 294), Halpern (1998: 452), and Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo (2001).
• Self-confidence : Lack of confidence in one’s abilities can block critical thinking. For example, if the woman in Rash lacked confidence in her ability to figure things out for herself, she might just have assumed that the rash on her chest was the allergic reaction to her medication against which the pharmacist had warned her. Thus willingness to think critically requires confidence in one’s ability to inquire (Facione 1990a: 25; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001).
• Courage : Fear of thinking for oneself can stop one from doing it. Thus willingness to think critically requires intellectual courage (Paul & Elder 2006: 16).
• Open-mindedness : A dogmatic attitude will impede thinking critically. For example, a person who adheres rigidly to a “pro-choice” position on the issue of the legal status of induced abortion is likely to be unwilling to consider seriously the issue of when in its development an unborn child acquires a moral right to life. Thus willingness to think critically requires open-mindedness, in the sense of a willingness to examine questions to which one already accepts an answer but which further evidence or reasoning might cause one to answer differently (Dewey 1933; Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Bailin et al. 1999b; Halpern 1998, Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). Paul (1981) emphasizes open-mindedness about alternative world-views, and recommends a dialectical approach to integrating such views as central to what he calls “strong sense” critical thinking.
• Willingness to suspend judgment : Premature closure on an initial solution will block critical thinking. Thus willingness to think critically requires a willingness to suspend judgment while alternatives are explored (Facione 1990a; Ennis 1991; Halpern 1998).
• Trust in reason : Since distrust in the processes of reasoned inquiry will dissuade one from engaging in it, trust in them is an initiating critical thinking disposition (Facione 1990a, 25; Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001; Paul & Elder 2006). In reaction to an allegedly exclusive emphasis on reason in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, Thayer-Bacon (2000) argues that intuition, imagination, and emotion have important roles to play in an adequate conception of critical thinking that she calls “constructive thinking”. From her point of view, critical thinking requires trust not only in reason but also in intuition, imagination, and emotion.
• Seeking the truth : If one does not care about the truth but is content to stick with one’s initial bias on an issue, then one will not think critically about it. Seeking the truth is thus an initiating critical thinking disposition (Bailin et al. 1999b: 294; Facione, Facione, & Giancarlo 2001). A disposition to seek the truth is implicit in more specific critical thinking dispositions, such as trying to be well-informed, considering seriously points of view other than one’s own, looking for alternatives, suspending judgment when the evidence is insufficient, and adopting a position when the evidence supporting it is sufficient.

Some of the initiating dispositions, such as open-mindedness and willingness to suspend judgment, are also internal critical thinking dispositions, in the sense of mental habits or attitudes that contribute causally to doing a good job of critical thinking once one starts the process. But there are many other internal critical thinking dispositions. Some of them are parasitic on one’s conception of good thinking. For example, it is constitutive of good thinking about an issue to formulate the issue clearly and to maintain focus on it. For this purpose, one needs not only the corresponding ability but also the corresponding disposition. Ennis (1991: 8) describes it as the disposition “to determine and maintain focus on the conclusion or question”, Facione (1990a: 25) as “clarity in stating the question or concern”. Other internal dispositions are motivators to continue or adjust the critical thinking process, such as willingness to persist in a complex task and willingness to abandon nonproductive strategies in an attempt to self-correct (Halpern 1998: 452). For a list of identified internal critical thinking dispositions, see the Supplement on Internal Critical Thinking Dispositions .

Some theorists postulate skills, i.e., acquired abilities, as operative in critical thinking. It is not obvious, however, that a good mental act is the exercise of a generic acquired skill. Inferring an expected time of arrival, as in Transit , has some generic components but also uses non-generic subject-matter knowledge. Bailin et al. (1999a) argue against viewing critical thinking skills as generic and discrete, on the ground that skilled performance at a critical thinking task cannot be separated from knowledge of concepts and from domain-specific principles of good thinking. Talk of skills, they concede, is unproblematic if it means merely that a person with critical thinking skills is capable of intelligent performance.

Despite such scepticism, theorists of critical thinking have listed as general contributors to critical thinking what they variously call abilities (Glaser 1941; Ennis 1962, 1991), skills (Facione 1990a; Halpern 1998) or competencies (Fisher & Scriven 1997). Amalgamating these lists would produce a confusing and chaotic cornucopia of more than 50 possible educational objectives, with only partial overlap among them. It makes sense instead to try to understand the reasons for the multiplicity and diversity, and to make a selection according to one’s own reasons for singling out abilities to be developed in a critical thinking curriculum. Two reasons for diversity among lists of critical thinking abilities are the underlying conception of critical thinking and the envisaged educational level. Appraisal-only conceptions, for example, involve a different suite of abilities than constructive-only conceptions. Some lists, such as those in (Glaser 1941), are put forward as educational objectives for secondary school students, whereas others are proposed as objectives for college students (e.g., Facione 1990a).

The abilities described in the remaining paragraphs of this section emerge from reflection on the general abilities needed to do well the thinking activities identified in section 6 as components of the critical thinking process described in section 5 . The derivation of each collection of abilities is accompanied by citation of sources that list such abilities and of standardized tests that claim to test them.

Observational abilities : Careful and accurate observation sometimes requires specialist expertise and practice, as in the case of observing birds and observing accident scenes. However, there are general abilities of noticing what one’s senses are picking up from one’s environment and of being able to articulate clearly and accurately to oneself and others what one has observed. It helps in exercising them to be able to recognize and take into account factors that make one’s observation less trustworthy, such as prior framing of the situation, inadequate time, deficient senses, poor observation conditions, and the like. It helps as well to be skilled at taking steps to make one’s observation more trustworthy, such as moving closer to get a better look, measuring something three times and taking the average, and checking what one thinks one is observing with someone else who is in a good position to observe it. It also helps to be skilled at recognizing respects in which one’s report of one’s observation involves inference rather than direct observation, so that one can then consider whether the inference is justified. These abilities come into play as well when one thinks about whether and with what degree of confidence to accept an observation report, for example in the study of history or in a criminal investigation or in assessing news reports. Observational abilities show up in some lists of critical thinking abilities (Ennis 1962: 90; Facione 1990a: 16; Ennis 1991: 9). There are items testing a person’s ability to judge the credibility of observation reports in the Cornell Critical Thinking Tests, Levels X and Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). Norris and King (1983, 1985, 1990a, 1990b) is a test of ability to appraise observation reports.

Emotional abilities : The emotions that drive a critical thinking process are perplexity or puzzlement, a wish to resolve it, and satisfaction at achieving the desired resolution. Children experience these emotions at an early age, without being trained to do so. Education that takes critical thinking as a goal needs only to channel these emotions and to make sure not to stifle them. Collaborative critical thinking benefits from ability to recognize one’s own and others’ emotional commitments and reactions.

Questioning abilities : A critical thinking process needs transformation of an inchoate sense of perplexity into a clear question. Formulating a question well requires not building in questionable assumptions, not prejudging the issue, and using language that in context is unambiguous and precise enough (Ennis 1962: 97; 1991: 9).

Imaginative abilities : Thinking directed at finding the correct causal explanation of a general phenomenon or particular event requires an ability to imagine possible explanations. Thinking about what policy or plan of action to adopt requires generation of options and consideration of possible consequences of each option. Domain knowledge is required for such creative activity, but a general ability to imagine alternatives is helpful and can be nurtured so as to become easier, quicker, more extensive, and deeper (Dewey 1910: 34–39; 1933: 40–47). Facione (1990a) and Halpern (1998) include the ability to imagine alternatives as a critical thinking ability.

Inferential abilities : The ability to draw conclusions from given information, and to recognize with what degree of certainty one’s own or others’ conclusions follow, is universally recognized as a general critical thinking ability. All 11 examples in section 2 of this article include inferences, some from hypotheses or options (as in Transit , Ferryboat and Disorder ), others from something observed (as in Weather and Rash ). None of these inferences is formally valid. Rather, they are licensed by general, sometimes qualified substantive rules of inference (Toulmin 1958) that rest on domain knowledge—that a bus trip takes about the same time in each direction, that the terminal of a wireless telegraph would be located on the highest possible place, that sudden cooling is often followed by rain, that an allergic reaction to a sulfa drug generally shows up soon after one starts taking it. It is a matter of controversy to what extent the specialized ability to deduce conclusions from premisses using formal rules of inference is needed for critical thinking. Dewey (1933) locates logical forms in setting out the products of reflection rather than in the process of reflection. Ennis (1981a), on the other hand, maintains that a liberally-educated person should have the following abilities: to translate natural-language statements into statements using the standard logical operators, to use appropriately the language of necessary and sufficient conditions, to deal with argument forms and arguments containing symbols, to determine whether in virtue of an argument’s form its conclusion follows necessarily from its premisses, to reason with logically complex propositions, and to apply the rules and procedures of deductive logic. Inferential abilities are recognized as critical thinking abilities by Glaser (1941: 6), Facione (1990a: 9), Ennis (1991: 9), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 99, 111), and Halpern (1998: 452). Items testing inferential abilities constitute two of the five subtests of the Watson Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal (Watson & Glaser 1980a, 1980b, 1994), two of the four sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), three of the seven sections in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005), 11 of the 34 items on Forms A and B of the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992), and a high but variable proportion of the 25 selected-response questions in the Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Experimenting abilities : Knowing how to design and execute an experiment is important not just in scientific research but also in everyday life, as in Rash . Dewey devoted a whole chapter of his How We Think (1910: 145–156; 1933: 190–202) to the superiority of experimentation over observation in advancing knowledge. Experimenting abilities come into play at one remove in appraising reports of scientific studies. Skill in designing and executing experiments includes the acknowledged abilities to appraise evidence (Glaser 1941: 6), to carry out experiments and to apply appropriate statistical inference techniques (Facione 1990a: 9), to judge inductions to an explanatory hypothesis (Ennis 1991: 9), and to recognize the need for an adequately large sample size (Halpern 1998). The Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) includes four items (out of 52) on experimental design. The Collegiate Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) makes room for appraisal of study design in both its performance task and its selected-response questions.

Consulting abilities : Skill at consulting sources of information comes into play when one seeks information to help resolve a problem, as in Candidate . Ability to find and appraise information includes ability to gather and marshal pertinent information (Glaser 1941: 6), to judge whether a statement made by an alleged authority is acceptable (Ennis 1962: 84), to plan a search for desired information (Facione 1990a: 9), and to judge the credibility of a source (Ennis 1991: 9). Ability to judge the credibility of statements is tested by 24 items (out of 76) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level X (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005) and by four items (out of 52) in the Cornell Critical Thinking Test Level Z (Ennis & Millman 1971; Ennis, Millman, & Tomko 1985, 2005). The College Learning Assessment’s performance task requires evaluation of whether information in documents is credible or unreliable (Council for Aid to Education 2017).

Argument analysis abilities : The ability to identify and analyze arguments contributes to the process of surveying arguments on an issue in order to form one’s own reasoned judgment, as in Candidate . The ability to detect and analyze arguments is recognized as a critical thinking skill by Facione (1990a: 7–8), Ennis (1991: 9) and Halpern (1998). Five items (out of 34) on the California Critical Thinking Skills Test (Facione 1990b, 1992) test skill at argument analysis. The College Learning Assessment (Council for Aid to Education 2017) incorporates argument analysis in its selected-response tests of critical reading and evaluation and of critiquing an argument.

Judging skills and deciding skills : Skill at judging and deciding is skill at recognizing what judgment or decision the available evidence and argument supports, and with what degree of confidence. It is thus a component of the inferential skills already discussed.

Lists and tests of critical thinking abilities often include two more abilities: identifying assumptions and constructing and evaluating definitions.

In addition to dispositions and abilities, critical thinking needs knowledge: of critical thinking concepts, of critical thinking principles, and of the subject-matter of the thinking.

We can derive a short list of concepts whose understanding contributes to critical thinking from the critical thinking abilities described in the preceding section. Observational abilities require an understanding of the difference between observation and inference. Questioning abilities require an understanding of the concepts of ambiguity and vagueness. Inferential abilities require an understanding of the difference between conclusive and defeasible inference (traditionally, between deduction and induction), as well as of the difference between necessary and sufficient conditions. Experimenting abilities require an understanding of the concepts of hypothesis, null hypothesis, assumption and prediction, as well as of the concept of statistical significance and of its difference from importance. They also require an understanding of the difference between an experiment and an observational study, and in particular of the difference between a randomized controlled trial, a prospective correlational study and a retrospective (case-control) study. Argument analysis abilities require an understanding of the concepts of argument, premiss, assumption, conclusion and counter-consideration. Additional critical thinking concepts are proposed by Bailin et al. (1999b: 293), Fisher & Scriven (1997: 105–106), and Black (2012).

According to Glaser (1941: 25), ability to think critically requires knowledge of the methods of logical inquiry and reasoning. If we review the list of abilities in the preceding section, however, we can see that some of them can be acquired and exercised merely through practice, possibly guided in an educational setting, followed by feedback. Searching intelligently for a causal explanation of some phenomenon or event requires that one consider a full range of possible causal contributors, but it seems more important that one implements this principle in one’s practice than that one is able to articulate it. What is important is “operational knowledge” of the standards and principles of good thinking (Bailin et al. 1999b: 291–293). But the development of such critical thinking abilities as designing an experiment or constructing an operational definition can benefit from learning their underlying theory. Further, explicit knowledge of quirks of human thinking seems useful as a cautionary guide. Human memory is not just fallible about details, as people learn from their own experiences of misremembering, but is so malleable that a detailed, clear and vivid recollection of an event can be a total fabrication (Loftus 2017). People seek or interpret evidence in ways that are partial to their existing beliefs and expectations, often unconscious of their “confirmation bias” (Nickerson 1998). Not only are people subject to this and other cognitive biases (Kahneman 2011), of which they are typically unaware, but it may be counter-productive for one to make oneself aware of them and try consciously to counteract them or to counteract social biases such as racial or sexual stereotypes (Kenyon & Beaulac 2014). It is helpful to be aware of these facts and of the superior effectiveness of blocking the operation of biases—for example, by making an immediate record of one’s observations, refraining from forming a preliminary explanatory hypothesis, blind refereeing, double-blind randomized trials, and blind grading of students’ work.

Critical thinking about an issue requires substantive knowledge of the domain to which the issue belongs. Critical thinking abilities are not a magic elixir that can be applied to any issue whatever by somebody who has no knowledge of the facts relevant to exploring that issue. For example, the student in Bubbles needed to know that gases do not penetrate solid objects like a glass, that air expands when heated, that the volume of an enclosed gas varies directly with its temperature and inversely with its pressure, and that hot objects will spontaneously cool down to the ambient temperature of their surroundings unless kept hot by insulation or a source of heat. Critical thinkers thus need a rich fund of subject-matter knowledge relevant to the variety of situations they encounter. This fact is recognized in the inclusion among critical thinking dispositions of a concern to become and remain generally well informed.

Experimental educational interventions, with control groups, have shown that education can improve critical thinking skills and dispositions, as measured by standardized tests. For information about these tests, see the Supplement on Assessment .

What educational methods are most effective at developing the dispositions, abilities and knowledge of a critical thinker? Abrami et al. (2015) found that in the experimental and quasi-experimental studies that they analyzed dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring each increased the effectiveness of the educational intervention, and that they were most effective when combined. They also found that in these studies a combination of separate instruction in critical thinking with subject-matter instruction in which students are encouraged to think critically was more effective than either by itself. However, the difference was not statistically significant; that is, it might have arisen by chance.

Most of these studies lack the longitudinal follow-up required to determine whether the observed differential improvements in critical thinking abilities or dispositions continue over time, for example until high school or college graduation. For details on studies of methods of developing critical thinking skills and dispositions, see the Supplement on Educational Methods .

12. Controversies

Scholars have denied the generalizability of critical thinking abilities across subject domains, have alleged bias in critical thinking theory and pedagogy, and have investigated the relationship of critical thinking to other kinds of thinking.

McPeck (1981) attacked the thinking skills movement of the 1970s, including the critical thinking movement. He argued that there are no general thinking skills, since thinking is always thinking about some subject-matter. It is futile, he claimed, for schools and colleges to teach thinking as if it were a separate subject. Rather, teachers should lead their pupils to become autonomous thinkers by teaching school subjects in a way that brings out their cognitive structure and that encourages and rewards discussion and argument. As some of his critics (e.g., Paul 1985; Siegel 1985) pointed out, McPeck’s central argument needs elaboration, since it has obvious counter-examples in writing and speaking, for which (up to a certain level of complexity) there are teachable general abilities even though they are always about some subject-matter. To make his argument convincing, McPeck needs to explain how thinking differs from writing and speaking in a way that does not permit useful abstraction of its components from the subject-matters with which it deals. He has not done so. Nevertheless, his position that the dispositions and abilities of a critical thinker are best developed in the context of subject-matter instruction is shared by many theorists of critical thinking, including Dewey (1910, 1933), Glaser (1941), Passmore (1980), Weinstein (1990), and Bailin et al. (1999b).

McPeck’s challenge prompted reflection on the extent to which critical thinking is subject-specific. McPeck argued for a strong subject-specificity thesis, according to which it is a conceptual truth that all critical thinking abilities are specific to a subject. (He did not however extend his subject-specificity thesis to critical thinking dispositions. In particular, he took the disposition to suspend judgment in situations of cognitive dissonance to be a general disposition.) Conceptual subject-specificity is subject to obvious counter-examples, such as the general ability to recognize confusion of necessary and sufficient conditions. A more modest thesis, also endorsed by McPeck, is epistemological subject-specificity, according to which the norms of good thinking vary from one field to another. Epistemological subject-specificity clearly holds to a certain extent; for example, the principles in accordance with which one solves a differential equation are quite different from the principles in accordance with which one determines whether a painting is a genuine Picasso. But the thesis suffers, as Ennis (1989) points out, from vagueness of the concept of a field or subject and from the obvious existence of inter-field principles, however broadly the concept of a field is construed. For example, the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning hold for all the varied fields in which such reasoning occurs. A third kind of subject-specificity is empirical subject-specificity, according to which as a matter of empirically observable fact a person with the abilities and dispositions of a critical thinker in one area of investigation will not necessarily have them in another area of investigation.

The thesis of empirical subject-specificity raises the general problem of transfer. If critical thinking abilities and dispositions have to be developed independently in each school subject, how are they of any use in dealing with the problems of everyday life and the political and social issues of contemporary society, most of which do not fit into the framework of a traditional school subject? Proponents of empirical subject-specificity tend to argue that transfer is more likely to occur if there is critical thinking instruction in a variety of domains, with explicit attention to dispositions and abilities that cut across domains. But evidence for this claim is scanty. There is a need for well-designed empirical studies that investigate the conditions that make transfer more likely.

It is common ground in debates about the generality or subject-specificity of critical thinking dispositions and abilities that critical thinking about any topic requires background knowledge about the topic. For example, the most sophisticated understanding of the principles of hypothetico-deductive reasoning is of no help unless accompanied by some knowledge of what might be plausible explanations of some phenomenon under investigation.

Critics have objected to bias in the theory, pedagogy and practice of critical thinking. Commentators (e.g., Alston 1995; Ennis 1998) have noted that anyone who takes a position has a bias in the neutral sense of being inclined in one direction rather than others. The critics, however, are objecting to bias in the pejorative sense of an unjustified favoring of certain ways of knowing over others, frequently alleging that the unjustly favoured ways are those of a dominant sex or culture (Bailin 1995). These ways favour:

• reinforcement of egocentric and sociocentric biases over dialectical engagement with opposing world-views (Paul 1981, 1984; Warren 1998)
• distancing from the object of inquiry over closeness to it (Martin 1992; Thayer-Bacon 1992)
• indifference to the situation of others over care for them (Martin 1992)
• orientation to thought over orientation to action (Martin 1992)
• being reasonable over caring to understand people’s ideas (Thayer-Bacon 1993)
• being neutral and objective over being embodied and situated (Thayer-Bacon 1995a)
• doubting over believing (Thayer-Bacon 1995b)
• reason over emotion, imagination and intuition (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• solitary thinking over collaborative thinking (Thayer-Bacon 2000)
• written and spoken assignments over other forms of expression (Alston 2001)
• attention to written and spoken communications over attention to human problems (Alston 2001)
• winning debates in the public sphere over making and understanding meaning (Alston 2001)

A common thread in this smorgasbord of accusations is dissatisfaction with focusing on the logical analysis and evaluation of reasoning and arguments. While these authors acknowledge that such analysis and evaluation is part of critical thinking and should be part of its conceptualization and pedagogy, they insist that it is only a part. Paul (1981), for example, bemoans the tendency of atomistic teaching of methods of analyzing and evaluating arguments to turn students into more able sophists, adept at finding fault with positions and arguments with which they disagree but even more entrenched in the egocentric and sociocentric biases with which they began. Martin (1992) and Thayer-Bacon (1992) cite with approval the self-reported intimacy with their subject-matter of leading researchers in biology and medicine, an intimacy that conflicts with the distancing allegedly recommended in standard conceptions and pedagogy of critical thinking. Thayer-Bacon (2000) contrasts the embodied and socially embedded learning of her elementary school students in a Montessori school, who used their imagination, intuition and emotions as well as their reason, with conceptions of critical thinking as

thinking that is used to critique arguments, offer justifications, and make judgments about what are the good reasons, or the right answers. (Thayer-Bacon 2000: 127–128)

Alston (2001) reports that her students in a women’s studies class were able to see the flaws in the Cinderella myth that pervades much romantic fiction but in their own romantic relationships still acted as if all failures were the woman’s fault and still accepted the notions of love at first sight and living happily ever after. Students, she writes, should

be able to connect their intellectual critique to a more affective, somatic, and ethical account of making risky choices that have sexist, racist, classist, familial, sexual, or other consequences for themselves and those both near and far… critical thinking that reads arguments, texts, or practices merely on the surface without connections to feeling/desiring/doing or action lacks an ethical depth that should infuse the difference between mere cognitive activity and something we want to call critical thinking. (Alston 2001: 34)

Some critics portray such biases as unfair to women. Thayer-Bacon (1992), for example, has charged modern critical thinking theory with being sexist, on the ground that it separates the self from the object and causes one to lose touch with one’s inner voice, and thus stigmatizes women, who (she asserts) link self to object and listen to their inner voice. Her charge does not imply that women as a group are on average less able than men to analyze and evaluate arguments. Facione (1990c) found no difference by sex in performance on his California Critical Thinking Skills Test. Kuhn (1991: 280–281) found no difference by sex in either the disposition or the competence to engage in argumentative thinking.

The critics propose a variety of remedies for the biases that they allege. In general, they do not propose to eliminate or downplay critical thinking as an educational goal. Rather, they propose to conceptualize critical thinking differently and to change its pedagogy accordingly. Their pedagogical proposals arise logically from their objections. They can be summarized as follows:

• Focus on argument networks with dialectical exchanges reflecting contesting points of view rather than on atomic arguments, so as to develop “strong sense” critical thinking that transcends egocentric and sociocentric biases (Paul 1981, 1984).
• Foster closeness to the subject-matter and feeling connected to others in order to inform a humane democracy (Martin 1992).
• Develop “constructive thinking” as a social activity in a community of physically embodied and socially embedded inquirers with personal voices who value not only reason but also imagination, intuition and emotion (Thayer-Bacon 2000).
• In developing critical thinking in school subjects, treat as important neither skills nor dispositions but opening worlds of meaning (Alston 2001).
• Attend to the development of critical thinking dispositions as well as skills, and adopt the “critical pedagogy” practised and advocated by Freire (1968 [1970]) and hooks (1994) (Dalgleish, Girard, & Davies 2017).

A common thread in these proposals is treatment of critical thinking as a social, interactive, personally engaged activity like that of a quilting bee or a barn-raising (Thayer-Bacon 2000) rather than as an individual, solitary, distanced activity symbolized by Rodin’s The Thinker . One can get a vivid description of education with the former type of goal from the writings of bell hooks (1994, 2010). Critical thinking for her is open-minded dialectical exchange across opposing standpoints and from multiple perspectives, a conception similar to Paul’s “strong sense” critical thinking (Paul 1981). She abandons the structure of domination in the traditional classroom. In an introductory course on black women writers, for example, she assigns students to write an autobiographical paragraph about an early racial memory, then to read it aloud as the others listen, thus affirming the uniqueness and value of each voice and creating a communal awareness of the diversity of the group’s experiences (hooks 1994: 84). Her “engaged pedagogy” is thus similar to the “freedom under guidance” implemented in John Dewey’s Laboratory School of Chicago in the late 1890s and early 1900s. It incorporates the dialogue, anchored instruction, and mentoring that Abrami (2015) found to be most effective in improving critical thinking skills and dispositions.

What is the relationship of critical thinking to problem solving, decision-making, higher-order thinking, creative thinking, and other recognized types of thinking? One’s answer to this question obviously depends on how one defines the terms used in the question. If critical thinking is conceived broadly to cover any careful thinking about any topic for any purpose, then problem solving and decision making will be kinds of critical thinking, if they are done carefully. Historically, ‘critical thinking’ and ‘problem solving’ were two names for the same thing. If critical thinking is conceived more narrowly as consisting solely of appraisal of intellectual products, then it will be disjoint with problem solving and decision making, which are constructive.

Bloom’s taxonomy of educational objectives used the phrase “intellectual abilities and skills” for what had been labeled “critical thinking” by some, “reflective thinking” by Dewey and others, and “problem solving” by still others (Bloom et al. 1956: 38). Thus, the so-called “higher-order thinking skills” at the taxonomy’s top levels of analysis, synthesis and evaluation are just critical thinking skills, although they do not come with general criteria for their assessment (Ennis 1981b). The revised version of Bloom’s taxonomy (Anderson et al. 2001) likewise treats critical thinking as cutting across those types of cognitive process that involve more than remembering (Anderson et al. 2001: 269–270). For details, see the Supplement on History .

As to creative thinking, it overlaps with critical thinking (Bailin 1987, 1988). Thinking about the explanation of some phenomenon or event, as in Ferryboat , requires creative imagination in constructing plausible explanatory hypotheses. Likewise, thinking about a policy question, as in Candidate , requires creativity in coming up with options. Conversely, creativity in any field needs to be balanced by critical appraisal of the draft painting or novel or mathematical theory.

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How to cite this entry . Preview the PDF version of this entry at the Friends of the SEP Society . Look up this entry topic at the Internet Philosophy Ontology Project (InPhO). Enhanced bibliography for this entry at PhilPapers , with links to its database.

• Association for Informal Logic and Critical Thinking (AILACT)
• Center for Teaching Thinking (CTT)
• Critical Thinking Across the European Higher Education Curricula (CRITHINKEDU)
• Critical Thinking Definition, Instruction, and Assessment: A Rigorous Approach (criticalTHINKING.net)
• Critical Thinking Research (RAIL)
• Foundation for Critical Thinking
• Insight Assessment
• Partnership for 21st Century Learning (P21)
• The Critical Thinking Consortium
• The Nature of Critical Thinking: An Outline of Critical Thinking Dispositions and Abilities , by Robert H. Ennis

abilities | bias, implicit | children, philosophy for | civic education | decision-making capacity | Dewey, John | dispositions | education, philosophy of | epistemology: virtue | logic: informal

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