foreign policy essay competition

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Essay Contest

The Institute for Youth in Policy International Essay Contest was launched to empower students to critically think about the issues that matter to them. By providing a platform for students to express their ideas and opinions, we aim to spotlight valuable insights and ideas from young people around the world. Ultimately, the Institute for Youth in Policy International Essay Contest may be seen as an opportunity for the Institute to invest in the future by supporting and uplifting the voices of young people, and by fostering a sense of civic engagement and social responsibility in the next generation.

We launched the Institute for Youth in Policy International Essay Contest as a way to engage and empower students to think critically about the issues that matter to them. By providing a platform for students to express their ideas and opinions, we aim to encourage the next generation of leaders to become more informed and civically engaged citizens. Additionally, the contest may serve as a way to spotlight valuable insights and ideas from young people around the world. By encouraging students to write about the issues that concern them, our competition may help a general audience to better understand the priorities and perspectives of students. Ultimately, the Institute for Youth in Policy International Essay Contest may be seen as an opportunity for the Institute to invest in the future by supporting and uplifting the voices of young people, and by fostering a sense of civic engagement and social responsibility in the next generation. ‍ Create innovative solutions to real-world problems Tell your story and your perspective Research issues important to you Get recognized for your writing Win prizes for your outstanding work Get published for your writing

You have been invited to speak at the United Nations Peace Conference. The following topics are recognized by the United Nations as pressing issues for current and future generations. Choose one of these issues below to speak on:

• Climate Change (UNFCCC)
• Globalization (Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural Committee)
• Technology (UNCTAD)

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Insight: Does the essay provide unique or interesting insights, analysis or perspectives on its subject matter? Impact: Is the significance or impact of the issue(s) being discussed, idea(s) being brought up, or point-of-views being communicated sufficiently captured in the essay? Clarity and organization : Is the essay easy to understand, with a clear and logical flow? Style: Is the essay engaging and well-written, with appropriate yet compelling tone, language and syntax for the subject matter?

Who can participate?

Any student, in any country, who is enrolled in an accredited high school or college/university at the time of submitting their essay is eligible to participate in the Institute for Youth in Policy International Essay Contest and compete for the prizes. Students taking academic gap years or semesters are also eligible. No current employees of the Institute for Youth in Policy, however, will be permitted to enter the contest.

Submission Guidelines

Essays can take the form of anything from an analytical research paper to a personal narrative to allegorical fiction. This means essays can be written in any citation style or with no citations at all if it is not a research-heavy paper. Word Limit: 1250 words All essays should be submitted as a .docx or a PDF document and should include your name as well as a title for your essay. Cover pages are acceptable but not necessary. Essays should be written in an easily readable font size (11 or 12 pt.) with a professional font style (Times New Roman, Arial, etc.).  

A platform that honed my skills and perspectives.

Applications Due August 31st

Essay submissions are due by 11:59pm ET on August 31, 2024. This date is already an extension, so late submissions will not be accepted!

Results generally get released within 45 days after the initial deadline.

The monetary ($250) and publication prizes will be sent via email to winners directly.

Fall 2023 Prompt and Winners

You've been elected leader of your country. What would you say during your inaugural address to inspire the citizens of your country, including those of every race, religion, political party, and creed?

Salma Amanda Latifa, Indonesia

Indonesia: diversity, natural wealth, and a leader’s commitment to an inclusive future.

This essay shined in particular because of its excellent integration of academic research, personal voice, and policy-oriented focus. Furthermore, as an organization that greatly values youth civic participation, the essay’s focus on the importance of youth in the modern world deeply resonated with our team. Fantastic work Read the essay here.

Sophia Rosin, United States

What are the greatest attributes of our democracy.

This essay highlights that the backbone of Democracy, specifically in the United States, is its ability to encourage deliberation and tolerance. We as a nonpartisan organization that encourages depolarization find the importance in shedding light on this particular subject in the increasingly divided global political climate.  This succinct and engaging description of democracy captured our attention. ‍ Read the essay here.

Clarence Tay Han Yang, Singapore

Looking forward.

This speech excelled in its powerful word choice and ability to efficiently incorporate and explain numerous challenging topics. Its smooth progression from the past to the present and future provided a well-researched image of Singapore that garnered our applause. ‍ Read the essay here.

Spring 2023 Prompt and Winners

Countless countries around the world suffer from a plethora of issues – economic hardship, social turmoil, political polarization, pandemic recovery, unreliable leadership, corrupt governance, warfare and conflict, the list goes on. If you were elected the leader of your country, what would you do to address the issues your country faces in order to build a more prosperous society?

Ethan Lee Yee Chien Singapore

"Singapore in the 21st Century: Addressing the Unique Challenges of my Homeland" Read the essay here.

Ototleng Molelekedi South Africa

"My South African Manifesto" Read the essay here.

Saarah Hussain Bangladesh

"Beyond the Paradox of Plenty: Battling Bangladesh’s Burdens" Read the essay here.

United States Institute of Peace

Contests for students.

The U.S. Institute of Peace (USIP) is committed to educating the next generation of peacebuilders about the U.S. role in preventing and resolving conflicts around the world, and about the important part that young people can play as engaged global citizens.

Starting in 1987, USIP challenged students to think critically about global issues of conflict and peace through the National Peace Essay Contest (NPEC). Now, USIP is building upon the legacy of the NPEC (which was wrapped up in 2014) by partnering with other organizations on a range of initiatives that inspire students to learn more about global peacebuilding and to put their own good ideas into action.

Make sure to explore our other resources for students, teachers, and the broader public by visiting the Public Education section. 

Academic WorldQuest

Each year, the World Affairs Councils of America (WACA) engages more than 4,000 high school students across the U.S. in its signature quiz contest that tests their knowledge of global issues and foreign policy in 10 categories. Since 2016, USIP has been a co-sponsor of this national contest, ensuring the inclusion of a peace and conflict category in Academic WorldQuest each year. 

For the 2021 competition, USIP’s category is  “Exploring Peace in a World of Conflict,”  with featured resources that blend research, data, and real-life examples of peacebuilding in action. For more information, check out our Academic WorldQuest page! 

National High School Essay Contest

As a successor to USIP’s own National Peace Essay Contest, USIP has since 2015 partnered with the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) on its annual National High School Essay Contest. The contest engages high school students in learning and writing about issues of peace and conflict, and encourages appreciation for diplomacy’s role in building partnerships that can advance peacebuilding and protect national security. 

The winner of the contest receives a $2,500 cash prize, an all-expense paid trip to Washington, D.C. to meet leadership at the U.S. Department of State and USIP, and a full-tuition paid voyage with Semester at Sea upon the student’s enrollment at an accredited university. The runner-up receives a $1,250 cash prize and a full scholarship to participate in the International Diplomacy Program of the National Student Leadership Conference. 

Explore the 2022 essay contest topic, “Partnerships for Peace in a Multipolar Era,” download this year’s contest study guide , and learn more about the essay contest here. 

Opportunities

High school conference at yale.

High School Essay Contest

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2021 International Affairs Essay Competition winners

Read the entries from four UVA undergraduates

The Virginia Journal of International Affairs , the University of Virginia’s only undergraduate foreign affairs research journal, partnered with the Miller Center and the International Relations Organization to sponsor an undergraduate essay competition examining lessons from past presidencies and history in general to inform the debate on contemporary policy challenges in international relations. All UVA undergraduates were invited to participate and responded to the following prompt:

In his inaugural address, President Joe Biden stated that “America is back.” Should the future ofAmerica’s foreign policy be one that embraces multilateralism or should it take a more unilateral approach? Use historical examples or case studies from prior presidential administrations to make your argument about the present. 

Winner: Caitlin Tierney

American exceptionalism as asymmetric multilateralism.

For four years, Trump’s unilateralist, protectionist, populist and “America First” policies shocked citizens of the United States and the world. After seeing the damage unilateralist foreign policy (especially when in the wrong hands) can cause, U.S. democrats long to return to the generally multilateral foreign policy approach that presidents have adhered to since WWII. Although a leader of many major international organizations, America’s unique position of arranging the post-WWII world order has created an asymmetric form of multilateralism that nominally is fully participatory and equal, but in fact gives favor to its founder. President Biden believes that “America is back” as the leader in the international field, but America cannot so easily return to this seat of preference and should assess that previous “American multilateralism” may verge closer to asymmetry or even partial unilateralism than the U.S. may be willing to admit.

President Biden simply claiming that “America is back” as a world leader is a hollow cry until actions follow. Fortunately, on day one of his term, Biden reentered key agreements such as the WHO, UNHRC, New START and Paris Agreement with more to follow. This gesture is important to signify an ideological change from the previous administration and agreement to multinational cooperation. The foundation of trust in the U.S., however, cracked with the election and actions of President Donald Trump, and, although Biden may be able to repair the rift, there will always be a weak spot of mistrust and uncertainty.

READ THE FULL ESSAY

First runner-up: Robert McCoy

“america is back” isn’t enough: keeping unilateralism from droning on.

So far, President Biden’s assertions that “America is back” are proving honest. Undoing some of Trump’s unilateralist decisions, Biden has rejoined the Paris Climate agreement and United Nations Human Rights Council and halted the U.S.’s withdrawal from the World Health Organization. The Associated Press reported that Biden filling “his State Department with . . . veterans of the Obama administration” indicates a “desire to return to a more traditional foreign policy.” Many are relieved by this return to normalcy; Dr. Sana Vakil of Chatham House has said, “I’m quite optimistic about the gang getting back together again.”

But even the pre-Trump era of foreign policy Biden seems to be reviving was far from a halcyon period of multilateralism and adulation from the international community. In fact, a 2013 WIN/Gallup International poll conducted in 65 countries revealed the U.S. to be the international community’s “overwhelming choice…for the country that represents the greatest threat to peace in the world today.” A 2012 Pew Research Center poll of 20 countries found that, “[a]cross much of the globe, people continue to believe the U.S. acts unilaterally in world affairs.”

Second runner-up: Mithra Dhinakaran

“america is back” as it should be.

American multilateralism has swung on a pendulum since the birth of our nation. The question of whether to put America “first” or cooperate with other countries has always racked our foreign policy. From our involvement in foreign wars to our adoption of protectionist laws, the United States’ patterns of cooperation with global partners have had extraordinary ramifications on the whole world. While unilateralism has helped secure U.S. interests in some respects, multilateralism is the only way the current administration can effectively implement foreign policy in the modern globalized world. The future of America’s foreign policy should embrace multilateralism for several reasons. First, the U.S. is surrendering its share of global power and requires allies to support its policies. Second, the globalized economy compels political cooperation to reflect economic partnerships. Third, the U.S. must act in conjunction with other countries to tackle global issues.

First, while the U.S. may have been able to strongman other nations into acquiescence in the past, the U.S. no longer has the same political and economic capital. Similar to our experience with the Soviet Union in the Cold War, we face a rising superpower that seeks to assert its influence where the U.S. has fallen behind. If China succeeds in winning allies in the Global South, the U.S. will not be able to unilaterally challenge and overcome that influence. The U.S. should focus on strengthening ties with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America to build a stronger front. An example of the success of this strategy in the past is the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Honorable mention: Kirstin O'Donoghue

Recreating american foreign policy: replacing unilateralist nationalism with inclusive multilateralism.

President Biden assumed the presidency amidst several crises — the devastating COVID 19 pandemic, increasingly tense relations with China, and a persistent climate crisis. Each administration has confronted its own seemingly insurmountable challenges, and Biden’s predecessors have all left in their wakes mistakes and successes which defined the tenability of their approaches. Trump’s nationalism and America First doctrine wreaked havoc upon American foreign policy and have left foreign policy experts advocating for a return to American diplomacy and a restoration of our foreign policy. Though Biden’s election was a pivotal first step toward revitalizing American foreign policy and reforming our reputation on the global stage, Trump’s isolationist scars have not healed. Rather than a restoration, America is in desperate need of a newly constructed inclusive multilateral approach that involves historically suppressed actors from a variety of regions, civilian populations, and non-governmental organizations.

In making suggestions for Biden’s foreign policy approach, one must not fall prey to the myth that the United States before Trump was consistently a gregarious multilateral actor, sacrificing its domestic interests for the global good. Wilsonian multilateralism stood in stark contrast against Nixon’s unilateral retreat from Bretton Woods and Reagan’s termination of UNESCO. Obama’s retrenchment approach to foreign policy mirrored most closely those of Eisenhower and Nixon, which advocated a reduced commitment of U.S. resources and a greater share of the burden placed on allies. Any moral high ground that we possessed before Trump’s nationalist approach, even if this perception was founded upon shaky ground, we have lost.

THE 2024-25 TOPIC

RESOLVED: Equitable access to pharmaceuticals should be prioritized over protecting intellectual property rights.

Sponsored by the brewer foundation and new york university, the ippf is the first and only competition that gives high school students around the world the opportunity to engage in written and oral debates on issues of public p olicy.   the competition begins in october, as teams submit qualifying round essays on the ippf topic. the top 64 teams are invited to engage in a single elimination, written debate tournament — volleying essays back and forth via email. the top eight teams earn an all-expenses-paid trip to the ippf finals in new york city ​​   this international contest is open to all schools - public and private - for free. teams compete for awards and scholarships. the ippf world champion wins a $10,000 grand prize.

about THE IPPF

2024 CHAMPIONS

In May 2024, Westwood High School was named the IPPF World Champion at the IPPF's 23rd annual competition. The team was awarded a $10,000 grand prize! 

ELIGIBILITY

The IPPF is open to high school students in grades nine through twelve attending public, private, parochial, or home schools. There is no cost to participate!

AWARDS & PRIZES

Teams that advance to the rounds of 64 and 32 receive custom IPPF medals. Teams advancing to the Sweet 16 round and beyond receive cash awards!

Fall 2024 Admissions is officially OPEN.  Sign up for the next live information session here .

Discourse, debate, and analysis

Cambridge re:think essay competition 2024.

This year, CCIR saw  over 4,200 submissions  from more than 50 countries. Of these 4,200 essays, our jury panel, consists of scholars across the Atlantic, selected approximately 350 Honourable Mention students, and 33 award winners. 

The mission of the Re:think essay competition has always been to encourage critical thinking and exploration of a wide range of thought-provoking and often controversial topics. The hope is to create a discourse capable of broadening our collective understanding and generating innovative solutions to contemporary challenges. This year’s submissions more than exceeded our expectations in terms of their depth and their critical engagement with the proposed topics. The decision process was, accordingly, difficult. After  four rigorous rounds of blind review  by scholars from Cambridge, Oxford, Stanford, MIT and several Ivy League universities, we have arrived at the following list of award recipients:

Competition Opens: 15th January, 2024

Essay Submission Deadline: 10th May, 2024 Result Announcement: 20th June, 2024 Award Ceremony and Dinner at the University of Cambridge: 30th July, 2024

We welcome talented high school students from diverse educational settings worldwide to contribute their unique perspectives to the competition.

Entry to the competition is free.

About the Competition

The spirit of the Re:think essay competition is to encourage critical thinking and exploration of a wide range of thought-provoking and often controversial topics. The competition covers a diverse array of subjects, from historical and present issues to speculative future scenarios. Participants are invited to engage deeply with these topics, critically analysing their various facets and implications. It promotes intellectual exploration and encourages participants to challenge established norms and beliefs, presenting opportunities to envision alternative futures, consider the consequences of new technologies, and reevaluate longstanding traditions. 

Ultimately, our aim is to create a platform for students and scholars to share their perspectives on pressing issues of the past and future, with the hope of broadening our collective understanding and generating innovative solutions to contemporary challenges. This year’s competition aims to underscore the importance of discourse, debate, and critical analysis in addressing complex societal issues in nine areas, including:

Religion and Politics

Political Science and Law

Linguistics

Environment

Sociology and Philosophy

Business and Investment

Public Health and Sustainability

Biotechonology

Artificial Intelligence 

Neuroengineering

2024 Essay Prompts

This year, the essay prompts are contributed by distinguished professors from Harvard, Brown, UC Berkeley, Cambridge, Oxford, and MIT.

Essay Guidelines and Judging Criteria

Review general guidelines, format guidelines, eligibility, judging criteria.

Awards and Award Ceremony

Award winners will be invited to attend the Award Ceremony and Dinner hosted at the King’s College, University of Cambridge. The Dinner is free of charge for select award recipients.

Registration and Submission

Register a participant account today and submit your essay before the deadline.

Advisory Committee and Judging Panel

The Cambridge Re:think Essay Competition is guided by an esteemed Advisory Committee comprising distinguished academics and experts from elite universities worldwide. These committee members, drawn from prestigious institutions, such as Harvard, Cambridge, Oxford, and MIT, bring diverse expertise in various disciplines.

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Youth Voice for ASEAN-China Cooperation | Writing Competition & Policy Lab

• Posted on July 15, 2022

In the latest ASEAN-China Special Summit in November 2021, President Xi Jinping announced China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) – calling it “a new milestone” in the history of the relations, and that it will inject new impetus into peace, stability, prosperity and development of the region and the world. In light of that, FPCI together with the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN initiates “Youth Voice for ASEAN-China Cooperation” – a program in which 20 winners of a region-wide essay writing competition will be able to participate in an exclusive two days policy lab to produce a policy recommendation that will be handed to the Chinese government and the ASEAN Secretariat.

About the Essay Writing Competition

Topic essay: “Filling in the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”

Your essay must cover at least one of the following points :

• What does China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership mean for you (politically, economically, culturally, etc)?
• Challenges and opportunities of the China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for ASEAN and/or China
• Recommendations to strengthen the implementation of China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership

Eligibility :

• Nationals of ASEAN member countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam)
• Active students (undergraduate, graduate)
• 28 years old or below

Requirements :

• Essay must be original from the author
• Essay has never been published elsewhere including personal blog 
• Consists of 1000 words at maximum
• Essay is written in English 
• Every individual is only allowed to submit 1 essay 
• Group submission is not eligible 
• Essay must be submitted in PDF format and renamed into: Country_Full Name_YAC Essay
• Essay must be submitted before 16 August 2022, 23:59 Jakarta time
• Citation format: APA 7th edition
• Bibliography is required at the last page
• Times New Roman
• Font size: 12
• Margin: 2 cm
• Spacing 1.15

Submission Procedure :

• Go to to fill in the application form and submit your essay 
• Applicants must also submit their student ID card 
• No entry fee

Submission Deadline :

• Tuesday, 16 August 2022
• 23:59 Jakarta time

Terms and Conditions :

• The winners of this competition must be able to participate in a virtual two-days policy lab which will be conducted on 5-6 October 2022 (date to be confirmed) 

*Note: The exact amount will depend on the exchange rate

• Opportunity to join an exclusive 2 days Policy Lab, in which participants will be able to deepen their knowledge on the China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and engage with policymakers, experts, and practitioners, to produce a joint policy recommendation– which will be handed to the governments and relevant bodies. 
• Certificate from FPCI and the Mission of People’s Republic of China to ASEAN
• Recommendation letter from the Mission of People’s Republic of China to ASEAN for further educational opportunities in China, namely the ASEAN-China Young Leaders Scholarship. 
• Selected winners will get an opportunity to have their essay published on The Jakarta Post

*to be confirmed – as per 16 September 2022

About the Policy Lab :

Policy Lab is an exclusive two days gathering that will gather the brightest young minds from all over the region. After careful examination, selected 20 winners of the writing competition will gather virtually to engage in important and substantial regional talks. The program aims to enable the next bright generation of thinkers, strategists, and leaders from Southeast Asia to participate in high-level discussion to analyze the past, present, and future direction of the ASEAN-China relationship.

It serves as a platform for participants to deepen their knowledge on the China-ASEAN Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, and engage with policymakers, experts, and practitioners, to produce a joint policy recommendation. Participants will also get the opportunity to expand their network with their fellow participants from ASEAN countries and China. The produced joint policy recommendation will be handed to the Chinese government and the ASEAN Secretariat.

The policy lab shall consist of the following activities:

• Expert Panel Discussions: participants will get to listen to high-level experts’ discussion from China and ASEAN countries and discuss about ASEAN-China relations and the CSP.
• Focus Group Discussions: participants will formulate a set of policy ideas and recommendations through active and interactive dialogues discussing a wide range of topics surrounding the CSP.
• ASEAN-China Youth Dialogue: participants will engage with Chinese youth- in a chaired substantial dialogue to exchange views on topics surrounding ASEAN-China relations and the CSP.
• Closing Ceremony: selected participants will present the joint policy recommendation to the Mission of the People’s Republic of China to ASEAN. 

Frequently Asked Questions :

I am a bachelor and currently working/waiting to be enrolled in a graduate study. Am I eligible to apply for the writing competition?

Applicants must be active students– meaning they are currently enrolled in a university. Therefore, the case above is not eligible to apply.

I am currently on study leave, but am still enrolled as a student in a university. Am I eligible to apply for the writing competition?

Yes, you are eligible to apply.

I have finished my undergraduate/ graduate study but I am still waiting for the official graduation. Am I eligible to apply for the writing competition?

If you have not received your official bachelor’s degree yet, you are still considered as an active student and are eligible to apply.

If I will not be able to participate in the two-days policy lab following the writing competition, am I still allowed to join the writing competition?

No. You are required to confirm availability to join the post competition two-days policy lab prior to the application, even though the policy lab will only be participated by the winners.

I am an active student enrolled in a university, but I do not have my student ID card as I lost it/ it has not been made available yet. May I apply without submitting the required student ID card? May I apply by submitting alternative proofs (official letters from university, etc.)?

Active students who could not submit their students ID card for any reason are not eligible to apply for the writing competition. Document other than student ID card will not be accepted.

I have submitted my essay. However, I would like to make some changes. May I resubmit my essay?

No. Applicants can not apply for more than one essay. Two times submission will not be considered. Applicants must only submit one essay.

Contact Person :

Jenny Sari Winata – Email: [email protected]

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The Future of the U.S.-China Educational Exchanges — 2024 China Essay Contest Runner Up

From Columbia University

As China and the United States grapple with issues of intellectual property theft, cybersecurity concerns, and competition for technological supremacy, their once symbiotic relationship in education is now in jeopardy. By “symbiotic” I mean the mutually beneficial exchange of knowledge, talent, and resources that has characterized the U.S.-China educational cooperation for decades. American universities have benefited from the influx of talented Chinese students and researchers, while China has gained access to cutting-edge research and educational practices. This reciprocal relationship has fostered innovation, cultural understanding, and economic growth for both nations. However, in recent years, the U.S. has imposed restrictions on Chinese students and scholars to facilitate the transfer of technologies critical to national security and economic competitiveness to China, while China has tightened its control over academic freedom and foreign influences on its campuses. These actions tend not to only hinder the flow of knowledge and talent between the two nations but also undermine decades of progress toward a more collaborative relationship with far-reaching implications for both countries and the global community. 

On the Chinese side, the government has sought to assert greater control over the academic sphere, including through tighter ideological oversight of universities, restrictions on foreign textbooks and online resources, and pressure on Chinese scholars to align their research with national priorities. This has raised concerns about academic freedom and the openness of China’s education system to international engagement.

While legitimate security concerns exist on both sides, current restrictions risk eroding the trust essential to US-China educational exchanges. This hinders the flow of knowledge and talent, fostering suspicion that could damage the broader relationship and jeopardize global stability. In this tense environment, educational exchanges are more crucial than ever for maintaining dialogue and collaboration. The US and China must prioritize finding a sustainable framework that balances security with the vital principles of openness, reciprocity, and mutual benefit. Though difficult, the stakes are too high to let this bridge between two major global powers collapse.

The Power of Educational Exchange: Beyond Dollars and Diplomas

  The magnetic pull of American universities and the rapid rise of Chinese talent have fueled an unprecedented era of educational exchange between the two nations. In just four decades, what began as a trickle of 52 Chinese scholars sent to the U.S. in 1978 had surged to over 289,526 by 2023, with more than half pursuing STEM degrees. However, this remarkable growth has had its challenges. In recent years, the number of Chinese students in the U.S. has begun to level off and even decline, dropping by 8.6% in the 2020-2021 academic year. This trend has been driven in part by the tightening of U.S. visa policies, as well as by growing concerns among Chinese students and parents about safety, discrimination, and the overall climate for international students in the U.S. On the other hand, while the number of American students in China had grown to around 15,000 per year at its peak, that figure has also declined sharply in recent years, falling by more than 50% between 2019 and 2021. This drop can be attributed to a combination of factors, including the COVID-19 pandemic, rising geopolitical tensions, and growing concerns about academic freedom and safety for American students in China.

The benefits of this U.S.-China educational exchange have been substantial for both sides. Chinese students and researchers have made immense contributions to U.S. innovation, particularly in cutting-edge fields like artificial intelligence, where around 27% of top researchers are China-born. Their intellectual dynamism and global perspectives have enriched American campuses and labs while returning students have been a key conduit for knowledge transfer fueling China’s rapid development.

For the U.S., Chinese students and researchers have been an indispensable source of talent and innovation. They have pioneered groundbreaking research, launched thriving startups, and helped maintain America’s edge in critical fields like artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and quantum computing. According to NAFSA’s report, Chinese students contributed a whopping $15.9 billion to the U.S. economy in 2018 alone through tuition, housing, and other spending.

But the value of these exchanges goes beyond dollars and diplomas. They have fostered a reservoir of goodwill and understanding between the American and Chinese people. For many Chinese, studying in the U.S. is a formative experience that shapes their worldview and leaves them with a lifelong appreciation for American culture and values. For Americans who study or work in China, the experience can be equally eye-opening, challenging stereotypes and revealing the nuances of a rapidly evolving society.

These grassroots connections have long been a stabilizing force in the often-rocky U.S.-China relationship. During the dark days following The Tiananmen Square Crackdown in 1989, it was the network of the U.S.-educated Chinese officials and scholars that helped keep lines of communication open and prevent a complete rupture in relations . More recently, as tensions have spiked over trade, Taiwan, and technology, the voices of moderation on both sides have often been those with deep personal ties to the other country.

The Economic and Social Risks of Decoupling

The erosion of the U.S.-China educational exchanges carries grave economic consequences that demand urgent attention. As artificial intelligence and other disruptive technologies reshape the global labor market, the United States risks a critical shortage of skilled workers in the very fields that will drive the economy of the future.

Consider the projections: A 2022 report by the Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimates that the U.S. could face a shortfall of 30,000 AI experts by 2025 if restrictions on Chinese researchers continue. Losing access to this vital talent pool could undermine America’s innovation edge and competitiveness in the industries of the future.

But the risks go beyond economics. As the U.S. and China decouple, the social fabric that has bound the two societies together is fraying. Educational exchanges have long fostered a web of personal relationships and cultural understanding that humanize the other side and temper the impulse toward conflict. Without these stabilizing ties, misperceptions and hostilities are likely to multiply.

 Moreover, as the global challenges of the 21st century – from climate change to public health crises to the ethical implications of AI – grow increasingly complex, solving them will require unprecedented cooperation between the U.S. and China. That cooperation depends on a foundation of mutual understanding and trust, one that is built through people-to-people ties and sustained collaboration. 

If educational decoupling continues, the U.S. and China risk not only economic loss but a dangerous empathy gap, one that could have catastrophic consequences in the event of a crisis. The costs of conflict between the world’s two largest economies would be incalculable, not just for them but for the entire global community.

Exchanges Under Threat: Finding Solutions

Educational exchanges between the U.S. and China, which have historically strengthened their relationship, are currently facing significant challenges. The U.S. has tightened visa restrictions, launched investigations into researchers’ links to China, and proposed cuts to exchange programs due to concerns about espionage and technology transfer. This has resulted in a chilling climate for Chinese students and scholars are reporting heightened feelings of suspicion and alienation. The Asian American Scholar Forum (AASF) has raised concerns about multiple incidents of Chinese American scientists, academics, and scholars being harassed or interrogated at ports of entry, which they believe are based on their background or ethnicity. These incidents involve U.S. citizens of Chinese descent or their family members being interrogated for hours, leading to increased fear and concerns about being targeted and surveilled within the community. AASF Executive Director Gisela Perez Kusakawa stated that these incidents cement the perspective for Chinese American scientists, researchers, and scholars that they can be subjected to heightened scrutiny, investigation, and surveillance, despite their contributions to the country.

In China, increased censorship, political interference, and surveillance complicate research for American scholars. The consequences of this narrowing space for academic dialogue are far-reaching, impacting both individual scholars and also extends to topics deemed politically sensitive by the Chinese government. A case in point is the 2022 denial of a visa to an American Human Rights professor, Ryan Thoreson, known for advocating for LGBTQ rights and developing capacities in human rights research and training. While the reason remains unclear, both the university and the professor were left without a specific explanation. However, the professor’s past work on promoting equal rights and social justice raises questions about whether these broader themes may have also played a role in the decision. This climate of restriction has fueled self-censorship among foreign academics, who fear that their research or teaching activities may jeopardize their visas or access if they address sensitive topics.

These academic barriers reflect the deep political sensitivities between the two nations, exacerbated by the U.S. Department of Justice’s ‘’China Initiative’ (established in 2018 to combat economic espionage), and China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea, stifling the free exchange of

ideas. Such restrictions not only impact individual careers but also threaten broader academic collaborations essential for fields ranging from technology to the social sciences. This cycle of suspicion and the resulting restrictions not only harm individual careers but also threaten larger academic collaborations that rely on trust and the free flow of ideas. When scholars cannot collaborate without fear of geopolitical consequences, critical research partnerships across various fields, from technology and science to humanities and social sciences, are put at risk..

To balance these security concerns with the benefits of collaboration—such as advancements in biotechnology and cancer research—both nations could implement measures like robust data encryption and establish collaborative oversight bodies composed of neutral experts. These bodies could be composed of:

• Senior researchers from top universities in the U.S. (e.g., MIT, Stanford), China (e.g., Tsinghua, Peking University), and countries like the UK (Oxford, Cambridge), Germany (Max Planck Institutes), or Japan (University of Tokyo);
• Representatives from international scientific organizations like the International Council for Science or the World Academy of Sciences;
• Former diplomats with experience in science and technology cooperation, such as those who have served on bilateral Science and Technology Committee;
• Legal experts specializing in international intellectual property law and research ethics.

These steps would protect sensitive information while building trust necessary for fruitful partnerships. A recent Nature Index analysis highlights the dramatic decline in non-collaborative research between the two countries, underscoring the risks of prioritizing security over knowledge sharing. Implementing secure data-sharing protocols and establishing joint research oversight committees have proven effective, as seen in the recent agreement between Stanford University and Peking University, which includes provisions for joint ethical review of research projects.

Moreover, promoting open forums for debate on diverse topics enables critical thinking and idea exchange, crucial for academic progress and innovation. The University of Chicago’s commitment to protecting controversial speech serves as a model for fostering a culture of intellectual openness essential for groundbreaking research, as seen in multicultural teams developing life-saving vaccines. Ensuring no restrictions based on nationality or ethnicity, as advocated by the National Science Foundation, is critical for maintaining a thriving academic environment.

In the end, prioritizing open discussion and debate on college campuses, as exemplified by the China Focus Essay Competition hosted by the Fudan-UC Center on Contemporary China, the 1990 Institute, The Carter Center, and the 21st Century China Center, is vital for fostering critical thinking and challenging perspectives.

Rescuing Educational Exchange: A Path Forward for the U.S. and China

President Biden and President Xi Jinping recognize the importance of interpersonal ties, turning rhetoric into reality will demand bold action. President Biden has promised to increase funding for the Fulbright program and other educational exchanges, signaling a commitment to fostering mutual understanding. Similarly, President Xi has emphasized the need for direct exchanges and cooperation in education during his speeches. To turn these words into action, both leaders could take specific steps such as easing visa restrictions for students and scholars, creating new joint research projects, and establishing high-level dialogues on education cooperation. These actions would demonstrate a genuine commitment to rebuilding trust and promoting mutual understanding through educational exchange.

To achieve this, both sides must act quickly to rescue and reinvest in educational exchange. The U.S. could shift its approach towards targeted restrictions in sensitive research areas rather than broad bans, ensuring knowledge sharing in non-critical fields. Transparency in explaining these restrictions to universities and scholars could foster greater trust. Additionally, programs fostering a welcoming environment for Chinese researchers and students would reduce anxieties and promote healthy collaboration. Ultimately, by leading the way in setting global standards for ethical and secure research collaborations, the U.S. could create a system where clear rules and fair practices prevail. These shifts are essential to finding a balance between protecting critical national interests and remaining open to the benefits of educational exchange.

For China, rescuing educational exchange will require a realistic appraisal of how its own actions have eroded the confidence of American partners. Greater transparency around issues like research funding, intellectual property, and academic freedom could help rebuild trust. So too could a more open posture towards American scholars and students seeking to study and conduct research in China.

Critically, it also means redoubling investments in homegrown innovation and STEM education to sustain America’s competitive edge. By cultivating its own domestic talent pipeline, the U.S. can reduce its overreliance on Chinese students while still welcoming the best and brightest from around the world.

The Power of Institutions and Individuals

Beyond government actions, the real power to preserve educational ties lies with the institutions and individuals at the heart of these exchanges. American and Chinese universities can collaborate to develop joint educational programs and research initiatives focused on areas such as sustainable development, cultural exchange, and technological innovation, ensuring transparent, reciprocal, and a shared commitment to addressing global challenges. Scholars and students from both countries can actively promote the importance of open exchange, serving as influential advocates and informal ambassadors dedicated to fostering mutual understanding.

One particularly promising area for collaboration is artificial intelligence. As a transformative technology with immense implications for both countries, AI is a domain where U.S.-China cooperation could yield significant benefits. Joint research projects, subject to appropriate oversight and IP protections, could accelerate progress on shared challenges like climate change, public health, and disaster response. Moreover, by bringing together American and Chinese AI researchers, such collaborations could help establish norms and best practices to guide the responsible development of this powerful technology.

The vitality of the educational exchange between the U.S. and China must be preserved and renewed. Not as a panacea for all that divides these two nations, but as a crucial reminder of what unites them: a shared interest in global stability, prosperity, and innovation. In an age of existential challenges and transformative technologies, maintaining robust educational exchanges may be the most significant advantage we can secure. These exchanges are not merely transactions of knowledge; they are investments in a peaceful and prosperous future, enabling both countries to navigate the complexities of modern geopolitics not as rivals, but as partners in the pursuit of knowledge and the service of humanity.

References:

Info. (2023, April 18). Asian American Scholar Forum raises concerns around increased airport enforcement and border harassment . Asian American Scholar Forum . https://www.aasforum.org/2023/02/02/asian-american-scholar-forum-raises-concerns-around-increased-airport-enforcement-and-border-harassment/

IIE Open Doors. (2023, November 13). All places of origin . IIE Open Doors . https://opendoorsdata.org/data/international-students/all-places-of-origin/

Li, C., & McElveen, R. (2020, October 14). The deception and detriment of U.S.-China cultural and educational decoupling . Brookings . https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-deception-and-detriment-of-us-china-cultural-and-educational-decoupling/

MacroPolo. (2024a, May 15). The Global AI talent tracker 2.0 . MacroPolo . https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/

MacroPolo. (2024b, May 15). The Global AI talent tracker 2.0 . MacroPolo . https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-global-ai-talent-tracker/

More restrictive U.S. policy on Chinese graduate student visas raises alarm. (2020, May 28). Science , 368 (6492), 1059 1061. https://www.science.org/content/article/more-restrictive-us-policy-chinese-graduate-student-visas-raises-alarm

NAFSA: Association of International Educators. (2021). Losing talent: Economic and foreign policy risk America can’t ignore . https://www.nafsa.org/policy-and-advocacy/policy-resources/losing-talent-economic-and-foreign-policy-risk-america-cant-ignore

National Science Foundation. (n.d.). NSF – National Science Foundation . https://www.nsf.gov/

Nature Index. (2019, May 15). Big fall for the United States in non-collaborative papers; China’s tally rises . Nature . https://www.nature.com/nature-index/news/big-fall-united-states-non-collaborative-papers-chinas-tally-rises

Ryan, T. (2023, November 1). Chinese universities ticked off for ideological education gaps . University World News . https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20231101150341788

Sixth Tone. (2020, May 28). Concerns grow about academic freedom and COVID-19 . Inside Higher Ed . https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2020/05/28/china-concerns-grow-about-academic-freedom-and-covid-19

Statista. (n.d.). Number of Chinese students that study in the U.S. Statista . https://www.statista.com/statistics/372900/number-of-chinese-students-that-study-in-the-us/

Thoreson, R. (2023, January 11). Chinese universities ticked off for ideological education gaps . University World News . https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20200110071137628

U.S. Department of Justice. (2018, November 1). Attorney General Jeff Sessions announces new initiative to combat Chinese economic espionage . https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-jeff-sessions-announces-new-initiative-combat-chinese-economic-espionage

U.S. Government Accountability Office. (2023). GAO-23-106114: Efforts to secure critical technologies in U.S.-China relations . https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-23-106114.pdf

University of California, San Diego. (2021). Three decades of Chinese students in America, 1991-2021 . China Data Lab . https://chinadatalab.ucsd.edu/uscet/three-decades-of-chinese-students-in-america-1991-2021/

Whiteness and free speech at the University of Chicago. (2023, July 3). New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/03/us/university-of-chicago-whiteness-free-speech.html

Wilhelm, M. (2018, September 12). Wilson Center releases study on China’s influence and interference in U.S. higher education . Inside Higher Ed . https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2018/09/12/wilson-center-releases-study-chinas-influence-and-interference-us-higher-ed

World Bank. (n.d.). Visa restrictions on Chinese students endanger U.S. innovation edge, universities say . The Wall Street Journal . https://www.wsj.com/articles/visa-restrictions-on-chinese-students-endanger-u-s-innovation-edge-universities-say-11635856001

Zhao, S. (n.d.). China’s influence on academic freedom: A study of Chinese interference in U.S. higher education . Harvard University Press .

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Report: DNC Offers Few Clues on Harris’s Foreign Policy

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DNC Offers Few Clues on Harris’s Foreign Policy

A botched rollout of the party platform shows how foreign policy is a sideshow in u.s. elections..

• United States
• Robbie Gramer
• Amy Mackinnon

Stay informed  with FP’s news and analysis as the United States prepares to vote.

If you want to learn more about the U.S. Democratic Party’s foreign-policy vision as the Democratic National Convention (DNC) gets underway this week, you have two options: a webpage that apparently hasn’t been updated in three years or a massive PDF document that is still written as if President Joe Biden, not Vice President Kamala Harris, is the party’s candidate.

The outdated platform and slapdash messaging on foreign policy represent a significant misstep on the part of a party machine looking to distinguish itself from former President Donald Trump’s Republican Party. But it also may reflect how little top Democratic strategists believe foreign policy will factor into voters’ decisions in the upcoming presidential election.

The Democrats’ main website has a section on “Renewing American leadership” that, at the time of this writing, talks about the war in Afghanistan in present tense (the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan in 2021) and makes no mention of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or the ongoing Israel-Hamas war that has pushed the Middle East to the brink of a full-scale regional conflict. Evidently, party leaders haven’t yet copied and pasted in the new 2024 platform and have just left the old one from 2020 up on the site.

As for the Democrats’ actual 2024 policy platform document , which passed by a largely ceremonial voice vote on Monday before being released to the public (though you still have to do a bit of work to find it on their site), it contains at least 20 references to Biden’s “second term.” The 92-page document, which lays out the party’s vision for the next four years should it clinch the presidential election in November, was finalized by the platform committee on July 16—less than a week before Biden announced his decision to step aside, paving the way for Harris to secure the party’s nomination.

The foreign-policy section—which comes at the end—is principally a recitation of Biden’s achievements and policy as president, with the promise of continuity in a second term. Elements of the section on China hew closely to (at times copying word-for-word) an essay that Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, wrote in Foreign Affairs last year. (In that piece, written shortly before the Hamas attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, that launched the ongoing war in Gaza, Sullivan also proclaimed that the Middle East region is “quieter than it has been for decades.” The online version of the piece was later edited to strike that phrase.)

All of this speaks to the unusual circumstances of this year’s race. “Nobody’s ever seen this before, where you get a nominee basically three weeks before the convention,” said Joel Rubin, a Democratic strategist who served as a deputy assistant secretary of state during the Obama administration.

Biden’s decision in July to halt his reelection campaign and hand the reins over to Harris jolted what had been an otherwise lackluster race between two men whose track records as president are well known to the U.S. public. In the weeks since, Harris’s record as a prosecutor, senator, and vice president have been scrutinized for clues on how she may govern and what her priorities would be as commander in chief.

Aside from an economic speech last Friday, Harris’s campaign has offered few details as to her agenda, and she has yet to do any substantive interviews with the press since becoming her party’s candidate. Her only remarks on foreign policy have come in response to activists interrupting a rally to protest Israel’s war in Gaza, in which she reaffirmed the need for a cease-fire and the release of hostages.

Despite its outdated references, the policy document represents the most detailed outline yet of the Democrats’ foreign-policy platform—which would likely be reflected in a Harris presidency—with a focus on strengthening alliance structures in the Indo-Pacific to counter China as well as in Europe to back Ukraine in its war against Russia.

“The threat posed by Russia transcends its war of aggression in Ukraine. Russia is enlisting North Korea, Iran and China in its efforts to attack freedom across the world through military equipment sales and economic partnerships,” the document states.

On China, the Democrats have touted the Biden administration’s attempted strategy of “de-risking” economic ties between the two countries without fully decoupling the economy, as well as the strategy of blocking China’s access to sensitive U.S. technologies deemed critical to national security.

The outdated documents may present a missed opportunity for Harris and her team to hash out a clear foreign-policy platform at the DNC, the marquee political event for the Democratic Party to cement its unity and policies ahead of what is expected to be a difficult election.

“There’s a tendency among some to say foreign policy doesn’t matter, and I think it should,” said Matt Duss of the Center for International Policy, a progressive think tank. “Obviously this platform was drafted to reflect President Biden as the candidate—that was a process that was already essentially complete when President Biden decided to step down. I understand it would’ve been a tough process to go back and redraft it in a way that reflected more accurately the views of Vice President Harris, but that’s why it is important for her and her team to articulate where they might take things in a different direction.”

Yet the dearth of substantive foreign-policy language in the platform may not matter much at the ballot box, administration and campaign insiders say, as the DNC and recent polling shows that Harris’s surprise entrance into the race has electrified the Democratic base and narrowed Trump’s chances for an electoral victory.

Leaving her foreign policy in the eye of the beholder, for now, could also be a shrewd move, said Rubin, the Democratic strategist. “That’s the mark of a smart politician,” he said.

This is most apparent with regard to the Israel-Hamas war, where both progressive critics of the administration’s handling of the conflict and staunch supporters of Israel see cause for optimism in a Harris presidency.

However, Duss said that foreign policy will still be laced into the Democratic party’s platform and discussions in the DNC, even if explicit conversations on wars and diplomatic deals don’t take center stage.

“Foreign policy will definitely factor in [to the election cycle], but it will factor in in ways that people don’t immediately recognize as traditional foreign policy,” he said. “When we talk about climate, when we talk about immigration, when we talk about post-neoliberal economics, these all have enormous foreign-policy implications.”

Robbie Gramer is a diplomacy and national security reporter at Foreign Policy . Twitter:  @RobbieGramer

Amy Mackinnon is a national security and intelligence reporter at Foreign Policy . Twitter:  @ak_mack

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2022 Student Foreign Policy Essay Contest

This essay contest has ended. You may read the winning essays here .

The John Quincy Adams Society is asking college students to weigh in on pressing questions in U.S. strategy. JQAS is partnering with  The National Interest — one of Washington’s most important foreign-policy magazines – to sponsor an essay contest. We are looking for professional, well-written, and insightful analysis.  TNI  will showcase the winners, where the essays can influence policymakers, scholars, and staffers helping to shape American policy. The winner will also be given a cash prize and have a spot (COVID pending) in the 2022 John Quincy Adams Society Summer Leadership Conference in Washington D.C.

This is the sixth contest the Society and the  National Interest  have conducted. You can read about the winners of previous contests here: 2021 ,  2020 ,  2019 ,  2018 ,  2017 .

This contest is an excellent opportunity to showcase your talents before a national readership and build your resume as a foreign-policy thinker. Past winners have gone on to the executive branch, congressional staff, journalism, top graduate programs, think tanks, well-known companies, and more.

Prompts (pick one):

• What national interests does the United States have in Taiwan? How much impact do these interests have on the well-being of people in the United States? In light of this, should the United States be willing to go to war with China over Taiwan?
• What national interests does the United States have in Ukraine? How much impact do these interests have on the well-being of people in the United States? In light of this, should the United States be willing to go to war with Russia over Ukraine?
• Under what circumstances should the United States be willing to use nuclear weapons?

Undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral students who will be attending institutions in the United States in 2022 are welcome to participate. (This includes both college students who will graduate in 2022 and high school seniors or others who currently plan to attend a U.S. college at any point in 2022.)

The winning essay will run on  TNI ’s website and be promoted on social media by both  TNI  and JQAS.

Prizes are as follows:

–  First prize  (one): $2000, essay featured on  TNI , two year subscription to  TNI , spot at the Society’s annual leadership conference in Washington, D.C.

–  Runner up  (two): $500, essay featured on  TNI , one year subscription to  TNI

–  Honorable mention  (four): essay featured on  Realist Review

Submissions shall respond to one of the prompts and shall be no more than  1100 words , and are due by  11:59 p.m. Pacific Time on Sunday, March 20, 2022 . Sources should be hyperlinked, rather than footnoted, when possible. Complete rules are at the bottom of the page. Strong essays will advance a clear perspective on the issue, supported by strong argumentation, knowledge of the subject matter, good writing (including structure and style), and originality.

You can submit your essay using the form below, which is also available here .

Student Foreign Policy Essay CONTEST RULES

1.  SPONSOR:  The sponsor of the  Student Foreign Policy Essay Contest  is the John Quincy Adams Society.

2.  ELIGIBILITY:  Contest entrants must be legal residents of the fifty United States and the District of Columbia aged eighteen years or older, except where prohibited. Employees, officers, and directors of the sponsor, and its subsidiaries, affiliates, and divisions (“Related Entities”) and their immediate families (parents, children, siblings and their spouses) and household members (whether or not related) of each are not eligible to enter. Anyone serving as a contest judge is ineligible for the contest. The contest is void outside the fifty United States, the District of Columbia and where prohibited and restricted by any federal, state, or local law, rule, or regulation (“Law”). The contest is subject to all Law.

3.  HOW TO ENTER:  The contest begins on January 4, 2022 at 12 p.m. PT and ends at 11:59 p.m. Pacific Time, Sunday, March 20, 2022. This time frame is known as the “contest period.” To be eligible for the contest, you must:

– Before the end of the contest period, go to the contest entry page and submit an essay no more than 1100 words in length on one of the three questions above.

To be eligible to submit a contest entry, you must be enrolled at any point in 2022 in an accredited postsecondary institution or program listed in the U.S. Department of Education’s most recent database ( http://ope.ed.gov/accreditation/GetDownLoadFile.aspx ). No person may submit more than one contest entry. Attempting to submit multiple contest entries will result in your disqualification from the contest. Your participation in the contest is optional and at your sole and absolute discretion.

4.  PROHIBITED CONTENT:  By entering the contest you agree not to create or submit a contest entry that:

– Infringes on any patent, trademark, trade secret, copyright, or other proprietary or property rights of any party;

– May be deemed, within the meaning of Law, to be electioneering communications, intervention in a political or electoral campaign, or lobbying;

– Is unlawful, threatening, harassing, abusive, obscene, vulgar, harmful, tortious, defamatory, libelous, false, invasive of another’s privacy, hateful racially, ethnically, or otherwise, or in any other way objectionable;

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– Harms minors in any way; or

– Violates any Law, intentionally or unintentionally.

The sponsor reserves the right to disqualify any and all contest entries that violate the above conditions, or for any other reason at any time without prior notice.

5.  JUDGING AND SELECTION OF PRIZE WINNERS:  All contest entries will be judged based on the following criteria:

– Clearly articulates an opinion

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6.  PRIZES : On or about April 6, 2022, three prize winners will be announced (the “Prize Winners”). The Prize Winners shall receive the following (the “Prize(s)”):

– First prize (one): $2000, essay featured on TNI, two year subscription to TNI, spot at the Society’s annual leadership conference in Washington, D.C.

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– Honorable Mention (four): essay featured on  Realist Review .

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2024 High School Essay Contest Winning Essay

You are here, in this section, disinformation: a threat to every level of diplomacy.

BY IAN ROSENZWEIG

In his intellectual explorations, Benjamin Franklin, the first diplomat of the fledgling United States of America, committed himself to truth. Franklin created “Junto,” a discussion group, “in the sincere Spirit of Enquiry after Truth, without fondness for Dispute, or Desire of Victory” (Canada). Franklin recognized the value of truth over personal benefit or gain. But today, truth is becoming elusive. In public life, biased media publish sensationalized content, and social media platforms allow unverified information – from deep fakes to fabricated “facts” – to gain traction. Artificial intelligence, too, has allowed disinformation and misinformation to infiltrate the public sphere. Beyond depriving global citizens of the United Nations (UN)-declared right to information, which is expressed in Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, these disinformation tactics influence intergovernmental affairs. They allow nations to exploit each other and sow seeds of distrust. Accordingly, the UN is seeking to raise awareness about and combat disinformation. Disinformation is more than a danger to individual relationships between specific nations. It impacts every global conflict and major geopolitical challenge, from pandemics to immigration policy, and is therefore a pervasive diplomatic challenge itself. Diplomats can mitigate the damage that disinformation causes by ensuring truth in their dealings, promoting public trust-building initiatives, engaging in honest, principled efforts, and collaborating to take direct action against those who spread disinformation.

Some international disinformation efforts are targeted toward individual nations, creating public distrust, sowing division, and violating the fundamental expectation that nations be granted sovereignty over their land and people. Election interference provides a prominent example of disinformation efforts. The Russian Federation and its “Internet Research Agency” (IRA) are frequently cited for disinformation tactics used to interfere in other nations’ elections (Gerrits 4). According to a report from the Policy Department for External Relations of the European Parliament, the IRA “purchased around 3,400 advertisements on Facebook and Instagram during the US 2016 election campaign,” reaching millions of American voters (Colomina, Sánchez Margalef, and Youngs 15). The IRA is also presumed to be responsible for disinformation regarding casualties of the Russian war in Ukraine (Silverman and Kao). Other disinformation, although not necessarily of Russian origin, has been flagged in recent European democratic procedures, including the 2016 Brexit referendum and the 2016 referendum in the Netherlands on the EU Association Agreement with Ukraine (Gerrits 6). These matters, although originating in national elections, are relevant to the diplomats of the countries involved and to every global power, including the US. Ideologically, protecting democracy is one of the foremost priorities of the US and its foreign policy. Pragmatically, interference in election initiatives as contentious as Brexit has the potential to reshape international decisions and relationships, thus impacting every nation. And beyond election interference, disinformation campaigns have successfully impacted issues from public health to armed conflict, allowing one nation to dictate other nations’ actions by creating public unrest and pressuring governments (Guterres 2). Through preventing the spread of disinformation, nations preserve democracy and sovereignty and protect uninformed and vulnerable populations worldwide.

In addition to influencing national politics and their global impacts, disinformation also creates tension in international diplomatic relations. In 2017, a series of reports regarding apparent Qatari support for terror, including accusations of praise for Hamas and Iran and a ransom payment to al-Qaeda, led the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and other Arab League countries to sever diplomatic ties with Qatar and implement a blockade on the nation (Windrem and Arkin). Qatar referred to the reports, which Qatar claims were uploaded to Qatari news sites via a hack orchestrated by the UAE, as a “smear campaign,” and US officials reported that the accusations were “false” and “apparently planted” (Windrem and Arkin). NBC News reported that the campaign against Qatar was also an effort to damage relations between Qatar and the US – an effort which seems to have been successful given then-President Donald Trump’s signaled support for the blockade against Qatar (Windrem and Arkin; Wintour). Normal relations between Qatar and the group of Arab League nations did not resume until 2021 (Krasna). This crisis highlights how disinformation damages international relationships. Had the US not investigated the accusations of the “smear campaign,” its relations with Qatar could have deteriorated. Such a shift could have upended diplomatic dynamics in the middle east and incited significant foreign policy changes. Similarly, disinformation regarding crime and immigration in Sweden led to tensions between Sweden and the US in 2017, which could have further negatively impacted the US’s relations in the Nordic and Baltic regions (Fjällhed). Disinformation can cause such “butterfly effects” in international affairs – ramifications beyond initial intentions can arise from disinformation. Without fighting disinformation globally, the Foreign Service invites more, similar crises to arise, some of which may not be resolved without great harm to the US.

Although the fight against disinformation is urgent, it is a formidable challenge that cannot be addressed hastily. The UN has called for greater control and oversight of disinformation. A 2021 resolution passed by the General Assembly tied the fight against disinformation to treaties including the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discriminations (United Nations General Assembly 1). It then, among other clauses, “call[ed] upon States to counter all forms of disinformation through policy measures, including education, capacity-building for prevention and resilience to disinformation, advocacy and awareness-raising” and it requested that the Secretary-General “seek the views of States, United Nations entities and relevant stakeholders” and submit a report (United Nations General Assembly 4). In response, Secretary-General António Guterres released a report in 2022 in which he noted that “Any analysis of disinformation needs to be multifaceted” because disinformation wreaks havoc across initiatives is not confined to isolated issues (Guterres 2). His report raises elections, public health, armed conflict, minority rights, and climate change as examples of fields that disinformation can impact. Secretary-General Guterres further emphasized that efforts to mitigate disinformation must not infringe upon freedom of expression or allow oppressive regimes to further limit their citizens’ rights (2). His recommendations for solutions included platform transparency regulations, public information campaigns, ensuring media independence, and increasing media literacy initiatives, all while considering both state and non-state actors (17-19).

The existing UN action indicates a commitment to truth, and American diplomats are in a unique position to promote international acceptance of the UN's findings given the international influence of the US. Through actively and forcefully adhering to and promoting UN guidelines, ensuring that US diplomats are not engaging in dishonest diplomatic action, and providing American support for UN information campaigns, the United States Foreign Service creates a global environment that recognizes the gravity of the disinformation crisis. Given that disinformation can influence every single initiative to which the Foreign Service is committed, and given the moral leadership that the US has the capacity to express, it is imperative that US policy pursues truth not just internally but throughout its diplomatic dealings. The US must hold its allies to a standard of truth. Without a guarantee of truth, transparency, and international dealings free of disinformation, the US cannot claim its mantle of moral leadership.

While disinformation has become an even more pressing concern since the aforementioned UN resolution and report because of the rise of generative artificial intelligence, neither the UN nor the global community has taken firm action. Efforts have been limited to remediating damage and building institutional trust, not dismantling the systems that propagate disinformation. Individually, however, the US has been more proactive. Surrounding the 2018 midterm elections, US Cyber Command interfered with the disinformation campaigns of Russia’s IRA, sending warnings to its operators, disconnecting servers, and disrupting internet connection (Jensen). Although such perturbation may not disarm the IRA in the long-term or deter Russian disinformation campaigns, sustained and multilateral efforts – coordinated and agreed upon by diplomats – have the potential to subvert the disinformation industry in Russia and elsewhere.

The US is already engaging in international efforts, including a partnership with Bulgaria announced in September 2023, to counter disinformation (United States Department of State). But there is an open opportunity for an international treaty, that incorporates more than two countries, to join the ranks of past landmark UN actions like the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. Such an agreement would not only affirm the standards for public information campaigns and honest diplomacy outlined by the Secretary-General’s report but commit the international community to tangible and concerted work to combat disinformation. While the US alone disrupted the Russian IRA’s schemes, an alliance of nations would be able to more decisively and universally inhibit the spread of disinformation. The US Foreign Service has the chance to reignite the spirit of the US’s original diplomat, Benjamin Franklin, and prioritize truth before all else. With appropriate leadership, the war-torn and divided international community can unite against disinformation, which can derail any international effort, and cooperate to preserve good faith and truth, without which diplomacy cannot function.

Works Cited

Canada, Mark. “Talking Politics in 2021: Lessons on Humility and Truth-Seeking from Benjamin Franklin.” The Conversation , 8 February 2021, theconversation.com/talking-politics-in-2021-lessons-on-humility-and-truth-seeking-from-benjamin-franklin-153924.

Colomina, Carme; Sánchez Margalef, Héctor; Youngs, Richard. Policy Department for External Relations. The impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world . European Parliament. April 2021. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2021/653635/EXPO_STU(2021)653635_EN.pdf .

Fjällhed, Alicia. “Managing Disinformation Through Public Diplomacy.” Public Diplomacy and the Politics of Uncertainty , Palgrave Macmillan, 2020, pp. 227–53.

Gerrits, André W.M. "Disinformation in International Relations: How Important Is It?". Security and Human Rights 29.1-4 (2018): 3-23. https://doi.org/10.1163/18750230-02901007 .

Guterres, António. Countering disinformation for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms . Report No. A/77/150. United Nations. 12 August 2022. https://undocs.org/en/A/77/287 .

Jensen, Benjamin. “Waging War against the Troll Farms.” Navy Times , 13 March 2019, www.navytimes.com/news/your-navy/2019/03/13/waging-war-against-the-troll-farms/ .

Krasna, Joshua. “Understanding the Wave of Normalization in the Middle East.” Foreign Policy Research Institute , 13 January 2021, www.fpri.org/article/2021/01/understanding-the-wave-of-normalization-in-the-middle-east/ .

Silverman, Craig, and Kao, Jeff. “Infamous Russian Troll Farm Appears to Be Source of Anti-Ukraine Propaganda.” ProPublica , 11 March 2022, www.propublica.org/article/infamous-russian-troll-farm-appears-to-be-source-of-anti-ukraine-propaganda .

United Nations General Assembly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). New York: United Nations General Assembly, 1948.

United Nations General Assembly. 2021. Resolution adopted by the General Assembly on 24 December 2021 – Countering disinformation for the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedom . A/RES/76/227. https://undocs.org/en/A/RES/76/227 .

“U.S. and Bulgaria to Collaborate on Combatting Disinformation.” United States Department of State , 25 September 2023, https://www.state.gov/u-s-and-bulgaria-to-collaborate-on-combatting-disinformation/ . Press Release.

Windrem, Robert, and Arkin, William M. “Who Planted the Fake News at Center of Qatar Crisis?” NBCNews.Com , NBCUniversal News Group, 18 July 2017, www.nbcnews.com/news/world/who-planted-fake-news-center-qatar-crisis-n784056 .

Wintour, Patrick. “Donald Trump tweets support for blockade imposed on Qatar.” The Guardian , 6 June 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/06/qatar-panic-buying-as-shoppers-stockpile-food-due-to-saudi-blockade .

Works Consulted

Bjola, Corneliu. “The ‘Dark Side’ of Digital Diplomacy: Countering Disinformation and Propaganda.” Elcano Royal Institute , 15 January 2019, www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/the-dark-side-of-digital-diplomacy-countering-disinformation-and-propaganda/ .

Foreign Threats to the 2020 US Federal Elections . National Intelligence Council. 10 March 2021. https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ICA-declass-16MAR21.pdf .

Henrikson, Alan K. “ https://dl.tufts.edu/pdfviewer/g445cq755/5d86p9662 .” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs , vol. 32, no. 3, 2008, pp. 5–6, https://dl.tufts.edu/pdfviewer/g445cq755/5d86p9662 .

Jackson, Dean. Issue Brief: How Disinformation Impacts Politics and Publics . National Endowment for Democracy. 29 May 2018. https://www.ned.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/How-Disinformation-Impacts-Politicsand-Publics.pdf .

Manfredi-Sánchez, Juan Luis, and Huang, Zhao Alexandre. “Disinformation and Diplomacy.” The Palgrave Handbook of Diplomatic Reform and Innovation , Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 375–96.

Mapping and Analysis of Efforts to Counter Information Pollution in Europe and Central Asia Region . UNDP. November 2022.

Nakashima, Ellen. “U.S. Cyber Command Operation Disrupted Internet Access of Russian troll factory on day of 2018 midterms” Washington Post , 27 February 2019, www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-cyber-command-operation-disrupted-internet-access-of-russian-troll-factory-on-day-of-2018-midterms/2019/02/26/1827fc9e-36d6-11e9-af5b-b51b7ff322e9_story.html .

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Guest Essay

The China Hangover Is Here

By Michael Beckley

Mr. Beckley is the author of “Danger Zone: The Coming Conflict With China.”

In the 2000s, former President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela bet his country’s economic future on a rising China, securing tens of billions of dollars in investments and loans-for-oil deals. It paid off at first. China voraciously consumed Venezuelan oil and financed infrastructure projects, such as a high-speed railway and power plants.

The 2010s brought a reckoning. Oil prices fell, and growth in Chinese oil demand slowed along with its economy. Venezuela’s oil export revenues plummeted, to $22 billion in 2016 from more than $73 billion in 2011. Misrule by Mr. Chávez and his handpicked successor, Nicolás Maduro, and myriad other domestic problems already had Venezuela on the brink; the gamble on China helped push it over the edge. In 2014, Venezuela’s economy collapsed. People scavenged for food in garbage dumps, hospitals were short of essential medicines and crime surged. Since then, nearly eight million people have fled the country. China largely cut Venezuela off from new credit and loans , leaving behind a slew of unfinished projects .

Venezuela’s over-dependence on China was an early warning that the world ignored. Dozens of other countries that rode China’s rise are now at serious risk of financial distress and debt default as the Chinese economy stagnates. Yet China refuses to offer meaningful foreign debt relief and is doubling down at home on its protectionist trade practices when it should be undertaking reforms to free up and restart its economy, the world’s second-largest and a crucial engine of global growth.

That is the flip side of China’s “miracle.” After the 2008 global financial crisis, the world needed an economic savior, and China filled that role. Starting in 2008, it pumped $29 trillion into its economy over nine years — equivalent to about one-third of global G.D.P. — to keep it going. The positive ripple effects were felt worldwide: From 2008 to 2021 China accounted for more than 40 percent of global growth . Developing countries eagerly attached themselves to what seemed like an unstoppable economic juggernaut, and China became the top trading partner for most of the world’s nations. Like Venezuela, many discovered that the booming Chinese economy was a lucrative new market for their commodity exports, and they leaned heavily into that, allowing other sectors of their economies to languish.

China also lent more than $1 trillion abroad, largely for infrastructure projects to be built by Chinese companies under its Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past two decades, one in three infrastructure projects in Africa was built by Chinese entities. The long-term debt risks for fragile developing economies were often ignored.

Chinese lending has slowed to a trickle

Annual foreign lending

$90 billion

$87 billion

Source: Boston University Global Development Policy Center

China’s economic growth has slowed sharply over the last few decades

China has consistently reported higher economic growth than outside sources estimate. While The Conference Board in recent years estimated numbers close to China’s, Rhodium Group estimated much smaller growth.

15% annual growth of G.D.P.

Reported by China

Estimated by

The Conference Board

Estimated by Rhodium Group

Sources: National Bureau of Statistics of China; The Conference Board; Rhodium Group

China is a major trading partner across the world

Share of total trade with China

10 percent or less

more than 10 percent

No recent data availabe

No recent data available

More than 10 percent

Source: United Nations Comtrade

Note: Trade data as of 2023. For countries where 2023 data is not available, the most recent year is used. Trade figures are reported annually from each nation and may still be incomplete.

China has been one of the world’s largest lenders to emerging markets

Aggregate external public debt owed by developing and emerging markets

$400 billion

International

Monetary Fund

Sources: Horn et al. (2021) “ China's Overseas Lending ,” Journal of International Economics; World Bank; Paris Club; International Monetary Fund

Note: Chart shows debt owed by developing and emerging markets included in the World Bank International Debt Statistics. Data on public debt owed to China is incomplete after 2017.

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The September/October issue is now available online

China’s Real Economic Crisis

Why Beijing Won’t Give Up on a Failing Model

By Zongyuan Zoe Liu

The Chinese economy is stuck. Following Beijing’s decision, in late 2022, to abruptly end its draconian “zero COVID” policy, many observers assumed that China’s growth engine would rapidly reignite. After years of pandemic lockdowns that brought some economic sectors to a virtual halt, reopening the country was supposed to spark a major comeback. Instead, the recovery has faltered, with sluggish GDP performance, sagging consumer confidence, growing clashes with the West, and a collapse in property prices that has caused some of China’s largest companies to default. In July 2024, Chinese official data revealed that GDP growth was falling behind the government’s target of about five percent. The government has finally let the Chinese people leave their homes, but it cannot command the economy to return to its former strength.

To account for this bleak picture, Western observers have put forward a variety of explanations. Among them are China’s sustained real estate crisis, its rapidly aging population, and Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s tightening grip on the economy and extreme response to the pandemic. But there is a more enduring driver of the present stasis, one that runs deeper than Xi’s growing authoritarianism or the effects of a crashing property market: a decades-old economic strategy that privileges industrial production over all else, an approach that, over time, has resulted in enormous structural overcapacity. For years, Beijing’s industrial policies have led to overinvestment in production facilities in sectors from raw materials to emerging technologies such as batteries and robots, often saddling Chinese cities and firms with huge debt burdens in the process.

Simply put, in many crucial economic sectors, China is producing far more output than it, or foreign markets, can sustainably absorb. As a result, the Chinese economy runs the risk of getting caught in a doom loop of falling prices, insolvency, factory closures, and, ultimately, job losses. Shrinking profits have forced producers to further increase output and more heavily discount their wares in order to generate cash to service their debts. Moreover, as factories are forced to close and industries consolidate, the firms left standing are not necessarily the most efficient or most profitable. Rather, the survivors tend to be those with the best access to government subsidies and cheap financing.

Since the mid-2010s, the problem has become a destabilizing force in international trade, as well. By creating a glut of supply in the global market for many goods, Chinese firms are pushing prices below the break-even point for producers in other countries. In December 2023, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that excess Chinese production was causing “unsustainable” trade imbalances and accused Beijing of engaging in unfair trade practices by offloading ever-greater quantities of Chinese products onto the European market at cutthroat prices. In April, U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen warned that China’s overinvestment in steel, electric vehicles, and many other goods was threatening to cause “economic dislocation” around the globe. “China is now simply too large for the rest of the world to absorb this enormous capacity,” Yellen said.

Despite vehement denials by Beijing, Chinese industrial policy has for decades led to recurring cycles of overcapacity. At home, factories in government-designated priority sectors of the economy routinely sell products below cost in order to satisfy local and national political goals. And Beijing has regularly raised production targets for many goods, even when current levels already exceed demand. Partly, this stems from a long tradition of economic planning that has given enormous emphasis to industrial production and infrastructure development while virtually ignoring household consumption. This oversight does not stem from ignorance or miscalculation; rather, it reflects the Chinese Communist Party’s long-standing economic vision.

As the party sees it, consumption is an individualistic distraction that threatens to divert resources away from China’s core economic strength: its industrial base. According to party orthodoxy, China’s economic advantage derives from its low consumption and high savings rates, which generate capital that the state-controlled banking system can funnel into industrial enterprises. This system also reinforces political stability by embedding the party hierarchy into every economic sector. Because China’s bloated industrial base is dependent on cheap financing to survive—financing that the Chinese leadership can restrict at any time—the business elite is tightly bound, and even subservient, to the interests of the party. In the West, money influences politics, but in China it is the opposite: politics influences money. The Chinese economy clearly needs to strike a new balance between investment and consumption, but Beijing is unlikely to make this shift because it depends on the political control it gets from production-intensive economic policy.

For the West, China’s overcapacity problem presents a long-term challenge that can’t be solved simply by erecting new trade barriers. For one thing, even if the United States and Europe were able to significantly limit the amount of Chinese goods reaching Western markets, it would not unravel the structural inefficiencies that have accumulated in China over decades of privileging industrial investment and production goals. Any course correction could take years of sustained Chinese policy to be successful. For another, Xi’s growing emphasis on making China economically self-sufficient—a strategy that is itself a response to perceived efforts by the West to isolate the country economically—has increased, rather than decreased, the pressures leading to overproduction. Moreover, efforts by Washington to prevent Beijing from flooding the United States with cheap goods in key sectors are only likely to create new inefficiencies within the U.S. economy, even as they shift China’s overproduction problem to other international markets.

To craft a better approach, Western leaders and policymakers would do well to understand the deeper forces driving China’s overcapacity and make sure that their own policies are not making it worse. Rather than seeking to further isolate China, the West should take steps to keep Beijing firmly within the global trading system, using the incentives of the global market to steer China toward more balanced growth and less heavy-handed industrial policies. In the absence of such a strategy, the West could face a China that is increasingly unrestrained by international economic ties and prepared to double down on its state-led production strategy, even at the risk of harming the global economy and stunting its own prosperity.

FACTORY DEFECTS

The structural issues underlying China’s economic stasis are not the result of recent policy choices. They stem directly from the lopsided industrial strategy that took shape in the earliest years of China’s reform era, four decades ago. China’s sixth five-year plan (1981–85) was the first to be instituted after Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping opened up the Chinese economy. Although the document ran to more than 100 pages, nearly all of it was devoted to developing China’s industrial sector, expanding international trade, and advancing technology; only a single page was given to the topic of increasing income and consumption. Despite vast technological changes and an almost unrecognizably different global market, the party’s emphasis on China’s industrial base remains remarkably similar today. The 14th five-year plan (2021–25) offers detailed targets for economic growth, R & D investment, patent achievement, and food and energy production—but apart from a few other sparse references, household consumption is relegated to a single paragraph.

In prioritizing industrial output, China’s economic planners assume that Chinese producers will always be able to offload excess supply in the global market and reap cash from foreign sales. In practice, however, they have created vast overinvestment in production across sectors in which the domestic market is already saturated and foreign governments are wary of Chinese supply chain dominance. In the early years of the twenty-first century, it was Chinese steel, with the country’s surplus capacity eventually exceeding the entire steel output of Germany, Japan, and the United States combined. More recently, China has ended up with similar excesses in coal, aluminum, glass, cement, robotic equipment, electric-vehicle batteries, and other materials. Chinese factories are now able to produce every year twice as many solar panels as the world can put to use.

For the global economy, China’s chronic overcapacity has far-reaching impacts. With electric vehicles, for instance, carmakers in Europe are already facing stiff competition from cheap Chinese imports. Factories in this and other emerging technology sectors in the West may close or, worse, never get built. Moreover, high-value manufacturing industries have economic effects that go far beyond their own activities; they generate service-sector employment and are vital to sustaining the kinds of pools of local talent that are needed to spur innovation and technological breakthroughs. In China’s domestic market, overcapacity issues have provoked a brutal price war in some industries that is hampering profits and devouring capital. According to government statistics, 27 percent of Chinese automobile manufacturers were unprofitable in May; at one point last year, the figure reached 32 percent. Overproduction throughout the economy has also depressed prices generally, causing inflation to hover near zero and the debt service ratio for the private nonfinancial sector—the ratio of total debt payments to disposable income—to climb to an all-time high. These trends have eroded consumer confidence, leading to further declines in domestic consumption and increasing the risk of China sliding into a deflationary trap.

When Beijing’s economic planners do talk about consumption, they tend to do so in relation to industrial aims. In its brief discussion of the subject, the current five-year plan states that consumption should be steered specifically toward goods that align with Beijing’s industrial priorities: automobiles, electronics, digital products, and smart appliances. Analogously, although China’s vibrant e-commerce sector might suggest a plethora of consumer choices, in reality, major platforms such as Alibaba, Pinduoduo, and Shein compete fiercely to sell the same commoditized products. In other words, the illusion of consumer choice masks a domestic market that is overwhelmingly shaped by the state’s industrial priorities rather than by individual preferences.

This is also reflected in policy initiatives aimed at boosting consumer spending. Consider the government’s recent effort to promote goods replacement. According to a March 2024 action plan, the Ministry of Commerce, together with other Chinese government agencies, has offered subsidies to consumers who trade in old automobiles, home appliances, and fixtures for new models. On paper, the plan loosely resembles the “cash for clunkers” program that Washington introduced during the 2008 recession to help the U.S. car industry. But the plan lacks specific details and relies on local authorities for implementation, rendering it largely ineffective; it has notably failed to lift the prices of durable goods. Although the government can influence the dynamics of supply and demand in China’s consumer markets, it cannot compel people to spend or punish them if they do not. When income growth slows, people naturally tighten their purses, delay big purchases, and try to make do for longer with older equipment. Paradoxically, the drag that overcapacity has placed on the economy overall means that the government’s efforts to direct consumption are making people even less likely to spend.

DEBT COLLECTORS

At the center of Beijing’s overcapacity problem is the burden placed on local authorities to develop China’s industrial base. Top-down industrial plans are designed to reward the cities and regions that can deliver the most GDP growth, by providing incentives to local officials to allocate capital and subsidies to prioritized sectors. As the scholar Mary Gallagher has observed, Beijing has fanned the flames by using social campaigns such as “common prosperity”—a concept Chinese leader Mao Zedong first proposed in 1953 and that Xi revived at a party meeting in 2021—to spur local industrial development. These planning directives and campaigns put enormous pressure on local party chiefs to achieve rapid results, which they may see as crucial for promotion within the party. Consequently, these officials have strong incentives to make highly leveraged investments in priority sectors, irrespective of whether these moves are likely to be profitable.

This phenomenon has fueled risky financing practices by local governments across China. In order to encourage local initiative, Beijing often does not provide financing: instead, it gives local officials broad discretion to arrange off-balance-sheet investment vehicles with the help of regional banks to fund projects in priority sectors, with the national government limiting itself to specifying which types of local financing options are prohibited. About 30 percent of China’s infrastructure spending comes from these investment vehicles; without them, local officials simply cannot do the projects that will win them praise within the party. Inevitably, this approach has led to not only huge industrial overcapacity but also enormous levels of local government debt. According to an investigation by The Wall Street Journal, in July, the total amount of off-the-book debts held by local governments across China now stands at between $7 trillion and $11 trillion, with as much as $800 billion at risk of default.

Although the scale of debt may be worse now, the problem is not new. Ever since China’s 1994 fiscal reform, which allowed local governments to retain a share of the tax revenue they collected but reduced the fiscal transfers they received from Beijing, local governments have been under chronic financial strain. They have struggled to meet their dual mandate of promoting local GDP growth and providing public services with limited resources. By centralizing financial power at the national level and offloading infrastructure and social service expenditures to regions and municipalities, Beijing’s policies have driven local governments into debt. What’s more, by stressing rapid growth performance, Beijing has pushed local officials to favor quickly executed capital projects in industries of national priority. As a further incentive, Beijing sometimes offers limited fiscal support for projects in priority sectors and helps facilitate approvals for local governments to secure financing. Ultimately, the local government bears the financial risk, and the success or failure of the project rests on the shoulders of the party’s local chief, which leads to distorted results.

A larger problem with China’s reliance on local government to implement industrial policy is that it causes cities and regions across the country to compete in the same sectors rather than complement each other or play to their own strengths. Thus, for more than two decades, Chinese provinces—from Xinjiang in the west to Shanghai in the east, from Heilongjiang in the north to Hainan in the south—have, with very little coordination between them, established factories in the same government-designated priority industries, driven by provincial and local officials’ efforts to outperform their peers. Inevitably, this domestic competition has led to overcapacity and high levels of debt, even in industries in which China has gained global market dominance.

Every year, Chinese factories produce twice as many solar panels as the world can use.

Take solar panels. In 2010, China’s State Council announced that strategic emerging industries, including solar power, should account for 15 percent of national GDP by 2020. Within two years, 31 of China’s 34 provinces had designated the solar-photovoltaic industry as a priority, half of all Chinese cities had made investments in the solar-PV industry, and more than 100 Chinese cities had built solar-PV industrial parks. Almost immediately, China’s PV output outstripped domestic demand, with the excess supply being exported to Europe and other areas of the world where governments were subsidizing solar-panel ownership. By 2013, both the United States and the European Union imposed antidumping tariffs on Chinese PV manufacturers. By 2022, China’s own installed solar-PV capacity was greater than any other country’s, following its aggressive renewable energy build-out. But China’s electric grid cannot support additional solar capacity. With the domestic market completely saturated, solar manufacturers have resumed offloading as much of their wares as possible onto foreign markets. In August 2023, the U.S. Commerce Department found that Chinese PV producers were shipping products to Cambodia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam for minor processing procedures to avoid paying U.S. antidumping tariffs. China’s PV-production capacity, already double the global demand, is expected to grow by another 50 percent in 2025. This extreme oversupply caused the utilization rate in China’s finished solar power industry to plummet to just 23 percent in early 2024. Nevertheless, these factories continue operating because they need to raise cash to service their debt and cover fixed costs.

Another example is industrial robotics, which Beijing began prioritizing in 2015 as part of its Made in China 2025 strategy. At the time, there was a clear rationale for building a stronger domestic robotics industry: China had surpassed Japan to become the world’s largest buyer of industrial robots, accounting for about 20 percent of sales worldwide. Moreover, the plan seemed to achieve striking results. By 2017, there were more than 800 robotics companies and 40 robotics-focused industrial parks operating across at least 20 Chinese provinces. Yet this all-in effort did little to advance Chinese robotics technology, even as it created a huge industrial base. In order to meet Beijing’s ambitious production targets, local officials tended to invest in mature technologies that could be scaled quickly. Today, China has a large excess capacity in low-end robotics yet still lacks sufficient capacity in high-end autonomous robotics that require indigenous intellectual property.

Overcapacity in low-end production has plagued other Chinese tech industries, as well. The most recent example is artificial intelligence, which Beijing designated as a priority industry in its last two five-year plans. In August 2019, the government called for the creation of about 20 AI “pilot zones”—research parks that have a mandate to use local-government data for market testing. The aim is to exploit China’s two greatest strengths in the field: the ability to quickly build physical infrastructure, and thereby support the agglomeration of AI companies and talent, and the lack of constraints on how the government collects and shares personal data. Within two years, 17 Chinese cities had created such pilot zones, despite the disruption of the coronavirus pandemic and the government’s large-scale lockdowns. Each of these cities has also adopted action plans to induce further investments and data sharing.

On paper, the program seems impressive. China is now second only to the United States in AI investment. But the quality of actual AI research, especially in the field of generative AI, has been hindered by government censorship and a lack of indigenous intellectual property. In fact, many of the Chinese AI startups that have taken advantage of the strong government support are producing products that still fundamentally rely on models and hardware developed in the West. Similar to its initiatives in other emerging industries, Beijing risks wasting enormous capital on redundant investments that emphasize economies of scale rather than deep-rooted innovation.

RACE OF THE ZOMBIES

Paradoxically, even as Beijing’s industrial policy goals change, many of the features that drive overcapacity persist. Whenever the Chinese government prioritizes a new sector, duplicative investments by local governments inevitably fuel intense domestic competition. Firms and factories race to produce the same products and barely make any profit—a phenomenon known in China as nei juan, or involution. Rather than try to differentiate their products, firms will attempt to simply outproduce their rivals by expanding production as fast as possible and engaging in fierce price wars; there is little incentive to gain a competitive edge by improving corporate management or investing in R & D. At the same time, finite domestic demand forces firms to export excess inventory overseas, where it is subject to geopolitics and the fluctuations of global markets. Economic downturns in export destinations and rising trade tensions can stymie export growth and worsen overcapacity at home.

These dynamics all contribute to a vicious cycle: firms backed by bank loans and local government support must produce nonstop to maintain their cash flow. A production halt means no cash flow, prompting creditors to demand their money back. But as firms produce more, excess inventory grows and consumer prices drop further, causing firms to lose more money and require even more financial support from local governments and banks. And as companies go more deeply into debt, it becomes harder for them to pay it off, compounding the chance that they become “zombie companies,” essentially insolvent but able to generate just enough cash flow to meet their credit obligations. As China’s economy has stalled, the government has reduced the taxes and fees levied on firms as a way to spur growth—but that has reduced local government revenue, even as social-services expenditures and debt payments rise. In other words, the close financial relationship between local governments and the firms they support has created a wave of debt-fueled local GDP growth and left the economy in a hard-to-reverse overcapacity trap.

Yet even now, China shows few signs of reducing its reliance on debt. Xi has doubled down on his campaign for China to achieve technological self-sufficiency, amid intense geopolitical competition with the United States. As Beijing sees it, only by investing even more in strategic sectors can it protect itself from isolation or potential economic sanctions by the West. Thus, the government is concentrating on funding advanced manufacturing and strategic technologies and discouraging investments that it sees as distracting, such as in the property sector. In order to promote more indigenous high-end technology, Chinese policymakers have in recent years mobilized the entire banking system and set up dedicated loan programs to support research and innovation in prioritized sectors. The result has been a tendency to deepen, rather than correct, the structural problems leading to excess investment and production.

For example, in 2021, the China Development Bank created a special loan program for scientific and technological innovation and basic research. By May 2024, the bank had distributed more than $38 billion worth of loans to support critical, cutting-edge sectors, such as semiconductors, clean energy technology, biotech, and pharmaceuticals. In April, the People’s Bank of China, along with several government ministries, launched a $69 billion refinancing fund—to fuel a massive new round of lending by Chinese banks for projects aimed at scientific and technological innovation. Barely two months after the program’s launch, some 421 industrial facilities across the country were designated as “smart manufacturing” demonstration factories—a vague label given to factories that plan to integrate AI into their manufacturing processes. The program also announced investments in more than 10,000 provincial-level digital workshops and more than 4,500 AI-focused companies.

Beyond hitting top-line investment numbers, however, this campaign has few criteria for measuring actual success. Ironically, this new program’s stated goal of filling a financing gap for small and medium-sized enterprises that are working on innovations points to a larger shortcoming in Beijing’s economic management. For years, China’s industrial policy has tended to funnel resources to already mature companies; by contrast, with its massive effort to develop AI and other advanced technologies, the government has committed the financial resources to match the venture capital approach of the United States. Yet even here, China’s economic planners have failed to recognize that the real driving force of innovation is disruption. To truly foster this kind of creativity, entrepreneurs would need unfettered access to domestic capital markets and private capital, a situation that would undermine Beijing’s control of China’s business elites. Without the possibility of market disruption, these enormous investments merely exacerbate China’s overcapacity problem. Money is funneled into those products that can be scaled most rapidly, forcing manufacturers to overproduce and then survive on the slim margins that can be reaped from dumping onto the international market.

THE AGONY OF EXCESS

In industry after industry, China’s chronic overcapacity is creating a complicated dilemma for the United States and the West. In recent months, Western officials have stepped up their criticisms of Beijing’s economic policies. In a speech in May, Lael Brainard, the director of the Biden administration’s Council of Economic Advisers, warned that China’s “policy-driven industrial overcapacity”—a euphemism for antimarket practices—was hurting the global economy. By enforcing policies that “unfairly depress capital, labor, and energy costs” and allow Chinese firms to sell “at or below cost,” she said, China now accounts for a huge percentage of global capacity in electric vehicles, batteries, semiconductors, and other sectors. As a consequence, Beijing is hampering innovation and competition in the global marketplace, threatening jobs in the United States and elsewhere, and limiting the ability of the United States and other Western countries to build supply chain resilience.

At their meeting in Capri, Italy, in April, members of the G-7 warned, in a joint statement, that “China’s non-market policies and practices” have led to “harmful overcapacity. ” The massive inflow of cheap Chinese-manufactured products has already raised trade tensions. Since 2023, several governments, including those of Vietnam and Brazil, have launched antidumping or antisubsidy investigations against China, and Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, the United States, and the European Union have imposed tariffs on various imports from China, including but not limited to electric vehicles.

Beijing’s industrial policies have driven cities and regions across China into debt.

Faced with mounting international pressure, Xi, leading party journals, and Chinese state media have consistently denied that China has an overcapacity problem. They maintain that the criticisms are driven by an unfounded U.S. “anxiety” and that China’s cost advantage is not the product of subsidies but of the “efforts of enterprises” that “are shaped by full market competition.” Indeed, Chinese diplomats have maintained that in many emerging technology industries, the global economy suffers from significant capacity shortages rather than excess supply. In May, the People’s Daily , the official party newspaper, accused the United States of using exaggerated claims about overcapacity as a pretext for introducing harmful trade barriers meant to contain China and suppress the development of China’s strategic industries.

Nonetheless, Chinese policymakers and economic analysts have long acknowledged the problem. As early as December 2005, Ma Kai, then the director of China’s National Development and Reform Commission, warned that seven industrial sectors, including steel and automobiles, faced severe overcapacity. He attributed the problem to “blind investment and low-level expansion.” Over the nearly two decades since, Beijing has issued more than a dozen administrative guidelines to tackle the problem in various sectors, but with limited success. In March 2024, an analysis by Lu Feng, of Peking University, identified overcapacity problems in new-energy vehicles, electric-vehicle batteries, and legacy microchips. BloombergNEF has estimated that China’s battery production in 2023 alone was equal to total global demand. With the West adding production capacity and Chinese battery makers continuing to expand investment and production, the global problem of excess supply will likely worsen in the years to come.

Lu warned that China’s overdevelopment of these industries will pressure Chinese firms to dump products on international markets and exacerbate China’s already fraught trade relations with the West. To address the problem, he proposed a combination of measures that the Chinese government has already attempted—such as stimulating domestic spending (investment and household consumption)—and those that many economists have long argued for but which Beijing has not done, including separating government from business and reforming redistribution mechanisms to benefit households. Yet these proposed solutions fall short of addressing the fundamental coordination problem plaguing the Chinese economy: the duplication of local government investments in state-designated priority sectors.

LOWER FENCE, TIGHTER LEASH

Thus far, the United States has responded to China’s overcapacity challenge by imposing steep tariffs on Chinese clean energy products, such as solar panels, electric vehicles, and batteries. At the same time, with the 2022 Inflation Reduction Act, the Biden administration has poured billions of dollars into building U.S. domestic capacity for many of the same sectors. But the United States should be wary of trying to isolate China simply by building trade barriers and beefing up its own industrial base.

By offering large incentives to companies that invest in critical sectors in the United States, Washington could replicate some of the same problems that are plaguing China’s economy: a reliance on debt-fueled investment, unproductive resource allocation, and, potentially, a speculative bubble in tech-company stocks that could destabilize the market if it suddenly burst. If the goal is to outcompete Beijing, Washington should concentrate on what the American system is already better at: innovation, market disruption, and the intensive use of private capital, with investors choosing the most promising areas to support and taking the risks along with the rewards. By fixating on strategies to limit China’s economic advantages, the United States risks neglecting its own strengths.

U.S. policymakers also need to recognize that China’s overcapacity problem is exacerbated by Beijing’s pursuit of self-sufficiency. This effort, which has been given major emphasis in recent years, reflects Xi’s insecurity and his desire to reduce China’s strategic vulnerabilities amid growing economic and geopolitical tensions with the United States and the West. In fact, Xi’s attempts to mobilize his country’s people and resources to build a technological and financial wall around China carry significant consequences of their own. A China that is increasingly cut off from Western markets will have less to lose in a potential confrontation with the West—and, therefore, less motivation to de-escalate. As long as China is tightly bound to the United States and Europe through the trade of high-value goods that are not easily substitutable, the West will be far more effective in deterring the country from taking destabilizing actions. China and the United States are strategic competitors, not enemies; nonetheless, when it comes to U.S.-Chinese trade relations, there is wisdom in the old saying “Keep your friends close and your enemies closer.”

The U.S. government should discourage Beijing from building a wall that can sanction-proof the Chinese economy. To this end, the next administration should foster alliances, restore damaged multilateral institutions, and create new structures of interdependence that make isolation and self-sufficiency not only unattractive to China but also unattainable. A good place to start is by crafting more policies at the negotiation table, rather than merely imposing tariffs. Waging trade wars amid geopolitical tensions will heighten the confidence deficit in the Chinese economy and lead to the depreciation of the renminbi, which will partly offset the impact of tariffs.

China may also be more flexible in its trade policies than it appears. Since the escalation of the U.S.-Chinese trade war, in 2018, Chinese scholars and officials have explored several policy options, including imposing voluntary export restrictions, revaluing the renminbi, promoting domestic consumption, expanding foreign direct investment, and investing in R & D. Chinese scholars have also examined Japan’s trade relations with the United States in the 1980s, noting how trade tensions forced mature Japanese industries, such as automobile manufacturing, to upgrade and become more competitive with their Western rivals, an approach that could offer lessons for China’s electric-vehicle industry. 

Apart from voluntary export restrictions, Beijing has already tried several of these options to some extent. If the government also implemented voluntary export controls, it could kill several birds with one stone: such a move would reduce trade and potentially even political tensions with the United States; it would force mature sectors to consolidate and become more sustainable; and it would help shift manufacturing capacity overseas, to serve target markets directly.

Xi is attempting to build a technological and financial wall around China.

So far, the Biden administration has taken a compartmentalized approach to China, addressing issues one at a time and focusing negotiations on single topics. In contrast, the Chinese government prefers a different approach in which no issues are off the table and concessions in one area might be traded for gains in another, even if the issues are unrelated. Consequently, although Beijing may seem recalcitrant in isolated talks, it might be receptive to a more comprehensive deal that addresses multiple aspects of U.S.-Chinese relations simultaneously. Washington should remain open to the possibility of such a grand bargain and recognize that if incentives change, China’s leadership might shift tactics abruptly, just as it did when it suddenly ended the zero-COVID policy. 

Washington should also consider leveraging multilateral institutions such as the World Trade Organization to facilitate negotiations with Beijing. For example, China might agree to voluntarily drop its developing country status at the WTO, which gives designated countries preferential treatment in some trade disputes. It may also be persuaded to support a revised WTO framework to determine a country’s nonmarket economy status—a designation used by the United States and the EU to impose higher antidumping tariffs on China—on an industry-by-industry basis rather than for an entire economy. Such steps would acknowledge China’s economic success, even as it held it to the higher trade standards of advanced industrialized countries.

Xi views himself as a transformational leader, inviting comparisons to Chairman Mao. This was evident when he formally hosted former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger—among the few widely respected American figures in Xi’s China—in July 2023, just four months before Kissinger’s death. Xi believes that as a great power, his country should not be constrained by negotiations or external pressures, but he might be open to voluntary adjustments on trade issues as part of a broader agreement. Many members of China’s professional and business elite feel despair about the state of relations with the United States. They know that China benefits more by being integrated into the Western-led global system than by being excluded from it. But if Washington sticks to its current path and continues to head toward a trade war, it may inadvertently cause Beijing to double down on the industrial policies that are causing overcapacity in the first place. In the long run, this would be as bad for the West as it would be for China.

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• ZONGYUAN ZOE LIU is Maurice R. Greenberg Fellow for China Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances Its Global Ambitions .
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